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RESUMO 
Na presente dissertação efetua-se uma análise teórica e empírica dos financiamentos 
estruturados. Apresentam-se as suas principais características, motivações, benefícios e 
problemas, e procede-se à comparação desta tipologia de financiamento com os 
financiamentos tradicionais ou não estruturados. 
A análise empírica desenvolvida tem por base uma amostra composta por operações de 
financiamento estruturado e de financiamento não estruturado, desenvolvidas na Europa 
Ocidental entre 1 de Janeiro de 2000 e 31 de Dezembro de 2011. A amostra de 
financiamentos estruturados é composta por 2.859 empréstimos realizados no âmbito de 
operações de project finance e 599 obrigações emitidas através da titularização de 
ativos. A amostra de financiamentos não estruturados é composta por 20.977 
empréstimos obrigacionistas. Procede-se, então, às seguintes análises: (1) como é que os 
fatores explicativos do custo do financiamento comparam entre financiamentos 
estruturados e não estruturados; (2) será o spread significativamente diferente nas duas 
formas de financiamento; (3) em que medida são os spreads destas duas tipologias de 
financiamento determinados pelos mesmos fatores; (4) será que a crise financeira 
internacional afeta de forma diferenciada os spreads destes financiamentos; e (5) quais 
os fatores que determinam a escolha entre estas duas tipologias de financiamento. 
Tendo subjacente a análise estatística realizada conclui-se que a maior parte dos fatores 
explicativos do spread são significativamente diferentes entre financiamentos 
estruturados e não estruturados e que o spread é estatística e significativamente maior 
para operações de project finance do que para operações de titularização de ativos e 
empréstimos obrigacionistas. Já a análise de regressão implementada demonstra que 
financiamentos estruturados e não estruturados são instrumentos de financiamento 
distintos. Tal como esperado, o spread é estatisticamente e significativamente mais 
elevado para o período de crise financeira. No que respeita à relação entre spread e 
maturidade conclui-se que existe uma relação não linear – do tipo ‘hump-shaped’ – para 
project finance e uma relação linear e positiva para empréstimos obrigacionistas. 
Finalmente, conclui-se que os promotores escolhem operações de financiamento 
estruturado quando procuram financiamento a longo prazo e que a probabilidade de 
observação de uma operação de financiamento estruturado diminuiu com a crise 
financeira de 2007/2008. 
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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation examines, at both the theoretical and empirical level, what structured 
finance transactions are, the motivations behind them, their benefits, features and even 
their problems, and confront them with their basic alternative, that is, straight debt 
finance. We argue that structured finance reduces the all-in cost of financing by 
minimizing the net costs associated with market imperfections or inefficiencies. 
This dissertation provides a full-length empirical analysis of structured finance, 
comparing the financial characteristics of a large sample of Western European 
structured finance transactions – 2,859 project finance loans and 599 asset securitization 
bonds – with a sample of straight debt finance transactions – 20,977 corporate bonds –, 
issued in the international capital markets between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 
2011. We examine (1) how common pricing factors compare between structured 
finance and straight debt finance transactions; (2) if the credit spread of structured 
finance transactions is significantly different to the credit spread of straight debt finance 
transactions; (3) the extent to which are structured finance and straight debt finance 
transactions priced by common factors; (4) if the credit spread of structured finance 
transactions is significantly affected by the 2007/2008 financial crisis; and (5) what 
factors determine a manager’s choice between these financing alternatives. 
We find that most of the common pricing characteristics differ significantly between 
structured finance and straight debt finance issues and that average credit spreads are 
statistically and significantly higher for project finance loans than they are for asset 
securitization bonds and corporate bonds. Loan and bond pricing regression analyses 
reveal that structured finance and straight debt finance transactions are distinct financial 
instruments and thus funded in segmented capital markets. According to expectations, 
the financial crisis does have a significant impact on structured finance and straight debt 
finance credit spreads; i.e., the average credit spread is statistically and significantly 
higher during the crisis period. We find a robust hump-shaped relationship between 
credit spread and maturity for project finance loans and a linear positive relationship 
between credit spread and maturity for corporate bond issues. Finally, when we apply 
an organizational choice model, we point out that borrowers choose an structured 
finance transaction when they seek long-term financing and the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis decreases the probability of observing an asset securitization transaction. 
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 1 
1. Introduction 
“The increasing complexity of the structured finance market, and the ever growing 
range of products being made available to investors, invariably create challenges in 
terms of efficient assembly, management and dissemination of information.” 
Andreas Jobst (2006a) 
 
The global development of the corporate sector has been demanding the creation of new 
vehicles for fundraising. Professionalization and the growing sophistication of capital 
markets, as well as increasing access to international markets, require less risky 
securities and internationally standardized warrantees.
1
 Therefore, analysis has been 
increasingly focused on a risk assessment process based on asset segregation and asset 
pooling, rather than on a company or a group of companies looking for financing. For 
many countries, this has required adjustments to be made to their financial system, 
towards new forms of financing, in which the role of structured finance transactions has 
gained increasing relevance. 
Defining the boundaries of structured finance is not an easy task at all. In fact, neither in 
academic nor in professional literature can systematic studies be found dealing with the 
positioning of both researchers and economic agents in the market (financial 
intermediaries). Similarly, there is little discussion of structured finance in leading 
corporate finance textbooks.
2
 Additionally, structured finance has been a large and 
rapidly growing subfield of finance, yet one where academic theory and research lag 
along way behind current practice. Given the growing importance of structured finance 
as a new financing instrument, corporate executives, bankers, lawyers, investors, 
government officials, and academics need to understand what structured finance is, why 
and how it may create value, and how to structure transactions with both operational 
and financial success. Research is needed not only to explain some practical paths, but 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this dissertation we use the terms security, financing instrument, and financial asset 
interchangeably. 
2
 As argued by Caselli and Gatti (2005), “In actual fact, neither in national or international literature can 
systematic studies be found which deal with both positioning of actors on the market as well as the choice 
of organizational structures at the basis of services offered.” Leland (2007) presents the same idea 
pointing out that “[Y]et financial theory has made little headway in explaining structured finance.” 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 2 
also to refine and re-direct existing finance theories. This was the first and primary 
motivation for the present study. 
The interest of studying structured finance is also justified by its dramatic increase in 
the last decade and by recent events in financial markets. The financial turmoil started 
in the third quarter of 2007 and continued through to 2008, leading to concerns about 
the exposure of financial institutions to the most risky segments of the US mortgage 
markets – the so-called subprime mortgage market – and related financial instruments. 
The resulting financial market tensions caused investors and regulators to be concerned 
about (and even doubt) the impact of some types of structured finance transactions on 
financial stability during times of stress, and the ability of different structured finance 
products to spread shocks across different capital segments.
3
 As a result, there is an 
increased need to understand what structured finance transactions are, the motivations 
behind them, their benefits, features and even their problems. 
Thirdly, although the academic literature analyzing the credit spread of corporate bonds 
is vast and growing, research on structured finance bonds and loans credit spread is 
scant. Empirical studies on project finance and asset securitization price determinants 
are very limited, although some exist. However, a comparative empirical investigation 
of the price determinants of project finance, asset securitization and corporate bonds is 
something completely new. 
Finally, even though the financial crisis is not the focus of our work, the suggested link 
between structured finance and the turmoil of the financial markets makes the analysis 
of the determinants of choosing a structured finance transaction versus a straight debt 
finance transaction particularly interesting and indeed relevant, both theoretically and 
practically. 
The evidence presented provides a more accurate framework for the objectives of this 
dissertation. In fact, this dissertation aims at the following six purposes. First, it 
contributes to a systematic definition of structured finance, by identifying its main 
                                                 
3
 The tumult in credit markets since 2007, which was related to problems involving securitizations of U.S. 
subprime mortgages and the widespread use of off-balance sheet vehicles, which rapidly spread to the 
global financial system, has called into question the desirability of structured finance. As referred by 
Lupica (2009), “Technological innovation coupled with financial wizardry fueled the rapid growth of the 
securitization market, leading to increasingly high volume conversions of cash flows into complex 
securitized and collateralized debt instruments and their derivatives.” 
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characteristics and critical success factors. Second, it examines the economic 
advantages which can result for originators / sponsors from each type of structured 
finance transaction, i.e., why structured finance matters? We make use of finance 
literature relating to security design, financial innovation, and structured finance to 
identify economic forces underlying the creation of structured finance transactions or 
products. Third, it compares the credit spread and the common pricing factors between 
and among structured finance and straight debt finance transactions. Fourth, it provides 
insights into the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis on structured finance credit spreads (and even on straight debt 
finance credit spreads). Following this, it identifies the common pricing factors for 
various types of structured finance transactions (asset securitization bonds and project 
finance loans) and measures the capability of each one to explain the credit spread. 
Econometric analyses are performed of the determinants of loan and bond pricing for 
structured finance and straight debt finance transactions (corporate bonds). Finally, it 
determines the factors that influence the choice of a structured finance transaction 
instead of a straight debt transaction. 
 
Considering that structured finance instruments are financial products designed to meet 
different needs of borrowers and investors as closely as possible, we start (Chapter 2) by 
discussing security design theory and its relationship to the literature on financial 
innovation and structured finance. Our aim is to put into perspective some of the 
fundamental motivations of firms to select structured finance versus straight debt 
finance transactions. Although all security design models provide a number of 
important insightful predictions, firms’ financial and financing structure decisions still 
remain unsatisfactorily explained, mainly (i) in terms of structured finance transactions, 
and (ii) with respect to the reason why firms decide to use structured finance as opposed 
to common debt. One possible explanation is that existing security design theories do 
not simultaneously and dynamically endogenize all contractual features.  
A key feature of structured finance transactions, which differentiates them from other 
financing arrangements, is the presence of a separate vehicle company (SPV or SPE) 
incorporated to take the initiative and to secure cash receipts and the resulting 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
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payments.
4
 Based on the literature review, as well as on the evidence emerging from the 
practices of international and domestic intermediaries that compete in the structured 
finance business area, we propose the following definition of structured finance: 
Structured finance refers to the design of financial products or instruments 
based on the use of flexible tools to meet, as closely as possible, the 
requirements of the originator or owner of an asset (or pool of assets) and 
the needs of investors. Thus, structured finance encompasses all financial 
arrangements helping to efficiently (re)finance a specified pool of assets 
beyond the scope of on-balance sheet financing products or instruments. 
Bearing in mind the aforementioned definition, as well as the available academic and 
professional literature, we consider that asset securitization, project finance, structured 
lease and leveraged corporate acquisition activities (mostly leveraged buyouts – LBOs), 
are all different forms of structured finance. 
To understand why structured finance matters, we are taken back to the Modigliani and 
Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance theorem,
5
 which holds that capital structure is 
irrelevant to firm value.
6
 In a Modigliani and Miller world, structured finance 
transactions would not exist, as they would offer no advantages over less costly 
alternatives. However, considering that debt and equity of any firm effectively represent 
asset-backed securities, the irrelevance proposition can play a fundamental role within a 
structured finance framework. In a world of perfect and liquid financial markets, where 
asymmetric information is not an issue, tranching
7
 or the act of encapsulating an 
initiative or a pool of assets in an ad hoc organization would not add value and firm’s 
                                                 
4
 Caselli and Gatti (2005) point out that the use of ad hoc vehicles (SPVs – special purpose vehicles, or 
SPEs – special purpose entities) which encapsulate projects or a pool of assets is a typical feature of 
structured finance transactions. 
5
 Modigliani and Miller presented formal proof that – under frictionless, perfect, and competitive capital 
markets – the value of a firm is independent of its capital structure; therefore its market value is 
unaffected by its financing choices. Their pioneering work, which showed the implications of market 
equilibrium conditions for firm structure and valuation, remains one of the most robust and influential 
contributions to modern finance theory. 
6
 Academics use the Modigliani and Miller theorem as a framework to consider which of its assumptions 
might be violated for particular capital structures; i.e., which real world costs a particular capital structure 
may help to reduce. As pointed out by Esty (2004a), their irrelevance proposition “… is powerful because 
it highlights the factors that make financing and structuring decisions value relevant.” 
7
 Tranching means the creation of multiple types of securities backed by the firm’s (or by the underlying 
asset pool, when considering securitization) assets and is considered one of the most important features 
that distinguishes structured finance instruments from traditional products (or straight debt finance 
instruments). 
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financing structure would be irrelevant. Thus, the existence of market imperfections (at 
least asymmetric information, market incompleteness, and market segmentation) can 
explain tranching, ‘off-balance sheet financing’ and the benefits of structured finance 
instruments. Consequently, structured financing may matter, because it creates value by 
minimizing the net costs associated with the stated market imperfections. 
Several economic motivations for assembling a financing transaction under a structured 
form are presented below. First, it enables the financing of a unique asset class that (i) 
previously may have been financed only by traditional borrowing methods or (ii) could 
not be financed at all without structured finance. Structured finance thus plays a critical 
role as a new and diverse source of funding. The second economic benefit lies in cost 
reduction, when the benefits of the reduced cost of funding are greater than the cost of 
the required credit enhancement. The third advantage refers to maintaining the 
sponsors’ financial flexibility by creating vehicle companies (SPVs) designated to take 
on the initiative, helping sponsors to protect their own credit standing and future access 
to financial markets, by improving or maintaining financial and regulatory ratios. 
Additionally, structured finance transactions allow originators or sponsors to transfer 
the risk of assets or liabilities and to carry out additional business without expanding 
their balance sheet. Structured finance also contributes to improving operational and 
informational market efficiency, reducing agency costs, and reducing information 
asymmetries. Finally, it also allows the issuer to obtain more leverage, compared to 
senior unsecured debt, and to increase tax shields/savings. 
Despite the previously mentioned economic benefits for sponsors and investors, 
structured finance transactions also have disadvantages, especially when used 
inappropriately. One can identify the following problems related to the use of structured 
finance transactions: (1) complexity; (2) off-balance sheet treatment; (3) asymmetric 
information problems; (4) agency problems; (5) higher transaction costs; and (6) wealth 
expropriation. Besides the fact that structured finance instruments are complex vis-a-vis 
straight debt finance transactions or products, two major problems are commonly 
pointed out, underlying the roots of the 2007/2008 financial crisis: (i) asymmetric 
information problems; and (ii) agency problems. The increased complexity of structured 
products related to securitization – like CDOs, squared CDOs, and even more complex 
securities – destroyed information, thereby making asymmetric information worse in the 
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financial system and increasing the severity of adverse selection and moral hazard 
problems. The originate-to-distribute business model, which lay behind the subprime 
mortgage market, was subject to the principal-agent problem, because (i) the mortgage 
originator had little incentive to make sure that the mortgage was of good credit risk, (ii) 
commercial and investment banks had weak incentives to ensure that the ultimate 
holders of the securities would be duly paid for, and (iii) even the credit rating agencies 
evaluating these securities were themselves also subjected to conflict of interest. 
 
To our knowledge, no full-scale empirical study of structured finance in Western 
Europe has yet been published, namely studying the impact of the 2007/2008 crisis and 
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, on the credit spreads of loans and bonds. 
Despite its use on a worldwide basis and several decades of history, a number of key 
issues regarding the specific risk determinants of structured finance, vis-a-vis straight 
debt finance, remain largely unresolved. In particular, recent research has suggested that 
project finance (a class of structured finance transactions) loans might be fundamentally 
different from other syndicated loans and bond issues.
8
 This dissertation aims at 
identifying the specific risk drivers and risk mitigants of structured finance transactions 
by means of comparative econometric analysis of ex ante credit spreads for a large cross 
section sample of Western Europe loans (project finance loans) and bond issues (asset 
securitization and corporate bonds), between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 
2011. 
Generally speaking, debt capital markets are roughly composed of two major types of 
financial instruments: straight debt finance (SDF) and structured finance (SF) 
instruments. Due to the differences in the structure and warranties related to these two 
types of transactions, their relevant pricing factors should also differ. This finding raises 
three questions: (1) How common pricing factors compare between SF and SDF 
transactions (or tranches)? (2) Is the credit spread on SF transactions (or tranches) 
significantly different to the credit spread on SDF transactions (or tranches)? And (3) 
to what extent are SF and SDF transactions (or tranches) priced by common factors? 
                                                 
8
 See Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Hainz and Kleimeier (2003), and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008). 
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These questions lead us to test three hypotheses. First (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2) 
we intend to argue that not only the credit spread but even the common pricing factors 
differ significantly between SF and SDF transactions. The third hypothesis states that 
the primary market credit spreads associated with SF and SDF transactions are 
influenced differently by common pricing factors. In testing Hypotheses 1 and 2, we use 
a parametric test (Student’s t-test) for continuous variables and a non-parametric test 
(Fisher's exact test) for dummy variables, to compare whether the distribution of the 
reported values for SF and SDF tranches are significantly different. In testing 
Hypothesis 3, we start by determining if SF and SDF transactions are priced in the same 
way, this is equivalent to testing whether project finance (PF), asset securitization (AS), 
and corporate bond (CB) issues are priced in segmented or integrated capital markets. 
Thus, a structural change test is used – we use the Chow test to determine whether the 
coefficients in a regression model are equal in separate sub-samples [Chow (1960)]. 
After documenting the extent to which the pricing variables for SF and SDF 
transactions show significant differences, we continue our empirical analysis by 
examining the factors impacting on the pricing of loans and bonds separately. We use 
an ordinary least squares regression analysis to model the magnitude of the relationships 
between pricing variables and the credit spread, and confront them with the outlined 
expectations. 
Additionally, the 2007/2008 financial crisis played a significant role in the failure of 
numerous businesses, declines in consumer wealth, and a downturn in economic 
activity, contributing to the European sovereign debt crisis. This fact raises one final 
question: Is the credit spread on SF transactions (or tranches) significantly affected by 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis?  
We thus propose to test a fourth hypothesis with the aim of studying the impact of the 
global financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis on structured 
finance credit spreads and pricing factors in Western European countries. We therefore 
examine whether the credit spread changes across time, by considering a pre-crisis 
period from January 1
st
, 2000 through to September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from 
September 15
th
, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date) through to December 
31
st
, 2011. We use a non-parametric test (Wilcoxon z-test for continuous variables and 
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Fisher's exact test for dummy variables) to compare whether the values reported for 
each variable are significantly different in the two periods. 
 
We study the specific characteristics of SF transactions by means of a comparative 
statistical and econometric analysis of credit spreads for a large cross section of Western 
European loans and bonds between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 2011. Our 
‘full sample’ contains information about 599 asset securitization issues (worth Euro 
179.1 billion) and 20,977 corporate bond issues (worth Euro 5,786.5 billion), extracted 
from DCM Analytics (provided by Dealogic), and 2,859 project finance tranches (worth 
Euro 332.1 billion), extracted from DealScan (provided by Thomson Reuters LPC). 
The relative pricing of SF (PF and AS issues) versus SDF (CB issues) issues is one of 
the most important findings presented in our univariate analysis (Chapter 4). Average 
credit spreads are statistically and significantly higher for PF loans (198.3 bps) than 
they are for AS bonds (148.9 bps) and CB (157.6 bps). On the contrary, average credit 
spreads for AS and CB issues do not differ significantly. Therefore, we only accept the 
hypothesis that the credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit spread on 
SDF for AS issues (Hypothesis 2). 
We reject Hypothesis 1, as most of the common pricing characteristics differ 
significantly, not only between SF and SDF issues but also among SF transactions – all 
pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences in value, with the 
exception of credit spread, tranche size, and currency risk between AS and CB issues.  
We find that the financial crisis does have a significant impact on SF and SDF credit 
spreads and we thus reject Hypothesis 4. The evidence strongly supports the assumption 
that the average credit spread is statistically and significantly higher for PF loans (329.1 
bps versus 136.9 bps), AS bonds (206.5 bps versus 143.5 bps), and CB (220.3 bps 
versus 125.5) during the crisis period. We also find that the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis have a substantial impact on the 
common pricing factors of loan and bond tranches. Almost all of the pair-wise 
comparisons indicate that equality of means can be rejected for PF, AS, and CB issues. 
We corroborate these finding in our regression analysis, after controlling for other 
microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing factors; i.e., the coefficient for crisis 
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dummy variable in PF, AS, and CB models is significantly, positively related to credit 
spread. Even when implementing an OLS regression analysis for our two sub-periods 
(pre-crisis and crisis period), we find that our results are robust across time, since the 
2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis 
significantly influences the explanatory power of the regressions, as well as the 
coefficients on the macro and micro pricing factors. One of our most interesting 
findings is that splitting our PF loans sample has a considerable impact on the 
regressions intercept, causing an increase of 342.96 bps between pre-crisis and crisis 
sub-samples. 
We conclude that, with respect to credit spread, PF, AS, and CB issues are not priced in 
a single integrated market. We thus reject hypothesis 3 and conclude that SF and SDF 
transactions are distinct financial instruments, and even PF loans and AS bonds are 
financial instruments influenced differently by common pricing factors. Rejecting 
Hypothesis 3 also means that we cannot estimate the full sample of loans and bonds in a 
single regression. So, we examine the determinants of credit spreads for each type of 
issue (PF vs AS vs CB) using an OLS regression framework. Although some variable 
coefficients have the expected features, others are not in line with the theoretical and the 
empirical literature. For example, even though currency risk coefficients for AS and CB 
issues have the expected features, our findings for PF loans are different from those 
presented in the empirical literature [e.g., Kleimeier and Megginson (2000)] – currency 
risk dummy variable has a positive impact on the credit spread. 
 
Given the controversy in the literature regarding the term structure of credit spreads for 
speculative-grade issuers and even the empirical puzzle of the term structure of PF 
loans, we also analyze the term structure of credit spreads for SF transactions compared 
to SDF transactions (Chapter 5). We identify several economic rationales that might 
explain why we should expect a different shape for the term structure of credit spreads 
for SF vis-a-vis SDF transactions. The literature reviewed led us to verify the hypothesis 
of a hump-shaped term structure of credit spreads for PF loans, a positive relationship 
for CB, and a negative relationship for AS bonds. We thus analyze the pricing of our 
cross section sample of loans and bonds within a multivariate regression framework, 
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augmenting our baseline multiple regression with the natural logarithm of maturity, 
while controlling for other micro and macro pricing factors. For PF loans, a robust 
hump-shaped relationship between credit spread and maturity is found. The logarithmic 
term is insignificant for AS bonds and a linear positive relationship between credit 
spread and maturity remains strongly significant for CB issues. 
 
In Chapter 6, one final question is raised concerning the choice between SF and SDF 
transactions and even between PF loans and AS bonds, or between AS and CB issues: 
What factors determine a manager’s choice between these financing alternatives? We 
want to determine what affects the probability of a new borrower’s choice between SF 
and SDF transactions and even between a PF loan and an AS bond or between an AS 
bond and a CB. Therefore, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman 
(1979). We perform maximum likelihood estimations of our credit spread samples for 
our model specification (models [1a], [1b], and [1c]), simultaneously with a probit 
selection equation where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either 
micro and macro variables. We start our analysis by looking at the estimation of the 
determination equation in model [1d], it is probably the first time credit spread is 
regressed against micro and macro variables for a sample that simultaneously includes 
PF loans and AS bonds. We point out, for example, that the effect of lower tranche size 
increases the probability of selecting an SF transaction, rather than an SDF transaction. 
Borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-term financing and when they 
operate in a higher risk country. Borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation 
and government areas increase the likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically a 
PF transaction. The probability of observing an AS bond issue increases if the borrower 
belongs to the financial industry. The 2007/2008 financial crisis decreases the 
probability of observing an AS transaction. Several macroeconomic factors, like the 
level of the interest rates, market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit 
accessibility positively influence the probability of observing an SF loan or bond. 
Finally, the market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility 
have proven to be irrelevant in the process of making a financing decision between PF 
loans and AS bonds. 
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This dissertation contributes to the available literature in several ways. First, to the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first work studying how common pricing factors compare 
between structured finance and straight debt finance transactions. Although the 
academic literature analyzing the credit spread of corporate bonds is vast and growing, 
research on structured finance bonds and loans credit spread is scant. Empirical studies 
on project finance loans and asset securitization bonds price determinants are very 
limited, although some exist. However, a comparative empirical investigation of the 
price determinants for PF, AS, and CB is something completely new. This gap in the 
literature is attributable to a lack of reliable data concerning the structure of asset 
securitization transactions. In this study, we overcome this problem by simultaneously 
using two databases (DealScan and DCM Analytics). 
Second, the present work adds new insights to the banking literature on loan pricing. By 
concluding that the existence of substantial differences among and between SF and SDF 
transactions in the impact of common pricing variables on credit spread, we can state 
that these transactions are priced differently. The investment banks in charge of 
structuring the technical features of certain PF and AS issues may find the estimates a 
useful tool concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the issuance credit spread 
and how they compare to SDF transactions, mainly after the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
Third, we contribute to the literature available on financial crises. The 2007/2008 
financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis significantly 
influences the explanatory power of the regressions, as well as the coefficients of the 
macro and micro pricing factors (in sign and in significance). Thus, some important 
conclusions are presented regarding regulatory policies and their impact on the 
prevention of future crises. Additionally, SF transactions still remain a valuable means 
to respond to the demand for funding. AS techniques remain very useful for banks, for 
fund raising and to comply with regulatory capital requirements. From our regression 
analyses, we can also conclude that, in SDF lending, the borrower typically specifies the 
amount of debt they are seeking, and their creditworthiness becomes the main 
determinant of loan spreads. By contrast, when an SF transaction is arranged by 
investment banks, the goal is to come up with the most efficient mix of maturities, 
spreads, tranches, warrantees, and other credit enhancement mechanisms to manage 
what lenders perceive to be the risk and the probability of default on the debt. This 
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means that for SF transactions, mainly in AS issues, credit rating becomes the most 
important pricing factor for this asset class when launched. Our findings are in line with 
those of Fender and Mitchell (2005), who argue that the increasing complexity of 
structured finance products creates incentives to rely more heavily on ratings than for 
other financing instruments, which is usually presented as one of the principal 
shortcomings of AS with regard to the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
Fourth, the present work points to the need to rethink the way banking regulation treats 
PF loans. Considering that we find a hump-shaped relationship between credit spread 
and maturity, a linear maturity adjustment to capital requirements (credit risk is usually 
viewed as increasing with maturity) might be less applicable to PF loans. Hence, 
regulatory capital arbitrage could induce banks to concentrate their loan portfolio on 
short-term vis-a-vis long-term project finance transactions, which might not be 
necessarily safer. 
Finally, we offer contributions to the field of corporate finance, by improving the 
understanding of what the boundaries of firms are and new insights on the industrial 
organization economics. The nature of the firm as a nexus of contracts is even more 
apparent in SF than in SDF settings. In PF and AS, a specially incorporated new firm 
(SPV) is created to manage all contracts and to make cash flows more readily verifiable 
for lenders. In such cases, it is crucial to design financial contracts with the objective of 
pre-committing, whenever possible, the possible behavior of the SPV management. 
Careful contract design prevents agency problems between SPV sponsoring firms and 
lenders, and establishes an effective risk management framework. Pre-committing 
future obligations also reduces the volatility of cash flows available for debt service. 
 
This document is organized as follows: Chapter 1 offers an introduction to the 
structured finance framework. It also identifies the motivations of our research, the 
objectives of the study, as well as its contributions. Chapter 2 presents a discussion of 
security design theory in the context of financial innovation, and in particular the design 
of structured finance securities or products. Chapter 3 addresses a review of structured 
finance related literature, based on the central economic benefits, as well as on the 
major problems related to the use of these financing instruments. Considering that 
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structured finance, more specifically asset securitization, played a relevant role in the 
development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, we dedicate a specific 
section to this issue. Chapter 4 details the research questions and presents the 
methodology. It also describes the Dealscan and DCM Analytics databases used in this 
study. In Chapter 4, the financial characteristics of SF tranches are compared with the 
sample of SDF tranches. We also study the impact of the financial crisis on credit 
spreads and pricing factors. Chapter 5 reviews the most prominent papers on loan 
pricing literature. It also examines the extent to which SF and SDF transactions are 
priced by common factors. It begins by presenting the methodology and discussing the 
sets of micro and macro variables and their expected impact on the credit spread. Next, 
it presents the regression analyses results. Our organization choice models are discussed 
and applied in Chapter 6. Chapter 7 includes a summary, our final conclusions, and 
some avenues for future research. 
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2. Security Design and Structured Finance 
2.1. Introduction 
 
“Financial securities are designed to suit many motives. Entrepreneurs and firms hope 
to raise capital efficiently. The managers of a firm use the securities they issue on 
behalf of their firm to signal the firm’s potential value and opportunities, or their own 
abilities and efforts. Entrepreneurs may issue securities designed to maintain some of 
the benefits of control of their firms. Market intermediaries hope to profit from offering 
transactions services in previously unavailable contingent claims. Regulators consider 
the role of financial innovation in promoting an efficient allocation of risk and capital.” 
Duffie and Rahi (1995) 
 
The primary purpose of this chapter is to discuss the essential building blocks shaping 
security design theory, as well as the connection to the related literature on financial 
innovation and structured finance. It is important to invoke security design in the 
context of structured finance because, as mentioned by Cherubini and Della Lunga 
(2007), the development of a structured finance product “… involves individuation of a 
business idea and the design of the product…” 
The literature on security design and financial innovation is extensive. A complete 
review of it is beyond the scope of this work.
9
 Instead, this chapter reviews the most 
prominent papers and attempts to interweave them in a manner providing a consistent 
picture of the security design theory and its relevance to the financial innovation 
process. Structured finance products are commonly mentioned as one group of the 
newly introduced instruments from financial innovation activities.
10
 
This chapter has five sections. The first section introduces the main purposes of this 
chapter. Section two looks into the relationships between financing activities and the 
                                                 
9
 In order to refer to useful surveys on both theoretical and empirical literature in relation to security 
design, see among others, Harris and Raviv (1989), Allen (1989), and Allen and Winton (1995). Finnerty 
(1992), Allen and Gale (1994), Carow et al. (1999), and Fabozzi (2005) have a number of enlightening 
surveys on financial innovation literature, both theoretical and empirical. Duffie and Rahi (1995) also 
offer a sound survey about financial innovations and security design. 
10
 The literature that relates to the issues of structured finance is discussed in Chapter 3. 
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theory of corporate finance. The third section provides a perspective on the security 
design problem, focusing on the design of optimal financial contracts. Section four 
examines financial innovation and security design. Section five outlines the implications 
of financial innovation in designing structured securities and products. 
 
2.2. Financing in the Context of Corporate Finance Theory 
“New financial product design, improved computer and telecommunications 
technology, and advances in the theory of finance have lead to dramatic and rapid 
changes in the structure of global financial markets and institutions.” 
Robert Merton (1995) 
 
According to Arrow (1974), to acquire physical capital, which is essential for the 
fulfillment of the productive function, the firm must find successful ways of attracting 
financial capital. This idea is consistent with the standard economic theory, which 
defines a firm as a set of investment opportunities, from which some are selected. By 
the same token, Milgrom and Roberts (1992) pointed out that “… the questions to be 
studied concern which investments ought to be undertaken, how the funds needed to pay 
for the investments ought to be raised.” 
Unfortunately, the neoclassical theoretical perspective of the firm fails to account for 
some important aspects of a firm’s financial behavior in the real world.11 Hart (1995) 
identifies three central weaknesses of the neoclassical paradigm: (i) its unawareness of 
the firm’s incentive problems; (ii) its omission of organizational issues; and (iii) the 
absence of a credible explanation for firm boundaries. The explanation of the financial 
behavior of real-world firms demands a more robust framework.
12
 
                                                 
11
 According to the neoclassical paradigm, the firm is viewed as a single economic agent whose actions 
follow specific and pre-determined decision-making criteria. Jensen (1983) posits that the neoclassical 
theoretical perspective views the firm as a production function in which “… there are no ‘people’ 
problems or information problems, […] as a result the research based on this model has no implications 
for how organizations are structured or how they function internally.” Gavish and Kalay (1983) provides 
a similar view observing that “… the firm has been viewed as a black ‘black box’, namely, as one 
homogeneous unit whose clear objective is to maximize its market value.” 
12
 We may observe firms from a diverse range of theoretical perspectives, such as: a production function; 
a nexus of contracts; an investment vehicle; a trade-off between the costs of transacting and the costs of 
contracting; and agency theory. 
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An alternative paradigm is the so-called contractual theories of the firm. These theories 
share a common contractual base and emphasize the importance of property rights (and 
therefore incentives), asymmetric information, and some behavior assumptions which 
extend the usual self-interest assumptions (such as ‘opportunism’ or ‘moral hazard’). 
The nexus-of-contracts view of the firm
13
 is so extensively supported that Allen and 
Winston (1995) claim that it is the dominant paradigm in modern corporate finance.
14
 
Hence, a corporation is a legal entity embodying a network of a far-reaching and 
complex set of contracts (explicit and implicit) among unequal stakeholders. 
The notion of ownership is a key element of the network of contractual relationships 
that build up the concept of firm. Economists, in their analyses of firm ownership have, 
typically, focused their attention on two key issues: (1) the allocation of residual rights 
of control and (2) the appropriation of residual returns. Furthermore, as referred by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), the “… specification of individual rights determines how 
costs and rewards will be allocated among participants in any organization.” 
Additionally, as that specification is shaped in a contractual arrangement, the “… 
individual behavior in organizations, including the behavior of managers, will depend 
upon the nature of these contracts.” 
 
 
If it were both inexpensive and effortless to write and enforce a complete contract,
15
 no 
eventualities or unpredicted outcomes would ever occur, and no difficulties would arise 
in ensuring that the contracted actions would materialize. Therefore, if every 
contingency could be anticipated and unambiguously contracted in advance and fully 
enforced through the legal system, the allocation of power in such a contractual 
relationship would be irrelevant. 
                                                 
13
 A pioneering approach was developed by Coase (1937) and more recently suggested by Alchien and 
Demsetz (1972). 
14
 See, for example, Jensen and Meckling (1976), Jensen and Smith (1985), and Milgrom and Roberts 
(1992). Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed the concept that a firm is a “… legal entity that serves as a 
nexus for a complex set of contracts (written and unwritten) among disparate individuals.” 
15
 A complete contract is one that specifies what everyone has to do in every relevant eventuality on any 
future date and how the resulting income in each event should be divided. 
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However, as incomplete contract theory posits,
16
 writing an ex ante all-inclusive 
voluntary contract proves to be ineffective in governing the relationships between 
parties, whose transactions are contingent on some future states of nature. Incomplete 
contracts are characterized for their intrinsic uncertainties (i.e. they do not stipulate the 
parties’ obligations for every conceivable scenario). According to Santos (2003), 
“[T]his feature, being a source of serious concerns regarding the opportunistic 
behavior of parties, represents a promising analytical tool for framing the financial 
contracting behavior of firms.”17 Incompleteness is by far the most fundamental 
question because it raises the problem of how to allocate controls in situations not 
covered by the initial contract, the so-called residual control rights. Financial contracts 
are defined in the incomplete contract literature in terms of how they allocate the 
referred control rights. Throughout the incomplete contract framework, debt and equity 
are viewed as standard financial instruments providing controls over managerial 
decision-making as well as over cash flow streams. This leads us to another weakness of 
the traditional neo-classical paradigm that views firm’s securities as pure financial 
assets void of any underlying power of economic decision.
18
 Nevertheless, as this 
dissertation intends to build a corporate finance framework in order to explain financing 
behavior of actual firms, it is important to incorporate the notion that equity securities 
establish a mechanism for the transfer of corporate control. 
 
The sources of financial capital required to finance the acquisition of assets are both 
internal and external. The first (retained earnings) depends on the firm’s ability to 
generate cash flows and is reflected in its dividend payout policy. As referred by 
Modigliani and Miller (1958), “… as long as management is presumed to be acting in 
the best interests of the stockholders, retained earnings can be regarded as equivalent 
                                                 
16
 Hart (1988) presents the “… insight that the firm as an institution takes on importance only in a world 
of incomplete contracts.” See Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) for a comprehensive description 
of incomplete contract theory. 
17
 Incomplete contracts allow for ex-post opportunism and they also raise the possibility of hold-up 
problems in relationship-specific investments [Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), and Bolton and 
Scharfstein (1998)]. 
18
 As pointed out by Berglöf (1990), “… in modern finance literature à Modigliani and Miller (1958) […] 
financial instruments only entitle their holders to return streams”. This view is also supported by 
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) who reported that “… the neoclassical theory regards financial securities as 
claims on streams of net receipts whose magnitude and variability are exogenously given.” 
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to a fully subscribed, pre-emptive issue of common stock.” External financing is 
provided by investors who buy equity and debt securities through the capital markets 
and financial intermediaries.
19
 Equity holders
20
 receive equity stock in exchange for 
their investment in the firm, entitling them to both a residual claim on the firm’s cash 
flow and the ultimate control over its assets (if the firm does not default after all 
creditors are fully paid). Debt holders
21
 are contractually promised a specific return in 
non-default states, and a preemptive claim against the firm’s assets in default states 
determined by indentured provisions.
22
 As pointed out by Santos (2003) “… financing a 
business firm may be viewed as a continuous process of contracting security issues, 
which are distinct in a number of ways. Among them, contractual arrangements related 
to investors’ returns, control rights, and ease of claim transferability.” Hence, 
differences between securities issued by firms are of crucial importance since they 
represent diverse property and corporate rights. 
 
As suggested above, the dominant paradigm in corporate finance views the firm as a 
nexus of contracts among various agents, in particular managers and investors.
23
 Allen 
and Winton (1995) point out that “[B]eginning with Jensen and Meckling (1976), an 
ever-increasing volume of papers has addressed optimal corporate financial structure 
within this basic framework.” These papers can be divided into two major areas of 
research: one addressing the issue of corporate financing and capital structure – that is, 
the mix of securities and financing sources used to finance real investments by 
                                                 
19
 It is important to notice that firms also issue securities with features of both debt and equity financial 
instruments. Convertible debentures, leases, preferred stock, nonvoting stock, and warrants are examples 
of hybrid securities. 
20
 Throughout this dissertation, we refer to shareholders, stockholders, and equity holders as synonymous. 
They have the responsibility for the operation of the firm through the election of the Board of Directors. 
Dividends received are not guaranteed and are paid at the discretion of the Board of Directors. 
21
 Throughout this dissertation, we refer to bondholders, debt holders, and creditors as synonymous. They 
have no control rights unless payments by the firm are omitted, in which case they have the right to 
foreclose on assets or, in some cases, force bankruptcy. 
22
 Contrary to equity holders, debt holders have no direct control over a firm’s investment decisions 
except when equity holders’ decisions are constrained by debt contract provisions. See Dewing (1934) for 
a comprehensive distinction between debt holders and equity holders’ rights. 
23
 The view of the corporation as a ‘nexus of contracts’ that is popular in financial economics is especially 
useful in thinking about structured finance (see section 3.2). For example, in project finance transactions 
(see Annex 2), banks are the architects of the project’s contractual structure, and that structure in turn 
determines the risk pricing of project’s debt. So, as referred by Corielli et al. (2010), in project finance 
“… it is crucial to design financial contracts and NFCs with the objective to precommitting, when 
possible, the future behavior of SPV management and its numerous counterparties.” 
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corporations – and the other deriving optimal financial contracts as optimal mechanisms 
for prevailing frictions between agents – the so-called security design literature (see 
section 2.3). 
Theories of capital structure attempt to explain the proportions of debt and equity 
observed on the right-hand side of a firm’s balance sheets.24 These theories focus on 
financing strategy, referred by Myers (2003) as “… the determination of overall debt 
ratios for a particular type of the firm in a particular setting.”25  
But when we look to the way a firm carves up its cash outflows into one or more layers 
of debt or equity, we see that the composition of financing varies cross-sectionally even 
within apparently homogeneous industries, and also over time, even when markets, 
institutions, regulation and taxations are apparently constant. The diversity of financing 
tactics is remarkable, with innovation in security design to continue apace, for example 
the design of specific security issues. Allen (1989) corroborates this idea by stating that 
“[T]he notion that firms finance their activities with debt and equity is a simplification; 
corporations have issued securities other than standard debt and equity for many 
centuries.” Financial innovation is not a recent phenomenon and has proceeded at a 
particularly fast pace during the last decades.
26
 The rationale of financial innovations 
has been studied and justified in the literature. For example, Miller (1986) argues that 
financial innovation is a response to features of the tax code and to regulation. An 
alternative rationale is stressed by Van Horne (1985): new securities may make markets 
more complete for the reason that they increase opportunities for risk sharing between 
investors. The fact that firms issue securities other than debt and equity, and the 
constant introduction of new and more complex securities, “… suggest that a more 
fundamental issue than ‘What is the optimal debt-equity ratio?’ is ‘What are the optimal 
                                                 
24
 Several studies have examined the capital structure problem since the pioneering work of Modigliani 
and Miller (1958), which showed the implications of market equilibrium conditions for firm financing 
structure and valuation. In order to refer to useful surveys on both theoretical and empirical corporate 
literatures in relation to capital structure, see among others, Myers (1977), Masulis (1988), Copeland and 
Weston (1988), Harris and Raviv (1991), Megginson (1997), and Myers (2003). 
25
The firm capital structure problem has been a source of intense debate based on the central question of 
the relevance of strategic financing decisions on a firm’s valuation. Most research assumes that: (i) firms 
are public; (ii) non-financial firms raise capital primarily from outside investors, not from the firm’s 
entrepreneurs, managers or employees; (iii) firms are assumed to have access to Anglo-Saxon capital 
markets and institutions, characterized by a broad, efficient public market for shares and corporate debt, 
and by reasonably good protection of the rights of outside investors. 
26
 See section 2.4 for further discussion of the issue of financial innovation. For a full account of 
securities innovations, see Finnerty (1988, 1992). 
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securities that should be issued?’” [Allen (1989)].27 This work intends to follow this 
perspective focusing on structured finance securities.
28
 
 
 
2.3. Security Design 
“The existing research on optimal financial contracting has contributed greatly to our 
understanding of the situations under which actual securities are in fact optimal 
responses to various capital market imperfections.” 
Allen and Winton (1995) 
 
This section addresses the topic of security design. Taking into consideration that a 
structured finance transaction is a financing contract with specific features, before we 
address the topic of structured finance, it is important to review the most prominent 
literature on security design and more specifically on the design of optimal securities. 
We start by briefly discussing the security design problem, in an attempt to identify and 
characterize the basic analytical framework of financing contracting. Next, some of the 
most relevant papers on optimal financial contracting are discussed. Finally, we 
compare the contributions of the various papers and provide some concluding remarks. 
 
2.3.1 The Security Design Problem 
The undertaking of investment projects and production activities, as well as the 
associated risk bearing, requires increased pooling of financial capital. Considering that 
the firm’s ability to generate and retain cash flow is typically lower than the required 
amount of funding, firms tend to become more organized, increasingly large and more 
complex [e.g., Hansmann (1996) and Easterbrook and Fischel (1991)]. Thus, a wealth-
constrained firm owner endowed with a profitable investment opportunity must raise 
                                                 
27
 According to Allen (1989), “… recent studies of capital structure have taken this perspective […] This 
literature has two branches. The first has been concerned with trying to identify the circumstances in 
which debt and equity are optimal […] The second branch has been concerned with the optimal securities 
that a firm should issue.” 
28
 See section 3.2 for a more complete description of structured finance. 
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external funding to finance the project. This leaves him with the classical capital 
structure problem, i.e., the quantitative definition of the capital mix. 
According to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theorem, under conditions of complete, 
perfect and frictionless markets, the capital structure choice is irrelevant in terms of the 
firm market value, which remains unaffected by financing decisions. This theoretical 
proposition carries the implication that the question of whether debt or equity contracts 
(securities) are optimal is irrelevant, as well as what the optimal securities a firm should 
issue are. However, in the real world, markets are neither perfect nor complete; there are 
costs, including information costs, agency costs, regulatory costs, and transaction costs; 
and there are benefits attainable through particular capital structures and securities.
29
 
The capital structure choice and the choice of the type of financing contractual 
arrangement thus affect the firm market value. Theoretically, it is still not clearly 
understood why firms’ financial contracts recurrently appear in certain patterns [e.g., 
Harris and Raviv (1989)]. This suggests that we need to invoke a more robust 
theoretical framework to help us explain the financial behavior of actual real-world 
firms, namely capital structure and security design.
30
 
In an economy obeying the Modigliani and Miller (1958) model,
31
 it is possible to 
design and write an ex-ante incentive contract to induce the agent to act in the 
principal’s best interest.32 If a contract could be written at no cost, laying down each 
party’s obligations and payoffs for any conceivable eventuality in every possible future 
state of the world, then the so-called agency problems would not emerge.
33
 Thus, these 
problems are associated with: (i) the imperfect observability of agent’s actions; and (ii) 
the costs of writing, executing, and enforcing contracts.
34
 
                                                 
29
 See Harris and Raviv (1991) for further discussion of this subject. 
30
 As pointed out by Allen and Gale (1989) “[I]n order to develop a theory of optimal security design, it 
is clearly necessary to develop a framework in which markets are incomplete.” 
31
 Where transaction costs are assumed nil, and observability of agent’s actions is perfect and costless. 
32
 It is equivalent to writing a complete contract. See, e.g., Tirole (1999) for further details and references 
to the related literature. 
33
 Agency theory attempts to explain the principal-agent relationship using the metaphor of a contract in 
which one party, the principal, delegates work to another party, the agent, who is empowered with some 
decision-making power in order to perform that work [see Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. 
34
 Allen and Gale (1999) suggest that the major barrier to the participation of firms in sophisticated 
markets is the need for costly ex-ante information acquisition. Thus, long-term relationships between 
intermediaries and firms can work as an effective substitute for costly ex-ante information and 
investigation. 
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The combined notions of property rights, asymmetric information, and self-interest 
behavior are an apparently sufficiently rich toolbox to eventually enable an optimization 
of security design in the context of a firm’s financing activity. According to Nachman 
and Noe (1994), the problem of choosing the optimal financing contractual 
arrangements and their relative proportions “is the fundamental capital structure 
question reformulated (albeit loosely) as a security design problem.” Therefore, a 
primary concern of designing financial securities is efficient contracting. 
In short, understanding the role of security design is difficult, since financial markets 
are not complete and frictionless. Therefore, it is important to depart from the presumed 
ideal world of Modigliani and Miller (1958) if we envisage shedding some light on 
Dowd’s (1996) question “Why do agents use the particular contract forms - debt and 
equity contracts in particular - that we observe in the ‘real world’?”; i.e., if we want to 
identify the circumstances under which debt and equity are optimal. However, the 
constant introduction of new securities and the rapid development of innovative 
financial products lead us to another fundamental question: What are the optimal 
securities to be issued? These two questions will be considered in the following sub-
sections of this dissertation. 
 
2.3.2 Debt (and Equity) as Optimal Contracts 
Financial security design theories most often begin with a situation in which a financier 
contracts with an entrepreneur over the supply of capital in order to finance an 
investment project. These theoretical frameworks typically specify a number of 
different assumptions about the features of the contracting technology and environment, 
which are, in general, related to the observability and contractibility of actions, the 
ability to renegotiate, the nature of information, agents’ risk preferences, and 
uncertainties. Thus, optimal contractual arrangements derived in the financial 
contracting literature are mechanisms used to resolve different types of conflicts of 
interest or asymmetric information problems that arise in agency relationships between 
economic agents,
35 
 such as entrepreneurs and financiers.
36
 
                                                 
35
 These include: (i) shirking; (ii) appropriating private; (iii) diverting cash flow; (iv) creating hold-up 
problems; (v) diluting investors’ claims; (vi) asset substitution; and (vii) risk shifting. According to 
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As referred by Allen and Winton (1995), “[T]he existing research on optimal 
contracting has contributed greatly to our understanding of the situations under which 
actual securities are in fact optimal responses to various capital market imperfections.” 
Most of the research carried out on the formal study of financial contracting has been 
developed along the main argument to be resolved by endogenous contract 
determination. From this perspective, the literature can be categorized under the 
following taxonomy: (1) allocation of cash flow rights in agency conflicts; (2) 
allocation of cash flow rights in adverse selection environments; (3) allocation of 
ownership and control rights; (4) the allocation of risk; and (5) the acquisition of 
information [Allen and Winton (1995), and Harris and Raviv (1995)]. 
 
Allocation of cash flow rights in agency conflicts 
It has been widely accepted that the search for explanations for financial contracting at 
the firm level should start by assuming a “nothing matters” economy [Modigliani and 
Miller (1958)]. Then it should, progressively, depart from some of the assumptions 
included in the capital structure irrelevance theorem. In such an economic environment, 
market participants enjoy not only homogeneous expectations about the outcomes of 
investment projects, but also are endowed with perfect, unlimited and costless 
information. With this line of reasoning in mind, we can conceive the possibility that 
the return generated by a project is only observed without cost by an entrepreneur, and 
any other entities would have to pay a fixed monitoring cost to become informed about 
the project’s cash flows. This framework broadly characterizes the Costly State 
Verification (CSV) environment originally developed by Townsend (1979), which has 
                                                                                                                                               
Holmström’s (1979) approach to the principal-agency problem, an agent’s effort is presumed 
unobservable to the principal. In this instance, the optimal incentive contract ensures that the agent puts in 
an adequate level of effort by making the agent’s compensation dependent on the outcome of signals, 
namely, output or profits. In Harris and Raviv’s (1979) model, the optimal financing contract between 
wealth unconstrained and risk-neutral contracting parties, is to give a fixed payment to the principal and 
make the agent the residual claimant. Both theories emphasize the role of cash flow rights (monetary 
incentives) to the entrepreneur. Ownership is relevant only because it affects pure cash flow rights. 
36
 Ultimately, conflicts of interest depend on the precise nature of the contracts that govern the 
relationship between managers and the owners, as well as on the firm’s financial structure. Since 
managers are responsible for control, we can identify a triangular agency relationship between the 
manager and the investors with residual claims (equity holders) and the investors with fixed claims (debt 
holders). Agency problems can also arise between majority equity holders and minority equity holders as 
well as between lending banks and bond holders. 
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allowed “considerable progress […] in explaining basic contract design and, to a lesser 
extent, financial structure” [Dowd (1996)].37 
An understanding of various features of the security design problem can be achieved 
using the principal-agent approach. In a principal-agent relationship, a firm’s insiders 
are more likely to be systematically better informed compared to their outside investors. 
Thus, there is the potential for various forms of opportunistic behavior whenever 
insiders have incentives to engage in wealth transfers at the expense of outside 
investors. One of the contributions of Townsend (1979) is the explanation of how 
private information about a project’s realization and its (ex-post) verification costs 
determine the extent to which optimal financial contracts have some debt features.
38
 
Townsend’s work was further extended, among others, by Diamond (1984), and Gale 
and Hellwig (1985). Their lines of reasoning include the introduction of broader 
modeling environmental conditions, such as less restrictive parties’ risk preferences 
(agents are risk neutral), multiple-period contracting, and non-pecuniary penalties. In 
Diamond (1984), the optimality of the debt financing contract is enforced by potentially 
unlimited non-pecuniary penalties which inflict adverse effects on borrower’s wealth in 
certain states. Gale and Hellwig (1985) prove, under less restrictive assumptions, that 
the optimal financing arrangement is the (single period) standard debt contract.
39
 They 
also show that, with a positive probability of bankruptcy, there will be less borrowing 
and investment than there would be with symmetric information. On the other hand, 
Williams (1987) argues that debt and equity may be optimal from an incentive point of 
view. Lacker (1990) generalized Diamond’s model and showed that, when a borrower 
holds an asset with a higher marginal utility for the borrower than for the lender, a debt 
contract collateralized by this asset is optimal.
40
 Some examples include, as pointed out 
by Allen and Winton (1995), “… home mortgages, car loans, or loans backed by a new 
                                                 
37
 The costly state verification model is a significant contribution for the contract theory. For in-depth, 
comprehensive discussions of contract theory see, e.g., Salanié (1997). 
38
 The entrepreneur fully pays the fixed claim when a company earns sufficient funds. Otherwise, the 
entrepreneur prefers to pay the lower state verification cost and impose some loss on the investors. This is 
basically the same as taking a first loss position in a securitization transaction. 
39
 By a standard debt contract Gale and Hellwig (1995) “… mean a contract which requires a fixed 
payment when the firm is insolvent, requires the firm to be declared bankrupt if this fixed payment cannot 
be met and allows the creditor to recoup as much of the debt as possible from the firm’s assets.” 
40
 In Diamond’s model, the collateral takes the form of the borrower’s freedom from pain and suffering, 
which has no value to the lender. 
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business’ assets, where individual tastes, lemons markets effects, or specialized 
managerial skills may make collateral more valuable to the borrower than to the 
lender.” Following Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwing (1985), and Williamson (1986, 
1987), Boyd and Smith (1994) developed a model where costly verification of project 
outcomes can be done stochastically. In such a case, they showed that standard debt 
contracts are “… almost optimal contracts”.41 
Although these models present debt as optimal contracts, they use several simplifying 
technical assumptions.
42
 Some papers allow for additional complications, namely: (1) 
agents exhibit risk averse behavior; (2) there are multiple types of borrowers; (3) firms 
typically exist for many years; (4) agents may be able to randomize their decision; and 
(5) firms usually borrow from multiple investors. Krasa and Villamil (1994) and Winton 
(1995) show that Townsend’s results are valid in the case where both agents are risk 
averse. In Winton (1995),
43
 when the borrower can borrow from multiple investors he 
prefers to issue debt-like contracts with varying degrees of seniority rather than 
symmetric debt-like contracts.
44
 This follows from the fact that “… if verifying returns 
is costly and private, assigning different levels of seniority to different investors reduces 
the duplication of verification costs [and] the number of investors who verify at the 
margin” [Winton (1995)]. Winton’s model can be applied to explain some features of 
structured finance transactions. In a Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) many classes of debt 
and preferred stock are typically issued, and the most junior claims are held by 
management and a buyout fund that monitors management closely.
45
 The second 
application is asset securitization,
46
 where relatively small financial claims are pooled 
by an intermediary and then refinanced. In securitization, two or more tranches are 
issued with different degrees of seniority among investors, the originating institution 
                                                 
41
 Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwing (1985), and Williamson (1986, 1987) show that when state 
verification is carried out nonstochastically, the optimal contract is a standard debt contract. 
42
 Like risk neutrality, single period contracting, with one investor, one type of investor, and deterministic 
verification. 
43
 Winton (1995) developed a model where a manager’s firm requires funds from several investors – 
contrary to Williams (1989), Hart and Moore (1990a), and Diamond (1991, 1993) where investors are 
small, numerous, and risk neutral, share the same information, and can collectively enforce liquidation. 
Additionally, an investor can only observe and verify the firm’s return privately and at a cost. 
44
 According to Allen and Winton (1995), “[T]his corresponds with actual practice, in which the absolute 
priority rule is the basic standard and firms issue securities with multiple levels of seniority – senior debt, 
subordinated debt, or preferred stock.” Absolute priority rule means that senior claims are to be paid in 
full before more junior claims receive anything. 
45
 See Annex 4 for an overview of Leveraged Buy-Out transactions. 
46
 For an overview of securitization see Annex 1. 
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typically agrees to buy the tranche’s ‘first loss’,47 and ‘credit enhancement’ is often 
provided by a third-party who provides coverage for additional losses up to a fixed 
amount. As referred by Winton (1995), “… the junior claimants are institutions that are 
best placed to perform verification or monitoring at low cost, whereas the purchase of 
the securities need not have such expertise.” 
Chang (1990) proved that with multi-period contracts in a setting where a firm produces 
independent returns in each of the two periods, the optimal contract has some 
resemblance to a bond with interim coupon. Considering that borrower return 
distributions are completely unobservable, Boyd and Smith (1993) point out that debt is 
an optimal contract when verification costs are positive. Lacker (1989) develops a more 
complex form of Hart and Moore’s (1989)48 problem – now contracts based on returns 
can be enforced in a court of law at a cost – and show that optimal contracts resemble 
debt so long as enforcement is used deterministically. Chang (1993) presents a model in 
which a firm exists for two periods. Once contracts are allowed to include a bankruptcy 
mechanism, the optimal contracts resemble debt. 
Hence, when the basic costly state verification model assumptions are relaxed, optimal 
contracts still have certain features in common with real debt or debt-like securities, 
namely: interim coupon payments, multiple levels of seniority, and credit rationing. 
 
A related body of literature takes on principal-agent theory to financial contracting 
between an investor and the manager of a firm. According to Harris and Raviv (1979), 
the manager’s position corresponds to unlimited liability equity, while that of the 
investor corresponds to riskless debt. Assuming that manager’s wealth is usually 
limited, Innes (1990) argues that if the investor’s compensation is constrained to being 
monotone increasing with a firm’s returns, the optimal contract will be debt. Based on a 
similar setting, Chiesa (1992) shows that a debt contract with warrants is optimal for the 
lender, instead of standard debt. Williams (1989) proves that when the firm’s output and 
                                                 
47
 This means that the originator takes all credit losses up to a certain percentage of assets’ value. First 
loss tranche is also called equity, residual or junior tranche (especially used for the highly leveraged first-
loss slice of a portfolio of highly rated assets). However, it cannot be confused with common equity 
issued by firms with ongoing businesses. 
48
 Hart and Moore (1989) shows (in the case an entrepreneur wishes to raise funds to undertake a project 
when contracting possibilities are incomplete) that the optimal contract is a debt contract and incentives to 
repay are provided by the ability of the creditor to seize the entrepreneur’s assets. 
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the managerial effort is unobservable, optimal contracts resemble combinations of 
equity and up to three classes of debt. Hart and Moore (1990a) provide interesting 
results on how different levels of seniority of debt contract can mitigate agency 
problems. They argue that a firm can only raise new funds if it is expected that new 
projects will have a positive Net Present Value (NPV). 
Santos (1997) developed a principal-agent model and showed that when the 
investment’s outcome depends on more than two control variables (controlled by the 
entrepreneur), debt and equity contracts can be simultaneously optimal. DeMarzo and 
Fishman (2007a) developed an agency model of financial contracting and assumed that 
the (risky) cash flows are observed only by the agent and, hence, are not directly 
contractible. They also argued that the optimal contract is a combination of outside 
equity and debt.
49
 
To conclude, in the context of a standard formulation of external financing, the security 
design problem consists of devising an optimal financing contract (security), which 
outside investors do not have the incentive to misprice. In the CSV framework, most 
commonly, debt contracts arise as the optimal contractual arrangement. However, as 
Townsend points out, his model is not helpful in explaining why firms resort to outside 
equity financing. Moreover, the optimality of debt disappears in this model once one 
brings in dynamic considerations such as repeated interactions between the debtor and 
creditor or ex-post renegotiation. Under other theoretical approaches, outside equity 
contracts may also be efficient.  
 
Allocation of cash flow rights in adverse selection environments 
Adverse selection models are driven by the assumption that asymmetry involves ex-ante 
information. Thus, the focus is on the characteristics of the contracts borrowers use as 
signals of their type. Hart and Holmstrom (1987) suggest that optimal contracts should 
be contingent on all relevant information. However, as referred by Allen and Winton 
(1995), “… an important feature of many existing financial contracts is that they are not 
                                                 
49
 DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) “… derived long-term debt, a line of credit, and equity as optimal 
securities.” This paper is part of a growing literature on dynamic optimal contracting models using 
recursive techniques that begun with Pheland and Townsend (1991), and Atkeson (1991), among others. 
See, e.g., Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for a review of many of these models. 
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contingent on easily available information which would appear relevant.”50 Among 
others, Allen and Gale (1992), De and Kale (1993), and Nachman and Noe (1994) show 
that, with adverse selection, noncontingent securities, like standard debt, are optimal 
contracts.
51
  
An early stream of this literature is driven by the impact of market imperfections and 
the economic characteristics of firms concerning their choice of debt maturity. It is 
mainly concerned with the effects of market frictions and imperfections, such as 
transaction costs, taxes, and interest rate risk on firms’ debt maturity decisions. Most 
papers emphasize the advantages of short-term maturities in debt contracts as an 
effective mechanism to mitigate agency problems, under asymmetric information and 
imperfect or costly contract enforcement.
52
 When the information about the true quality 
of a firm’s assets is asymmetrically distributed between insiders and outsiders, 
financing decisions at large, and short-term debt issues in particular, may be perceived 
by market participants as signaling firm asset quality as suggested in, e.g., Flannery 
(1986) and Diamond (1991). In this framework, there may be a potential advantage for 
short-term debt [Myers (1977)]. 
Flannery (1986) presents a signaling model where the insiders of the highest quality 
firms will prefer to issue short-term debt, exposing the firm to the liquidity risk. In 
contrast, managers of firms with less favorable prospects will be unwilling to take such 
risk, and will therefore prefer to issue long-term debt. Diamond (199l, 1993) explains 
the maturity / seniority structures of debt contracts in terms of the non-observability of 
the credit quality of a borrower’s project. Diamond (1991) shows that, in the presence 
of liquidity shocks and appropriation of private rents associated to control rights, short-
                                                 
50
 As an example, Allen and Winton point out that standard debt contracts are not contingent on the firm’s 
earnings. 
51
 Allen and Gale (1992) present a model where adverse selection interacts with measurement distortion 
and this leads to noncontingent securities being used. Considering that securities cannot be made 
contingent on all states of nature, bad firms are more likely to offer securities such as income bonds since 
the net benefits of distorting are greater for bad firms. According to Nachman and Noe (1994), in 
equilibrium firms choose contracts in which payments are stable or equal, except when there are 
insufficient earnings to pay the amount. De and Kale (1993) assume that a firm can use a combination of 
Fixed-Periodic-Obligation Debt (e.g., standard debt) and No-Periodic-Obligation Debt (e.g., income 
bonds). They find a unique equilibrium when firms use only Fixed-Periodic-Obligation Debt. 
52
 After an initial impulse provided by Myers (1977), a strand of theoretical literature developed focusing 
on the impact of asymmetric information on the debt maturity decision. 
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term debt dominates.
53
 Moreover, he also shows that debt maturity choice is modeled as 
a trade-off between the managerial preference to issue short-term debt and the liquidity 
risk associated with short-term debt financing.
54
 In 1993 Diamond developed a model in 
which a firm’s manager can choose debt seniority, as well as maturity. It shows that (1) 
short-term debt is optimal when it is senior; (2) long-term debt is optimal when it is 
junior; and (3) long-term debt is optimal when it allows the issuance of additional senior 
short-term debt at the interim date. Thus, firms will obtain a better price for short-term 
debt in a situation whereby short-term debt holders can be refinanced at the expense of 
long-term debt holders. Hart and Moore (1994) examine the relationship between the 
maturity of firms’ debt and the timing of project realizations, and conclude that the 
maturity of assets and liabilities should be matched. 
Repullo and Suarez (1998) follow the literature on debt contracts focusing on the 
disciplinary role of liquidation, and develop a model that moves into a moral hazard 
context. They argue that the level of entrepreneurial wealth and the liquidation value of 
the investment project are key determinants of the optimal mode of finance. As pointed 
out by the authors, “[O]ur results predict that, in order to give the informed lender the 
right incentives to liquidate, informed debt will be, in case of liquidation, secured and 
senior to uninformed debt.”55 
 
Allocation of ownership and control rights 
Another strand of literature has focused on the allocation of ownership and control 
rights among different investors (rather than focusing on the allocation of cash flows to 
and among investors as discussed in the previous two subsections).
56
 If both parties in a 
financing arrangement could write a contract without costs, contingent upon all possible 
                                                 
53
 According to Diamond (1991), “… there is a credit rating such that those with higher ratings prefer 
short-term debt as a type of ‘bridge financing’ that allows them to choose to refinance when good news 
arrives, while lower rated borrowers prefer long-term debt.” Although, borrowers with low credit rating 
may have no choice but to choose short-term debt. 
54
 For other approaches to the debt maturity structure problem see, for example, Goswami, Noe and 
Rebello (1995, 1997), and Hart and Moore (1994). 
55
 Repullo and Suarez (1998) consider that bank lending or the issuance of tightly held securities can be 
considered as informed finance, whereas the placing of public traded securities (such as corporate bonds) 
can be considered as uninformed finance. 
56
 Research on ownership and control focuses not only on managerial incentives (agency/costly state 
verification) but also on investors’ incentives. 
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states of the world, and lawfully enforceable, then the allocation of power in such a 
contractual relationship would be irrelevant. Additionally, there would be little room for 
the exercise of ownership and control rights. In this case, all relevant decisions would 
be made ex-ante. 
As referred by Allen and Winton (1995), “[W]ork on allocation of control among 
different securities typically focuses on the role of outside debt and equity. The basic 
role of outside debt in these models is illustrated by Aghion and Bolton (1992)…” 
Aghion and Bolton (1992) examine a project’s long-term financing in an incomplete 
contracting framework [along the lines of Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and 
Moore (1990b)]. An important result of their analysis concerns the implications of the 
standard debt contract in terms of the optimal (contingent) allocation of control rights.
57
 
Although Kalay and Zender (1992) present similar results, Zender (1991) argues that 
the use of both outside debt and outside equity is optimal.
58
 Aghion and Bolton (1992) 
and Zender (1991) show that contracts with contingent transfer of control rights may 
minimize inefficiencies, which provides a rationale for debt contracts. Bearing in mind 
the basic problem of Hart and Moore (1989),
59
 Berglöf and Von Thadden (1994) point 
out that when a single investor provides all financing, optimal capital structure consists 
of short-term secured debt and long-term claims such as debt and equity. Additionally, 
Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) argue that debt provides (ex-ante) incentives to 
managers to be committed to an (ex-post) course of action. 
Other related literature includes Bolton and Scharfstein (1990), Bulow and Rogoff 
(1989), and Hart and Moore (1994). Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) develop a theory in 
which the threat of restricting future financing provides an incentive to fulfill a 
                                                 
57
 Aghion and Bolton (1988) argue that the use of debt by the entrepreneur and the institution of 
bankruptcy constitutes a mechanism that grants control to the entrepreneur when earnings prospects are 
good and to the investor when they are bad. They use an incomplete contracting framework to argue that 
debt-like contracts may improve efficiency by allocating control rights to the debt holders in the event of 
bankruptcy. 
58
 In a similar vein of Hart and Moore (1988) – examine state-contingent property rights associated with 
debt and equity –, Zender (1991) views bankruptcy as an efficient transfer of firms’ control to the debt 
holders. 
59
 Hart and Moore (1989) developed a model of an entrepreneur who wishes to raise funds to undertake a 
project when contracting possibilities are incomplete. They pointed out that the optimal contract is debt 
and the incentives for the entrepreneur to repay the borrower funds are provided by the threat of 
liquidation. 
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promised repayment schedule of a debt contract.
60
 Bulow and Rogoff (1989) present a 
model in which a sovereign debtor cannot commit to loan repayment and uses 
strategical debt repayment schemes. The theory builds on the assumption that the 
country is able to repudiate debt, exposing itself to the potential retaliation of lenders. In 
such a case, future renegotiation is unfeasible. Hart and Moore (1994) developed a 
model with an intuition analogous to Hart and Moore (1998),
61
 Bolton and Scharfstein 
(1990), and Fluck (1998).
62
 These theories are rooted on the hypothesis that project’s 
realizations are either unobservable or not verifiable, and assume that such an 
environment allows the potential appropriation of private rents related to control 
rights.
63
 Hart and Moore (1994) relax some of the assumptions of the referred papers 
and place importance on the effects of human capital inalienability over a project 
financing. They conclude that the optimal contract mirrors a debt security in which 
control is transferred to the creditor if the promised payment is not fulfilled, and it 
triggers liquidation.
64
 
Anderson and Sundaresan (1996) study the design (and valuation) of debt contracts in a 
dynamic setting under uncertainty. They show that: (1) contrary to low growth firms, 
high growth firms tend to use low coupon debt contracts; (2) firms tend to increase 
coupon rates as tax rates increase to take advantage of tax shield; and (3) highly levered 
firms tend to use low-coupon debt.  
 
                                                 
60
 They show that the optimal contract is debt, and if the agent defaults he/she faces a cost that can be 
interpreted as not being refinanced in the future. Quadrini (2004), Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006), and 
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007b) developed a multiperiod version of this model and also allowed for the 
determination of the firm’s scale. 
61
 Hart and Moore (1998) analyzes “… the role of debt in persuading an entrepreneur to pay out cash 
flows, rather to divert them.” They argue that debt does a good job in maximizing the entrepreneur’s 
resources in ‘good’ states of the world, and in maximizing the investor’s payoff in bad states of the world. 
This enables the entrepreneur to reinvest as much as possible when reinvestment is more valuable. 
62
 Fluck (1998) demonstrates that “… no investor is willing to hold outside equity when management has 
the ability to divert cash flows as private benefits and when management manipulation of cash flows is 
costly to verify.” He argues that besides debt, outside equity with unlimited life is the financing choice of 
positive NPV projects. Therefore, the entrepreneur may issue debt, outside equity, or a mix of the two 
when cash flows are stable. However, even in a situation in which cash flows variability is high and “… 
no funds can be raised by issuing debt, investors may still be willing to provide outside equity financing.” 
[Fluck (1998)]. 
63
 For a theoretical discussion of corporate ownership and control see Bebchuk (1999). 
64
 Hart and Moore (1994) conclude that the optimal financial claim resembles a debt contract in which (1) 
the entrepreneur promises a fixed payment to the financier; and (2) the financier takes control of the 
project and liquidates the assets if debt is not fully repaid. Thus, the right to liquidation is central in these 
models. 
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At the empirical level, Kaplan and Strömberg (2000) examine contracts between 
venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. They find that venture capital contracts include 
provisions that appear to be designed to mitigate potential hold-up problems between 
entrepreneurs and investors. Their findings suggest that (i) cash flow rights matter in a 
way that is consistent with principal-agent models; (ii) control rights matter, which 
strongly suggests that contracts are incomplete; and (iii) cash flow rights and control 
rights can be separated and made contingent on observable and verifiable measures of 
contractual performance.
65
 
 
The allocation of risk 
As referred by Allen and Winton (1995), “[T]raditional financial theories suggest that 
one of the major advantages of having different types of securities is that they allow 
different groups of investors with different risk tolerance to bear the amount of risk they 
desire.” This leads to another fundamental question: ‘How securities should be designed 
when risk sharing is the main issue?’ 
Several authors have studied this issue based on transaction costs as a source of market 
incompleteness. Allen and Gale (1989) developed a perfectly competitive, symmetric 
information model, where there are transaction costs and concluded that the price of a 
security is determined by the group that values it most, and that debt and equity are not 
optimal (optimal securities are extreme). Allowing for the cost of marketing securities 
as the relevant transaction costs, Mandan and Soubra (1991) point out that, in some 
cases, equity, debt, and warrants are optimal (optimal securities are no longer extreme). 
Pesendorfer (1995) formulated a model related to Ross (1989) and introduced financial 
innovation. He showed that (1) innovation can improve agents’ utilities by reducing 
costs of marketing; (2) the level of innovation is not necessarily constrained efficiently; 
and (3) innovation eliminates indeterminacy observed in other models. An approach to 
security design is developed by Allen and Gale (1991), who assume an environment in 
which the set of traded securities is endogenous and investors are permitted to undertake 
                                                 
65
 These results are consistent with theoretical predictions by Aghion and Bolton (1992) and Dewatripont 
and Tirole (1994). Another related literature focuses on the design of ownership (equity) structure – 
allocation of shares to different investors, allocation of liability to shareholders, and allocation of control 
among shares. As this dissertation focuses on debt financing, such papers have not been reviewed. 
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unlimited short sales. In this environment, and contrary to Allen and Gale (1988) where 
short selling is severely limited, an equilibrium exists. Besin (1993) uses an imperfect 
model akin to that in Allen and Gale (1991) to reassess the Balasko and Cass (1989) and 
Geanokoplos and Mas-Colell’s (1989) real indeterminacy result. The author argues that 
the real indeterminacy is removed by the introduction of intermediaries who choose 
securities and that the real determinacy of equilibrium does not depend on the level of 
transaction costs. 
Considering the optimal security design problem, Fulghieri and Lukin (2001) argue that 
“… depending on the cost and precision of the information-production technology, risky 
debt or a composite security with convex payoff emerges as optimal securities.”66 Their 
model can be applied to the field of structured finance. Regarding securitization, the 
originator may prefer to issue a security with ‘high information sensitivity’ if he intends 
to maintain a residual equity position in the pool of assets.
67
 
 
The acquisition of information 
It is widely accepted that the volume of information held by investors affects the value 
of a security. Thus, securities can be designed to affect the extent to which information 
is acquired in order to maximize value. In this line of reasoning, Boot and Thakor 
(1993) developed a model where a firm issues securities to investors who have to pay to 
become informed on the firms’ value. They argue that (1) good firms have incentives to 
provide as much information as possible to investors, and by splitting their cash flows 
between risky (equity) and safe groups (debt) of securities they provide better incentives 
for investors to become informed; and (2) bad firms plan to imitate good firms, so they 
can receive on average the value of the two. An extension of the Boot and Thakor 
(1993) model is formulated by DeMarzo and Duffie (1997)
68
 in which they analyze the 
effect of information acquisition on the design of securities like collateralized mortgage 
                                                 
66
 They argue that when investors can produce information on the quality of the firm, the type of 
securities issued matters. In this case, insiders “… may prefer to issue a more information-sensitive 
security such as equity, rather than a less information-sensitive one such as risky debt.” 
67
 In such cases, the originator signals their incentives to monitor by maintaining an equity position. 
68
 DeMarzo and Duffie (1997) consider a situation where the information received by investors does not 
signal firm type and there are many firms. In this case, it is worthwhile to package the securities and then 
to split this portfolio into a risky and safe component, which is consistent with the fact that financial 
intermediaries pool assets and then issue multiple securities against them (i.e., with asset securitization). 
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obligations (CMOs). They show that marginal cash flows should be allocated to one 
security or another rather than split between securities. Gale (1992) argues that if all 
firms intend to issue new securities a Pareto superior equilibrium could result. 
Conversely, the investors’ preference for standard securities can lead to an undesirable 
equilibrium, because – as the information about new securities is costly – investors will 
demand a premium from the issuer. Considering a noisy expectations model, Demange 
and Laroque (1995) study the relationship between private information and the design 
of securities. They point out that to overcome the unwillingness of investors to trade 
with entrepreneurs (due to entrepreneur superior information), they can design the 
securities sold, so that they are uncorrelated with their information. Rahi (1995) 
develops a similar model but without noisy traders and shows that equity is the optimal 
security.  
In Rajan and Winton (1995), attention turns to covenants and collateral as common 
features of loans made by financial institutions.
69
 They point out that long-term debt 
with covenants is preferable to short-term debt, “… as long as the covenants depend on 
information that is not costlessly available to the public.” With regard to collateral, they 
argue that the type of collateral signals the borrower’s economic situation – the signal is 
stronger when the collateral is risky in the short-run or depreciates quickly (e.g., 
accounts receivable or inventory versus plant, equipment or land). Similarly, Goswami, 
Noe and Rebello (1995) argue that covenanted long-term debt, contrasting to 
uncovenanted long-term debt, tends to cause negative announcement effects.
70
 
Inderst and Mueller (2006),
71
 conclude that “… debt is optimal when the lender is too 
conservative, an equity is optimal when she is too aggressive […] Ultimately, debt is 
optimal for relatively safer projects…[and]… levered equity is optimal for projects that 
are less likely to break even based on public information.” This confirms observed 
patterns of Project Finance whereby transactions are predominantly financed with debt. 
                                                 
69
 Rajan and Winton (1995) investigate how loans can be structured to enhance the institutions’ incentives 
to monitor. Several authors have studied this issue. For example, Smith and Warner (1979) argue that 
control rights from covenants reduce adverse selection and moral hazard. Park (1994) shows that 
covenants serve as mechanisms that improve the flexibility and efficiency of financial contracting. 
70
 As referred by Goswami, Noe and Rebello (1995) “… the use of covenant restrictions on long-term 
debt dominates the use of short-term debt as a means of signaling information.” 
71
 They developed a model in which lenders can be too conservative and reject positive-NPV projects or 
too aggressive and accept negative-NPV projects. 
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2.3.3 Concluding Remarks 
The literature on optimal financial contracting can be classified based on a relatively 
stable taxonomy. The first group of models – allocation of cash flow rights in agency 
conflicts – view financial contracts as mechanisms to efficiently align the interests of 
entrepreneurs with outside investors. In these models, insiders presumably have the 
ability to appropriate (at least partially) project’s income, and have access to private 
benefits of control. In this framework, securities are designed to induce sufficient 
payout to finance investment projects. Under these conditions, it has been shown that 
the debt contract is the only optimal contract when lenders cannot observe borrowers’ 
income without costs.
72
 In this class of models, ‘equity’ is entirely owned by the 
entrepreneur (insiders), and all external financing is raised under the form of debt 
contracts.
73
 The models developed into the second set of theories are driven by adverse 
selection considerations – allocation of cash flow rights in adverse selection 
environments. At this point, securities are designed to signal borrower’s private 
information to lenders.
74
 The third group consider the role of securities in the allocation 
of ownership and control rights.
75
 In the fourth group of models, securities are designed 
to optimize the information that investors have – acquisition of information.76 The fifth 
category includes models representing the allocation of risk among the different kinds 
of investors.
77
 
This subsection refers to some circumstances where debt and equity are optimal 
financial contracts. However, “… the long history and extent of financial innovation 
suggest that firms’ financing needs are not satisfied by debt and equity.” [Allen (1989)]. 
This is the reason why one branch of the security design literature has been focused on 
optimal securities, instead of the circumstances under which debt and equity are 
optimal. Theories of optimal securities are based on the reality of incomplete markets. 
However, the literature to date does not provide much insight into the actual path of 
most financial innovations and structured finance products. 
                                                 
72
 See, e.g., Fluck (1998) and Myers (2000). 
73
 See, e.g., Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Hart and Moore (1989), 
Lacker (1990), and Winton (1995). 
74
 See, e.g., Diamond (1991), De and Kale (1993), Diamond (1993), and Nachman and Noe (1994). 
75
 See, e.g., Grossman and Hart (1988), Harris and Raviv (1988), Zender (1991), Aghion and Bolton 
(1992), and Hart and Moore (1994). 
76
 See, e.g., Boot and Thakor (1993), and DeMarzo and Duffie (1997). 
77
 See, e.g., Allen and Gale (1988, 1991, 1994), Bisin (1993), and Pesendorfer (1995). 
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To summarize, although all models yield a number of important insightful predictions, 
firms’ financial and financing structures decisions still remain unsatisfactorily 
explained, mainly (i) in terms of structured finance transactions, and (ii) with respect to 
the reason why firms decide to use structured finance instead of common debt. One 
possible explanation is that existing security design theories do not simultaneously and 
dynamically endogenize all contractual features. 
 
 
2.4. Financial Innovation and Security Design 
2.4.1 Introduction 
Tufano (2003) defines financial innovation as an ongoing process whereby private 
parties experiment to differentiate their products and services, responding to changes in 
the economic environment; broadly speaking, “… financial innovation is the act of 
creating and then popularizing new financial instruments as well as new financial 
technologies, institutions and markets.”78 The author breaks down financial innovation 
into product innovation – e.g., new derivative contracts or new corporate securities – 
and process innovation – e.g., new forms of distributing securities, new forms of 
processing transactions or even new forms of pricing securities. According to Frame 
and White (2004) financial innovation “… represents something new that reduces costs, 
reduces risks, or provides an improved product/service/instrument that better satisfies 
participants’ demands.” Thus, financial innovations can be sorted as new products, new 
services, new production processes, or new organizational forms.
79
 
Some authors focus on the creation of lists or taxonomies of innovations. For example, 
regarding securities innovations, Finnerty (1988, 1992) has created a list of over 60 
securities innovations organized by the type of instrument and by the function served.
80
 
                                                 
78
 While presented to a fairly modest extent, relative to other topics in Corporate Finance, the topic of 
financial innovation is addressed in comprehensive books [e.g., Allen and Gale (1994)] and in entire 
issues of journals [e.g., Journal of Economic Theory (1995, Vol. 65)]. 
79
 Ross (1989) presents two classes of financial innovations: (i) the new securities and their markets; and 
(ii) the dynamic trading strategies that make use of new instruments or products. 
80
 Innovative financial instruments include debt innovations, preferred stock innovations, convertible 
debt/preferred stock innovations, and common equity innovations. Considering the function served, 
Finnerty (1988) organize securities based on their capacity to solve corporate finance problems: 
reallocating risk; increasing liquidity; reducing agency costs; reducing transaction costs; reducing taxes; 
or circumventing regulatory constrains. Carow et al. (1999) extends Finnerty’s (1992) work by updating 
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Even in the book Security Analysis, Graham and Dodd (1934) included an appendix 
with a “… partial list of securities which deviate from normal patterns.” The many lists 
produced of financial innovations – by traditional labels of equity or debt or by product 
feature – show a significant difficulty in categorizing new products. Therefore, most 
authors adopted a functional approach to classify financial innovations – while the 
functions of financial systems and products are stable, the ways in which they are 
performed are not.
81
 
According to Fabozzi (2005), financial innovations can be classified by specific 
functions: (i) price risk-transferring innovations, (ii) credit risk-transferring innovations, 
(iii) and liquidity-generating innovations. The first type of financial innovations allows 
market participants to manage exchange rate risk or price risk. Credit risk-transfer 
innovations provide sponsors with instruments for dealing with the risk of default. 
Liquidity-generating innovations have three effects: (1) enabling the financing of an 
asset based on new sources of funds, (2) amplifying the liquidity of the financial 
market, and (3) enabling financial institutions and other market participants to exploit 
capital arbitrage circumventing capital constraints imposed by regulators and rating 
agencies. Although the authors present their own taxonomy of functions, no commonly 
accepted classification has been adopted. Additionally, a single innovation is likely to 
address multiple functions. For example, using the Fabozzi’s (2005) functional 
perspective, asset securitization invokes all three functions.
82
 
As suggested by Finnerty (1988), when discussing financial engineering, referred to by 
the author as the means for implementing financial innovation, “… the deregulation of 
the financial services industry and increased competition within investment banking 
have undoubtedly placed increased emphasis on being able to design new products, 
                                                                                                                                               
the list of securities innovations through to the end of 1997 and provides evidence that “… the pace of 
innovation on securities design has not slackened.” 
81
 See, e.g., Finnerty (1988, 1992) and BIS (1986). Merton (1992) advances the notion of ‘function’ as 
critical in understanding financial systems. Referring to financial intermediation, Merton (1995) presents 
the functional perspective as a ready alternative to the institutional perspective, mainly in financial 
environments characterized by rapid changes. As pointed out by Merton (1995), “… with the current rate 
of technological advance and integration of world financial markets, this approach may prove especially 
useful in predicting the future direction of financial innovation, changes in financial markets and 
intermediaries and the places for regulatory bottlenecks.” 
82
 As pointed out by Fabozzi (2005), “[A]sset securitization provides all of these functions […] asset 
securitization results in securities whose liquidity is greater than that of an unsecuritized portfolio of 
loans or receivables, borrowing from ultimate investors who would not ordinarily want to hold a 
portfolio of loans or receivables, and reduction by depository institutions of their capital requirements by 
transferring assets off their balance sheets.” For further discussion of asset securitization see Annex 1. 
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develop better processes, and implement effective solutions to increasingly complex 
financial problems.” The design of new securities or products – securities innovation – 
is widely accepted as a central activity in the financial engineering process.
83
 Securities 
are thus designed to achieve many purposes, namely: (i) entrepreneurs and firms intend 
to raise capital efficiently; (ii) managers use securities to signal the firm’s potential 
value; (iii) intermediaries hope to profit from offering securities designed to accomplish 
investors’ needs; and (iv) regulators consider the role of security design and financial 
innovation in promoting efficiency in the allocation of risk and capital [Duffie and Rahi 
(1995)].
84
  
 
2.4.2 Functions Served by Financial Innovation 
The existence of financial innovation has been studied and justified in the literature on 
the grounds of a healthy panoply of arguments.
85
 The most prominent explanations are 
rooted to the attempts to understand how various market imperfections and even the 
change of these imperfections stimulate financial innovation. As referred by Tufano 
(2003), “[T]hese imperfections prevent participants in the economy from efficiently 
obtaining the functions they need from the financial system.”86 Van Horne (1985) argues 
that in order for a new financial product, instrument or process to be truly innovative, it 
must enable financial markets to become more efficient or make them more complete. If 
                                                 
83
 According to Finnerty (1988), corporate financial engineering has three types of activities: (i) securities 
innovation – involves the development of innovative financial instruments; (ii) financial processes 
innovation – reduces the cost of implementing financial transactions; and (iii) creation of creative 
solutions to corporate finance problems. Banks (2006) defines financial engineering as a process that is 
related to the “… creation of new products that are useful to intermediaries and end-users. It involves 
identifying a particular need, determining how best to address the need, assembling the necessary 
building blocks, and delivering the finished product to the user.” 
84
 Carow et al. (1999) suggest that “… three of the most common objectives of innovative security design 
have been to (1) manage the interest rate (and other financial price) risk faced by investors and issuers; 
(2) to reduce information costs faced by investors […]; and to (3) increase the tradability of financial 
assets.” 
85
 Nevertheless, according to Frame and White (2004), “[A] striking feature of this literature, however, is 
the relative dearth of empirical studies that specifically test hypotheses or otherwise provide a 
quantitative analysis of financial innovation.” 
86
 According to Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000), the literature on financial innovation has three main 
strands: (i) literature that analyzes the advantages of several innovations [e.g., Finnerty (1992), Allen and 
Gale (1994)]; (ii) literature that studies the forces that drive financial innovation activity [e.g., Van Horne 
(1985), Miller (1986), Ross (1989), Merton (1992), and Allen and Gale (1994)]; and (iii) literature that 
relies on signaling rationale [Tufano (1989), Boot and Thakor (1997), and Bhattacharyya and Nanda 
(2000)]. 
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the financial markets were perfect and complete, there would be no opportunities for 
financial innovations. 
Thus, the rationale for the emergence of financial innovations as an endogenous 
response to market and contracting incompleteness and imperfections, should be seen as 
economically advantageous in,
87
 completing inherently incomplete markets [e.g., Allen 
and Gale (1989), Ross (1989),
88
 Duffie and Rahi (1995),
89
 and Grinblatt and Longstaff 
(2000)
90
], reducing or mitigating agency concerns and information asymmetries [e.g., 
Haugen and Senbett (1981) and Ross (1989)],
91
 reducing transaction, search or 
marketing costs [e.g., Merton (1989), Ross (1989), Madan and Soubra (1991), and 
McConnell and Schwartz (1992)],
92
 responding to taxes and regulation [e.g., Miller 
(1986),
93
 Campbell (1988), Finnerty (1988), Kane (1986),
94
 Santangelo and Tufano 
                                                 
87
 The list provided by Tufano (2003) is the most inclusive, and we will draw heavily on it. 
88
 Ross (1989) points out that the explosion of financial innovations, manly fixed income instruments, is 
commonly explained by the capacity of these new instruments to complete financial markets. But the 
author also focuses on institutional markets and financial marketing as central dimensions to understand 
financial innovation – according to Ross (1989) “… marketing costs help to shape the form of the new 
institutional features.” 
89
 Duffie and Rahi (1995) review the literature on market incompleteness and innovation and conclude 
that “[A]t this early stage, while there are several results providing conditions for the existence of 
equilibrium with innovation, the available theory has relatively few normative or predictive results. From 
a spanning point of view, we can guess that there are incentives to set up markets for securities for which 
there are no close substitutes, and which may be used to hedge substantive risks.” 
90
 Grinblatt and Longstaff (2000) examine Treasury STRIPS (or zero-coupon bonds) and find that 
investors use the STRIPS program primarily to make markets more complete. 
91
 As pointed out by Tufano (2003), “[T]hroughout history, information asymmetries have prompted a 
number of innovations… Early innovations tended to substitute for (or economize on) the use of costly 
information, while later innovations capitalized on its lower costs.” 
92
 According to Merton (1989), financial intermediaries play an important role in the presence of 
transaction costs as they permit economic agents facing transaction costs to achieve the desired risk-
return profile. Concerning securitization, Hill (1996) suggests that the issuance of asset-backed securities 
allows the reduction of transaction costs. Mandra and Soubra (1991) refer that financial intermediaries 
maximize their revenues net of marketing costs designing multiple financial products that appeal to a 
wider set of investors. 
93
 As pointed out by Miller (1986), “[T]he major impulses to successful innovations over the past twenty 
years have come, I am saddened to have to say, from regulation and taxes.” Accordingly, Fabozzi et al. 
(2006) point out that a structured finance transaction is a complex transaction employed by banks, other 
financial institutions, and corporations as a source of funding and/or favorable capital, tax, and accounting 
treatment. In the same line of reasoning, Davis (2005) emphasizes the rolling of structured finance in 
enabling financial institutions to exploit regulatory capital arbitrage (e.g., through securitization). 
94
 Kane (1986) presents the ‘regulatory dialectic’ – innovation as a response to regulatory constrains and 
regulation as a reaction to the new innovations – as a major source of innovation. Bank capital 
requirements are a good example. As pointed out by Jones (2000) when referring to securitization, “… 
this method is used routinely to lower the effective risk-based capital requirements against certain 
portfolios to levels well below the Basel Capital Accord`s nominal 8% total risk-based capital standard.” 
The same idea is presented by Hill (1996) and Alles (2001). 
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(1997), and Frame and White (2004)],
95
 increasing globalization and managing risks 
[e.g., Smith et al. (1990), and Tufano (2003)],
96
 or taking advantage of technological 
shocks [e.g., Campbell (1988), White (2000), Tufano (2003), and Frame and White 
(2004)].
97
 Consequently, it is important to stress that the financial innovation process is 
dynamic, as one innovation begets the next – characterized by Merton (1992) as the 
‘financial innovation spiral’.98 
Based on Campbell (1988), Frame and White (2004) suggest a list of economic / 
environmental factors favoring financial innovation. In addition to the previously 
mentioned economic advantages of financial innovation, Frame and White (2004) point 
out macroeconomic conditions – unstable macroeconomic conditions “… create 
uncertainties and risks and thus are likely to spur more innovation than would be true 
in a stable macroeconomic environment.” Based on empirical work, Frame and White 
(2004) conclude that: (i) regulation drives financial innovation; (ii) the size of banks is 
positively related with the adoption and diffusion of new technologies; (iii) investors’ 
degree of education and income is positively related with the use of new financial 
technologies; (iv) financial innovators are compensated for their efforts – there appears 
                                                 
95
 A good example of a tax induced financial innovation is structured leasing. According to Arzac (2005), 
this type of structured finance transaction can “… generate governable tax benefits, with a different 
sequence and structure than is achieved by depreciating the asset and covering attendant financial costs 
arising from the funding policy adopted to purchase the asset…” Caselli (2005) argues that the benefit 
from a structured leasing transaction is much more significant when tax benefits are greater and more 
flexible than those obtained by depreciating the underlying asset. For further discussion of structured 
leasing see Annex 3. 
96
 Smith et al. (1990) show that increased volatility (increase in riskiness) stimulates financial innovation. 
The increase in the volatility of interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices provides the impetus 
for financial innovation. The same idea is presented by Tufano (2003): innovation helps firms, investors 
and even governments to manage new risks (exchange rates risks, interest rate risks and political risks) 
that arise with higher globalization. 
97
 Advances in technology can explain the timing of some innovations. Tufano (2003) argues that 
advances in information technology support sophisticated pooling schemes observed in securitization. 
White (2000) points out that information technology and improvements in telecommunications have 
facilitated a number of innovations (e.g., new methods of underwriting securities, new methods of 
assembling portfolios of stocks, new markets for securities, and new means of executing security 
transactions). According to Frame and White (2004), the development of technologies like 
telecommunications and data processing allows financial-market participants to measure and manage 
their risk exposures more efficiently and effectively. 
98
 Merton (1995) argues that the financial-innovation spiral pushes the financial system toward an 
idealized target of full efficiency. That is, as new products become standardized and move from financial 
intermediaries to markets, “… the proliferation of new trading markets in those instruments makes 
feasible the creation of new custom-designed financial products that improve ‘market completeness’.” 
Success of products encourages the creation of new products and strategies and the spiral works toward 
the situation of a (theoretically) zero marginal transaction cost and the markets become complete. 
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to be first-mover advantages;
99
 and (v) the welfare effects of financial innovation appear 
to be positive. 
According to Duffie and Rahi (1995), “[F]inancial securities are designed to suit many 
motives”. They argue that the design of new securities is frequently motivated by new 
regulation, changes in fiscal or monetary policies, or adjustments in accounting 
standards or tax codes. Allen and Gale (1994) and Duffie and Rahi (1995) survey the 
literature on the role of innovation in completing and spanning markets. Considering the 
spanning role of securities and the interaction between spanning and asymmetric 
information, the authors reach two major conclusions: (i) from a spanning point of view, 
“… we can guess that there are incentives to set up markets for securities for which 
there are no close substitutes, and which may be used to hedge substantive risks”; and 
(ii) given the potential for adverse selection, “… we would expect issuers of securities to 
consider the impact of private information on the design of their securities.” 
Some authors present the advances in the theory of finance as an important factor 
promoting changes in the structure of the financial system and leading to financial 
innovations.
100
 Considering the investor perspective, Carow et al. (1999) argue that 
firms issue new securities to accomplish certain risk-return profiles desired by investors, 
or to replicate investment strategies available but at a lower cost. 
 
Nevertheless, there is no consensus amongst authors regarding the net impact of 
financial innovation on society. Merton (1992) believes in a net positive impact, stating 
that “[F]inancial innovation is viewed as the ‘engine’ driving the financial system 
towards its goal of improving the performance of what economists call the ‘real 
economy’.” He gives the example of the U.S. national mortgage market and the 
development of international markets for financial derivatives.
101
 However, other 
authors argue that financial innovation has a net negative impact on society. As pointed 
out by Tufano (2003), their arguments are based on the costs of innovation that 
postpone taxation, give rise to loss of tax revenues, introduce a sense of inequity, add a 
                                                 
99
 Duffie and Rahi (1995) also argue that there is a first-mover advantage in the process of innovation. 
100
 See, e.g., Bernstein (1992) for a description of the interplay between theory and practice in bringing 
about some of the major innovations of the last decades. 
101
 In 1995, Merton also states that “[I]nnovation in financial intermediation improves efficiency by 
completing markets, lowering transaction costs, and reducing agency costs.” 
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higher degree of complexity that leads to bad business decisions and social costs, and 
generate a high degree of market volatility. On the contrary, Frame and White (2004) 
declare that “[O]ur review of the empirical literature shows that the findings are largely 
positive, especially for product and process innovations.” Considering financial 
innovations as both the introduction of new assets and the integration of segmented 
markets, Acharya and Bisin (2005) show that financial innovations are socially 
desirable when: (i) they generate a higher level of risk-sharing, and (ii) given the 
backdrop of a segmented assets market in integrating economies, there is coordination 
between financial intermediaries in the innovation process. 
Finally, Gennaioli et al. (2010) present a mixed perspective on this subject. Despite 
recognizing the benefits of financial innovation, they “… take a more skeptical view 
about the social value of liquidity creation when investors neglect certain risks. In such 
a system, security issuance can be excessive and lead to fragility and welfare losses, 
even on the absence of leverage.” 
 
2.4.3 Financial Innovators 
Several studies attempt to answer the following question: who innovates? Ross (1988) 
refers to investment banks as institutions playing a key role in the financial innovation 
process. They maximize their profits by coming up with innovative securities with the 
goal of lowering marketing or search costs. Boot and Thakor (1997) focus on the design 
of financial systems
102
 and conclude that innovation would be lower in a universal 
banking system (e.g., the German system) than in a financial system with functionally 
separated banking (e.g., the U.S. system, where commercial and investment banking are 
functionally separated).
103
 Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000) study the incentives of 
investment banks to innovate. They find that banks with larger market shares tend to 
innovate and smaller banks are likely to share innovations with the larger ones.
104
 
                                                 
102
 For further discussion of financial system design topic see, e.g., Allen (1992) and Allen and Gale 
(1995). 
103
 According to Boot and Thakor (1997), universal banks have less incentive to innovate than specialized 
banks due to spillover effects. “This provides one perspective on the higher rate of financial innovation in 
the U.S. relative to Europe.” 
104
 As pointed out by Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000), “[I]nnovation incentives increase in volatile 
environments and regulatory scrutiny actually encourages loophole exploitation activity.” They show that 
the larger the market share the greater the investment bank incentives are to engage in innovative activity. 
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Tufano (1989) studies the benefits accruing to financial innovation and concludes that 
“… innovators earn higher market shares than followers, even though imitation is 
rapid.” Carrow (1999) achieves similar results but finds, contrary to Tufano (1989), that 
underwriting spreads decline as the number of followers increases. When considering 
the role of the issuers in financial innovation, Tufano (2003) argues that larger and well-
established firms have a leading role in innovation, while smaller and weaker firms face 
a greater number of constraints. 
 
2.4.4 Security Innovation Models 
There are several equilibrium models of financial innovation. Next, we will present the 
main results of the most prominent ones. Duffie and Rahi (1995) present two central 
stages in security innovation models: (i) “[G]iven the innovated securities and those 
already present, the determination of equilibrium prices and allocations”; and (ii) 
“[G]iven the correspondence mapping the securities to be chosen for innovation to the 
resulting set of security market equilibria, optimization by one or more innovators.” A 
major difficulty in developing such models is the determination of a reasonable and 
tractable model for security market equilibrium – a considerable number of financial 
innovation models leads to a situation with non-existing equilibrium, except for 
situations in which innovations lead automatically to complete markets. 
Elul (1995) studies the welfare effects of financial innovation in incomplete markets 
and shows that the introduction of a new security may have “… almost arbitrary effects 
on agents’ utilities.” Dow (1998) presents the same idea declaring that “… opening a 
new market may make everybody worse off, even when the new security is in 
equilibrium.”105 Allen and Gale (1989, 1991, and 1994) analyze the impact of short 
sales restrictions on social welfare. They argue that, in asset securitization, these 
restrictions can provide arbitrage value because two portfolios of securities paying the 
                                                 
105
 Dow (1998) uses standard finance models of trading with informational asymmetry [e.g., Kyle (1985) 
and Glosten and Molgrom (1985)] to study the value of financial innovation and analyze the welfare 
effect of adding a new security. Both arbitrageurs and hedgers can be worse off because the liquidity of 
the old market reduces as risk-averse arbitrageurs use new market to hedge their positions in the 
preexistent market. However, a major limitation of the model can be pointed out: production and 
investment decisions do not consider the effect of security prices. 
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same amount may have different prices.
106
 Along the same line of Allen and Gale, Chen 
(1995) argues that with short sale restrictions innovation may be profitable because it 
can reduce the cost of market frictions.
107
 Pesendorfer (1995) presents a model in which 
financial intermediaries can issue new securities collateralized by a portfolio of standard 
securities and by portfolios of securities innovated by other intermediaries. The author 
shows that there is no incentive in equilibrium to introduce new securities (securities 
that have not already been introduced).
108
  
Gennaioli et al. (2010) developed a model with a structure similar to traditional models 
of innovation [Ross (1976) and Allen and Gale (1994)], considering that investors and 
intermediaries do not attend to some risks, and have a preferred habitat for specific 
(namely safe) assets. They obtain three main results: (i) there is space for financial 
innovation, but when some risks are neglected, the new securities are over-issued; (ii) 
markets for new securities are fragile;
109
 and (iii) in equilibrium, intermediaries buy 
back many of the new securities and prices will fall sharply as a result of the over-
issuance of new securities.
110
 
 
2.5. Financial Innovation and Structured Finance 
“An important question concerns how such securities should be optimally designed; in 
other words, how should the payoffs to a security be allocated across states of nature in 
order to maximize the amount the issuer receives?” 
Allen and Gale (1989) 
 
                                                 
106
 Considering the Allen and Gale articles together, results are disconfirming: in their 1989 paper, they 
show that innovation is efficient and may enhance social welfare (when considering that short selling is 
severely limited); however, in their 1991 article, they find that financial innovation is not necessarily 
efficient (assuming the environment in which the set of traded securities is endogenous and investors are 
permitted to undertake unlimited short sales). 
107
 Chen (1995) developed a model based on intermediaries that create new securities collateralized by 
old ones. 
108
 Pesendorfer (1995) bases his/her work on a notion of equilibrium similar to that presented by Allen 
and Gale (1989, 1991, and 1994); i.e., all consumers and intermediaries optimize, and markets clear. 
109
 When additional news about unattended risks catches investors and intermediaries by surprise, 
investors dump the ‘false substitutes’ and fly to the safety of traditional securities. 
110
 The model fits well the international financial crises that started in the second half of 2007. 
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A considerable number of new financial products have been brought to financial 
markets recently. Thus, an important question concerns: why the design of new 
securities or products matters? The results of Modigliani and Miller (1958) and of 
subsequent authors
111
 that, under a specific set of restrictive and artificial assumptions – 
when markets are complete – the capital structure decision of firm was irrelevant to its 
market valuation, suggests that the design of securities issued in this case is also 
irrelevant. However, the result that capital structure effectively matters in a world where 
market frictions and imperfections are present indicates that the design of securities may 
also be important.
112
 This throws light on the optimal design of securities and on the 
development of structured finance products.
113
 In academia, models such as that of 
Allen and Gale (1989) suggest that successful structured finance products allocate cash 
flows to the investors who value them the most, allowing securities to be held in their 
most valuable form. Thus, structured finance research needs to focus on market 
imperfections to understand the design of structured finance transactions. 
 
The profusion of new products and securities introduced in financial markets in recent 
years has been attributed to a variety of causes: regulation, changes in fiscal or 
monetary policies, adjustments in accounting standards or tax codes, and volatility in 
interest rates, among others. Finnerty (1988) presents deregulation of the financial 
services industry and increased competition within investment banks as important 
causes to financial innovation. Investment banking institutions play an important role in 
the development and introduction of innovative products.
114
 One of the main activities 
of these institutions is the search for opportunities to create new financial instruments. 
                                                 
111
 Such as Stiglitz (1969, 1974), Baron (1974, 1976), and Hellwig (1981). 
112
 Allen and Gale (1989) developed a model of security design in which they explicitly incorporate the 
transaction costs of issuing securities and conclude that “… Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) irrelevance 
result does not hold: the value of firms has to depend on their financial structure to give them incentive to 
issue costly securities.” Harris and Raviv (1989) state that security design is a tool for resolving conflict 
of interest between contestants for control and outside investors and for maximizing firm value.  
113
 Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007) argue that “[S]tructured Finance denotes the art (and science) of 
designing financial products to satisfy the different needs of investors and borrowers as closely as 
possible.” 
114
 In an Arrow-Debreu world with complete markets and complete information, financial intermediaries 
would not have space. However, in today's world there are numerous reasons why the investment 
opportunities offered by financial markets are incomplete, in particular: (i) complexity – the market 
provides only simple contracts; (ii) liquidity – a limited set of securities is usually observed; (iii) legal 
uncertainty – preference for securities on which there is a settled body of case law; and (iv) gains from 
standardization – higher volume of trading in standard securities. 
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By combining a set of already existing components, it is possible to satisfy some special 
needs of specific groups of investors. As referred by Breuer and Perst (2007),
115
 “… this 
process is called ‘financial engineering’, as investment bankers act similarly to 
engineers or natural scientists when planning and creating complex financial 
innovations, on the basis of some elementary building blocks, in order to meet their 
customers’ needs.” According to Finnerty (1988), financial engineering is the 
‘lifeblood’ of financial innovation activity.116 
Duffie and Rahi (1995) present the same idea saying that “[T]he innovator, often as 
investment bank, usually acts as an intermediary.” Investment banks also innovate 
through their underwriting activities, acting as design and pricing consultants to firms 
willing to issue a new financial instrument or product. The authors point out the creation 
of asset-backed securities – such as collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) – as a 
major example of financial innovation.
117
  
In his 1989 work, Tufano developed an empirical study about the advantages of 
financial innovation for investment banks. As patent or copyright protection is difficult 
to obtain for financial products, Tufano argues that by innovating, an investment bank 
expects to capture a higher share in the underwriters market.
118
 Through innovation, an 
investment bank obtains expertise and reputation, factors that give first-mover 
advantages to these institutions.
119
 But when a new and complex security is designed, 
                                                 
115
 Breuer and Perst (2007) apply the cumulative prospect theory, in combination with arbitrage theory, to 
price and evaluate Discount Reverse Convertibles (DRCs) and Reverse Convertible Bonds (RCBs) as 
examples of structured products. 
116
 Investment banks face strong financial incentive for engineering innovative securities or products 
because the development of a new product provides an opportunity to solicit business from clients that 
have traditionally worked with other investment banks. 
117
 Caselli and Gatti (2005) present securitization (in addition to project finance, structured leases, and 
acquisition finance activities, supported on a strong debt component – mostly leveraged buyouts) as a 
type of structured finance. As asserted by Roever and Fabozzi (2003) “… securitization is a form of 
financing where monetary assets with predictable cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created 
third party that has borrowed money to finance the purchase. These borrowed funds are raised through 
the sale of asset-backed securities (ABS), which can take the form of either commercial paper or bonds.” 
For further discussion of securitization and asset-backed securities see Annex 1. 
118
 The incentive to innovate is reduced unless an innovator can prevent competitors from freely imitating 
its innovations. Such problems can be acute for financial innovations because the costs of security 
innovation – product development, marketing, and legal expenses – can be substantial. Therefore, 
investment banks may have a limited first-mover advantage before rival banks can offer similar products. 
119
 According to Duffie and Rahi (1995), this expertise “... includes the ability to exploit the properties of 
the financial product to the benefit of the issuer (for example, obtaining the most efficient tax shield if the 
product is designed for tax avoidance), the ability to price the product in the market accurately, and 
knowledge of the market of potential investors in the product.” 
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the investment bank has to have the ability to convince an issuer (or investor) that it 
would receive (or pay) a fair value for that security. Otherwise, it will be difficult for 
the security to reach the market.
120
 Moreover, the financial innovation impact depends 
on the level of financial market sophistication. For example, the introduction of a new 
structured product is likely to be less successful in an underdeveloped financial market 
than in a more developed and sophisticated financial market. 
Finnerty (1988) argues that one of the financial engineering branches involves the 
creation of solutions to corporate finance problems, “… such as the design of 
customized security arrangements for a project finance or leveraged buyout […] those 
involved in various forms of asset-based financing.”121 Thus, Structured Finance 
products are commonly mentioned as one group of newly introduced instruments 
resulting from financial innovation activities. 
The success of structured products depends on the trade-off between the costs for the 
issuer and the benefits they offer to investors.
122
 Therefore, they have to offer issuing 
company’s shareholders real value added for being so popular. Based on Finnerty’s 
(1988) work about securities innovation, we can point out some sources of value that 
can be added by structured finance transactions: (i) risk reallocation / yield reduction – 
risks are transferred from those who are less willing to bear it to those who are more 
willing to bear it and, therefore, they require a smaller yield premium [e.g., 
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) and stripped mortgage-backed securities]; 
(ii) reduced agency costs – the capital structure must be engineered to satisfy the risk-
return preferences of the various classes of investors and to minimize potential agency 
costs (e.g., project finance and leveraged buyouts); (iii) reduced issuance costs (e.g., 
securitization); and (iv) tax arbitrage (e.g., structured leases). 
                                                 
120
 Bearing in mind the model of security standardization developed by Gale (1992), we can argue that 
there may be an aversion to complexity in security design related to the costs associated with the analysis 
of complex securities. 
121
 Finnerty (1988) points out that financial engineering “… involves the design, the development, and the 
implementation of innovative financial instruments and processes, and the formulation of creative 
solutions to problems in finance.” The author gives leveraged buyout structuring, corporate restructuring, 
and project finance/lease/asset-based financial structuring as prominent examples. 
122
 Investment banks typically calculate the costs of creating a new structured product supported on 
arbitrage-theoretical tools for perfect capital markets. The evaluation of investor’s potential utility gains 
requires one to abstract from a perfect capital market as customers do not have the same market 
assessment as investment banks do. See Breuer and Perst (2007) for further discussion of this subject. 
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Additionally, the demand for tailored products, like structured finance products is 
encouraged by the increase of delay costs faced by firms. As explained by 
Bhattacharyya and Nanda (2000), “… banks will tend to pursue innovation 
opportunities in areas where clients face greater costs of delay.” Structured finance is 
often used if the established forms of external finance are unavailable for a particular 
financing need, or traditional sources of funding are too expensive, circumstances where 
firms may face higher delay costs. 
 
As previously noted, with the discussion of the security design and financial innovation 
theory it is primarily aimed to put into perspective some of the theoretical foundations 
of the firms’ decision to select structured finance instruments and products as a 
component of its strategic financing decision. One of the unsatisfactory aspects of 
corporate finance theory is its inability to explain why firms decide to obtain funding 
via structured finance instruments and products vis-a-vis straight debt financing. In 
Chapter 3, we discuss the literature of structured finance, which is the theoretical 
framework that enabled the formulation of the testable hypotheses. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 49 
3. Review of Structured Finance Literature 
3.1. Introduction 
The literature on structured finance is scarce when compared to other fields of corporate 
finance. Only a small number of academic and professional (financial intermediaries as 
principal actors in the market) studies can be found, which systematically address 
structured finance. Taking into consideration that structured finance is a business area 
that encompasses a wide range of transactions, we decided to include securitization, 
project finance, structured leasing and leveraged acquisitions
123
 under the classification 
of structured finance transactions. This perimeter of analysis was built based on existing 
literature, as well as on the observation of the transactions undertaken by the 
intermediaries competing for this business area (section 3.2 explains this choice). 
Going through the existing literature, a set of relevant papers can be found on the 
subject of structured finance.
124
 In the following sections, we discuss structured finance 
literature based on the central economic benefits as well as on the major problems 
related to the use of these financing instruments. Considering that structured finance, 
more specifically asset securitization, played a relevant role in the development and 
propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, we dedicate a specific section to this 
issue. Our goal is to review the most influential theoretical papers, summarize their 
results, present their relationship to each other, and associate them with the existing 
empirical evidence. Furthermore, grouping prominent papers in this manner enables us 
to exam the relationships among similar key economic benefits and disadvantages of 
different structured finance transactions. 
With the purpose of achieving an analysis as clear and extensive as possible, and also to 
put into perspective the approach to the problem adopted in this study, the extant 
literature has been classified according to the major group of categorization and to the 
type of structured finance transaction we are analyzing. Such classification is 
                                                 
123
 Leveraged Acquisitions are acquisition finance activities conducted by utilizing a deal based on a 
strong debt component. Considering that LBOs are the most widespread category of such transactions, 
from now on we will use indistinctly throughout the dissertation Leveraged Acquisitions and LBOs. 
124
 Literature review is carried out based not only on structured finance literature but also on the most 
prominent papers on each type of operations identified as examples of structured finance transactions; i.e., 
securitization, project finance, structured leasing, and leveraged acquisitions. 
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summarized in Table 3.1 and will be closely followed in the next sections (the 
numbering in the table matches that of the following sections of this chapter). 
Each of these major groups is discussed in a separate section, despite the fact that many 
of the papers would fit well in more than one group. In each group we build on previous 
research, review the most influential theoretical papers and attempt to interweave them 
in a manner that produces a coherent picture of the structured finance theory as it is 
presented today. Annex 5 shows a summary of relevant literature on structured finance 
by presenting a table in which we build up a relationship between reviewed studies and 
key theoretical elements of structured finance transactions; i.e., (1) operational and 
informational efficiency; (2) asymmetric information; (3) capital structure; (4) tax, legal 
and regulatory issues; (5) agency problems; and (6) motivations for using structured 
finance. 
 
This chapter has four sections. The first section introduces the main purpose of this 
chapter. Section two gives a perspective on the existing definitions of structured 
finance. Additionally, we contribute to a systematic definition of structured finance. The 
third section outlines the economic motivations for structured finance transactions. 
Next, we present some problems related to the use of structured finance. Finally, we 
examine the influence of structured finance transactions in the development and 
propagation of financial crises, especially the 2007/2008 financial turmoil. 
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3.2. Definition of Structured Finance 3.2.1. Existing Definitions of Structured Finance
3.2.2. A Contribution to the Definition of Structured Finance
3.3. Motivations for Using Structured Finance 3.3.1. Source of Liquidity and Funding Diversification Securitization (3.3.1.1.) | Structured Leasing (3.3.1.2.)
3.3.2. Reduction of Funding Costs Securitization (3.3.2.1.) | Project Finance (3.3.2.2.) | Structured Leasing (3.3.2.3.)
3.3.3. Improved Efficiency Securitization (3.3.3.1.) | LBOs (3.3.3.2.)
3.3.4. Reduction of Agency Costs Project Finance (3.3.4.1.) | LBOs (3.3.4.2.) | Securitization (3.3.4.3.)
3.3.5. Reduction of Information Asymmetries Securitization (3.3.5.1.) | Project Finance (3.3.5.2.) | LBOs (3.3.5.3)
3.3.6. Higher Leverage and Tax Shields/Savings Project Finance (3.3.6.1.) | LBOs (3.3.6.2.) | Securitization (3.3.6.3.) | Structured Leasing (3.3.6.4.)
3.3.7. Improve/Preserve Financial and Regulatory Ratios Project Finance (3.3.7.1.) | Securitization (3.3.7.2.) | Structured Leasing (3.3.7.3.)
3.3.8. Risk Management Securitization (3.3.8.1.) | Project Finance (3.3.8.2.) | Structured Leasing (3.3.8.3.)
3.3.9. Financial Flexibility Project Finance (3.3.9.1) | Structured Leasing (3.3.9.2.) | Securitization (3.3.9.3.)
3.4. Problems Related to the Use of Structured Finance 3.4.1. Complexity Securitization | Project Finance | LBOs | Structured Leasing
3.4.2. Off-Balance Sheet Treatment Securitization | Project Finance | Structured Leasing
3.4.3. Asymmetric Information Problems Securitization | LBOs
3.4.4. Agency Problems Securitization
3.4.5. Higher Transaction Costs Securitization | Project Finance | LBOs | Structured Leasing
3.4.6. Wealth Expropriation LBOs | Structured Leasing
3.5. Structured Finance and Financial Crises 3.5.1. Financial Crises
3.5.2. Structured Finance and The Subprime Financial Crisis
3.5.3. Concluding Remarks
Major Group Elements of Structured Finance Type of Structured Finance Transaction
 
Table 3.1: Review of Structured Finance literature 
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3.2. Definition of Structured Finance 
3.2.1 Existing Definitions of Structured Finance 
Davis (2005) argues that “… the definition of structured finance is broad, and not 
everyone agrees on exactly what it is.”125 Defining the boundaries of such a structure is 
not fully consensual, especially among financial intermediaries in this area of 
business.
126
 Correspondingly, Criado and Rixtel (2008) state that structured finance “… 
relates to a group of complex instruments and mechanisms that defers simple universal 
definition…” 
Relying on a broad definition, Fabozzi et al. (2006) define structured finance as “… 
techniques employed whenever the requirements of the originator or owner of an asset, 
be they concerned with funding, liquidity, risk transfer, or other need, cannot be met by 
an existing, off-the-shelf product or instrument. Hence, to meet this requirement, 
existing products and techniques must be engineering into a tailor-made product or 
process. Thus, structured finance is a flexible financial engineering tool.”127 According 
to Jobst (2007), “[S]tructured finance encompasses all advanced private and public 
financial arrangements that serve to efficiently refinance and hedge any profitable 
economic activity beyond the scope of conventional forms of on-balance sheet securities 
(debt, bonds, equity) at lower capital cost and agency costs from market impediments 
on liquidity”. Similarly to Jobst (2007), Tavakoli (2008) asserts that “[S]tructured 
finance is a generic term referring to financings more complicated than traditional 
loans, generic bonds, and common equity.” Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007) argue 
that “[S]tructured Finance denotes the art (and science) of designing financial products 
                                                 
125
 Davis (2005) implements a survey which asks some of the expert contributors to the Journal of 
Structured Finance two basic questions (Questionnaires were sent to 53 people and 27 responses were 
received): (1) ‘What is your definition of structured finance?’; ‘Where do you think the boundaries are?’. 
As pointed out by Fabozzi et al. (2006), “[I]t is apparent from the survey that ‘structured finance’ covers 
a wide range of activity in the market.” 
126
 Davis (2005) also presents some difficulties related to the definition of structured finance: (i) in 
structured finance business, the “… very hard-to-define attribute may help preserve its creativity, 
vibrancy, and flexibility and generally contribute to the success of structured finance…”; and (ii) that the 
field of finance is dynamic and “… what was complex and structured today may become ‘plain-vanilla’ 
and standard tomorrow.” 
127
 According to Fabozzi et al. (2006) this is “… a good working definition for structured finance [though] 
there are alternative definitions…” See their work for some additional definitions proposed by 
practitioners and regulators. They conclude by stating that “… it is probably best to say that there is no 
one definition of structured finance, and that the term can be used to describe any financial transaction 
that is not plain vanilla.” 
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to satisfy the different needs of investors and borrowers as closely as possible”. 
Coinciding with Jobst (2007) and Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007), Fabozzi and 
Kothari (2007) present a structured finance transaction as a financing solution or 
product that is structured to achieve certain purposes and needs. 
According to Caselli and Gatti (2005) asset securitization, project finance, structured 
lease and acquisition finance activities, supported by a strong debt component (mostly 
leveraged buyouts – LBOs), are the formats of structured finance.128 Based on a survey 
of experts on the definition of structured finance, Fabozzi et al. (2006) point out that 
structured finance should include securitization, leasing, project finance, and other 
‘unusual complex financing transactions’.129 Building on the characteristics of such 
transactions, Akbiyikli et al. (2006) argue that “[A] structured financial transaction is 
any transaction that makes use of an SPV.”130 
Servigny and Jobst (2007) advocate a restricted view of structured finance, referring 
only to securitization.
131
 This point is well illustrated in Oldfield (1997) who notes that 
a structured finance transaction “… has three parts. The first is collateral to back the 
transaction. The second is an entity to house the transaction, and the third is a set of 
financial instruments issued by the entity to fund the transaction”.132 Coval et al. (2009) 
offer a similar definition. Essentially, structured finance activities are based on “… the 
pooling of economic assets like loans, bonds, and mortgages, and the subsequent 
issuance of a prioritized capital structure of claims, known as tranches, against these 
collateral pools.” 
                                                 
128
 As pointed out by Caselli and Gatti (2005), “[T]his perimeter of analysis does not lend itself to 
meticulous theoretical or empirical debate. The evidence which emerges from observation of the 
managerial practices of international and domestic intermediaries that compete in this business […] 
substantially confirms this choice.” 
129
 The survey was primarily implemented by Davis (2005). 
130
 Similarly, Kavanagh (2003) asserts that structured finance generally requires participation from 
inception of more than one entity and has its origins in two different phenomenons which occurred in the 
1970s: securitization and the use of special purpose vehicles (SPVs). 
131
 Contrastingly, Fabozzi et al. (2006) suggest that “…our view is that securitization is a subset of 
structured finance.” 
132
 Similarly, the Committee on the Global Financial System (2005) defines structured finance based on 
“… three key characteristics: (1) pooling of assets (either cash-based or synthetically created); (2) 
tranching of liabilities that are backed by the asset pool (this property differentiates structured finance 
from traditional “pass-through” securitisations); (3) de-linking of the credit risk of the collateral asset 
pool from the credit risk of the originator, usually through use of a finite-lived, standalone special 
purpose vehicle (SPV).” A similar perception is presented by Rajan and McDermott (2007) and Krebsz 
(2011). 
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As it becomes clear from the above, some authors strongly interrelate structured finance 
with securitization. For example, according to Oldfield (1997), structured finance, in a 
narrow sense, is used almost interchangeably with securitization. In the present 
dissertation, we will use a wide definition of structured finance.
133
 Additionally, there 
are different opinions as to whether we should categorize derivatives – such as interest 
rate, currency and credit – as structured finance. Although some derivatives are highly 
structured products, we consider derivatives to be elements that allow certain plain 
vanilla products to become structured. This argument is supported by Fabozzi et al. 
(2006) who states that “[W]hile an interest rate derivative contract does not in itself 
constitute structured finance, the use of derivatives is one of the features that 
distinguish large structured financings.” Thus, considering the existing literature one 
can identify the following types of structured finance: 
i. Securitization.134  135 
ii. Project finance.136  137 
                                                 
133
 Our view is similar to that of Fabozzi et al. (2006), who assert that “[C]learly structured finance 
encompasses more than simply securitization, although that is a popular definition for it.” Tavakoli 
(2008) presents the same line of reasoning as well as Roever and Fabozzi (2003), who state that 
“[S]tructured Finance also encompasses project finance, some types of equipment and cross-border 
finance, and some other kinds of secured financing.” 
134
 According to Cumming (1987), “… perhaps the best definition of securitization is the matching up of 
borrowers and savers wholly or partly by way of financial markets. Such a definition covers issuance of 
securities such as bonds and commercial paper – a practice that entirely replaces traditional financial 
intermediation – and also sales of mortgage-backed and other asset-backed securities – transactions that 
rely on financial intermediaries to originate loans but use the financial markets to seek the final holders.” 
As asserted by Roever and Fabozzi (2003) “… securitization is a form of financing where monetary 
assets with predictable cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created third party that has 
borrowed money to finance the purchase. These borrowed funds are raised through the sale of asset-
backed securities (ABS), which can take the form of either commercial paper or bonds”. Securitization 
can be implemented basically in two ways [ECB (2008)]: (i) in a so-called true sale securitization, the 
underlying assets are sold by the originator (a firm or more specifically a bank) to the SPV and thus 
removed from its balance sheet; (ii) in a so-called synthetic securitization, the underlying assets remain on 
the balance sheet of the originator, and only risk of the underlying assets is transferred to the SPV by 
buying credit derivatives such as credit default swaps over these assets. Securitization products generally 
are viewed as including Asset-Backed Securities (ABS), Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities 
(RMBS), Commercial Mortgage-Backed Securities (CMBS), Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), 
and Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP). See Annex 1 for an overview of securitization 
instruments. 
135
 See, for example, Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Davidson et al. (2003), Tavakoli (2003, 2008), Tasca 
and Zambelli (2005), Kothari (2006), Jobst (2007), and Krebsz (2011) who explain the structure of 
securitization transactions. 
136
 Esty (2004a) argues that a project finance transaction “… involves the creation of a legally 
independent project company financed with nonrecourse debt (and equity from one or more sponsors) for 
the purpose of financing a single purpose, industrial asset.” Gatti (2008) points out that project finance 
“… is the structured financing of a specific economic entity – the SPV, or special-purpose vehicle, also 
known as the project company – created by sponsors using equity or mezzanine debt and for which the 
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iii. Structured leasing.138  139  
iv. Leveraged Acquisitions140 [through particular focus on Leveraged Buy-Outs 
(LBOs), the most common category of such a transaction].
141
  
142
 
v. Structured Credit.143 
                                                                                                                                               
lender considers cash flows as being the primary source of loan reimbursement, whereas assets represent 
only collateral.” See Annex 2 for a review of project finance. 
137
 See, for example, Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996), Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Esty (2004a, 
2004b, 2007), Gatti (2005), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), and Gatti (2008) for further discussion of 
this topic. 
138
 Used in particular transactions involving complex and large-scale assets, such as airplanes, ships, 
industrial plant and equipment, and large real estate projects, a structured leasing transaction can fall 
within one of the following two categories: (1) leveraged transactions (mainly cross-border leasing with a 
trust); and (2) synthetic leasing. A structured leasing is understood as a transaction that develops 
synergies between funding policy, risk management of the underlying assets and tax benefits. With these 
types of transactions, the sponsor aims to manage the need for funding in a creative manner, as opposed 
to just raising funds by means of recourse to the leasing instrument. Thus, structured leasing is a highly 
flexible tool. As pointed out by Caselli (2005), structured leasings, “… inasmuch as a leasing transaction 
can: (i) enable contract terms to be modulated in relation to the lessee’s cash flow structure; (ii) generate 
governable tax benefits, with a different sequence and structure than is achieved by depreciating the asset 
and covering attendant financial costs arising from the funding policy adopted to purchase the asset; (iii) 
finance the possible call option at the end of the leasing transaction.” See Annex 3 for an overview of 
structured leasing. 
139
 See Carretta and De Laurentis (1998) for a review of leasing transactions. For a comprehensive 
account of theoretical and empirical literature on structured leasing see, among others, Braund (1989), 
Slovin et al. (1990), Fowkes (2000), Caselli (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Deo (2009). 
140
 Capizzi (2005) asserts that “… in accordance with operative approach characterizing the most 
important local and global investment banks, leveraged acquisitions have been placed within the area of 
structured finance.” He argues that “… leverage acquisitions constitute an important category in the area 
of structured finance, namely those that result in leaving the acquired company with a debt ratio that is 
higher than what it was before the acquisition.” With regard to the literature and the business area of 
structured finance, the following types of leveraged acquisitions can be identified: (1) Leveraged Buy-Out 
(LBO); (2) Management Buy-Out (MBO); (3) Management Buy-In (MBI); (4) Buy-In Management Buy-
Out (BIMBO); (5) Family Buy-Out (FBO); (6) Workers Buy-Out (WBO); (7) Corporate Buy-Out (CBO); 
and (8) Fiscal Buy- Out (FBO). 
141
 In a Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO) transaction, a group of investors finance the acquisition of a 
corporation or division mainly by borrowing against the target’s future cash flow. According to 
Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009), “[A] leveraged buyout (LBO) is the acquisition of a company, division, 
business, or collection of assets (“target”) using debt to finance a large portion of the purchase price. 
The remaining portion of the purchase price is funded with an equity contribution by a financial sponsor 
(“sponsor”). LBOs are used by sponsors to acquire a broad range of businesses, including both public 
and private companies, as well as their divisions and subsidiaries.” Arzac (2005) argues that “…the 
buyout is organized and effected by the promoters, which include a sponsor and, often, existing 
management as well […] The sponsor is usually an LBO equity fund or the Merchant-banking arm of a 
financial institution. It provides the core equity and effectively controls the acquisition”. Focusing on the 
LBO equity contribution, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) assert that “[T]he leveraged buyout investment 
firms today refer to themselves (and are generally referred to) as private equity firms.” See Annex 4 for a 
review of leveraged acquisitions and LBOs. 
142
 See, among others, Weston et al. (2001), Arzac (2005), Capizzi (2005), Ronneboog and Simons 
(2005), Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Guo et al. (2011). 
143
 Essentially financing products with structured coupons and / or linked derivatives; e.g., loans with 
embedded derivatives and even relatively complex transactions that lower corporations’ funding costs by 
converting floating rate obligations to fixed rated obligations (or the opposite) through the use of interest 
rate swaps. As pointed out by Cherubini and Della Lunga (2007), “… nowadays, the structured finance 
terms has been provided with a more specialized meaning, i.e. that of a set of products involving the 
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3.2.2 A Contribution to the Definition of Structured Finance 
Used by financial and non-financial institutions, structured finance is often adopted 
when the established forms of external finance are unavailable for a particular financing 
need or conventional sources of funding are too expensive. Cherubini and Della Lunga 
(2007) present a similar idea declaring that “… structured finance product is nowadays 
constructed to enable someone to do something that could not be done in any other way 
(or in a cheaper way) under the regulation.” It is generally used wherever there are 
reliable cash flow streams across the life span of the loan, which the owner wants to 
make use of to obtain a sizable cash payment from financing proceeds, in a situation 
where the owner would like to retain the ownership of, and manage, those cash streams 
(e.g., cash streams such as proceeds from power purchase agreements, rents from real 
estate assets, toll revenues, payments of taxes, patent revenues, credit card revenues, 
and the like) [Davis (2005)]. 
Structured finance transactions seek to replace capital-market-based financing with 
credit financing through disintermediation, as well as seek to sponsor financial 
relationships outside the lending and deposit-taking capabilities of banks. According to 
Fabozzi et al. (2006), “… the issuer raises funds by issuing certificates of ownership as 
pledges against existing or future cash flows from an investment pool of financial assets 
in a bid to increase the issuer´s liquidity position without increasing the capital base or 
by selling these reference assets to a special-purpose vehicle, which subsequently issues 
debt to investors to fund purchase.”  
Fabozzi et al. (2006) point out that one or more of the following elements generally 
characterize a structured finance transaction: (1) a complex financial transaction which 
may involve the actual or synthetic transfer of assets or risk exposure in order to achieve 
certain accounting, regulatory, or tax objectives; (2) a transaction based on a special 
purpose vehicle (SPV);
144
 (3) an asset-backed bond issue; (4) a combination of interest 
                                                                                                                                               
presence of derivatives…” Some authors [e.g., Rajan and McDermott (2007)] use the term ‘Structured 
Credit’ when referring to Credit-Linked Notes (CLNs) and Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs), the 
so-called cash products; and to credit derivatives, which “… range from single-name default swaps to 
indexes like the CDX and iTraxx to custom synthetic CDO tranches.”, the so-called synthetic products. In 
our work, all CLNs and CDOs are subsets of securitization. 
144
 Gorton and Souleles (2005) define Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), Special Purpose Entity (SPE) or 
Special Purpose Company (SPC) – employed in this work as synonymous – as “… a legal entity created 
by a firm (known as the sponsor or originator) by transferring assets to the SPV, to carry out some 
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rate and credit derivatives; (5) a transaction used by banks, other financial institutions, 
and corporations as a source of funding and/or a favorable capital, tax, and accounting 
treatment; and (6) disintermediation between banks and other corporations. 
According to Caselli and Gatti (2005), the presence of a separate vehicle company (SPV 
or SPE) is critical when it has to be decided if a transaction can be included in the class 
of structured finance.
145
 They present the following conditions: (1) “[T]he recipient of 
the funds raised is a separate entity from the party or parties sponsoring the 
transaction…” – this is achieved by creating separate vehicle companies, chosen to take 
on the initiative and to secure cash receipts and payments which result; (2) “… all 
economic consequences generated by the initiative in question are attributed to this 
SPV…” – consequently, creditors grant financing to the SPV and not to sponsors or 
originators; and (3) “… the assets instrumental to managing the project are separated 
from the remaining assets of the parties that create the vehicle…” – thus, both cash 
flows generated by the initiative and SPV´s assets become collateral for creditors.
146
 
These three conditions explain why ‘off-balance sheet financing’ and structured finance 
are frequently applied as synonymous.
147
 
                                                                                                                                               
specific purpose or circumscribed activity, or a series of such transactions. SPVs have no purpose other 
than the transaction(s) for which they were created, and […] the rules governing them are set down in 
advance and carefully circumscribe their activities.” They usually house asset risk either through the 
purchase of the assets or in a synthetic form. SPVs can have several legal forms; e.g., a limited 
partnership, a limited liability company, a trust, or a corporation [Kramer (2003)]. Tavakoli (2008) 
presents SPVs as powerful structured finance tools, which can be either onshore and offshore. See 
Lancaster et al. (2008) and Tavakoli (2008) for further discussion of ‘structured finance and special 
purpose entities’. See Annex 6 for further discussion of this subject. 
145
 This is the reason why they identify securitization, project finance, structured leasing transactions and 
leveraged acquisitions as examples of structured finance transactions. However, for securitization, we can 
find transactions that do not use SPVs. For example, up until the 1990s, CDOs all used SPVs that 
purchased the portfolio of assets and issued securities. The SPV purchased the assets from a bank’s 
balance sheet and/or trading books – the so-called ‘true sale’ structures. Synthetic securitizations 
eliminate the need for an SPV entity, albeit they may also use an SPV to issue limited recourse notes 
linked to a CDO’s tranched credit risk. 
146
 The creation of a separate entity that raises funding for the implementation of a specific initiative (or 
project) implies that the loan repayment is guaranteed primarily by the generation of cash flows by the 
SPV’s assets. Since creditors are dealing with no-recourse financing (or limited recourse financing in 
specific assets), “[T]he net worth of the sponsors is, in theory, irrelevant in assessing the financial 
sustainability of the loans…” [Caselli and Gatti (2005)]. Special purpose entities are often classified as 
either ‘pass-through’ structures – they pass all of the principal and interest payments of assets through to 
investors (are generally passive tax vehicles and do not attract tax at the entity level) – or ‘pay-through’ 
structures – they allow for reinvestment of cash flows, and purchase of additional assets. 
147
 This idea is corroborated by Gorton and Souleles (2005), who assert that “[O]ff-balance sheet 
financing arrangements can take the form of research and development limited partnerships, leasing 
transactions, or asset securitizations, to name the most prominent.” Although the terms SPV, SPE and 
SPC can be used interchangeably, it is important to distinguish between corporate and trust structures. 
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As we intend to consolidate the various definitions of structured finance in a systematic 
way, we propose a definition as follows:
148
 
Structured finance refers to the design of financial products or instruments 
based on the use of flexible tools to meet, as closely as possible, the 
requirements of the originator or owner of an asset (or pool of assets) and 
the needs of investors. Thus, structured finance encompasses all financial 
arrangements helping to efficiently (re)finance a specified pool of assets 
beyond the scope of on-balance sheet financing products or instruments. 
In a structured finance transaction, the requirements of the owner of the assets or cash 
flows refer to liquidity, funding, risk transfer, efficient risk allocation, favorable capital, 
tax and accounting treatment, or other needs. Instruments are usually designed (e.g., 
covenants, warrantees, corporate structure, contract, trusts, etc.) to achieve segregation 
of those assets or cash flows from the originator or sponsor of the transaction. 
Additionally, credit enhancement mechanisms are implemented (e.g., the use of 
warrantees to enhance recoveries and tranching to define risk attachment points). 
 
As suggested above, a key feature of structured finance transactions that distinguishes 
them from other financing arrangements is the presence of a separate vehicle company 
(SPV or SPE); i.e., the recipient of the raised funds is a separate entity from the party or 
parties sponsoring the transaction. This separation is achieved by creating vehicle 
companies (SPVs) designated to take on the initiative and to secure cash receipts and 
the resulting payments. Additionally, the SPV plays an important role in the 
segmentation of cash flows and risks in a form proving more attractive for investors, 
through a process called structuring. Given the crucial role that the SPV plays in 
structured finance, we will not consider structured credit as a type of structured finance. 
                                                                                                                                               
While in USA SPEs are often (but not always) set up as trusts for tax reasons, in non-USA venues the 
SPE is a common corporate structure. SPEs are currently set up in a variety of tax-friendly venues 
including Delaware, New York, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, the Caymans, the Bahamas, Ireland, Jersey, 
Guernsey, and Gibraltar. While choice of venue usually revolves around tax issues, other considerations 
like accounting issues, bank regulatory issues, and other structural issues are also relevant according to 
the specific structured finance application (see Annex 6 for further discussion). 
148
 This definition stems from the literature review, as well as from the evidence which emerges from the 
observation of the practices of international and domestic intermediaries that compete in structured 
finance business area. 
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Leland (2007) shares the same intuition, indicating that “[S]tructured Finance typically 
refers to the transfer of a subset of a company’s assets (an ‘activity’) into a bankruptcy-
remote corporation or other special purpose vehicle or entity (SPV/SPE). These entities 
then offer a single class of securities […] or multiple classes of securities…” Schwarcz 
(2005) also states that structured finance transactions “… include securitization, project 
finance, and similar transactions in which companies originating financial assets, such 
as accounts receivable, loans, or lease rentals, utilize special-purpose vehicles (SPVs, 
sometimes referred to interchangeably as special-purposes entities or SPEs) to 
facilitate the transaction.” 149 
 
In brief, the three main specificities of structured finance are: (i) the critical role of the 
vehicle company; (ii) high level of leverage; and (iii) centrality of prospective cash flow 
in order to evaluate the feasibility of operation, representing the distinguishing elements 
of operations such as project financing, structured leasing, securitization and leveraged 
acquisitions.  
 
 
3.3. Motivations for Using Structured Finance 
This section discusses the main economic forces underlying the creation of structured 
finance transactions or products. It first presents the economic benefits of structured 
finance transactions in general. Subsequently, we examine the economic advantages for 
originators / sponsors of each specific type of structured finance product; i.e., 
securitization, project finance, leveraged acquisitions (particularly LBOs), and 
structured leases.  
To analyze the motivations for using structured finance instruments, first and foremost 
it is important to understand why they create value. For that, we have to look into 
Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) capital structure irrelevance preposition, which states 
                                                 
149
 The same idea is presented by Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), IMF (2005), Akbiyikli et al. 
(2006), and Fabozzi et al. (2006). As pointed out by Akbiyikli et al. (2006), a structured finance 
transaction “… is any transaction that makes use of an SPV [which] is set up for the purpose of allowing 
firms to sell or divest themselves of particular assets and to raise funds.” 
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that firm value does not depend on how a firm finances its investments.
150
 Thus, the 
choice between corporate finance or structured finance to raise funds should be a matter 
or indifference to shareholders; i.e., in a Modigliani and Miller’s world, structured 
finance would not exist, as it would offer no advantages over less costly alternatives. 
Modigliani and Miller’s theorem is based on the idea that capital markets are perfect. 
However, as pointed out by Esty (1999) “[T]he real world, of course, is not perfect by 
this definition; it contains ‘imperfections’. Besides taxes, transactions costs, and costs 
of financial distress, there are costs stemming from asymmetric information between 
corporate insiders and outsiders, and from incentive conflicts among managers, 
shareholders, and creditors.” Generally, structured finance creates value by minimizing 
the net costs associated with the stated market imperfections. 
Caselli and Gatti (2005) present the advantages of assembling a financing transaction in 
a structured form by analyzing the difference between two logics of financing: (1) off-
balance sheet forms (or structured finance); and (2) on-balance sheet forms (or 
corporate financing). They argue that “… the first economic benefit of structured 
transactions lies in the cost of funding of new financial resources for the initiative. If the 
benefits of a reduced cost of funding are greater than the cost of the credit 
enhancement, realizing the initiative on a structured basis is advantageous for sponsors 
[…] the second advantage in separating the initiative from the sponsor(s) lies in 
maintaining financial flexibility of this company or companies.”151 The first economic 
benefit is also presented in a 1995 report entitled ‘New Developments in Structured 
Finance’.152 In this report, it is indicated that one of the principal benefits from 
structured financing is a reduction in the cost of financing. Any transaction, which is 
specifically structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing assets producing 
                                                 
150
 Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that, under certain conditions, financial policy does not matter. 
In particular, under perfectly competitive and complete capital markets and when there are no bankruptcy 
costs, no taxes, no information asymmetries, and no transaction costs, firm value is independent of its 
capital structure. 
151
 The isolation of an initiative or a pool of assets in a separate vehicle company is intended to isolate the 
risk of these assets from those of the sponsor or sponsors. Thus, different creditworthiness can be reached 
by the SPV and the sponsor. As asserted by Caselli and Gatti (2005), “[O]ne extreme may be strong 
sponsors and weak initiatives segregated in a vehicle. The other extreme (more commonly found in 
practice) could be cases where sponsors have rather low creditworthiness but nonetheless are able to 
make the initiative hinge on a vehicle company which, appropriately secured by credit enhancement 
mechanisms, can obtain a higher credit rating than its originators.” 
152
 Written by the Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate Reorganization of the Association of the Bar 
of the City of New York. 
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cash flows solely for supporting the transaction, allows the issuer to obtain better credit 
ratings and/or leverage than it would by issuing senior secured debt. These elements 
allow the sponsor to achieve lower costs of funding. Akbiyikli et al. (2006) corroborate 
the second economic benefit presented by Caselli and Gatti (2005). They argue that the 
purpose of structured finance is to help to preserve its own credit standing and future 
access to financial markets. 
Tavakoli (2008) argues that the key motivations for using structured finance include, 
among others: (i) reducing funding costs – e.g., in securitization, SPVs can obtain 
capital at rates better than those obtainable by the originator; (2) changes on the right-
hand side of the balance sheet; (3) increasing balance sheet capacity – firms use 
structured finance vehicles to finance assets used in their business; (4) providing 
liquidity by transforming illiquid assets into cash; (5) regulatory capital arbitrage;
153
 (6) 
financing assets; and (7) tax management. Similarly, Lancaster et al. (2008) argue that 
structured finance has played a critical role in improving the efficiency, liquidity, and 
availability of capital around the world. Additionally, they also present borrowing costs 
reduction, greater and more diverse investment opportunities, financial synergies,
154
 and 
risk distribution as some important benefits of structured finance. 
In summary, the issuance of multiple debt security classes (tranching), the access to new 
sources of funding, the relaxation of capital constraints for financial institutions, and the 
reduction of information asymmetries and agency costs are often cited as structured 
finance benefits.
155
 Additionally, “…the structuring process serves to complete the 
financial market by creating high-credit-quality securities that would otherwise not 
exist in the market…” [Rajan and McDermott (2007)].156 
                                                 
153
 Tavakoli (2008) argues that “… both banks and insurance companies engage in regulatory capital 
arbitrage as a prime motivation for securitization of assets that offer a low return on regulatory capital.” 
154
 According to Leland (2007), financial synergies are often referred to as the principal reason for 
structured finance. Allowing for a model where information is symmetric, cash flows are verifiable, and 
there are no agency costs, the author points out that “… financial synergies can be of significant 
magnitude, and it provides a clear rationale for asset securitization and project finance.” Consistent with 
Gorton and Souleles (2005), Leland (2007) argues that securitization is more desirable when the 
originating firm is riskier. When referring to project finance, Leland (2007) points out that the use of 
separate financing allows greater additional debt financing. 
155
 See, for example, Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988), Lockwood et al. (1996), Oldfield (1997), Esty 
(2003), DeMarzo (2005), and Fender and Mitchell (2005). 
156
 For example, by issuing CDOs from portfolios of bonds or loans rated A, BBB, or BB, financial 
intermediaries can create a larger pool of AAA-rated securities and a small unrated or low-rated bucket 
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Taking into account the prior, as well as the current literature available in the field of 
structured finance, we have identified the following categories of key economic benefits 
provided by structured finance, which will be developed further in the next sections: (1) 
it enables the financing of a unique asset class that (i) previously may have been 
financed only by traditional borrowing methods or (ii) could not be financed at all 
without structured finance – thus, structured finance is a source of liquidity and funding 
diversification; (2) it can reduce borrowing costs; (3) it contributes to more complete 
capital markets, improving operational and informational efficiency; (4) it can reduce 
agency costs; (5) it contributes to a reduction of information asymmetries; (6) it allows 
the issuer to obtain more leverage compared to senior unsecured debt and to increase 
tax shields/savings; (7) it permits the originator/sponsor to improve/preserve financial 
and regulatory ratios; (8) it may transfer the risk of assets or liabilities to allow an 
originator to do additional business without expanding its balance sheet – risk 
management; and (9) it grants more flexibility to issuers, in terms of maturity structure, 
security design, and asset types – financial flexibility. 
Table 3.2 provides a map with the mentioned economic forces underlying the creation 
of structured finance transactions or products and identifies those which are behind the 
implementation of each specific type of structured finance transaction; i.e., 
securitization,
157
 project finance,
158
 LBOs,
159
 and structured leases.
160
 
                                                                                                                                               
where almost all the credit risk is concentrated; i.e., the CDO tranching process creates both higher and 
lower credit quality financial instruments from the original portfolio. 
157
 The rationale for the emergence of securitization transactions should be seen in economic advantages 
associated with: (1) increasing liquidity and funding [e.g., Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Jobst (2006a), and 
Krebsz (2011)]; (2) reducing the cost of funding [e.g., Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Davidson et al. 
(2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Jost (2006), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; 
(3) allowing originators to obtain diversification of funding sources [e.g., Davidson et al. (2003), Roever 
and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011)]; (4) improving originators’ risk 
management [e.g., Cumming (1987), Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988), 
Davidson et al. (2003), Jobst (2006a), and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)]; (5) increasing the segmentation 
between the origination and investment functions [e.g., Davidson et al. (2003)]; (6) allowing originators 
to benefit from regulatory and/or tax arbitrage [e.g., Cumming (1987), Jones (2000), Davidson et al. 
(2003), and Krebsz (2011) ]; and (7) allowing originators to improve key financial ratios [e.g., Goldberg 
and Rogers (1988), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011)]. 
Additionally, securitization can help to reduce real-world costs, like regulatory costs, information costs, 
agency costs, and bankruptcy costs [Hill (1996)]. See Annex 1 for further discussion of the economic 
motivations for using securitization. 
158
 Taking into account the available literature in the field of project finance, the use of such structured 
finance transactions may enable sponsors to obtain several benefits, namely: (1) reduction of funding 
costs [e.g., Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Esty (2003), and Gatti (2005)]; (2) maintenance of the 
sponsors financial flexibility [e.g., Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001), Gatti (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; (3) 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 63 
LBOs Project Securitization Structured
Finance Leasing
Source of Liquidity and Funding Diversification
Reduction of Funding Costs
Improved Efficiency (Informational and Operational)
Reduction of Agency Costs 
Reduction of Information Asymmetries
Higher Leverage and Tax Shields/Savings
Improve/Preserve Financial and Regulatory Ratios
Risk Management
Financial Flexibility
Structured Finance Transactions
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Table 3.2: Motivations for using structured finance transactions or products. 
 
Despite the common motivations behind all the types of structured finance transactions 
(e.g., reduction of information asymmetries, higher leverage and tax shields/savings), it 
can be concluded from Table 3.2 that securitization and project finance are the 
transactions with more common economic motivations or benefits. This is a very 
relevant conclusion as we use asset securitization bonds and project finance loans as 
                                                                                                                                               
higher debt-to-equity ratios [e.g., Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001), Gatti (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; (4) 
separate incorporation and avoidance of contamination risk (the separation of large, risky projects in an 
SPV) [e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; (5) reduction of corporate taxes [e.g., Esty (1999)]; (6) improve risk 
management [e.g., Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996) and Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b)]; and (7) reduction 
of the costs associated with market imperfections; i.e., the benefits from reducing information 
asymmetries, incentive conflicts, taxes, and distress costs are significant [e.g., Brealey, Cooper, and 
Habib (1996) and Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b)]. See Annex 2 for further discussion of project finance 
economic benefits. 
159
 The rationale for the emergence of LBOs can be explained by the following sources of wealth gain: (1) 
tax savings [e.g., Weston et al. (2001), Renneboog and Simons (2005), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and 
Guo et al. (2011)]; (2) reduction in agency costs [e.g., Opler and Titman (1993), Weston et al. (2001), 
Renneboog and Simons (2005), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Guo et al. (2011)]; (3) wealth 
transfers [e.g., Weston et al. (2001) and Renneboog and Simons (2005)]; (4) better management 
incentives [e.g., Opler and Titman (1993), Weston et al. (2001), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Guo 
et al. (2011)]; (5) improvement of operating performance and efficiency [e.g., Lichtenberg and Siegel 
(1990), Weston et al. (2001), and Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)]; (6) corporate undervaluation [e.g., 
Weston et al. (2001) and Renneboog and Simons (2005)]; (7) transaction costs reduction [e.g., 
Renneboog and Simons (2005)]; and (8) takeover defenses [e.g., Renneboog and Simons (2005)]. See 
Annex 4 for further discussion of the economic motivations for using LBOs. 
160
 The main factors that stimulate the demand for structured leasing transactions are [Caselli (2005) and 
Fabozzi et al. (2006)]: (1) risk transfer and risk management of the asset; (2) funding cost reduction via 
tax benefits exploitation; (3) overall investment financing; (4) progressive extension of the average term 
for leasing transactions; (5) working capital conservation; (6) credit capacity preservation; and (5) 
reduction of information asymmetries between the lender (lessor) and the borrower (lessee). We present 
structured leasing transaction as off-balance sheet financing that can fall within one of the following two 
categories: (1) Leveraged Leases (or tax or true leases); and (2) Synthetic Leases (or synthetic structured 
leasing). See Annex 3 for an overview of structured leasing transactions. 
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proxies for structured finance transactions in our univariate analysis (chapter 4) and 
multivariate regression analysis (chapter 5). 
 
3.3.1. Source of Liquidity and Funding Diversification 
3.3.1.1. Securitization as a Source of Liquidity and Funding Diversification 
The increased liquidity and diversification of funding sources are usually presented as 
economic advantages associated with securitization.
161
 Roever and Fabozzi (2003) refer 
to securitization as a reliable and relatively unconstrained source of off-balance sheet 
financing, which mitigates traditional funding constrains and may favor company 
growth. The same line of reasoning is presented by Jobst (2006a) and Krebsz (2011), 
but for two different time periods. Jobst (2006a), referring to a pre-crisis (2007/2008 
financial crisis) period, argues that securitization allows issuers to raise funds and 
improve their liquidity position without increasing their on-balance sheet liabilities and 
capital base. Recently, Krebsz (2011) pointed out that “[T]he credit crisis with its far-
reaching implications for the global financial markets has put the liquidity and funding 
strategy on the top of the agenda of most banks and financial institutions.” Although 
securitization has played a relevant role in the development and propagation of the 
financial crisis, it also allowed financial institutions to solve liquidity and funding 
problems in the post-crisis period, namely as an active tool to access various lending 
schemes (SLSs) by central banks around the world. Similarly, Goldberg et al. (1988), 
Estrella (2002), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), and Cardone-
Riportella et al. (2010) present the need for new sources of funding – banks may sell 
loans in order to fund their assets instead of raising deposits – as one of the main types 
of motivations behind securitization.
162
 
However, the diversification benefits of securitization may also be presented from the 
perspective of investors. According to Fabozzi et al. (2006) securitization transactions 
allow investors “… to diversify sector interest; access different (and sometimes 
superior) risk-rewards profiles; and access sectors that are otherwise not open to 
                                                 
161
 See, among others, Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Jobst (2006a), Fabozzi and 
Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011). 
162
 Once an originator is well established in the asset-backed securities market, it can look at both the 
corporate bond market and the asset-backed securities market when assessing its best funding source. 
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them.” Thus, the key benefit to investors is the ability of securitization to tailor risk-
return profiles.
163
 Jobst (2006a) corroborates this idea and states that “[I]nvestors of 
securitized debt can quickly adjust their investment holdings at low transaction costs in 
response to a change of personal risk sensitivity, market sentiment or consumption 
preferences.” Krebsz (2011) presents the ability to address different types of investors, 
wider pricing, and ratings stability as the main advantages of asset securitization from 
the perspective of investors.
164
 
 
3.3.1.2. Structured Leasing as a Source of Funding 
As regards structured leasing, Beattie et al. (2000) argue that poor liquidity and cash 
flow have significant influence over leasing decisions.
165
 They conclude that structured 
leasing is usually used by firms using complex and large-scale assets and who face 
liquidity and cash flow constrains.
166
 According to Krishnan and Moyer (1994), “… 
firms with greater financial distress potential and high debt leverage, ceteris paribus, 
may find financing alternatives to leasing unavailable.” Thus, when bankruptcy 
probability increases, lease financing becomes a more attractive financing option as it 
offsets the higher transaction costs that are usually associated with lease agreements 
versus secured debt agreements. 
 
                                                 
163
 Hill (1996) argues that securities issued in a securitization transaction “… can have a risk and reward 
configuration the investor otherwise could have obtained only by acquiring, at higher cost, several 
securities.” 
164
 Referring to ratings’ stability, Krebsz (2011) points out that prior to credit crisis securitization 
transactions ratings used to be relatively stable and showed a fairly low rating volatility compared to 
corporate bonds. Nevertheless, this “… changed dramatically during the credit crisis when the market 
saw for the first time bulk downgrades of AAA-rated SF instruments, sometimes bond downgrades by up 
to 14 notches (i.e., for some CDO of ABS deals) in a single rating action.” 
165
 Beattie et al. (2000) present the following four major determinants of leasing: (1) industry sector is a 
significant explanatory factor for the level of leasing; (2) firm size has a different influence on the choice 
between leasing and other forms of debt finance – small companies may prefer leasing over debt; (3) tax 
considerations is an important factor in the choice between debt and leasing; and (4) poor liquidity and 
cash flow have significant influence over the decision of leasing. 
166
 The authors argue that “… the characteristics of a firm’s current and future assets, and in particular 
asset specificity, can influence financing.” The same line of reasoning is presented by Smith and 
Wakeman (1985), Williamson (1988), Krishnan and Moyer (1994), and Barclay and Smith (1995). 
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3.3.2. Reduction of Funding Costs 
According to Jobst (2007) structured finance is invoked by financial and non-financial 
institutions, when established forms of external finance are either (i) unavailable for a 
particular financing need, or (ii) too expensive for issuers in what would otherwise be 
an unattractive investment based on the issuer’s required cost of capital. Thus, the 
reduction of funding costs is commonly presented as a major economic force behind 
structured finance transactions. 
 
3.3.2.1. Securitization and the Reduction of Funding Costs 
The main motivations for securitization can be discussed from the perspective of a 
nonbank corporation and from the perspective of a bank corporation.
167
 According to 
several authors [e.g., Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and 
Fabozzi (2003), Jost (2006a), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)], 
the reduction of funding costs is a benefit commonly referred to either a bank
168
 or a 
nonbank corporation.
169
 According to Davidson et al. (2003), “… firms with high-
quality assets may be able to reduce their financing costs through securitization.” This 
happens when bonds created through securitization have a higher credit rating or are 
otherwise perceived to have less risk than the originator’s general obligations. The same 
line of reasoning is presented by Hill (1996) and Riddiough (1997). According to the 
authors, securitization has been used by lower-rated issuers to reduce asymmetric 
information costs. This is corroborated by Carow et al. (1999), who argue that “… for 
corporations with a low credit rating, securitization may be able to reduce borrowing 
costs on that debt.” This happens because the credit quality of the issued securities is 
                                                 
167
 According to Jobst (2006a), the more pertinent advantages of securitization enjoyed by financial 
institutions are: (1) the reduction of economic cost of capital (economic motive) and regulatory minimum 
capital requirements (regulatory motive); (2) the diversification of asset exposures (hedging motive); and 
(3) the recognition of the gains (or losses) within the moment of the true sale of the asset pool. Moreover, 
the reduction of agency costs (e.g., underinvestment and asset substitution) and the asset-liability 
management improvement “… are particularly instrumental to the efficient capital management of non-
financial corporate issuers.” 
168
 Fabozzi et al. (2006) argue that “[B]anks can use securitization to (1) support asset growth, (2) 
diversify their funding mix and reduce cost of funding, and (3) reduce maturity mismatches.” 
Securitization enables banks to reduce their funding costs because most of the notes issued by SPVs are 
higher rated than the bonds issued directly by the originating bank itself. 
169
 Lupica (1998) presents several motivations for a nonbank corporation to choose to securitize its assets, 
namely: (1) improving liquidity; (2) increasing diversification of funding sources; (3) lowering the 
effective interest rate; (4) improving risk management; and (5) achieving accounting-related advantages. 
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based on the underlying pool of assets, not the issuer’s credit rating. As a result, the 
originator is allowed to issue a security with a credit rating superior to its own.
170
 
 
3.3.2.2. Project Finance and the Reduction of the Net Cost of Financing 
According to Gatti (2005), the use of project finance may enable sponsors to obtain a 
reduction of funding costs. This happens when the “… structuring cost for the initiative 
(that in any event is very high, especially if the deal is extremely complex) is less than 
the saving on funding cost, owing to the improved credit rating obtainable by the 
venture when compared to that of the sponsor.” The same intuition is shown by Esty 
(2003) who states that “… project finance reduces the net cost of financing these assets 
[i.e.] project companies have evolved as institutional structures that reduce the cost of 
performing important financial functions such as pooling resources, managing risk, and 
transferring resources through time and space…” Project finance reduces risk through 
credit enhancement and other structuring devices, which reduce lender exposure by 
altering borrowers risk profiles over time. 
Empirically, the reduction of funding costs is corroborated by Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000), who find that “… floating-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads (over 
LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans.” According to Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981), the distinctive role of banks is to overcome information problems and minimize 
adverse selection in the lending market. Financial intermediation, information 
revelations, and monitoring are the channels through which banks reduce the costs of 
funds [Diamond (1984)]. Project finance enables lenders to distinguish project 
performance from firm performance, monitor project management decisions, and 
                                                 
170
 If a corporation wants to issue bonds collateralized by a pool of assets it probably will have the same 
funding cost as if it issues a corporate bond. But if the company creates another legal entity (SPV) and 
sells the assets – in such a way that if the company is forced into bankruptcy (there is a ‘true sale’) its 
creditors cannot try to recover the financial assets because they are legally owned by the SPV – to that 
entity who issues bonds backed by those assets, investors interested in buying the bonds will evaluate the 
credit risk of the assets. Additionally, the SPV will show the characteristics of the collateral to a rating 
agency which evaluates the credit quality of the collateral and will inform the issuer what must be done to 
obtain a desired credit rating. In this case, the issuer must be asked to ‘credit enhance’ the structure. 
Basically, rating agencies look at the potential losses from the collateral and make a determination of how 
much credit enhancement is needed for the bond classes issued to achieve the ratings targeted by the 
issuer. Thus, the company can obtain funding using its assets to achieve a better credit rating for the 
bonds issued than otherwise would be obtained if the company chose to issue corporate bonds – with 
enough credit enhancement, it can issue a bond with a triple A rating. 
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determine the cash flow available for interest and principal repayment, thus reducing the 
net costs of financing. 
 
3.3.2.3. Structured Leasing and the Reduction of Funding Costs 
Comparing leasing with purchasing using borrowed funds, Fabozzi et al. (2006) present 
funding cost reduction via tax benefits as one of the major economic forces behind 
structured leasing.
171
 In a tax-oriented transaction, the lease is treated as a true sale for 
tax purposes, so that tax benefits of ownership can be transferred to the lender. This is 
crucial in a true sale lease transaction, where a lessee cannot use tax benefits associated 
with equipment ownership due to the lack of currently taxable income or net 
carryforwards of operating loss.
172
 According to Caselli (2005), “… the tax variable 
becomes a powerful tool for creating economic maneuvering room to reduce the cost of 
capital for its users.” Capturing tax benefits means taking advantage of the differences 
in tax treatment between leasing and other forms of financing with the aim of reducing 
the lessee’s cost of capital – reduction of the all-in cost.173 Additionally, Eisfeldt and 
Rampini (2009) argue that the benefit of leasing is that the repossession of leased assets 
is easier than the foreclosure of secured loans; i.e., lease financing has an advantage 
over straight debt and even secured debt, as far as it offers a stronger financial claim, 
being effectively senior to any other financial claim.
174
 
Referring to the use of leasing in project financing, Fowkes (2000) argues that true 
leasing may provide an alternative source of funding at a lower cost; i.e., in a leveraged 
lease (or tax or true lease) the lessee forgoes tax depreciation benefits but negotiates 
                                                 
171
 According to Beattie et al. (2000), “[L]easing provides the option of ‘selling’ tax allowances to a 
lessor, in exchange for lower rental payments.” 
172
 Lease payments from leasing rather than borrowing are lower if a lease transaction is properly 
structured in a way that the lease will be treated as an operating lease for financial reporting purposes and 
as a true lease for tax purposes. A synthetic lease is a type of structured leasing transaction that meets this 
need while avoiding one of the drawbacks of a true lease for many lessees: the possibility of loss when 
the true sale lease terminates and the equipment may have to be acquired from the lessor. 
173
 As in other tax-based techniques, the implementation of a structured leasing transaction is more 
important when the value of the asset is large and allows for a potentially greater appropriation of tax 
benefits. 
174
 Some authors study the debt versus leasing decision. Ang and Peterson (1984) fail to demonstrate that 
debt and leasing are substitutes and find a complementary relationship. Although Lewis and Schallheim 
(1992) find similar results, Marston and Harris (1988), and Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) support 
substitutability. More recently, Mehran et al. (1997) present mixed evidence and Beatti et al. (2000) argue 
that leasing and debt are partial substitutes. 
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lower lease rates with the lessor. Altamuro (2006) shows that synthetic leases provide 
an economic benefit for the lessee in the form of lower direct financing costs – she finds 
that “… synthetic lease firms receive more favorable interest rates on future syndicated 
loans.”175 The minimization of bankruptcy risks for the bank or leasing company, 
compared to traditional real estate loan, is commonly presented as an effective benefit 
for lenders which is reflected in the borrower all-in cost. 
 
3.3.3. Improved Efficiency 
In an Arrow and Debreu (1954) world, with perfect and complete markets, financial 
innovation through the sale of new types of securities does not add value for firms and 
investors, since the cash flows generated by a new security can be replicated by a 
combination of existing securities.
176
 Nevertheless, if financial markets are incomplete, 
adding new types of securities can be valuable if it helps to make markets more 
complete. Provided that an investor can obtain benefits of diversification by adding 
structured finance securities to his portfolio, then the identification of the sources of 
market incompleteness by arrangers can make these type of securities profitable. 
Moreover, and regarding operational efficiency, several authors argue that structured 
finance allows companies to profit from their comparative advantages. 
 
3.3.3.1. Efficiency and Securitization 
When facing perfect capital markets, repackaging – pooling assets and then reselling the 
pool as a collection of new securities – and tranching – transforming the profile of 
expected cash flows into multiple tranches – would not create value. However, this is at 
odds with the reality of the securitization market. Gaur et al. (2003) argue that if asset 
(re)packaging helps to complete markets, then the market will place a premium on them 
                                                 
175
 Altamuro (2006) presents the following three major benefits to lessees using synthetic leases: (1) the 
ability to finance 100% of the purchase price of the asset; (2) providing favorable financing taxes vis-a-
vis traditional debt financing; and (3) generating financial reporting benefits – as the synthetic lease is an 
off-balance sheet transaction, neither the asset nor the related liabilities are reported in financial 
statements. 
176
 The fundamental asset price insight of Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) is that an asset’s value is 
determined by state prices and its distribution of payoffs across economic states. Thus, securities that 
guarantee their promised payments in the best economic states will have high values, because these are 
the states where a dollar is less valuable. 
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and the originator can profit from pooling and tranching the assets. “[T]hus, even 
though the market is incomplete, there is demand from individuals who are willing to 
buy unspanned claims at arbitrage-free prices.” Repackaging gains can be explained by 
three market imperfections: transaction costs, market incompleteness [Duffie and Rahi 
(1995), Riddiough (1997), and Gaur, Seshadri, and Subrahmanyam (2003)], and 
asymmetric information. 
The segmentation of financial markets gives rise to arbitrage opportunities which may 
be exploited by originators in creating asset securitization securities.
177
 Oldfield (2000) 
presents this idea noting that structuring profits can result from price discrimination.
178
 
The common referred types of arbitrage opportunities that usually arise when market 
segmentation exists are: (i) limits imposed by preferences, investment mandates or 
regulation;
179
 and (ii) pricing differentials among assets.
180
 In order that these 
opportunities become effective it must be impracticable for other arbitrageurs to step in 
and force the profit from structuring a transaction to be zero.
181
 With regards to 
structured mortgages securities (a type of securitization), Oldfield (2000) points out that 
“… structuring activity is designed to segment customers and create price 
discrimination by selling different tranches for different prices…”; i.e., an underwriter 
profits with price discrimination. A successful underwriter must possess some 
advantages, based on either customer information, access to collateral, or structuring 
analytics. In this way, the arguments presented by the author suggest that more complex 
or unusual assets may lead more easily to structured finance transaction than 
standardized ones. 
Likewise, Fender and Mitchell (2005) suggest that segmented financial markets (due, 
for example, to the existence of investors with ratings-based investment mandates) may 
make it attractive for structured finance arrangers to create new assets with desired loss 
                                                 
177
 Described and formally characterized by Varian (1987). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) provide a 
discussion of the limits to arbitrage. If efficient arbitrage prevails – commonly in liquid markets with low 
transaction costs – financial structuring does not create value. 
178
 Price discrimination works by selling different tranches of a transaction for different prices. 
179
 This may limit the access of particular groups of investors to securities that might otherwise be 
desirable. The arranger takes advantage of knowledge about investors’ demands by practicing price 
discrimination and captures part of the premium that the investor is willing to pay for the tailored product. 
180
 Such arbitrage opportunities emerge from differences in corporate bond spreads across rating 
categories. 
181
 For an arbitrageur to eliminate structuring profits, it is important that transaction costs are low and 
there are plenty of buyers and sellers. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 71 
characteristics for particular investor classes. The investors benefit as structuring allows 
the completion of incomplete financial markets – for example, by enabling investors 
constrained to invest in certain types of rated securities to gain exposure to asset classes 
like leveraged loans. Another example is given by Fabozzi et al. (2006) who argue that 
securitization transactions allow investors “… to diversify sector interest; access 
different (and sometimes superior) risk-rewards profiles; and access sectors that are 
otherwise not open to them.” The same line of reasoning is presented by Jobst (2007). 
The author argues that securitization offers sponsors the flexibility to create securities 
with diverse risk-return profiles in terms of security design. It also contributes to a more 
complete capital market, by offering any mean-variance trade-off along the efficient 
frontier of optimal diversification at lower transaction cost.
182
 
Finally, Lancaster et al. (2008) argue that securitization has played a critical role in 
improving the efficiency, liquidity, and availability of capital. However, the underlying 
assumption behind the argument that securitization improves the efficiency of credit 
markets is that there is no information loss between borrowers and investors, which had 
not happened before the financial crisis of 2007/2008.
183
 As pointed out by Bolton et al. 
(2010), this information loss can be explained by conflicts of interest
184
 that emerged 
from Credit Rating Agencies’ (CRAs) behavior in structured finance markets, which 
may have reduced market efficiency – competition among CRAs facilitated ratings 
shopping by issuers and resulted in excessively high reported ratings. 
 
As regards operational efficiency, Berger and Udell (1993) suggest that the ‘monitoring 
technology hypothesis’ of securitization allows companies to obtain technological gains 
from specializing in niches of comparative advantage (which suggests economies of 
scale in those activities). Hill (1996) argues that securitization may increase the future 
cash inflows of a firm due to effects of specialization in the origination and retention of 
                                                 
182
 The same idea is presented by the Committee on the Global Financial System (2005): “[I]nvestors’ 
interest has been motivated by portfolio diversification and attractive risk-return profiles.” 
183
For further discussion of the causes and consequences of the 2007/2008 financial turmoil see section 
3.5. 
184
 Bolton et al. (2010) point out three sources of conflicts of interest in the Credit Ratings Agencies 
(CRAs) industry, namely: (i) CRAs can understate credit risk to attract more business; (ii) issuers are 
allowed to purchase only the most favorable ratings; and (iii) some investors (trusts) may take ratings at 
face value.  
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receivables. This idea is corroborated by Thomas (2001), who states that “… 
securitization allows companies – FIs [Financial Institutions] as well as non-FIs – to 
specialize on the activities of their comparative advantage.” 
 
3.3.3.2. LBOs and the Improvement of Operating Efficiency 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Weston et al. (2001), and Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) 
present the improvement of operating performance and efficiency as one of the main 
sources of wealth gains in LBOs. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) argue that LBOs 
contribute to a better allocation of resources in the economy by improving the operating 
performance of the target firm. According to Weston el al. (2001), the decision process 
can be more efficient under private ownership, which is associated with the delisting of 
the target firm. 
LBOs add industry and operating expertise, creating value to target companies. Private 
equity firms use their industry expertise and operating knowledge to develop value 
creation plans for their investments. The empirical evidence on the operations 
performance of companies shows largely that LBOs are associated with significant 
operating and productivity improvements. Cumming, Siegel, and Wright (2007) 
summarize much of this literature and conclude that there “… is a general consensus 
across different methodologies, measures, and time periods regarding a key stylized 
fact: LBOs [leveraged buyouts] and especially MBOs [management buyouts] enhance 
performance and have a salient effect on work practices.” 
 
3.3.4. Reduction of Agency Costs 
Adam Smith (1776) was the first to point out that large firms are not owned and 
operated by individual entrepreneurs. Smith recognized that the separation of the 
controlling power assigned to residual claimants and the power committed to 
professional managers is a source of inefficiency, due to potential misalignment 
between their objective functions.
185
 Since managers are responsible for control, it is 
                                                 
185
 According to Berle and Means (1932), a fundamental source of agency problems in firms is the 
separation of ownership and control. The owners of capital do not usually run the business they are 
financing, but leave it to agents (managers) to maximize returns on their investment. This gives rise to 
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possible to identify a triangular agency relationship between the manager, the investors 
with residual claims (equity holders), and the investors with fixed claims (debt holders); 
i.e., conflicts of interest do not arise exclusively from the manager-shareholder agency 
relationship. Other claimholders, such as debt holders, also have vested interests in the 
firm.
186
 As pointed out by Jensen and Meckling (1976), both equity and debt financing 
generate specific agency problems.
187
 
Ultimately, the incentives of the managers and possible conflicts of interest depend on 
the precise nature of the contracts governing the relationship between managers and 
owners, as well as on the firm’s financial structure. The inability to write complete 
contracts, combined with the fact that it is costly to monitor and enforce contracts, 
creates the potential for incentive conflicts between various agents inside firms. 
Therefore, one of the agency theory’s principal concerns is the design of efficient 
contractual arrangements allowing residual claimants (principals) to exercise their 
ownership control rights and monitor agents’ decision-making.188 
These incentive conflicts relate to investment decisions, which can fall into one of the 
following four categories: (1) overinvestment in negative NPV projects – known as free 
cash flow conflicts [Jensen (1986)]; (2) investment in high-risk, negative NPV projects 
– known as risk shifting [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]; (3) underinvestment in positive 
NPV projects – known as debt-overhang [Myers and Majluf (1984)]; and (4) 
                                                                                                                                               
conflicts of interest and diverging objectives between the agent and the capital owners (investors). See, 
among others, Eisenhardt (1989) for a discussion of agency theory. 
186
 Conflicts of interest between equity holders and debt holders result from the opportunistic behavior 
that allows owners to attempt to add to their own wealth at the debt holders’ expense. Typically, the most 
prevailing causes involved in shareholders-debt holders agency problems are: (1) claim dilution [Jensen 
and Smith (1985)]; (2) risk shifting [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]; (3) unexpected increases in dividend 
payments [Kalay (1982)]; (4) asset substitution [Jensen and Meckling (1976), Galai and Masulis (1976), 
and Jensen and Smith (1985)]; (5) underinvestment [Myers (1977, 1984)]; and (6) overinvestment [Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)]. 
187
 Several conditions should be observed in order that an agency problem arise in an agency relationship. 
First, a conflict of interest between the principal and the agent develops. However, this factor alone is not 
sufficient, because in a world without uncertainty it would be possible, ex ante, to write an incentive 
contract to induce the agent to act in the principal’s best interest. Thus, agency problems are also 
associated with uncertainty and the costs of writing and executing contracts. Agency costs, those that 
arise from agency problems, are the sum of the out-of-the pocket costs of structuring, administering, and 
enforcing contracts plus any residual losses involved [Jensen and Meckling (1976)]. 
188
 Literature concerning agency theory has developed along two theoretical paths: the positive and the 
normative (principal-agent). Among the most influential contributors to the positive agency theory path 
are Jensen and Meckling (1976). Other important contributors are Fama and Miller (1972), Jensen (1983), 
Jensen (1986), and Stulz (1990). See, e.g., Charreaux (1987) for a review of the literature on the positive 
agency theory. For further discussion of principal-agent theory see, among others, Ross (1973), Harris 
and Raviv (1979), Grossman and Hart (1983), Sappington (1991), and Rajan (1992). 
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underinvestment in risky, positive NPV projects due to managerial risk aversion [Smith 
and Stulz (1985)]. 
 
3.3.4.1. Project Finance and the Reduction of Agency Costs 
Esty (1999) argues that project finance can help to eliminate all four aforementioned 
investment distortions.
189
 It reduces overinvestment in negative NPV projects by 
requiring project companies to raise external funds from third parties;
190
 it reduces debt-
overhang problem by assigning project returns to new investors rather than existing 
capital providers;
191
 and it reduces the underinvestment in risky, positive NPV projects 
by isolating project risk and so reducing the risk contamination to sponsoring firms.
192
 
The same idea is presented by Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996), who argue that 
project finance creates value by resolving agency problems. Project finance can be used 
to mitigate costly agency conflicts (1) inside project companies – conflicts between 
sponsors (ownership) and managers (control) and conflicts between sponsors and 
related parties; and (2) among capital providers – conflicts between debt holders and 
equity holders. According to Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b), the creation of a special entity 
separate from the party or parties sponsoring the transaction provides an opportunity to 
address the agency conflicts between ownership and control.
193
 
Project finance structures use high ownership concentration and high leverage to 
discourage costly agency conflicts among participants. Esty (2004b) argues that project 
                                                 
189
 To explain the economic importance of project finance transactions, most existing studies focus on 
agency or moral hazard problems. See, e.g., An and Cheung (2010). 
190
 The use of high leverage forces managers to disgorge free cash flow in the form of interest and 
principal payments thereby limiting their ability to invest. Even though high leverage exacerbates the risk 
shifting problem, a project finance transaction is designed to minimize value destruction. 
191
 Project finance transactions allow companies with little spare debt capacity to avoid the opportunity 
cost of underinvestment in positive NPV projects. According to Esty (2003) project finance solves this 
problem “… by allocating project returns to new capital providers in a way that cannot be replicated 
using corporate debt.” Because this conflict occurs at the sponsor rather than the project level we 
distinguish the debt-overhang problem from agency cost motivation. See Myers (1977) for further 
discussion of debt-overhang phenomenon. 
192
 John and John (1991) present a theoretical analysis based on this underinvestment incentive of 
managers. They show that financing projects separately can reduce the agency cost of underinvestment. A 
similar idea is presented by Berkovitch and Kim (1990). 
193
 As referred by Esty (2003), “[I]n many ways, the observed governance structures in project 
companies resemble leveraged-buyouts (LBOs) and achieve many of the same results described by Jensen 
(1989) and Kaplan (1989 and 1991).” Gatti (2008) points out that the separation of the company and the 
new investment project is always the first best option for shareholders. 
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finance highly levered capital structures play an important disciplinary role, because 
they prevent managers from wasting free cash flow, and deter related parties from 
trying to appropriate it.
194
 The project company has to allocate cash flows according to a 
pre-determined ‘cash waterfall’, leaving no room for managerial discretion. 
Additionally, the combination of concentrated equity ownership (small board of 
directors comprised of directors from each sponsor) and direct control (compensation 
contracts for managers linked to project performance) prevents a wide range of 
incentive problems. In summary, structural features of project finance transactions, like 
extensive contracting, concentrated debt and equity ownership, separate legal 
corporation, and high leverage, reduce costly agency conflicts at the project level. 
 
3.3.4.2. LBOs and Agency Costs Reduction 
According to Opler and Titman (1993),
195
 Weston et al. (2001), Renneboog and Simons 
(2005), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Guo et al. (2011), the emergence of LBOs 
can be explained by wealth gains obtained via the reduction of agency costs. Three 
hypotheses are usually applied: (1) the incentive realignment hypothesis; i.e., the need 
to realign incentives of managers with those of shareholders, is frequently mentioned as 
a potentially important factor in LBO transactions [Kaplan (1989b)]; (2) the control 
hypothesis, meaning that the wealth gains come from the increase in the quality of 
control – an LBO transaction leads to a reunification of ownership and control by 
mitigating the free-rider problem [Grossman and Hart (1980)] in monitoring managerial 
actions in public corporations with a dispersed shareholder structure;
196
 and (3) the free 
cash flow hypothesis, suggesting that the wealth gains of LBOs are largely the result of 
                                                 
194
 The agency explanation of capital structure emphasizes the incentive conflicts among providers of 
equity capital, providers of debt capital, and firm managers. Project financing reduces the 
underinvestment cost of debt capital caused by the agency conflict between debt holders and equity 
holders. According to Esty (2004b), “[T]hus it provides strong empirical support for agency-based 
theories of capital structure in the presence of incomplete contracts.” For further discussion of capital 
structure and structured finance see sub-section 3.3.6. 
195
 Opler and Titman (1993) assert that “[P]roponents of LBOs (e.g., Jensen (1986, 1989)) argue that the 
transactions create wealth by improving managerial incentives and forcing disgorgement of excess free 
cash flow that would otherwise be invested unwisely.” 
196
 See, e.g., DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984), Admati, Pleiderer, and Zechner (1994), and Maug 
(1998). 
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the elimination of free cash flow problems – according to Jensen (1986), managers have 
incentives to retain resources and make firms grow beyond their optimal size.
197
 
Regarding the hypotheses presented, Jensen (1989) and Kaplan (1989a and 1989b) 
argue that by paying careful attention to management incentives, LBOs reduce agency 
problems between managers and shareholders. Private equity firms typically give the 
management team a large equity upside through stocks and options, and require 
management to invest in the company. Additionally, because companies are private, 
management’s equity is illiquid, what reduces their incentive to manipulate short-term 
results. Secondly, private equity investors control the boards of the acquired companies 
more actively and become more involved in their governance. This last idea is also 
presented by Tirole (2006). The author argues that LBOs, as governance instruments of 
the market for corporate control, create “… a new and superior form of corporate 
governance.”198 The third key ingredient in reducing agency problems is leverage – 
third hypothesis.
199
 As pointed out by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), “[L]everage 
creates pressure on managers not to waste money, because they must make interest and 
principal payments. This pressure reduces the ‘free cash flow’ problems described in 
Jensen (1986)…”  
 
3.3.4.3. Securitization and the Reduction of Conflicts of Interest 
Riddough (1997) proposes a model of asset securitization where there is a conflict of 
interest between junior and senior security holders. The author points out that the design 
                                                 
197
 See, e.g., Jensen (1986), and Cotter and Peck (2001). 
198
 Andres et al. (2007) examine a sample of 115 European leveraged going to private transactions from 
1997 to 2005 and posit that corporate governance mechanisms – related to free cash flow, shareholder 
protection, undervaluation and the market for corporate control – are “… important factors in explaining 
the short term gains generated by European LBOs.” The same line of reasoning is presented by 
Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007). According to Gertner and Kaplan (1996), and Acharya and Kehoe 
(2008), LBOs company boards are smaller and meet more frequently than public companies. 
Furthermore, private equity investors quickly replace management with poor performance. Guo et al. 
(2011) find that cash flow performance increases when the private equity replaces the CEO before or at 
the time of the LBO. 
199
 Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986, 1989) argue that debt can induce management to act in 
the interests of investors in ways that cannot be duplicated with optimally designed compensation 
packages. Guo et al. (2011) examine (for a sample of 192 buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006) if 
and how, LBOs create value. They argue that consistent with the benefits of debt, “… cash flows gains 
are greater for firms with greater increases in leverage as a result of buyout.” 
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of asset-backed securities depends on the security governance structure.
200
 In practice, 
the contractual structure is built up to specify the rights and responsibilities of the note 
holders and other third-party managers, in an attempt to reduce the conflicts of interest. 
Securitization may redress conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders in the 
capital structure choice of firms concerning possible agency costs due to 
underinvestment [Myers (1977, 1984)] and asset substitution [Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)]. Using optimal risk allocation models, Benveniste and Berger (1987) and James 
(1988) show that securitization can improve risk sharing and increase project funding 
by avoiding the Myers (1977) underinvestment problem.
201
 
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) point out that, under the pecking order theory,
202
 
issuers with severe information asymmetry problems would prefer to issue secured debt 
(i.e., asset-backed) – which carries lower agency costs – because investors receive their 
repayment directly from a diversified pool of asset exposures insulated from the issuer. 
According to the trade-off theory,
203
 the choice of secured debt would be restricted to 
those cases where the marginal benefit of debt outweighs the associated amount of 
agency and financial distress costs. This idea is corroborated by Jobst (2006a), who 
asserts that “… under the pecking order and trade-off theory asset securitisation is the 
refinancing instrument of choice for cash-strapped issuers, whose high agency costs of 
asymmetric information debar them from other forms of external finance.” 
The credit crisis of 2007/2008 has somehow tarnished the positive role played by 
securitization in helping to mitigate costly agency conflicts. Several authors [e.g., Alles 
(2001), Jobst (2006a), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Jobst (2009)] argue that 
securitization may lead to a severe principal-agent problem where the firm, who 
originates the assets to be ultimately sold and securitized, retains little or no interest in 
                                                 
200
 In a negotiation process with financial distress borrowers, conflicts of interests will emerge between 
junior and senior security holders, because the senior ones generally prefer immediate payoff to 
extension. However, for junior security holders – who possess superior asset pool information – loan 
extension incentives usually lead to higher levels of subordination. 
201
 See Jobst (2006a) for further discussion of this subject. 
202
 Myers and Majluf (1984) considered the effects of information asymmetry between managers and 
lenders on capital structure decisions and developed a model that shows why a firm may prefer to fund 
new projects with internal funds first, followed by external debt and finally external equity – the so-called 
pecking-order theory. 
203
 This theory holds that firms balance the tax advantage of borrowing against the cost of financial 
distress. See Miller (1977), Fama and French (1998), and Graham (2000). See sub-section 3.3.6 for 
further discussion of capital structure in structured finance framework. 
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the pool of securitized assets. They argue that, in the 2007/2008 financial crisis, 
originators and issuers were tempted to pursue their own economic incentives, which 
imposed a substantial agency cost on an otherwise efficient asset securitization. This 
subject will be further developed in section 3.5. 
 
3.3.5. Reduction of Information Asymmetries 
In financial contracting, the parties usually do not have all the information they need to 
make optimal decisions. Furthermore, other than not being completely informed, 
insiders and outside investors are also unequally informed. As referred by Leland and 
Pyle (1977) “… in financial markets, informational asymmetries are particularly 
pronounced.”204 This phenomenon is well known in the literature of corporate finance 
as the asymmetric information problem. 
Seminal contributions of Akerlof (1970),
205
 Spence (1973), and Crawford and Sobel 
(1982) support the development of the asymmetric information theories, suggesting that 
information is not costless and symmetrically distributed among economic agents. This 
reality has an impact on the economic wealth of contracting parties. When looking into 
financial instruments, unequal distribution of information amongst buyers and sellers 
limits their ability to ascertain the real characteristics of firms, projects or assets. In this 
scenario, the party with informational superiority tends to behave opportunistically and 
take advantage of this. The most common problems of asymmetric information are the 
adverse selection problem
206
 and the moral hazard problem.
207
 
                                                 
204
 It is widely accepted that securities are often issued under unequal access to information; i.e., different 
participants in financial markets typically have varying amounts of information about securities offered in 
the market. The market failure to distribute information symmetrically amongst agents introduces 
incentive problems in financial contracting, which are potential impediments preventing prices from fully 
reflecting available information. Asymmetric information problems are not costless because financial 
contracting tends to be more complex – which increases transaction costs – and particular forms of 
financial contracting are necessary to minimize the costs accruing to financing. 
205
 Akerlof (1970) pointed in his landmark paper that a market (the market for lemons) may function 
badly, or not function at all, if the one party (the informed one) has no way to signal the quality of the 
good it is selling. 
206
 The adverse selection problem is an ex ante form of information asymmetry, as it arises before the 
parties are engaged in any kind of binding contractual arrangements. As argued by Macho-Stadler and 
Pérez-Castrillo (1997), the adverse selection problem “… appears when the agent holds private 
information before the relationship is begun.” The adverse selection problem can be solved by conveying 
private information that signals to less informed parties the true characteristics of the issuer. 
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The literature of security design initially focused on the adverse selection problem. 
Leland and Pyle (1977) assert that when owners of a project have private information 
about the project, the amount of their own funds invested will be interpreted as a signal 
of its quality – the greater the amount of equity retained, the higher the quality of the 
project. Gordon and Pennacchi (1990) focus on the moral hazard problem and point out 
that, considering the existence of informed and uninformed investors in financial 
markets, there is scope for splitting the cash flows from an asset to create multiple types 
of securities. Boot and Thakor (1993) develop a model with an intuition akin to that of 
Gordon and Pennacchi (1990). The major difference between the two models is that the 
optimal design in Boot and Thakor (1993) is supply-driven rather than demand-driven. 
The authors argue that, in asset markets with asymmetrically informed investors, it is 
optimal for firms to split their cash flows through a senior / subordinated security 
design.
208
 Similarly, Diamond (1993), Winton (1995), and Glaeser and Kallal (1997) 
argue that the design and issuance of different classes of securities with different 
degrees of seniority – structuring – reduces monitoring costs. 
 
3.3.5.1. The Role of Securitization in the Reduction of Information Asymmetries 
Hill (1996) argues that securitization can help reduce ‘real-world costs’, like 
information costs. Information cost reductions seem largest for firms who face severe 
‘lemons problems’. As asserted by Hill (1996), “[S]ecuritization removes, and 
sweetens, a slice from the lemon – while leaving the remainer not appreciably sourer 
than it was before.”; i.e., securitization offers a credible and less costly way for 
information about the firm’s receivables to be produced and provided to investors. 
Similarly, Iacobucci and Winter (2005) argue that “… asset securitization is driven by 
                                                                                                                                               
207
 The moral hazard problem is an ex post form of information asymmetry, as it arises after the parties 
are committed to financial contracting arrangements. As referred by Salanié (1997), moral hazard 
behavior occurs when “… (a) the Agent takes a decision (‘action’) that affects his utility and that of the 
Principal; (b) the Principal only observes the ‘outcome’, an imperfect signal of the action taken; and (c) 
the action the Agent would choose spontaneously is not Pareto-optimal.” Therefore, this behavior takes 
place whenever the seller of a security has an incentive to hide information and pursue activities that are 
not desirable for the investor. Solutions to moral hazard in debt contracts are related to the inclusion of 
provisions (e.g., covenants) that align the incentives of the borrower to those of the lender. 
208
 They show that it is more profitable for a firm to issue multiple securities with ‘information 
insensitive’ cash flows paid to the senior security holders and ‘information sensitive’ cash flows paid to 
the subordinated security holders. 
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the propensity of the market to allocate assets to investors who are best informed about 
asset values.” 
If there is asymmetric information about the firm’s value and investment opportunities, 
there are additional costs of raising funds. Securitization reduces the cost of selling 
undervalued securities, because the information about the firm and its assets becomes 
less expensive, decreasing the monitoring costs incurred by investors. According to 
Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), private information about the originated assets would 
induce financial institutions to prefer the securitization of better quality assets to 
mitigate their regulatory capital requirements for ‘overcharged’ asset exposure, whilst 
worse quality assets are retained.
209
 Boot and Thakor (1993) and Riddiough (1997) 
show that a financial institution wishing to raise funds in the presence of asymmetric 
information can increase revenue by pooling assets and issuing different types of 
securities against the pool of cash flow.
210
 
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) developed a model akin to Boot and Thakor (1993) and 
argue that, considering the design of asset-backed securities, the “… optimal tranche 
will consist of a senior claim against the pool. The issuer retains the residual portion 
plus any unsold fraction of the senior tranche.”211 DeMarzo (2005) extends DeMarzo 
and Duffie’s (1999) model and concludes that pooling and tranching allow 
intermediaries to leverage their capital more efficiently, enhancing the returns to their 
private information. 
Fender and Mitchell (2005) argue that “… structured finance products may be more 
effective than other financial instruments at addressing problems of adverse selection 
and segmentation in financial markets.” In the presence of these two imperfections in 
financial markets, tranching may add value. The same line of reasoning is presented by 
Pais (2009), who argues that depository institution reduces the degree of information 
asymmetry about that pool of loans by securitizing the loans. According to Pais (2009), 
                                                 
209
 This idea is corroborated by Ambrose et al. (2005) who find that, similar to Calem and LaCour-Little 
(2004) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), lower risk loans are securitized. 
210
 Riddiough (1997) argues that since an issuer will suffer no asymmetric information losses on asset-
backed securities, splitting off a riskless security is beneficial. He shows that the retention of the risky 
security and the adjustment of the levels of subordination can mitigate the asymmetric information 
problems. 
211
 This behavior is consistent with observed practice in securitization markets, where originator 
commonly retains the first loss tranche. 
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asset securitization can “… reduce information-related costs, particularly for riskier 
(unfavorable information) or more opaque institutions.” First, because the originator 
pools and isolates assets in an SPV, in such a way that the risk of the securities backed 
from those assets depends only on the pool’s risk. Using credit enhancement 
mechanisms further reduces the risk of the securities, so the resulting securities can 
obtain higher ratings. Second, the participation of credit rating agencies reduces the 
need of investors to produce information about the pool. Finally, the retention of first 
loss positions is an important instrument to mitigate conflicts due to information 
asymmetry. 
 
3.3.5.2. Project Finance and Asymmetric Information 
Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b) presents the asymmetric information motivation as one of 
the four primary motivations for using project finance.
212
 Asymmetric information 
allows one to understand why the combination of a firm with a project might be worth 
more when financed separately with nonrecourse debt (project finance) than when 
financed jointly with corporate funds (corporate financing). 
In an incomplete information framework, the joint evaluation of the project and existing 
assets can be problematic.
213
 As pointed out by Shah and Thakor (1987), the main 
benefit of project finance is to reduce the information search cost. The authors provide 
the first formal, theoretical work offering a rationale for project financing rather than 
conventional corporate financing. Project financing can be economically more valuable 
than conventional financing, because the cost of producing information about a single 
project is less than the cost of producing information about the whole of the firm's 
projects. By reducing asymmetric information between the firm and lenders, project 
financing can enhance a project’s value by permitting higher optimal leverage than 
conventional financing. Similarly, Kensinger and Martin (1988) argue, based on a 
                                                 
212
 The other three primary motivations are: (1) agency cost motivation; (2) debt overhang motivation; 
and (3) risk management motivation. 
213
 According to Esty (1999), “[T]he separation of projects from the sponsoring firm or firms facilitates 
initial credit decisions […] With a small lending syndicate and extensive negotiations, it is relatively easy 
to convey information that would either be more difficult with a larger group of creditors or undesirable 
for competitive reasons.” 
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signaling model, that riskier projects should be project-financed to reduce signaling 
costs. 
Previous research shows that firms with asymmetric information are more prone to 
underinvestment [Myers and Majluf (1984)].
214
 According to Esty (2004a, 2004b), 
project finance can help to reduce underinvestment as project finance reduces 
asymmetric information by eliminating the need to value assets-in-place. The separation 
of projects from their sponsors facilitates initial credit analysis and decisions. As 
pointed out by Esty (1999), “[W]ith segregated cash flows and dedicated management, 
there is little room for the kind of intentional or judgmental misrepresentation that is 
possible with diversified or consolidated firms.” 
 
3.3.5.3. LBOs and Information Asymmetries 
Weston et al. (2001) and Renneboog and Simons (2005) argue that the rationale behind 
the emergence of LBOs can be supported by wealth gains provided by corporate 
undervaluation. According to Weston et al. (2011), large premiums paid are consistent 
with the argument that the managers or investors have more information about the firm 
than shareholders. Asymmetric information between managers and outsiders about the 
firm value means that the management has superior information and knows the true 
distribution of future returns. The signaling theory [see, among others, Ross (1977), and 
Leland and Pyle (1977)] applied to LBOs suggests that, in the presence of asymmetric 
information, managers with favorable information are likely to hold a large share of 
their firms’ stock and obtain outside financing disproportionally with debt. Thus, wealth 
gains can result from alternative higher-valued use of the firm’s assets by management. 
This is the case in MBOs, where managers of the target company can employ specific 
accounting and finance techniques to depress pre-announcement share prices [see, e.g., 
Lowenstein (1985), Schadler and Karns (1990), Harlow and Howe (1993), and Kaestner 
and Liu (1996)]. 
                                                 
214
 According to Myers and Majluf (1984), underinvestment occurs only when the value of both assets-in-
place and investment opportunities are uncertain; i.e., when capital providers have asymmetric 
information about both assets-in-place and investment opportunities. In such a situation, the authors 
recommend two solutions: financing assets separately – through, e.g., project finance – and holding 
financial slack. 
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3.3.6. Higher Leverage and Tax Shields 
The modern theory of optimal capital structure starts with the Modigliani and Miller 
(1958) value-irrelevance propositions.
215
 Although their propositions are difficult to test 
directly, financial innovation in general, and particularly structured finance, provide 
strong circumstantial evidence. Furthermore, considering that structured finance 
transactions have been one of the principal means by which firms form their capital 
structures, structured finance largely affects the value of the firm.  
This idea was initially presented in 1963, when Modigliani and Miller, using this logic, 
showed that, if corporate tax is in effect, firms should use debt exclusively as a 
financing instrument, since this would prevent corporate tax.
216
 Still, this prediction did 
not fit well with empirical evidence, which suggests that firms typically use moderate 
amounts of debt. As leverage increases, there is an increase in the likelihood of financial 
distress and bankruptcy, and this should reduce the use of debt relative to equity 
financing.
217
 However, SPVs involved in structured finance transactions have capital 
structures with higher leverage ratios than those of public companies; i.e., structured 
finance transactions are characterized by their intensive use of debt.  
 
3.3.6.1. Project Finance and Leverage 
Shah and Thakor (1987),
218
 Kensinger and Martin (1988), John and John (1991), 
Chemmanur and John (1996), Brealey et al. (1996), and Esty (2003), among others, 
                                                 
215
 Harris and Raviv (1991) provide a relatively comprehensive review of the theoretical and empirical 
literature related to capital structure. Myers (2001) and Barclay and Smith (2005) provide a more up-to-
date discussion of the principal theories and empirical findings. 
216
 The value of a levered firm would equal the value of an unlevered firm plus the tax benefit associated 
with debt financing. 
217
 The so-called trade-off theory of capital structure [Myers (1984)]. This theory has been criticized 
based on a set of arguments which resulted in the development of alternative theories [see Kim (1989) for 
a survey of this literature]. Other theories were based on asymmetric information [Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), Myers (1977), and Green (1984)] and signaling [Ross (1977), Myers and Majluf (1984), and 
Brennan and Kraus (1987)]. In short, there are four major theories of capital structure, which differ in 
their relative emphases on the factors that could affect the choice between debt and equity (e.g., agency 
costs, taxes, asymmetric information, market imperfections, and regulatory constrains): (1) the 
Modigliani-Miller theory of capital-structure irrelevance; (2) the trade-off theory; (3) agency theories; and 
(4) the pecking-order theory. These theories overlap and all the theories may be needed to explain capital 
structure decisions. 
218
 Shah and Thakor (1987) have developed a model that analyzes optimal financing in the presence of 
corporation taxation. They argue that “… project financing enhances the values of some of these projects 
by permitting higher optimal leverage than with conventional financing.” 
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analyze the advantages and disadvantages of project finance in the context of a firm’s 
capital structure. Bearing in mind the trade-off theory of capital structure, a firm should 
increase leverage to the point where the marginal gain from incremental tax shields 
equals the marginal loss from incremental distress costs.
219
 Leverage ratio and asset risk 
are the principal factors affecting the probability of default. When assets have a low-
variance in asset returns, firms can increase leverage and pick up additional interest tax 
shields;
220
 i.e., equity holders can sell virtually all of the expected cash flows to debt 
holders and pick up valuable interest tax shields in the process. As pointed out by Esty 
(2002a), “[T]his is, in fact, one of the arguments used to justify hedging activities […] 
In practice, projects have relatively low asset risk and correspondingly high debt 
capacity.”221 It is for this reason that several studies [e.g., Esty (2002a) and Esty and 
Megginson (2003)] find that capital structures of project companies are very different to 
those of public companies. Esty (2002a) presents a mean book value debt-to-total 
capitalization ratio of 70% for project companies, approximately twice the similar sized 
CompuStat firms in 2001 (33.1%). The same idea is presented by Finnerty (2007), 
arguing that project finance arrangements are structured to reduce project risk and 
designed to achieve high initial leverage.
222
 Another economic benefit pointed out by 
Esty (1999) is the reduction of corporate taxes; i.e., (1) tax rate reductions and tax 
holidays are commonly observed in project finance deals; and (2) high leverage 
increments interest tax shields.
223
 
 
 
 
                                                 
219
 The expected cost of distress is equal to the probability of distress multiplied by the cost of distress. 
220
 See, e.g., Stulz (1996) for further discussion of this subject. 
221
 This is possible because project finance allows for a high level of risk allocation among participants in 
the transaction. Esty (2002a) argues that project companies located in countries with a high sovereign 
debt rating – measured according to Standard and Poor's rating system – have higher debt to total 
capitalization ratios than those project companies located in countries with a low debt rating. Similarly, 
Vaaler, James, and Aguilera (2008) find that project firms located in countries with common law legal 
systems, stronger creditor rights, and wealthier economies generally have higher leverages, indicative of 
lower project risk. 
222
 As pointed out by Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001), “[P]roject financing can sometimes be used to improve 
the return on the capital invested in a project by leveraging the investment to a greater extent than would 
be possible in a straight commercial financing of the project.” 
223
 This idea is corroborated by John and John (1991), who refer that project financing “… increases 
value by reducing agency costs and increasing value of tax shields.” 
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3.3.6.2. LBOs and Leverage in Capital Structure Framework 
LBOs are characterized by their very intensive use of debt. As pointed out by De 
Maeseneire and Brinkhuis (2011), 71% of buyout financing consists of debt. The 
leveraged acquisitions theory suggests that a high level of debt financing serves many 
roles, like the disciplining effect on management and the value of tax shields provided; 
i.e., the high portion of debt in LBOs gives rise to significant interest tax deductions.
224
 
While agreeing that tax savings are a relevant source of gains in LBOs, Kaplan (1989b), 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and Smith (1990) show that wealth is also created. 
They find improvements in cash flows after an LBO transaction.
225
 
High level of debt financing also involves disadvantages, like agency costs and 
bankruptcy costs. This idea is corroborated by Roden and Lewellen (1995), who argue 
that the financing decision to be taken by the buyout group will involve a trade-off 
between leverage-related costs (agency costs of high levels of debt financing and 
bankruptcy costs) and leverage-related benefits (disciplining effect of debt on 
management and the value of tax shields provided by the debt). As pointed out by 
Roden and Lewellen (1995), “… the financing choices observed should reflect a trade-
off that seeks to match at the margin the benefits and opportunities with the costs and 
constrains.” Although the established capital structure theories claim that these and 
other factors drive the financing choice in LBOs, De Maeseneire and Brinkhuis (2011) 
find that classical capital structure theories cannot fully explain LBO’s capital structure. 
They show that the conditions in the debt market heavily influence the level of leverage 
with respect to LBOs. These results are in line with the findings of Axelson et al. (2007) 
and Demiroglu and James (2007) for determinants of capital structure in LBOs taking 
place in the U.S.  
 
 
                                                 
224
 Lowenstein (1985), Kaplan (1989a), and Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) argue that the wealth gains 
from LBOs are largely the result of interest tax shields related to the high leverage that underlies the 
transaction. 
225
 They show that firms with simultaneously higher cash flows and lower Tobin’s q are more likely to 
undertake an LBO, which is consistent with the free cash flow hypothesis. The same intuition is presented 
by Carow and Roden (1997). Additionally, they also show that firms with lower and, therefore, greater 
debt capacity, have higher abnormal returns. 
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3.3.6.3. Securitization and Issuer’s Capital Structure 
Hill (1996) argues that securitization can help to alleviate various costs introduced by 
market imperfections, like agency costs, bankruptcy costs, regulatory costs, and 
information costs. Along this line of reasoning, Jobst (2006a) argues that securitization 
may redress conflicts of interest between creditors and shareholders in the capital 
structure choice of firms, concerning possible agency costs from underinvestment 
[Myers (1977, 1984)] and asset substitution [Jensen and Meckling (1976)], due to 
excessive levels of debt or the presence of non-value maximizing investment behavior 
respectively. Thus, “… issuers with high agency costs of debt and/or low prospects 
should be more likely to engage in asset securitisation.” 
 
3.3.6.4. Structuring Leasing and Tax Benefits 
While there is extensive literature on leasing, most of it focuses on the differential tax 
position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rationale for leasing [e.g. Bower 
(1973), Miller and Upton (1976), Brealey and Young (1980), Smith and Wakeman 
(1985), and Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1987)].
226
 Miller and Upton (1976) 
conclude that no financial advantages can accrue from leasing. On the contrary, 
Lowellen, Long, and McConnell (1976) and Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976) argue that, 
under a set of assumptions, there is a potential for gains for the firm involved in leasing 
because government can suffer a loss in taxes. The same line of reasoning is presented 
by Beattie et al. (2000). They argue that tax considerations is an important factor in the 
choice between debt and leasing, because leasing provides the option of ‘selling’ tax 
allowances to a lessor, in exchange for lower rental payments. 
Caselli (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006) present the capture of tax benefits (including 
cross border tax loopholes)
227
 as a reason for structured leasing. Caselli (2005) argues 
that “… the tax variable becomes a powerful tool for creating economic maneuvering 
room to reduce the cost of capital for its users.” Capturing tax benefits means taking 
                                                 
226
 Krishnan and Moyer (1994) present a very concise and complete literature review on this subject. 
227
 Cross border leases are deals that are structured in a way that they take advantage of tax benefits in a 
country other than that in which the transactions takes place. As asserted by Caselli (2005), “[T]his is 
achieved by using a vehicle company domiciled in other country, which assumes the role of lessee and 
them proceeds to rent the underlying asset to the effective lessee.” 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 87 
advantage of the differences in taxation between leasing and other forms of financing, 
with the aim of reducing lessee’s cost of capital – reduction of the all-in cost. Fowkes 
(2000) analyses the use of leasing in project financing and argues that “[L]ease finance 
can provide sponsors with significant accounting earnings and tax benefits.”228 
 
3.3.6.5. Concluding Remarks  
In conclusion, a structured finance transaction is usually based on the incorporation of 
an SPV, exclusively for the transaction. This means that the SPV is the owner of the 
asset(s) and is then used to organize the operation in order to raise the funding needed to 
purchase the asset itself or to develop the project. Thus, the SPV is a key element for 
sponsors / originators to achieve (or maintain) certain capital structures without ceasing 
to invest in new investment projects or limit their operational capacity. Additionally, as 
all economic consequences generated by the initiative in question are attributed to this 
SPV, and both cash flows generated by the initiative and SPVs’ assets are offered as 
collateral to creditors – debt repayment depends only or primarily on the assets and cash 
flows of the SPV, and not on the overall financial strengths of the originator – this 
leaves room for highly leveraged capital structures and incremental interest tax 
shields/savings. 
 
3.3.7. Improve/Preserve Financial and Regulatory Ratios 
The determinants of asset ownership and the boundaries of the firm have been a 
longstanding topic for economic research, going back at least to the seminal 
contribution of Coase (1937). When contracts are incomplete, financing an asset off-
balance sheet or owning it does matter and involves numerous trade-offs. 
 
 
 
                                                 
228
 The author presents four motivations for combining leasing and project financing: (1) leasing may 
provide off-balance sheet treatment; (2) leasing can provide improvement in earnings; (3) leasing may 
allow a sponsor to maximize the tax benefits associated with ownership of the assets; and (4) a true 
leasing may provide an alternative source of funding at a lower cost. 
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3.3.7.1. Project Finance and Off-balance Sheet Financing  
Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001) assert that preventing debt from showing on the balance 
sheet – so as not to impact financial ratios – is an important objective for the borrower, 
when using project finance. The off-balance sheet treatment of the funding raised by the 
SPV is crucial for sponsors, since it only has limited impact on sponsors’ 
creditworthiness, and does not impact sponsors’ ability to access additional financing in 
the future.
229
 The same idea is presented by Gatti (2005), who asserts that the use of 
project finance may enable sponsors to obtain ‘insurance’ against any potential negative 
impact of the project. In 2008, Gatti focuses on two essential benefits: (1) separate 
incorporation and avoidance of contamination risk (the separation of large, risky 
projects in an SPV); and (2) preservation of financial ratios, since the debt raised by the 
SPV is not shown on the originators’ balance sheet. 
 
3.3.7.2. Securitization and Capital Arbitrage 
As mentioned above, the main motivations for securitization can be discussed from the 
perspective of a nonbank corporation and from the perspective of a bank corporation. 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) argue that the improvement of the originators’ key financial ratios 
is a common economic benefit referred to either a bank or nonbank corporation. As 
pointed out by Goldberg and Rogers (1988), “… if the transaction is considered a sale 
of assets, firms can realize a gain (or a loss) upon sale, thereby accelerating income 
recognition.” Additionally, by removing assets from balance sheet, securitization can 
improve a company’s return on assets and return on equity ratios.230 
Regarding bank corporations, several authors [e.g., Cumming (1987), Jones (2000), 
Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Krebsz (2011)] argue that securitization allows originators to 
benefit from regulatory and/or tax arbitrage. Krebsz (2011) refers to arbitrage as one of 
the key drivers behind an asset securitization transaction.
231
 Fabozzi et al. (2006) point 
out the role of capital – banks can adjust their capital ratios by engaging in 
                                                 
229
 This advantage of project finance for sponsors is also presented in the literature by Shah and Thakor 
(1987), John and John (1991), and Chemmanur and John (1996). 
230
 See, e.g., Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011). 
231
 According to the author, this means that the originator aims “… to leverage an actual or perceived 
advantage it may have: this could be regulatory arbitrage […], informational arbitrage […], 
technological arbitrage […], or simply financial arbitrage.” 
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securitization – as one of the main reasons for a bank corporation to issue asset-backed 
securities.
232
 The use of securitization to reduce banks’ capital requirements involves 
seizing the opportunity to arbitrage the regulatory capital required under the Capital 
Accord of 1998 – Basel I. Despite Basel II agreement (and the ongoing, forward 
looking Basel III), which came into effect in 2008, meeting some of the weaknesses of 
the Basel I Accord,
233
 a major economic driver of a new securitization transaction 
persists; i.e., the applicable calculation rules (e.g., standardized approach vs internal 
ratings-based approach vs advanced ratings-based approach) highly influence the 
regulatory capital charge. 
 
3.3.7.3. Structured Leasing and Financial Ratios 
Comparing leasing with purchasing using borrowed funds, Fabozzi et al. (2006) present 
the credit capacity preservation as a motivation for selecting structured leasing. 
According to reporting standards for leases, a capital lease – a lease that transfer 
substantially all of the benefits and risks incident to ownership of property, should be 
accounted for as the acquisition of an asset and the incurrence of an obligation by the 
lessee (FASB Statement No. 13) – has to be capitalized as a liability and the equipment 
recorded as an asset on the balance sheet. Conversely, operating lease is not capitalized, 
and thus preserves credit capacity – the debt-to-equity ratio will be lower. Most long-
term leases are structured to achieve the classification of operating leases for accounting 
purposes, and thus treated as off-balance sheet financing, which allows the lessee to 
preserve financial ratios.
234
 
Focusing on synthetic leases, Weidner (2000) argues that these transactions improve 
balance sheet and ratios from which businesses are judged.
235
 Similarly, Sandler (2000) 
presents the following benefits of off-balance sheet lease financing: (1) reduction in 
                                                 
232
 This idea is also presented by Donahoo and Shaffer (1991), Berger and Udell (1993), Duffie and Rahi 
(1995), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995), Berger et al. (1995), Jones (2000), 
Calomiris and Mason (2004), and Ambrose et al. (2005). 
233
 As pointed out by Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), concerning the Basel II agreement, “… the possible 
reduction in the capital requirements is closely associated both with the quality of the underlying 
portfolio and with the amount of risk exposure retained by the originator entity, which prevents the 
possible arbitrage of capital.” 
234
 For further discussion of leasing classification for accounting purposes see Annex 3. 
235
 When a lease is classified as an operating lease, the lessee does not depreciate the asset. This favorably 
impacts the price-to-earnings ratio and the earnings-to-assets ratio. 
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leverage ratio; (2) increase in return on assets; (3) increase in earnings and cash flows; 
(4) increase in tax deductions for long-life assets; and (5) the ability to generate 
additional earnings from reinvestment of capital otherwise invested in leased assets. 
 
3.3.8. Risk Management 
3.3.8.1. Securitization as a Risk Management Tool 
One of the main reasons for an originator to issue an asset-backed security is risk 
management. Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) argue that “… securitization transactions 
manage these risks [credit, interest rate, and prepayment risks] more explicitly, and 
therefore more efficiently, than does conventional lending [… and…] it makes these 
risks more transparent and it also allocates them far more precisely to the players who 
are best able to absorb them.” 
This idea is corroborated by Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), who argue that securitization 
is one of several corporate risk tools available to management. When assets are sold in a 
securitization, the originating company no longer bears the interest rate or credit risk of 
those assets. With regard to bank corporations, the literature presents risk management 
and the transfer of credit risk – securitization consists of one of the main instruments 
available to banks to transfer credit risk and to fund risky financial assets in order to 
minimize financial distress costs – as one of the main reasons behind securitization.236 
Securitization leads to an improvement in the management of interest rate risk and 
credit risk [Hess and Smith (1988), and Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988)] if the originator 
securitizes its worst assets. However, securitization may also increase the level of risk if 
the bank securitizes its best assets; i.e., when the assets kept on-balance sheet are poorer 
quality assets [Murray (2005)]. With respect to interest risk management, Fabozzi 
(2005) points out that securitization allows financial institutions to securitize assets that 
expose the institution to a higher degree of risk and retain certain parts of the transaction 
to obtain a specific asset/liability position. 
 
                                                 
236
 See, among others, Goldberg et al. (1988), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Jobst (2006a), and Cardone-
Riportella et al. (2010). 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 91 
3.3.8.2. Project Finance and Risk Management 
Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996) argue that project finance creates value by 
improving risk management.
237
 This idea is corroborated by Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b). 
Underinvestment problems due to distress costs and/or managerial risk aversion [Stulz 
(1984)] can be reduced through project finance transactions. The nonrecourse nature of 
project debt protects the sponsoring firm from risk contamination (i.e., when a failing 
project drags a healthy sponsoring firm into default or imposes increased distress costs 
on it). As asserted by Esty (2004b), project finance “… allows the firm to isolate asset 
risk in a separate entity where it has limited ability to inflict collateral damage on the 
sponsoring firm; in essence, it allows firms to truncate large left-hand tail outcomes, 
which Stulz (1996) claims is the primary goal of risk management.” Additionally, 
project finance creates value by improving risk management inside the project. Risks 
are allocated with the goals of reducing cost and ensuring proper benefits; i.e. they are 
allocated to the parties that are in the best position to manage them. 
 
3.3.8.3. Structured Leasing and Risk Management 
Concerning structured leasing, Caselli (2005) points out the risk transfer and risk 
management of the asset as one of the most important factors that stimulate the demand 
for these types of transactions. A structured lease (leverage lease or synthetic lease) is 
based on the establishment of an SPV exclusively for the transaction, which works as a 
key risk management device.
238
 In both structures – the SPV acts as an owner (leverage 
lease) or as a lessor (synthetic lease) of the assets – off-balance sheet operating lease 
treatment for the lessee under FAS 13 is achieved [Fowkes (2000)]. Contrary to a 
synthetic lease, in a leveraged lease all of the risks are substantially transferred to the 
                                                 
237
 A stream of research interprets project finance as one of the risk management strategies taken by 
sponsors. For example, Chemmanur and John (1996) argue that project finance can be used as a 
bankruptcy protection device of a low-risk project from high-risk projects. Corielli et al. (2010), using a 
sample of almost 1,000 project finance loans, find that lenders “… rely on the network of nonfinancial 
contracts as a mechanism to control agency costs and project risks.” 
238
 With a leveraged lease, which is structured as a lease for tax purposes, the tax benefits of depreciation 
and interest deduction are retained by the lessor but partially passed back to the lessee through lower 
rents. A synthetic lease is an operating lease for accounting purposes but structured as financing for tax 
purposes. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 92 
lessor. For tax purposes, a synthetic lease is structured so that the lessee may reclaim 
that it is, in substance, the owner of the encumbered property. 
 
3.3.9. Financial Flexibility 
3.3.9.1. Project Finance and Financial Flexibility Preservation 
To understand the motivations for using project finance, we need a thorough 
understanding of why the combination of a firm plus a project might be worth more 
when financed separately with nonrecourse debt (project finance) than when they are 
financed jointly with corporate funds (corporate financing).
239
 If the project to be 
implemented represents a significant part of the sponsor’s assets, its implementation 
will increase debt and the cost of future credit lines, and eventually preclude future 
initiatives with a positive NPV. By using project finance – an off-balance sheet 
structured deal – the funding concerns an ad hoc legal entity involving no or limited 
recourse to the sponsor. Thus, project finance is of great demand when it does not have 
a substantial impact on the balance sheet or the creditworthiness of the sponsoring entity 
or entities. 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) argue that “[T]he ultimate goal in project financing is to arrange a 
borrowing for a project that will benefit the sponsor but at the same time have 
absolutely no recourse to the sponsor, and therefore no effect on its credit standing or 
balance sheet.” They point out the following benefits regarding financial flexibility 
when segregating a financing operation as a project financing: (1) improvement in the 
return of the capital invested in the SPV through leverage; (2) maintenance of the 
originator credit terms; (3) prevention of regulatory problems affecting the sponsor; and 
(4) costs segregation for regulatory purposes. The same idea is presented by Nevitt and 
Fabozzi (2001). They assert that project finance transactions provide financial flexibility 
to originators because each one or a combination of the following objectives may be 
achieved: (1) protection of credit rating; (2) suppress debt on the balance sheet; (3) limit 
                                                 
239
 A sponsor can select to finance a new investment project using two alternatives: (1) the new project is 
financed on-balance sheet – corporate financing; (2) the new project is financed off-balance sheet by 
incorporation into a newly created economic entity (SPV) – project financing. See Gatti (2008) for further 
discussion of the main differences, advantages, and disadvantages between corporate financing and 
project financing. 
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direct liability to a certain period of time so as to avoid a liability for the remaining life 
of the project; and (4) avoid restrictive covenants in an indenture or loan agreement 
which might preclude direct debt financing or leases for the project. 
 
3.3.9.2. Structured Leasing and Financial Flexibility 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) present financial flexibility via working capital protection and 
fewer restrictions on management as important factors that stimulate the demand for 
structured leasing transactions. According to the authors, one of the advantages of 
leasing against borrowing to purchase equipment is that “… a lease agreement typically 
does not impose financial covenants and restrictions on management.” Regarding 
working capital protection, contrary to borrowing money to purchase equipment, 
leasing usually provides an amount equal to the entire price of the equipment. In 
addition, costs incurred to acquire the equipment (e.g., delivery and installation charges) 
can be included in a lease agreement.  
 
3.3.9.3. Securitization and Financial Flexibility 
Securitization can be defined on the basis of three key characteristics: (1) pooling of 
assets; (2) tranching of liabilities that are backed by the asset pool; (3) de-linking of the 
credit risk of the collateral asset pool from the credit risk of the originator, usually 
through use of a finite-lived, standalone special purpose vehicle (SPV). This means that 
the SPV becomes the owner of the assets, which is then used to organize the operation 
in order to raise the funding needed. Thus, securitization is a reliable and relatively 
unconstrained source of off-balance sheet financing that allows issuers to raise funds 
and improve their liquidity position without increasing their on-balance sheet liabilities 
and capital base. 
According to Goldberg and Rogers (1988), by removing assets from balance sheet, 
securitization can improve a company’s return on assets and return on equity ratios. The 
same line of reasoning is presented by Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari 
(2007), and Krebsz (2011). These authors argue that securitization allows financial 
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institutions to improve/preserve financial and capital ratios, thus increasing its financial 
flexibility. 
 
 
3.4. Problems Related to the Use of Structured Finance 
Despite the previously mentioned economic benefits for sponsors and investors, 
structured finance transactions also have disadvantages, especially when used 
inappropriately. Considering the available literature in the field of structured finance, 
we have identified the following problems related to the use of structured finance 
transactions, which will be further developed in the next sections: (1) complexity; (2) 
off-balance sheet treatment; (3) asymmetric information problems; (4) agency 
problems; (5) higher transaction costs; and (6) wealth expropriation. 
Table 3.3 interrelates the mentioned problems (or disadvantages) with the main 
structured finance instruments; i.e., securitization,
240
 project finance,
241
 LBOs,
242
 and 
structured leases.
243
 
                                                 
240
 The most commonly referred disadvantages of securitization are: (1) complexity [e.g., Davidson et al. 
(2003), Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fender and Mitchell (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Jobst (2006a)]; 
(2) off-balance sheet treatment [e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2006) and Rutledge and Raynes (2010)]; (3) 
asymmetric information problems [e.g., Gorton (2009), Jobst (2009), Lupica (2009), and Krebsz (2011)]; 
(4) agency problems [e.g., Alles (2001), Jobst (2006a), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Jobst (2009)]; 
and (5) higher transaction costs [e.g., Davidson et al. (2003) and Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)]. See 
Annex 1 for further discussion of the disadvantages of securitization. 
241
 Critics of project finance argue that this type of structured finance transactions has the following 
problems: (1) complexity [e.g., Esty (1999, 2004a), Caselli and Gatti (2005), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; 
(2) off-balance sheet treatment [e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; and (3) higher transaction costs [e.g., Esty 
(1999, 2004a), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Gatti (2008)]. See Annex 2 for further discussion of project 
finance disadvantages. 
242
 The most commonly referred disadvantages of LBOs are: (1) complexity [e.g., Caselli and Gatti 
(2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; (2) asymmetric information problems [e.g., Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009) and Cumming and Zambelli (2010)]; (3) higher transaction costs [e.g., Roden and Lewellen 
(1995) and Cumming and Zambelli (2010)]; and (4) wealth expropriation [e.g., Opler and Titman (1993), 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Cumming and Zambelli (2010)]. See Annex 4 for further discussion of 
the problems of using LBOs. 
243
 Critics of structured leases argue that the limitations of these off-balance sheet transactions are: (1) 
complexity [e.g., Caselli and Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. (2006)]; (2) off-balance sheet treatment [e.g., 
Caselli and Gatti (2005)]; (3) higher transaction costs [e.g., Caselli and Gatti (2005) and Fabozzi et al. 
(2006)]; and (4) wealth expropriation [Wanzenboeck (2001) and Altamuro (2006)]. See Annex 3 for an 
overview of the disadvantages of structured leasing transactions. 
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Table 3.3: Problems related to the use of structured finance. 
 
Structured finance transactions are fairly complex and involve a significant amount of 
cash flow evaluation, due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. Consequently, 
structuring such a deal is more costly than corporate financing. Table 3.3 corroborates 
this idea as complexity and higher transaction costs are problems or disadvantages 
common to all of the structured finance transactions. 
Moreover, it can be said that there is a broad consensus that securitization played an 
important role in the development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
244
 
Hence, the main problems of securitization transactions are essentially presented within 
the context of the recent financial crisis. 
 
3.4.1. Complexity 
It is commonly agreed that structured finance instruments are complex vis-a-vis straight 
debt finance transactions or products [see, e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. The risk and 
return evaluation of a structured finance instrument requires modeling the risk of the 
underlying assets, which can be particularly difficult if the asset pool is composed of 
heterogeneous assets (e.g., in securitization) or if the SPVs’ cash flows are difficult to 
measure (e.g., in project finance). Additionally, it is necessary to evaluate the deal’s 
specific features, including how the cash flows will be distributed to the tranches or 
loans, the main covenants presented in the transaction, the rights and duties of various 
parties involved, and the elected credit enhancement mechanisms. 
                                                 
244
 See, among others, BIS (2008), IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), and Brunnermeier 
(2009). For further discussion of the role of securitization in the 2007/2008 financial turmoil see section 
3.5. 
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Fender and Mitchell (2005) argue that the increasing complexity of structured finance 
products creates incentives to rely more heavily on ratings than for other financing 
instruments. Although they are useful, structured finance ratings have limitations that 
market participants and public authorities need to take into account in their assessment 
of structured finance instruments and their markets. Thus, despite the fact that 
structured finance products can contribute to market completion and a better dispersion 
of risk, they also have limitations with potential financial stability implications.
245
 This 
idea is corroborated by Fabozzi et al. (2006), who point out that “… the increasing 
complexity of the structured finance market and the ever growing range of products 
being made available to investors are invariably creating challenges in terms of 
efficient information assembly, management, and dissemination.” 
Asset securitization transactions are fairly complex and involve a significant amount of 
due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. As referred by Davidson et al. (2003), 
“[A] first transaction from an originator can take anywhere from 1 to 2 years to 
complete ....” This idea is corroborated by Jobst (2006a), who presents the structural 
complexity of securitization as the main drive for the principal concerns about this type 
of structured finance, which are: (1) high concentration of interest rate risks; (2) the 
potential for errors in the rating and pricing of complex security designs; and (3) the 
shortcomings of analytical models in assessing risks. 
Regarding project finance, Fabozzi et al. (2006) present complexity, in terms of 
designing the transaction, writing the required documentation, and the patience and time 
required for designing financing and operating agreements, as one of the main 
disadvantages of project finance. 
 
3.4.2. Off-Balance Sheet Treatment 
Another common problem relates to the fact that many structured finance transactions 
are limited-recourse rather than nonrecourse, and thus there is a potential grey area in 
which accounting rules allow off-balance sheet treatment, but there is nonetheless some 
                                                 
245
 With regard to the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the following limitations of securitization transactions 
can be pointed out: (1) their features lead to different agencies’ rating methodologies; (2) their tranches 
are generally tailored to achieve desired ratings; and (3) the process of rating these instruments is based 
on an issuer-pays model – which raises questions about the possible existence of conflicts of interest. 
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contingent liability to the parent company´s shareholders. The off-balance sheet 
treatment is a key concept when we are referring to structured finance. However, the 
terms nonrecourse and off-balance sheet should remain synonyms, which does not 
always happen.
246
 Liabilities having effective no recourse to a company´s shareholders 
can justly be treated as off-balance sheet. 
The ability to finance a corporation off-balance sheet by issuing structured securities 
starts, not with finance, but with legal procedures. As asserted by Rutledge and Raynes 
(2010), “… unlike the economics analysis underlying off-balance-sheet finance, which 
is internally consistent because it is mathematical, the legal theory of off-balance-sheet 
finance has yet to be formalized. The law is piecemeal, relatively unexamined and 
disconnected from the economics.” Within securitization it has become at some point 
impossible for investors to understand where they have recourse to the borrower plus 
some assets held in a trust for it (a pledge), and where investors have no recourse to the 
borrower but agree to be repaid strictly from cash flows appending to some assets held 
in trust on its behalf (a sale). A fundamental question remains at the heart of the debate: 
to whose balance sheet do some SPVs append? 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) issue a warning related to the use of structured finance, namely the 
use of SPVs to manipulate accounting statements and commit fraud, and to reduce 
transparency and disclosure. Even in the absence of fraud, the transfer of assets to SPVs 
may mislead investors as to the extent of nonrecurring earnings or deferred losses. To 
name an example, the authors mentioned that Enron pushed beyond the legal and ethical 
boundaries of structured finance.
247
 
The most commonly mentioned disadvantages of structured leases are the costs of 
opacity related to the identification of whose balance sheet (lessor or lessee) does some 
leased assets append [Caselli and Gatti (2005)]? For example, synthetic leases are 
operating leases for accounting purposes and financing operations for tax purposes; i.e., 
                                                 
246
 There is an increased need for the transactions that have significant recourse to the sponsor to be put 
back on the balance sheet. 
247
 According to Fabozzi et al. (2006) “[T]he immediate cause of Enron bankruptcy was a loss of 
confidence among investors caused by that company´s restatement of earnings and inadequate, 
misleading disclosure of off-balance sheet entities and related debt.” Project finance is a method of 
monetizing cash flows, sharing and transferring risks, and is based on transparency. The Enron 
transactions had none of these characteristics. They attempted to arbitrage accounting, taxes, and 
disclosure. For further discussion of how the Enron debacle affected project finance and the broader 
realm of structured finance see Davis (2002). 
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they are off-balance sheet leases, in which the lessee remains the owner of the financed 
assets and retains the tax benefits associated with ownership, while simultaneously 
enjoying the benefits of an operating lease – the lessor offers the lessee a lower lease 
rate because the equity investor passes a portion of his tax benefit back to the lessee in 
the form of reduced lease payments.
248
 
 
3.4.3. Asymmetric Information Problems 
Gorton (2009) argues that a potential important problem is the loss of information when 
high complex structures are used to implement a securitization transaction. In the 
presence of asymmetric information, originators and issuers might be tempted to pursue 
their own economic incentives, which imposes substantial agency cost on efficient asset 
securitization.
249
 Asymmetric information problems can come from (1) the information 
advantage of the originator with regard to the quality of borrowers and the historical 
performance of individual asset exposures – adverse selection; and (2) the complex 
security design of securitized assets, which suggests superior information of arrangers 
concerning the true value of issued securities. As declared by Jobst (2009), “[T]he 
cause of the [2007/2008] crisis can be traced to market failure stemming from conflicts 
of interest in the securitization process and ill-designed mechanisms to mitigate the 
impact of asymmetric information.” 
Krebsz (2011) corroborates the idea presented by Jobst (2009) and points out that 
“[S]ome of these [securitization] deals were structured intentionally to achieve artificial 
symmetry of information, either by using structures that were so complicated that no 
one could really understand…” The author defines this as an ‘arbitrage of 
information’.250 Similarly, Lupica (2009) argues that as complex securitization 
                                                 
248
 Another example is the leverage lease. For financial accounting purposes, a leverage lease (operating 
lease) is not disclosed in the lessee balance sheet as financial obligations; i.e., the lease equipment is not 
capitalized and the lease obligation is not shown as a liability on the balance sheet. 
249
 Asymmetric information could lead to moral hazard on the part of the issuers (asset originators in true 
sale transactions) if their effort level before and after the issue date is not incentive compatible with 
investor interests. 
250
 In securitization transactions, one can identify three main types of arbitrage mechanisms: (1) timing 
arbitrage – someone receives funds that legally belong to somebody else but is contractually required not 
to pass on these funds immediately; (2) information arbitrage – somebody has more information available 
than someone else and may be tempted to act on the basis of this knowledge; (3) different regulatory 
treatments – e.g., different regulatory rules used for banks using standardized or foundation approach vs. 
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transactions have become ever more usual, information asymmetries between issuers 
and investors have grown larger.
251
 In the absence of a proper comprehension and 
valuation of securitized assets, the credit ratings will become based on misjudgments, 
which in turn determine the failure in determining the price of these types of securities. 
Coval et al. (2009) focus on economic catastrophe bonds and investigate the pricing and 
risk of instruments created as a result of recent structured finance activities.
252
 They 
argue that there is an asymmetric information problem in senior CDOs
253
 tranches. 
When compared with single-name counterparts, senior CDOs tranches should demand a 
different risk premium, as they have significantly different systematic risk exposures 
from credit rating. The author suggests that investors receive inadequate information 
from credit rating agencies for pricing senior CDOs tranches. Fons (2008) also points 
out that the failure of rating agencies to signal, in a timely and accurate way, the 
conditions of many securities backed by subprime housing loans was caused by the 
conflicts of interest posed by rating agencies’ ‘issuer-pays’ business model.254 
Empirically, Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009) confirm the existence of asymmetric 
information problems. Based on a dataset of MBSs issued between 1991 and 2002, they 
find that informed originators trade lemons in the mortgage market; i.e., the assets sold 
to the SPV are of lower quality compared to the assets retained on the balance sheet.
255
 
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) illustrate some of the arguments presented by critics of 
LBOs. They assert that LBOs take advantage of superior information, but do not create 
economic value; i.e., LBOs benefits are only induced by private equity investors’ 
superior information on future company performance – incumbent management is a 
                                                                                                                                               
the internal ratings based approach which leads to the application of different multiplication factors when 
calculating the required capital reserve. 
251
 Lupica (2009) argues that this can lead to further failings in the fundamental structuring of 
transactions, with, for example, senior tranches’ fallibility far greater than their rating suggests. 
252
 Bonds that default only under severe economic conditions. Coval et al. (2009) show “… that many 
structured finance instruments can be characterized as economic catastrophe bonds.” 
253
 For a description of CDOs see Annex 1. 
254
 This failure can be traced directly to two types of weaknesses: rating shopping (the opacity of rated 
securities is a common feature of structured finance markets and the rating agency generally does not 
have enough information to assign a rating) and regulation. 
255
 These results are contrary to the arguments presented by Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), Kohen and 
Santomero (1980), Kim and Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989), and Blum (1999). They argue that banks 
could have an incentive to securitize high-quality loans and to retain low-quality loans. 
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source of this inside information. The same line of reasoning is presented by Cumming 
and Zambelli (2010). They argue that the insider managers may hold private knowledge 
that can be used as insider information in other transactions. 
 
3.4.4. Agency Problems 
The credit crisis of 2007/2008 has somewhat tarnished the previously prevailing 
positive image of securitization, as a process to help remedy deficiencies in financial 
markets, arising from incomplete capital allocation. Several authors [e.g., Alles (2001), 
Jobst (2006a), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Jobst (2009)] argue that securitization 
may lead to a severe principal-agent problem where the firm, who originates the assets 
to be ultimately sold and securitized, retains little or no interest in the pool of 
securitized assets. In this case, the originator does not have the same incentive to pay 
attention to the creditworthiness of its customers, as would be the case when the assets 
remain on its balance sheet. This idea is corroborated by Shin (2009), who asserts that 
the distorted incentives verified at all stages of the securitization process allowed the 
loans with high credit risk to pass through the financial system, and to be held in the 
portfolios of unsuspecting final investors. Similarly, Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) assert 
that “[G]iven the ability of lenders to pass along subprime loans into the capital 
markets via credit enhancement […] lenders have been viewed by critics of 
securitization as abandoning their responsibility of evaluating the creditworthiness of 
potential borrowers.” Finally, Jobst (2009) presents the market failure stemming from 
conflicts of interest in the securitization process as one of the major causes of the crisis. 
Empirically, this idea is corroborated by Titman and Tsyplakov (2010). They show that 
poorly performing originators are more willing to originate riskier mortgages because 
they have less incentive to carefully evaluate the credit quality of prospective 
borrowers. 
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3.4.5. Higher Transaction Costs 
As argued by Davidson et al. (2003), “[S]ecuritization is quite costly in terms of up-
front and ongoing fees compared to other types of financing.”256 This idea is 
corroborated by Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), who point out that the disadvantages 
of securitization include the fixed costs of setting up the SPV. 
According to Fabozzi et al. (2006), one of the major disadvantages of project finance is 
the higher cost of borrowing when compared to conventional financing.
257
 As pointed 
out by Esty (2004a), “[Y]et project finance also has some very serious drawbacks – it is 
expensive to set up, it takes a long time to execute (i.e., the transaction costs are very 
high), and it is highly restrictive once in place…”258 Similarly, Gatti (2008) argues that 
the principal drawback of project finance is that structuring such a deal is more costly 
than corporate financing. The author presents the following reasons: “1. The legal, 
technical, and insurance advisors of the sponsors and the loan arranger need a great 
deal of time to evaluate the project and negotiate the contracts term to be included in 
the documentation; 2. The cost of monitoring the project in process is very high; 3. 
Lenders are expected to pay significant costs in exchange for taking on greater 
risks.”259 
One of the most frequently mentioned disadvantages of structured leases are the costs of 
complexity [Caselli and Gatti (2005)]. This idea is corroborated by Fabozzi et al. 
(2006), who state that a structured lease is similar to a single-investor lease – in terms of 
equipment selection and negotiation (rentals, options, responsibility for taxes, insurance, 
and maintenance) – but appreciably more complex in size, documentation, legal 
involvement, and, most importantly, in the number of parties involved and the unique 
advantages that each party gains. 
                                                 
256
 Davidson et al. (2003) estimates, for a Euro 100 million transaction in Europe, that these costs add to 
the overall financing costs about 15 to 50 basis points, assuming a 7-year bullet financing. 
257
 The same idea is presented by Esty (1999). The author says that “[N]egotiating the deal, including the 
financial, construction and operating contracts, is extremely time-consuming and expensive.” 
258
 Esty (2003) estimates transaction costs to be around 5% of the deal value. 
259
 Despite some counter-intuitive features of project finance when compared to corporate financing (e.g., 
the creation of a stand-alone company takes more, entails greater transaction costs, higher leverage 
increases the probability of default, and, in most cases, this implies higher debt rates), Esty (2004b) 
argues that, in practice, “… the individual structural components fit together in a very coherent and 
symbiotic way, and can reduce the net financing costs associated with large capital investments…” 
Similarly, Bonetti et al. (2010) state that “… a cost/benefit analysis reveals that the additional expenses 
are more than compensated for by the advantages that arise from off-balance sheet financing and 
appropriate risk allocation.” 
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With respect to LBOs, although high leverage enables the reduction of agency costs 
between managers and shareholders and increments tax shields, the inflexibility of the 
required payments increases the chance of costly financial distress [Cumming and 
Zambelli (2010)]. Based on LBOs transactions, Roden and Lewellen (1995) argue that 
the financing decision to be taken by the buyout group will involve a trade-off between 
leverage-related costs (agency costs of high levels of debt financing and bankruptcy 
costs) and leverage-related benefits (disciplining effect of debt on management and the 
value of tax shields provided by the debt). 
In short, higher leverage in a structured finance transaction usually induces up-front and 
ongoing fees which are relatively higher, when compared to straight debt finance 
transactions. 
 
3.4.6. Wealth Expropriation 
Miller and Upton (1976) conclude that no financial advantages accrue from leasing. 
Lowellen, Long, and McConnell (1976) and Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976) argue that, 
under a set of assumptions, there is a potential for gains in valuation for the firm 
involved in leasing, resulting from tax benefit expropriation (government bears a loss in 
taxes). According to Altamuro (2006), critics of structured leases argue that the 
economic benefits of these off-balance sheet transactions “… are the result of short-
sighted opportunistic behavior by managers that lead to wealth extraction at the 
expense of other groups of stakeholders.” Finally, some authors [e.g., Wanzenboeck 
(2001)] argue that, in cross-border leasing, the wealth expropriation phenomenon is 
greater, essentially when the leasing is structured based on the interposition of a trust 
between the lessor and lessees. In this case, the tax benefits produced are duplicated. 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) assert that LBOs take advantages of tax benefits, but do 
not create economic value. The same idea is presented by Opler and Titman (1993), 
who point out that “[C]ritics of LBOs argue that most of the gains to equityholders 
arise because of tax savings (see Lowenstein (1985)) and the expropriation of nonequity 
stakeholders (e.g., employees and bondholders) and have expressed concern about the 
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effect of financial distress…”260 Cumming and Zambelli (2010) corroborate the intuition 
of Opler and Titman (1993) and assert that the current criticism of LBOs is associated 
with: (1) the potential negative impact on the acquired company; (2) the inside 
information held by managers; and (3) private equity financed LBOs may weaken the 
target firms and kill jobs.
261
 More recently, particular criticism has been directed at the 
so-called club deals.
262
 Officer et al. (2010) find that “… target shareholders in club 
deals receive significantly lower premiums than sole-sponsored LBOs and other merger 
and acquisition transactions.” This may be the result of private equity partnerships 
colluding to depress prices by limiting the number of competing bidders in an auction 
for a takeover target. 
 
 
3.5. Structured Finance and Financial Crises 
3.5.1. Financial Crises 
“Financial crises are major disruptions in financial markets characterized by sharp 
declines in asset prices and firms failures.” 
Frederic Mishkin (2010) 
 
The expression financial crisis is roughly applied to a multiplicity of situations in which 
financial institutions or assets rapidly lose a huge part of their value. In the 19th and 
early 20th centuries, many financial crises were associated with banking panics, and 
many recessions coincided with those panics. A well-functioning financial system 
allocates capital to its most productive uses and solves asymmetric information 
problems. It is widely accepted [see, e.g., Mishkin (2010)] that financial crises occur 
when an increase in asymmetric information, as a result of a disruption in the financial 
                                                 
260
 Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan and Stein (1993), and Opler (1993) developed 
academic studies of bankruptcy costs and bankruptcy cost reduction in highly levered transactions. These 
studies emerged because firms that did LBOs in the late 1980s incurred financial problems, which 
renewed concerns about potential financial distress costs created by these transactions. 
261
 On the contrary, Amess and Wright (2007) present evidence that “… LBOs, per se, do not destroy jobs 
and emphasize the need for more empirical evidence to better address the current international 
controversy surrounding LBOs.” 
262
 In a club deal, two or more private equity firms jointly sponsor an LBO. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 104 
system, causes severe adverse selection and moral hazard problems, making financial 
markets unable to channel funds in an efficient manner, from savers to households and 
firms with investment opportunities of positive net present value. Consequently, 
economic activity contracts sharply.
263
 
A relationship can be established between financial innovation as the process of new 
securities design and financial crises. Gennaioli et al. (2010) point out that there is a 
common narrative in many episodes of financial innovation. First, investors (strongly) 
demand for a particular – often safe – stream of cash flows. Then, in response, 
intermediaries create new securities from risky assets offering the desired stream. Next, 
large amounts of new securities are issued because new securities are believed by 
investors (and by the intermediaries) to be good substitutes for the traditional ones – this 
is achieved through financial engineering. At some point in time, both investors and 
intermediaries are surprised, because previously unattended risks are reflected in the 
news, which is followed by a flight from ‘false substitutes’ to safe traditional securities. 
Finally, the prices of traditional securities rise, while those of new ones drop sharply. A 
recent example of this narrative is the securitization of mortgages, in which financial 
institutions created mortgage-backed securities, with an AAA rating, by means of 
pooling and tranching mortgages and other loans. Investors and intermediaries had the 
perception that these securities were safe and apparently good substitutes for U.S. 
government bonds. After trillions of dollars of securities were sold to investors, in the 
summer of 2007, both investors and intermediaries faced the news that the AAA-rated 
securities were not safe.
264
 
However the recent episode, the international financial crisis that began in July-August 
2007,
265
 is far from unique. Other examples can be presented. Particularly, in the 1980s 
                                                 
263
 Mishkin (2010) presents six categories of factors that play important roles in financial crises: (i) asset 
market effects on balance sheets; (ii) deterioration in financial institutions’ balance sheets; (iii) banking 
crisis – the contagion process underlying bank panics resulting from asymmetric information; (iv) 
increases in uncertainty – adverse selection problem, making lenders less willing to lend; (v) increases in 
interest rates; and (vi) government fiscal imbalances. 
264
 As stated by Carow et al. (2010), “[W]hat came as a rather complete surprise is how fast home prices 
declined, and defaults grew, so that even AAA-rated mortgage backed securities were affected. As these 
securities were downgraded, investors turned back to government bonds, and many financial institutions 
had to liquidate their holdings to reduce leverage, precipitating a financial crisis.” 
265
 When Bear Stearns liquidated two hedge funds that invested in mortgage-backed securities, BNP 
Paribas halted redemption in three investment funds supposedly investing in AAA-rated assets, the 
LIBOR-OIS spread exploded, and the market of asset-backed commercial paper collapsed. 
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investment banks began to sell CMOs and, in 2008, money market funds were seriously 
disrupted after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. 
The global financial crisis, which started in 2007 – triggered by a liquidity shortfall in 
the U.S. banking system – has resulted in the collapse of financial institutions and the 
bailout of banks by national governments, and has revealed substantial transparency and 
information shortcomings, due to the increasing opaqueness and complexity of the 
global financial system. Considering that this has been particularly evidenced by 
uncertainty on the valuation and related ratings of structured products, a further analysis 
of the role played by structured finance instruments in the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
becomes crucial. 
 
3.5.2. Structured Finance and the Subprime Financial Crisis 
The subprime financial crisis was triggered by the exposure of financial institutions to 
the subprime mortgage market
266
 and related financial instruments, which were 
primarily related to structured finance and, more specifically, to asset securitization.
267
 
Several authors pointed out that structured finance played a significant role in the 
development and propagation of the financial crisis.
268
 As the IMF (2008a) states “… 
the proliferation of new complex structured finance products, markets, and business 
models exposed the financial system to a funding disruption and breakdown in 
confidence” and that particular products “… exacerbated the depth and duration of the 
                                                 
266
 Considered the most risky segment of the United States mortgage market. According to Kiff and Mills 
(2007) subprime mortgages are residential loans that do not conform to the criteria for ‘prime’ mortgages 
and so have a lower expected probability of full repayment, as they are made to more ‘risky’ mortgage 
borrowers. Standard and Poor’s states that borrowers below A (credit rating) quality are considered 
subprime. See Gorton (2009) for a further description of subprime RMBS Bonds and CDOs backed by 
RMBS Bonds. 
267
 According to Criado and Rixtel (2008) “[A]s risk assessments were adjusted, the financial turmoil 
spilled over to other financial market segments and risky assets – particularly those linked to structured 
finance – were abandoned in favor of ‘safe haven’ instruments such as government debt securities.” As 
pointed out by the authors, financial market turmoil showed the following characteristics: (i) stock prices 
fell; (ii) volatility levels jumped – particularly in the short-term money markets; (iii) interbank money 
market interest rates verified unprecedented rises; (iv) credit spreads increased; and (v) central banks 
injected substantial amounts of liquidity into the markets. The liquidity concerns that dominated the 
initial phase of the financial crisis were accompanied by credit risk concerns and transformed into crises 
of solvency related to major financial institutions when they started to report losses that were actually 
much larger than had been anticipated. For further discussion of financial turmoil see, for example, IMF 
(2008a and 2008b), BIS (2008), Borio (2008), and Mishkin (2010). 
268
 See, among others, BIS (2008), IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), 
and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011). 
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crisis by adding uncertainty relating to their valuation as the underlying fundamentals 
deteriorated.” The capability of structured finance to repackage risks and create ‘secure’ 
assets from a risky collateral lead to a rapid growth in the issuance of structured 
securities, most of which were perceived by investors as near risk-free financial 
assets.
269
 During the financial crisis, it was discovered that these securities were actually 
far riskier than originally perceived by investors and certified by rating agencies.
270
 As 
referred by Gennaioli et al. (2010), “[W]hen investors or intermediaries perceive some 
securities to be safe, they would borrow using them as collateral, often with very low 
haircuts…” But when investors and intermediaries realized that these securities were 
actually risky they would sell them, trying to meet their collateral requirements, leading 
to an additional fragility from fire sales. 
Criado and Rixtel (2008) point out a set of weaknesses related with the use of structured 
finance, which were revealed by the financial turmoil, including: (i) banks 
underestimated their exposure to structured finance products and specific ‘off-balance 
sheet’ vehicles;271 (ii) certain banks retained large exposures to specific structured 
finance instruments, such as collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) without sufficiently 
understanding their impact on capital and liquidity positions; (iii) banks resorted to 
more volatile funding sources including structured finance products;
272
 and (iv) the 
process of securitization may have generated unwelcome incentive problems, 
considering that banks may not have accurately assessed the credit risk of borrowers, 
when they put their loans off-balance sheet using securitization techniques. The authors 
argue that asset securitizations, such as (subprime) mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP), ‘cash flow’ collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs), and synthetic CDOs, played a central role in the development and propagation 
                                                 
269
 As referred by Coval et al. (2009), “[A]s a result of the prioritization scheme used in structuring 
claims, many of the manufactured tranches are far safer than the average asset in the underlying pools.” 
270
 Structured finance, by virtue of diversification, tranching, and other forms of financial engineering 
created asset-backed securities (AAA-rated) that proved, during the financial crisis that started in 2007, to 
be false substitutes for the traditional and safe ones. In this case, false substitutes tend to lead to financial 
instability even without the effects of excessive leverage. For example, investors assumed that an AAA-
rated bind issued by a European-listed company carried the same risk as an AAA-rated bond backed by a 
pool of assets. 
271
 Which play an important role in this type of financing as suggested by Gorton and Souleles (2005). 
According to Lancaster et al. (2008) “[T]hose SIVs that have been most affected by the market turmoil of 
2007 are also those that are most heavily exposed to structured products, which also happens to be the 
newest SIVs in the market.” 
272
 When structured credit markets closed the funding capability of specific banks – such as Northern 
Rock in the United Kingdom – they were significantly impaired.  
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of the financial crisis. Additionally, Coval et al. (2009) state that securitization promotes 
the substitution of diversifiable risks for risks that are systematic or non-diversifiable. 
“[A]s a result, securities produced by structured finance activities have far less chance 
of surviving a severe economic downturn than traditional corporate securities of equal 
rating.”273 The authors consider that the fragility of structured securities ratings and 
their high exposure to systematic risk are the main reasons for the impressive rise and 
subsequent fall of securitization. 
Two major problems can be pointed out underlying the financial crisis: (i) asymmetric 
information problems, and (ii) agency problems [see, among others, Calomiris (2009)]. 
Although financial engineering has the potential to create securities and products that 
better match investors’ needs, they also have hazards. The structured products like 
CDOs and squared CDOs (and other types of even more complex products)
274
 can get 
so complex that it can be hard to determine the cash flows of the underlying assets and 
the value of issued securities. As asserted by Mishkin (2010), “… the increased 
complexity of structured products can actually destroy information, thereby making 
asymmetric information worse in the financial system and increasing severity of adverse 
selection and moral hazard problems.” Moreover, the originate-to-distribute business 
model, which lies behind the subprime mortgage market, is subject to the principal-
agent problem, because the mortgage originator has little incentive to make sure that the 
mortgage is of good credit risk.
275
 However, the agency problems become serious when 
the commercial and investment banks also have weak incentives to ensure that the 
ultimate holders of the securities would be paid for. The credit rating agencies 
                                                 
273
 The low capital requirements imposed on AAA-rated assets allowed banks to hold any senior tranches 
on their balance sheets. However, when the securitization market collapsed in late 2007, the investment 
banks found themselves holding hundreds of billions of dollars of low-quality assets pools. 
274
 See Annex 1 for a detailed description of such instruments. Structured CDOs played a key role in the 
2007/2008 financial crisis. As problems in the subprime mortgage markets in the United States mounted 
during the second and third quarters of 2007, CDOs based on mortgage-backed securities linked to the 
subprime market were negatively affected inflicting enormous losses on investors. Markets for these 
products dried up and as investors were not able to determine their losses, uncertainty grew in global 
financial markets and led to a spill-over of the financial turmoil to other financial market segments. 
275
 In originate-to-distribute (O&D) business model, mortgages are originated by a separate party, 
typically a mortgage broker, and are then distributed to an investor as an underlying asset security. O&D 
model differs from originate-to-hold (O&H) banking model because with securitization, banks were no 
longer the originators and holders of loans, but had become the originators and distributors to the capital 
markets of both credit and risks. 
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evaluating these securities are also themselves subject to conflict of interest.
276
 A 
similar idea is presented by Tavaloki (2008), who argues that the lack of appropriate 
due diligence (by rating agencies) and disclosure are the principal factors behind the 
financial crisis. 
 
As a result of the international financial crisis, several authors asked if we should halt 
financial liberalization and innovation in order to prevent crises from recurring. Shiller 
(2008) argues that as financial innovation involves complicated financial arrangements, 
it can also create hazards. The sub-prime crisis has demonstrated the existence of 
problems still to be solved, like the implementation of stricter disclosure requirements 
for new securities and better-designed vehicles for hedging risks. When referring to the 
innovations associated to the sub-prime crisis, Shiller (2008) states that “… we should 
not slow down financial innovation in general. On the contrary, some of the fixes that 
result from the sub-prime crisis will probably take the form of still more innovation, 
further increasing the sophistication of our financial markets.” Similarly, Keys et al. 
(2010) argue that securitization is an important innovation and has several merits. 
However, the underlying assumption behind the argument that securitization improves 
the efficiency of credit markets is that there is no information loss between borrowers 
and investors. Hence, an increase in the ‘skin in the game’ and the reduction of the 
information loss are presented by Hull (2009) and Keys et al. (2010) as key factors for 
improving securitization transactions. 
 
3.5.3. Concluding Remarks 
It is commonly accepted that most credit is nowadays created using the originate-to-
distribute model in which the originator of a loan sells it to someone (usually a special 
                                                 
276
 Credit rating agencies earn fees from rating securities and also from advising originators how to 
structure these transactions to get higher credit ratings. Additionally, “[T]he position of oligopoly enjoyed 
by these firms reduces their incentives to compete by developing more effective ratings methods and 
procedures…” [Herring and Kane (2009)]. In response to the criticism levied at credit rating agencies for 
having contributed to the financial crisis, regulators have been pressured to reform the way in which those 
agencies do business. The European Parliament recently issued a new regulation on credit rating agencies 
and their activities in Europe, which include new registration requirements, strengthened supervision by 
EU and nation authorities, new conduct-of-business rules and operational duties, as well as a new rating 
regime for structured finance investments. 
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purpose entity), who adds it to a portfolio of similar loans, and then issues new 
securities, holding a claim against the income provided by the loan portfolio. The 
transition from the traditional originate-to-hold model to the originate-to-distribute 
model, as well as its reliance on credit markets as a continuing source of credit, has 
been blamed by academics and practitioners for the financial crisis of 2007/2008. If the 
originator does not hold the credit it originates, but distributes the loan and its risks to 
other entities through securitization, the originator has a reduced incentive to monitor 
the credit granting process. Thus, this model brings with it a major principal-agent 
problem in the credit screening process, because the credit incentives of the originator 
are not aligned with those of the entity that ultimately holds the loan. When we add the 
growing complexity associated with the securitization process, the result is a ‘market for 
lemons’ problem [Akerlof (1970)], leading to the collapse of the market for securitized 
assets.
277
 However, it should be put into perspective that securitized subprime mortgage 
backed securities only represent 6% of the approximately (at the end of 2007) $10 
trillion asset securitization market. Thus, the rest $9.4 trillion of structured products 
have generally been stable quality securities, with rating transition matrices probabilities 
equal to or better than the corporate bond market [Lancaster et al. (2008)]. 
 
The asset securitization market, or at least some part of it, began to show some signs of 
recovery in 2008 and 2009. According to data from the Association for Financial 
Markets in Europe (AFME) and the European Securitization Forum (ESF), in 2008 and 
2009, there were a few issues of ABS notes, approximately USD900bn of which have 
been issued in the U.S. and around USD65bn have been issued in Europe. The 
European Central Bank (ECB) and the Bank of England became two important players 
in these markets: around USD1,100bn of European ABS offers in 2008 and 2009 were 
taken by the ECB and around USD535bn by the Bank of England (source: Bloomberg). 
Krebsz (2011) asserts that “[B]y mid-June 2010 there appears to be a thin but healthy 
pipeline of transactions lined up for issuance in the second half of this year and 2011.” 
                                                 
277
 As pointed out by Martin (2009), “… securitization has grown to encompass increasingly more 
sophisticated and complex structures that make it difficult, if not impossible, to assess the value and risk 
of a particular security given the myriad of layers through which the security is connected to a particular 
mortgage, credit card receivable, or corporate loan or bond issue.” 
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Since 2008, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS), the European Commission 
(EC), the International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO), the Committee 
of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR), the European Central Bank (ECB), the Bank of England, European 
Union national regulators, and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
have been contributing to restore confidence in the securitization market.
278
 The major 
recommendations are as follows [Krebsz (2011)]: (1) to improve pool information on 
U.S. and European RMBS into a more easily accessible and more standardized format; 
(2) to set up core market standards of due diligence disclosure practices for RMBS; (3) 
to strengthen and standardize the representations and warranties for RMBS; (4) to 
develop standard norms for RMBS servicing duties and evaluating servicer 
performance; (5) to improve independent third-party sources of valuation; (6) to restore 
market confidence in credit rating agencies by enhancing transparency in the rating 
process; and (7) to establish and enhance educational programs about securitization and 
structured products. 
 
The crisis demonstrated that, in securitization, the value of the underlying cash flows 
varies with their repackaging, and that repackaging risk does not just eliminate it. 
Additionally, when market deterioration becomes systemic, SPVs may be unable to 
withstand market inertia, and triggers will eventually be breached – complex 
securitization products have introduced systemic risk into the financial system and 
maybe they have multiplied it. We can present some key factors that may help to 
overcome the shortcomings leading to the credit crisis, namely: (1) reduced complexity; 
(2) increased transparency; (3) increased standardization of transactions; (4) improved 
disclosure of underwriting standards; (5) increasing the alignment of incentives between 
originators and investors; (6) avoiding active rating shopping; (7) reduced overreliance 
on credit ratings; (9) increased risk management and risk mitigation; and (10) the need 
for investors to understand the benefits and drawbacks of arbitrage mechanisms.
279
 
                                                 
278
 See Krebsz (2011) for a comprehensive list of recommendations, as well as legislative and regulatory 
initiatives proposed by these entities. 
279
 Tavakoli (2008) points out that “[W]hat is needed is effective regulation. Until that occurs, investors 
will have to fend for themselves and practice the fundamentals of prudent lending and investing.” A 
similar line of reasoning is presented by Krebsz (2011), who states that structured finance markets will 
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4. Research Questions and Data Description 
4.1. Background Information 
The primary purpose of this dissertation is to identify the common elements of various 
types of structured finance transactions and examine their economic advantages; i.e., 
why structured finance matters? This can be achieved by identifying the motivations 
behind structured finance transactions versus straight debt finance transactions. In fact, 
despite its use on a worldwide basis and several decades of history, a number of key 
issues regarding the specific determinants of structured finance, vis-a-vis other forms of 
financing, remain largely unresolved. This dissertation intends to provide a contribution 
to this research field of Corporate Finance. 
From the previous literature discussion, we can highlight two core economic benefits 
provided by structured finance. The first motivation relates to the fact that structured 
finance enables the financing of a unique asset class when established forms of external 
finance are either (i) unavailable for a particular financing need, or (ii) less expensive 
than traditional sources of funds. The second economic benefit is the reduction in the 
cost of funding (e.g., through lower yield on issued debt). If the benefits of the reduced 
cost of funding are greater than the cost of the credit enhancement, making use of a 
structured basis is advantageous for sponsors – any transaction that is specifically 
structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing assets producing cash flows 
solely for supporting the transaction, allows the issuer to obtain better credit ratings 
and/or leverage than it would by issuing senior secured debt.
280
 Therefore, the core 
issues that will be investigated are the aspects that characterize these types of financing 
structures and distinguish them from straight debt finance transactions, with particular 
emphasis on examining the pricing factors affecting their cost of funding in Western 
European countries. 
If structured finance (SF) instruments or transactions allow the reduction of funding 
costs, then the rates charged on SF transactions (or tranches) should be lower than the 
                                                                                                                                               
grow again if some fundamental changes – namely standardization, transparency, and simplicity – are put 
in place. 
280
 See, among others, Caselli and Gatti (2005), Davis (2005), Akbiyikli et al. (2006), Jobst (2007), and 
Tavakoli (2008). 
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rates charged on straight debt finance (SDF) transactions (or tranches).
281
 Due to the 
difference in underlying risks, the relevant pricing factors for these two types of debt 
instruments should also differ. Four objectives are thus pursued in the dissertation. First, 
the pricing factors of SF transactions are identified and compared to pricing factors of 
SDF transactions. Second, the credit spread on SF is compared to the credit spread on 
SDF (Chapter 4). Next, we perform an econometric analysis of the determinants of loan 
and bond pricing (credit spreads) for SF and SDF transactions to determine how 
borrower, transaction-specific factors, and economic factors influence credit spreads 
(Chapter 5). Finally, we determine the factors which influence the choice between the 
use of SF and SDF transactions (Chapter 6). 
Few researchers have studied these topics, so we will need to develop many of the 
testable hypotheses on our own. While Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) compare the 
spread and the common pricing factors of project finance loans with other syndicated 
loans, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) compare the term structure of ex ante project finance 
credit spreads with non-project finance loans and bonds.
282
 Vink and Thibeault (2008) 
examine if the primary market spreads associated with ABS, MBS, and CDOs are 
influenced differently by common pricing factors. Our study is the first to investigate 
how common pricing factors compare among and between SF (project finance loans 
and asset securitization bonds) and SDF transactions (corporate bonds).
283
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2. describes the research questions 
employed in this study. Section 4.3. includes a sample description followed by section 
4.4. which describes the statistical results. 
 
                                                 
281
 Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that project finance loans have lower spreads than many other 
types of syndicated loans. Considering project finance deals, Corielli et al. (2008) assert that “… the 
credit risk premium required by lenders should be lower in deals where effective risk management 
through a pervasive set of NFCs is in place as compared to those deals with poor risk management..:” 
We intend to examine whether this conclusion remains valid not only when compared with other SF 
transactions, but as well as with SDF transactions. 
282
 Esty and Megginson (2003) define lending syndicates as “… pyramids with a few arranging banks 
(arrangers) at the top and many providing banks (providers) at the bottom.” See Gorton and Pennachi 
(1995), Esty (2001), and Esty and Megginson (2003) for a more detailed description of syndicated loans. 
283
 We draw mainly on loan pricing studies and their methodologies presented in, among others, 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), Gatti el al. (2007), Corielli et al. 
(2008), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), and Vink and Thibeault (2008). 
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4.2. Research Questions and Methodology 
In general, debt capital markets are roughly composed of two major types of financial 
instruments: straight debt finance (SDF) and structured finance (SF) instruments. Due to 
the differences in the structure and warranties related to these two types of transactions, 
their relevant pricing factors should differ as well. This raises the following three 
questions: (1) How common pricing factors compare between SF and SDF transactions 
(or tranches)? (2) Is the credit spread on SF transactions (or tranches) significantly 
different to the credit spread on SDF transactions (or tranches)? And (3) to what extent 
are SF and SDF transactions (or tranches) priced by common factors? 
In short, three hypotheses are tested with respect to SF pricing. First (Hypothesis 1 and 
Hypothesis 2) we want to argue that not only the credit spread but even the common 
pricing factors differ significantly between SF and SDF transactions. The third 
hypothesis states that the primary market credit spreads associated with SF and SDF 
transactions are influenced differently by common pricing factors.
284
 Generally, it is 
proposed the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The pricing factors of SF credit spreads do not differ significantly in 
relevance from the pricing factors of SDF credit spreads. 
Hypothesis 2: The credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit spread on 
SDF.
285
 
Hypothesis 3: The impact of pricing factors on credit spread do not differ significantly 
among and between SF and SDF transactions. 
 
                                                 
284
 In this dissertation we use the issuance credit spread (or the tranche spread at closing). Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), Gatti et al. (2007), Vink and Thibeault (2008), and 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), among others, use the same variable. Vink and Thibeault (2008) argue that it 
is commonly recognized that issuance spreads are a more accurate measure of the risk premium 
demanded by investors. 
285
 Caselli and Gatti (2005), Fabozzi et al. (2006), and Tavakoli (2008), among others, point out the 
reduction of funding costs as one of the major economic motivations of structured finance transactions. 
The same intuition is presented by Davidson et al. (2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi et al. 
(2006), Jost (2006), and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) for asset securitization. According to Esty (2003) 
and Gatti (2005), the use of project finance may enable sponsors to obtain a reduction in the net cost of 
financing. For further discussion of this issue see sub-section 3.3.2. 
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The purpose of answering the first and the second question is to provide extensive 
insight into the common characteristics and pricing factors associated with SF and SDF 
financial instruments and to elaborate on any substantial differences between them. In 
testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 we use a parametric test (Student’s t-test) for continuous 
variables and a non-parametric test (Fisher's exact test) for dummy variables, to 
compare whether the distribution of the reported values for SF and SDF tranches are 
significantly different. This analysis is presented in section 4.4. 
The third hypothesis states that various different variables determine the credit spread, 
and it may well be that the impact of these variables on the credit spread is different 
among and between SF and SDF transactions; i.e., in pricing transactions, the pricing 
factors may have a different impact on the credit spread exhibited by the value of the 
coefficients. Furthermore, the degree of impact on the spread could differ from one 
financial instrument class to another. In testing Hypothesis 3, a structural change test is 
used. The Chow test is an econometric test used to determine whether the coefficients in 
a regression model are equal in separate subsamples [Chow (1960)].
286
 Having 
documented to what extent the pricing variables for SF and SDF transactions show 
significant differences, we continue our empirical analysis by examining the factors 
impacting on the pricing of tranches. We use an ordinary least squares regression 
analysis to model the magnitude of the relationships between pricing variables and the 
credit spread with the expectations as outlined in sub-section 5.3.2. Should Hypothesis 3 
be rejected, examining the coefficients allows us to determine pricing variables for each 
class separately. Should Hypothesis 3 be accepted, a regression test would have to be 
run on one sample only. 
 
Finally, the significant role played by the 2007/2008 financial crisis
287
 in a number of 
business failures, the decline in consumer wealth, and the downturn in economic 
                                                 
286
 See Davidson and Mackinnin (1993) for further discussion of this topic. In short, the Chow test is an 
econometric test used to determine whether the coefficients in two linear regressions on different data sets 
are equal.  
287
 The global financial crisis that started in 2007 triggered by a liquidity shortfall in the U.S. banking 
system, has resulted in the collapse of financial institutions and the bailout of banks by national 
governments, and has revealed substantial transparency and information shortcomings due to the 
increasing opaqueness and complexity of the global financial system. According to Criado and Rixtel 
(2008), “… this has in particular been evidenced by uncertainty on the size and distribution of the losses 
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activity contributing to the European sovereign debt crisis
288
 require a study of the 
impact of the global financial crisis on SF credit spreads. There is broad consensus 
about the important role played by SF transactions, especially asset securitizations, in 
the development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis.
289
 As IMF (2008a) 
suggests “… the proliferation of new complex structured finance products, markets, and 
business models exposed the financial system to a funding disruption and breakdown in 
confidence” and that particular products “… exacerbated the depth and duration of the 
crisis by adding uncertainty relating to their valuation as the underlying fundamentals 
deteriorated.” These arguments raise one final question: Is the credit spread on SF 
transactions (or tranches) significantly affected by the 2007/2008 financial crisis? One 
final hypothesis is thus proposed: 
 
Hypothesis 4: After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, 
the 2007/2008 financial crisis does not have a significant impact on SF 
credit spread. 
 
The purpose of answering the fourth question is to provide extensive insight into the 
impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis on SF credit spread. Given that, since the second half of 2008 we have been 
observing considerable financial turmoil, a flight to quality might have left many 
investors and intermediaries in the Western European countries credit-rationed. Hence, 
SF borrowers and lenders might have also changed their attitude towards SF in terms of 
pricing and compensation. We are therefore examining whether the credit spread 
changes over time, by considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 through to 
                                                                                                                                               
resulting from the subprime crisis and on the valuation and related ratings of structured products.” 
Mishkin (2010) points out the mismanagement of financial innovation and the bursting of a housing price 
bubble as the underlying forces of the financial crisis. 
288
 From late 2009, a sovereign debt crisis developed in Europe as a result of the rising private and 
government debt levels around the world together with a wave of downgrading of government debt in 
some European states. In several countries, private debts arising from a property bubble were transferred 
to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and government responses to slowing economies 
post-bubble [see, among others, Haidar (2012)]. 
289
 See, among others, BIS (2008), IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), 
and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011). 
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September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th
, 2008 (Lehman Brothers' 
bankruptcy filing date) through to December 31
st
, 2011. 
 
4.3. Sample Selection 
Our sample consists of individual loans and bond offers extracted from DealScan and 
DCM Analytics databases, respectively. DCM Analytics database (formerly Bondware 
database) is compiled by Dealogic
290
 and offers comprehensive information of debt 
securities issued on the debt capital markets. DealScan database is provided by 
Thomson Reuters LPC, a primary market information provider of individual deal 
information on the global syndicated loan markets. Information is available on the 
micro characteristics of the loan and bond offers (e.g., transaction and tranche size, 
maturity, currency, pricing, rating, type of interest rate) and of the borrowers (e.g., 
name, nationality, industry sector). 
The reason for using two databases is that we require information about the pricing 
characteristics of structured finance and straight debt finance transactions. In fact, while 
DCM Analytics provides very detailed information regarding corporate bonds (used as a 
proxy for straight debt finance transactions) and asset securitization, Dealscan has 
particularly rich data about project finance loans. We use asset securitization and project 
finance transactions as proxies for structured finance instruments.
291
 
These databases contain detailed historical information on virtually the entire 
population of bond securities (DCM Analytics) and syndicated loans (DealScan) issued 
in the international capital markets from January 1
st
, 2000 through to December 31
st
, 
2011. Although the database extracted from DCM Analytics contains information on 
several types of bonds, we include only those with a deal type code of “corporate bond-
investment-grade”, “corporate bond-high yield”, “asset-backed security”, and 
                                                 
290
 Dealogic (formerly Capital DATA) was founded in 1983 and is based in London. 
291
 As pointed out in section 3.2., one can identify four types of structure finance instruments; i.e., project 
finance, asset securitization, structured leasing, and leveraged acquisitions (mainly LBOs). We rely on 
project finance and asset securitization as structured finance instruments because: (i) there is no public 
information on structuring leasing transactions; and (ii) LBOs can be implemented without an SPV to 
facilitate the transaction, which is a key element of structured finance transactions. 
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“mortgage-backed security”.292 Bond tranches classified either as fixed rate bonds, with 
coupon rate information, or variable rate bonds, with both spread and index information 
were included in the data. For variable rate bonds, only those quoted on the following 
indices were included: Euribor, Euro Libor, USD Libor, and GBP Libor. Bonds with 
additional features such as step-up, caps, or floors were excluded. While Dealscan 
database contains historical information about syndicated loans and related banking 
instruments, we examine only loans with a deal specific purpose code of “project 
finance”. We also require, for both databases, that the Borrower/Issuer country belongs 
to Western Europe
293
 and that the tranche size (in Euro millions) be available. After 
applying these screens, we are able to examine a total of 24,435 debt issues (worth Euro 
6,297.8 billion).
294
 
Our sample contains information on 599 asset securitization issues (worth Euro 179.1 
billion) – of which 430 issues (worth Euro 106.3 billion) have a deal type code of ABS 
and 169 issues (worth Euro 72.9 billion) have a deal type code of MBS –, 20,977 
corporate bond issues (worth Euro 5,786.5 billion), and 2,859 project finance issues 
(worth Euro 332.1 billion).
295
 We refer to this as our ‘full sample’. We refer to the 
database composed of asset securitization and project finance issues as our ‘structured 
finance full sample’ and the database composed of corporate bond issues as our ‘straight 
debt finance full sample’. 
 
As the unit of observation is a single issue or a single loan tranche, multiple issues from 
the same transaction appear as separate observations in our database. Project finance 
                                                 
292
 We exclude bond issues, which have a deal type code of ‘Medium-Term Note’, ‘Non-Us Agency’, 
‘Covered Bonds’, and ‘Collateralized-Debt Obligation’. Perpetual bonds were also excluded from the 
database. The asset securitization market is composed of asset-backed securities (ABS), mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs). Due to the important role played by CDOs 
in the 2007/2008 financial crisis – CDOs based on mortgage-backed securities linked to the subprime 
market were negatively affected inflicting enormous losses on investors – and as CDO issues are 
frequently backed by ABS and MBS, we decided to exclude CDOs from our asset securitization dataset. 
293
 We consider the following countries as pertaining to Western Europe: Austria; Belgium; Cyprus; 
Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Greece; Iceland; Ireland; Italy; Luxemburg; the Netherlands; 
Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; Switzerland; and the United Kingdom. 
294
 We verify with Thomson Reuters that our project finance sample (loans with a deal specific purpose 
code of “project finance”) refers to loans made to a vehicle company and with Dealogic that our asset 
securitization sample (bonds with a deal type code of “asset-backed security” and “mortgage-backed 
security”) refers to securities sold to investors by bankruptcy-remote special purpose vehicles (SPVs). 
295
 We examine only PF loans that are actually signed loans. 
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and asset securitization transactions typically consist of several tranches funding the 
same SPV. Therefore, we focus on the transaction tranches as our basic observation. 
Our sample has two limitations for the purposes of our research. First, it may have some 
problems of colinearity, because multiple tranches appear as separate observations in 
our sample. Second, some issues have incomplete loan characteristics, which, as a 
result, will reduce our sample in the univariate analysis (section 4.4.) and in the 
multivariate regression analysis (Chapter 5). 
 
4.4. Descriptive Statistics 
This section provides a full-length statistical analysis of SF (project finance and asset 
securitization) versus SDF (corporate bonds) lending in Western Europe. We start by 
comparing the distribution of loans and bonds across time, industry, and nationality of 
the borrower/issuer. The financial characteristics of project finance (PF) loans are 
compared with the sample of asset securitization (AS) bonds, as well as with our 
corporate bonds (CB) sample. Univariate tests of significance differences between PF, 
AS, and CB tranches are also presented. Finally, non-parametric tests are used to 
compare whether the values reported for each variable are significantly different in pre-
crisis and crisis periods. 
 
4.4.1 Characteristics of Structured Finance versus Straight Debt Finance 
The distribution by year of PF, AS, and CB issues in the full sample, is described in 
Table 4.1. Table 4.2 presents the industrial distribution of the PF, AS, and CB issues, 
while Table 4.3 presents the geographic distribution of the facilities in each of these 
three samples. 
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Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
2000 84 13,502 4.1 115 26,027 14.5 1,250 341,913 5.9
2001 87 13,061 3.9 81 12,990 7.3 1,138 363,536 6.3
2002 69 13,455 4.1 77 17,709 9.9 1,187 278,418 4.8
2003 124 23,067 6.9 42 14,894 8.3 1,962 376,540 6.5
2004 119 12,292 3.7 66 31,555 17.6 2,477 393,164 6.8
2005 122 18,278 5.5 53 10,034 5.6 2,454 597,527 10.3
2006 131 18,340 5.5 55 10,639 5.9 2,628 691,627 12.0
2007 233 27,204 8.2 35 3,469 1.9 2,819 575,316 9.9
2008 638 60,423 18.2 39 36,122 20.2 1,125 444,552 7.7
2009 376 33,567 10.1 36 15,694 8.8 1,412 797,634 13.8
2010 496 53,187 16.0 - - - 1,337 506,067 8.7
2011 380 45,739 13.8 - - - 1,188 420,238 7.3
Total 2,859 332,114 100.0 599 179,132 100.0 20,977 5,786,532 100.0
Year
Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
 
Table 4.1: Distribution of the sample of PF, AS, and CB issues by year.
296
 
 
Table 4.1 shows the evolution of PF, AS, and CB issues between 2000 and 2011. PF 
lending to Western Europe peaked in 2008 (by value and number), fell in 2009 and rose 
again in 2010. AS also peaked in 2008 and fell in 2009. After 2009, we do not have 
observations in our sample. This is partly explained by the European sovereign debt 
crisis, which has limited the increase of securitized products, but also by the fact that an 
increasing number of banks have underwritten their own securitization programs to use 
them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the auctions of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), issuing the so-called Covered Bonds. As asserted by Cardone-Riportella et 
al. (2010), these practices “… have partially replaced the issue of debt, or the interbank 
market itself, as sources of finance to enable banks to grant loans.” Finally, CB issues 
peaked in 2009 and since then have fallen. 
Table 4.2 reveals interesting differences between PF and AS, which largely confirm the 
standard picture of these two types of SF transactions. Table 4.2 shows that AS bonds 
are highly concentrated in one industry, whereas the general population of PF loans 
reveals a far less concentrated industrial pattern. 75.1% of all AS bonds (by value) are 
                                                 
296
 The first three columns describe characteristics of the sample of loans in the Dealscan database with 
the loan purpose code listing as “project finance”. Column four to six describe characteristics for the 
sample of bonds in the DCM Analytics database with the deal type code of “asset-backed security” and 
“mortgage-backed security” (asset securitization bonds), while the next three columns provide similar 
information for the sample of bonds in the DCM Analytics database with the deal type code of “corporate 
bond-investment-grade” and “corporate bond-high yield” (corporate bonds). The first, fourth, and seventh 
columns detail the number of each type of debt tranche issued between 2000 and 2011, while the second, 
fifth, and eight columns describe the total value (in Euro millions). The third, sixth, and ninth columns 
present percentages of the total value for each year. 
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issued by sponsors in the financial industry, while only 1.4% of PF lending goes to 
borrowers in this industry. PF lending is concentrated in four key industries; i.e., 
industrial (37.9%), utilities (31.1%), transportation (13.7%), and commercial (10.6%) 
industries account for 93.3% of all PF lending (value) and 93.7% of all PF loans. 
Similar results are presented by Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). Based on a sample of 
4.956 PF loans booked on national and international markets from January 1
st
, 1980 
through to March 23
rd
, 1999, they find that no less than 90.9% of all PF lending (by 
value) are made to borrowers in the Commercial & Industrial, Utilities, and 
Transportation industries.
297
 These industries account for only 24.9% of the total value 
– and 25.9% of the number – of AS bonds. This finding is consistent with the common 
wisdom that project finance is used primarily to fund tangible-asset-rich and capital 
intensive projects, while asset securitization is a form of financing where monetary 
assets with predictable cash flows are pooled and sold to a specially created third party 
that has borrowed money to finance the purchase. Conversely, a number of similarities 
can be established between the general population of AS and CB samples. As for AS, 
CB are highly concentrated in the financial institutions industry (67.2% of the total 
value and 80.8% of the total number). The most interesting difference can be observed 
in the industrial industry, which accounts for 13.2% of all corporate bond lending, 
almost double the fraction for AS (6.5%) – 8.6% of the total number versus 5.5% for 
AS. 
 
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Commercial 454 35,259 10.6 90 21,750 12.1 1,226 677,251 11.7
Industrial 836 125,993 37.9 33 11,622 6.5 1,802 761,763 13.2
Utilities 1,206 103,214 31.1 27 8,522 4.8 692 355,409 6.1
Financial Institutions 12 4,777 1.4 444 134,457 75.1 16,952 3,887,415 67.2
Transportation 182 45,533 13.7 5 2,782 1.6 261 96,199 1.7
Government 112 8,518 2.6 - - - 7 794 0.0
Other 57 8,819 2.7 - - - 37 7,701 0.1
Total 2,859 332,114 100.0 599 179,132 100.0 20,977 5,786,532 100.0
Industrial Category 
of Borrower
Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
 
Table 4.2: Industrial distribution of PF, AS, and CB issues.
298
 
                                                 
297
 Corielli et al. (2008) present similar results. Based on a sample of PF loans closed between January 
1998 and May 2003 they show that the largest share of loans was awarded to electricity/power and other 
energy utilities (about 52% of the total value), followed by telecommunications (28%) and transportation 
(14%). 
298
 The first, fourth, and seventh columns detail the number of tranches issued by borrowers/issuers in a 
particular industry, while the second, fifth, and eight columns describe the total value (in Euro millions) 
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Table 4.3 also shows clear differences between the Western European countries which 
attract PF lending and those where AS and CB are directed. 
 
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Number of 
Tranches
Total Value 
of Tranches 
(Euro 
Millions)
Percent of 
Total Value
Austria 12 2,788 0.8 1 27 0.0 1,442 135,740 2.3
Belgium 61 6,850 2.1 18 1,723 1.0 432 114,076 2.0
Cyprus 7 244 0.1 - - - 15 4,419 0.1
Denmark 11 1,307 0.4 - - - 24 5,000 0.1
Finland 10 4,780 1.4 - - - 115 35,219 0.6
France 229 27,340 8.2 32 1,526 0.9 1,843 855,408 14.8
Germany 160 19,424 5.8 117 47,299 26.4 7,604 1,387,083 24.0
Greece 62 10,874 3.3 2 74 0.0 160 66,692 1.2
Iceland 4 450 0.1 - - - 2 306 0.0
Ireland 74 4,613 1.4 10 3,309 1.8 186 99,279 1.7
Italy 348 28,296 8.5 52 39,314 21.9 1,755 611,264 10.6
Luxemburg 3 311 0.1 3 173 0.1 79 27,127 0.5
Netherlands 83 14,691 4.4 42 4,270 2.4 1,242 465,500 8.0
Norway 29 4,658 1.4 - - - 1 350 0.0
Portugal 198 20,993 6.3 11 1,391 0.8 420 85,015 1.5
Spain 915 93,152 28.0 19 6,228 3.5 1,097 572,038 9.9
Sweden 30 2,144 0.6 - - - 15 4,483 0.1
Switzerland 17 10,769 3.2 - - - 1,709 103,240 1.8
United Kingdom 606 78,429 23.6 292 73,797 41.2 2,836 1,214,293 21.0
Total 2,859 332,114 100.0 599 179,132 100.0 20,977 5,786,532 100.0
Geographic Location 
of Borrower
Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
 
Table 4.3: Geographic distribution of PF, AS, and CB issues.
299
 
 
AS bonds are highly concentrated in three countries (89.5% by value and 77% of the 
total number of issues are made by borrowers located in U.K., Germany, and Italy), 
with the bulk number of issues concentrated in the U.K. (41.2% by value and 48.7% of 
all AS tranches). The general population of PF loans reveals a far less concentrated 
geographic pattern. No less than six countries concentrate 80.6% of the total value – and 
no less than 85.9% of the total number – of PF loans. Closer analysis reveals a similar 
pattern for CB issues, with the same six countries (Germany, U.K., France, Italy, Spain, 
and Portugal) accounting for an identical fraction (81.7% of the total value of CB versus 
80.6% of all PF lending). The biggest recipient of CB lending is Germany. This country 
accounts for 24% of the total value of CB issues (26.4% for AS bonds), whereas it 
                                                                                                                                               
for each industry. The third, sixth, and ninth columns present percentages of the total value for each 
industry. We divided the industrial category of the borrower into seven categories as proposed by 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). 
299
 The first, fourth, and seventh columns detail the number of each type of debt security issued in a 
particular country in Western Europe, while the second, fifth, and eight columns describe the total value 
(in Euro millions) for each country. The third, sixth, and ninth columns present percentages of the total 
value for each country. 
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accounts for a mere 5.8% of the value of all PF lending. Intriguingly, U.K. borrowers 
are less represented in the PF sub-sample than the Spanish borrowers (23.6% by value 
versus 28%). Considering the emphasis placed by U.K. governments on the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI); i.e., on private rather than public financing of large public 
infrastructure projects, one would expect a grater fraction of U.K. borrowers in the total 
value of PF loans. 
 
Table 4.4 presents basic characteristics for the full sample of PF, AS, and CB issues. 
Significant differences are revealed between both SF and SDF issues, as well as 
between the two categories of SF issues (i.e., PF and AS tranches). One of the most 
remarkable findings is how much larger AS and CB tranches are than PF tranches. 
These issues have mean values of 299 Euro millions (M€) and 276 M€, respectively, 
compared with 116 M€ for PF issues. The converse of this result is that PF tranches are, 
on average, 183 M€ smaller than the general population of AS tranches (116 M€ versus 
299 M€) and 160 M€ smaller than of CB tranches (116 M€ versus 276 M€). Thus, as 
regards tranche size, AS securities are similar to SDF securities. This can be explained 
by the fact that both transactions involve the offer of securities in the capital markets, 
while syndicated loans are the prominent form of funding for project-financed 
investments. 
According to the average maturity (years) variable, the three types of loans are 
substantially different financing instruments. The average maturity of PF loans, 13.6 
years, is significantly lower that of the AS bonds full sample (20.9 years), but 
considerably longer than that of the CB full sample (5.3 years). Additionally, compared 
to AS and CB samples, PF loans involve more than the number of twice banks in the 
transaction. Further, AS and CB transactions are more likely to be exposed to currency 
risk when compared to the PF full sample. 
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Variable of interest Project Finance Loans Asset Securitization Bonds Corporate Bonds
Number of tranches 2,859 599 20,977
Total volume, Euro millions 332,114 179,132 5,786,532
Tranche size, Euro millions
Average 116 299 276
Minimum 0.045 0.050 0.017
Maximum 3,800 22,298 7,763
Average maturity, years 13.6 20.9 5.3
Tranches with guarantee (% ) 96.9 100.0 2.1
Tranches with currency risk (% ) 11.0 31.4 33.2
Tranches to U.K. borrowers (% ) 21.2 48.7 13.5
Tranches to financial institutions (% ) 0.428 74.1 80.8
Average number of banks 6.9 2.4 2.9  
Table 4.4: Basic characteristics for the full sample of PF, AS, and CB issues.
300
 
 
The most remarkable similarity between SF instruments is how frequently PF loans and 
AS bonds are issued with guarantees (96.9% and 100%, respectively). This largely 
meets the standard characteristics of project finance and asset securitization. Contrary to 
the traditional corporate bonds, where it is the ability of the issuer to generate sufficient 
cash flows to repay the debt obligation that determines the risks of the transaction, in 
asset securitization the source of repayments shift from the cash flows of the issuer to 
the cash flows generated by the securitized assets and/or a third party guarantor, in case 
of default. In a project finance transaction, the financing is structured with as little 
recourse as possible to the sponsor, while at the same time providing sufficient credit 
support through guarantees or undertakings of a sponsor or third party, so that lenders 
will be satisfied with the credit risk. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between PF loans and the other two types of 
issues is how infrequently PF loans are extended to financial institutions. Whereas 
74.1% of AS tranches and 80.8% of CB tranches are issued by borrowers in this 
industry, only 0.43% of all PF loans are issued by sponsors in the financial institutions 
industry. 
 
4.4.2 Loans and Bonds Pricing Samples Description 
Since we wish to determine whether SF instruments are more or less expensive for 
borrowers/sponsors than SDF securities, and to compare the common pricing 
characteristics associated with PF, AS and CB issues, we select from our full sample 
                                                 
300
 Table 4.4 details samples of loans and bonds requiring that the amount is available. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 124 
those issues that have comparable pricing data expressed.
301
 This screen has yielded a 
“high-information” sub-sample of 12,080 loans (worth 4,962,996 M€), of which 1,090 
(worth 158,487 M€) have been classified as PF loans, AS bonds represent 439 issues 
(worth 140,733 M€), and 10,551 are CB issues (4,663,777 M€). Our high-information 
samples include issues with five (A) default and recovery risk characteristics (credit 
rating, loan to value, time to maturity, tranches with guarantee, and country risk); nine 
(B) marketability characteristics (tranche size, number of tranches, number of 
bookrunners, number of banks, type of interest rate, tranches to U.K. borrowers, 
tranches to financial institutions, and finally management fee); and one (C) systematic 
risk characteristic (tranches with currency risk).
302
 
 
On average, we document a relatively high survival rate from the full sample to the 
high-information sample (54.7% for PF loans, 75.2% for AS bonds, and 54.3% for CB). 
This is presented in Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7. Each table represents the characteristics (or 
variables of interest) of the full sample compared with the high-information sample. 
 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
Credit spread (bps) 1,090 198.3 138.5 1,090 198.3 138.5 100.0%
Credit rating [1-22 weak] 80 7.0 3.9 46 6.3 4.3 58%
Loan to value (% ) 2,859 47.3% 39.4% 1,090 47.9% 38.4% 38%
Time to maturity (years) 2,573 13.6 9.3 1,060 13.9 9.1 41%
Tranches with guarantee 2,270 96.9% - 764 94.2% - 34%
Tranche size, Euro millions 2,859 116.2 225.9 1,090 145.4 240.7 38%
Number of tranches 2,845 2.9 1.7 1,080 3.0 1.7 38%
Number of bookrunners 955 2.1 1.9 461 2.2 2.0 48%
Number of banks 2,829 6.9 6.7 1,078 8.9 7.6 38%
Tranches with fixed rate 1,110 1.4% - 1,090 0.0% - 98%
Tranches with floating rate 1,110 98.6% - 1,090 100.0% - 98%
Tranches with currency risk 2,859 11.0% - 1,090 11.5% - 38%
Country risk [1-22 weak] 2,859 2.1 1.7 1,090 2.0 1.6 38%
Tranches to U.K. borrowers 2,859 21.2% - 1,090 19.4% - 38%
Tranches to financial institutions 2,805 0.4% - 1,078 0.5% - 38%
Management fee (bps) 140 49.0 34.4 130 50.8 34.9 93%
Variable of interest
PF Loans full sample PF Loans high-information sample Survival Rate
 
Table 4.5: Common pricing characteristics of PF loans in the full sample compared with those in the 
high-information sample. 
                                                 
301
 We select from our full sample those credits that have complete data on credit spread. 
302
 This segmentation of our high-information sample characteristics is based on Vink and Thibeault 
(2008) work for a sample of 3,467 loans (worth 163,900 M€). 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 125 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
Credit spread (bps) 439 148.9 167.4 439 148.9 167.4 100.0%
Credit rating [1-22 weak] 497 4.3 3.5 364 4.3 3.6 73%
Loan to value (% ) 599 36.4% 35.6% 439 39.4% 36.5% 73%
Time to maturity (years) 599 20.9 14.8 439 21.3 15.3 73%
Tranches with guarantee 599 100.0% - 439 100.0% - 73%
Tranche size, Euro millions 599 299.1 1,070.4 439 320.6 1,189.6 73%
Number of tranches 599 4.5 2.7 439 4.2 2.6 73%
Number of bookrunners 599 1.4 0.7 439 1.4 0.8 73%
Number of banks 599 2.4 1.9 439 2.5 1.9 73%
Tranches with fixed rate 599 24.9% - 439 27.1% - 73%
Tranches with floating rate 599 75.1% - 439 72.9% - 73%
Tranches with currency risk 599 31.4% - 439 31.7% - 73%
Country risk [1-22 weak] 599 1.3 0.9 439 1.4 0.9 73%
Tranches to U.K. borrowers 599 48.7% - 439 39.9% - 73%
Tranches to financial institutions 599 74.1% - 439 76.8% - 73%
Management fee (bps) 48 33.1 26.9 37 35.8 28.4 77%
Variable of interest
AS Bonds full sample AS Bonds high-information sample Survival Rate
 
Table 4.6: Common pricing characteristics of AS bonds in the full sample compared with those in the 
high-information sample. 
 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
Credit spread (bps) 10,551 157.6 193.3 10,551 157.6 193.3 100.0%
Credit rating [1-22 weak] 16,080 4.9 2.7 8,693 5.5 3.0 54%
Loan to value (% ) 20,977 61.8% 45.4% 10,551 87.4% 27.2% 50%
Time to maturity (years) 20,977 5.3 5.9 10,551 6.9 5.9 50%
Tranches with guarantee 20,977 2.1% - 10,551 3.7% - 50%
Tranche size, Euro millions 20,977 275.9 439.5 10,551 442.0 517.0 50%
Number of tranches 20,575 18.4 29.8 10,545 1.8 3.3 51%
Number of bookrunners 20,973 1.6 1.2 10,549 2.1 1.5 50%
Number of banks 20,973 2.9 3.4 10,549 3.7 3.5 50%
Tranches with fixed rate 20,977 79.0% - 10,551 67.9% - 50%
Tranches with floaing rate 20,977 21.0% - 10,551 32.1% - 50%
Tranches with currency risk 20,977 33.2% - 10,551 22.6% - 50%
Country risk [1-22 weak] 20,977 1.4 1.2 10,551 1.8 1.5 50%
Tranches to U.K. borrowers 20,977 13.5% - 10,551 16.9% - 50%
Tranches to financial institutions 20,977 80.8% - 10,551 67.3% - 50%
Management fee (bps) 2,235 22.7 18.9 1,334 21.4 19.2 60%
Variable of interest
CB full sample CB high-information sample Survival Rate
 
Table 4.7: Common pricing characteristics of CB in the full sample compared with those in the high-
information sample. 
 
A comparison of the common variables in the full samples and the high-information 
samples in Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 reveals that the high-information issues are not 
dissimilar to their counterparties in terms of credit spread (remain the same), default and 
recovery risk characteristics, marketability characteristics, and systematic risk 
characteristic. Therefore, we will assume that any empirical results derived from the 
high-information sub-samples can be extended to the larger population of all issues. In 
addition to the variables presented in Table 4.4, Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 present several 
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new variables of interest. Although most of these are self-explanatory, next we present a 
discussion of each variable. 
 
Credit Spread 
The credit spread corresponds to the price for the risk associated with the financing 
instrument, on the basis of available information, at the time of the issue. For PF loans, 
the credit spread represents the spread paid by the borrower over 3-month Euribor (the 
three-month Euro Interbank Offered Rate) or 3-month Libor (the three-month London 
inter-bank offered rate).
303
 For bonds, the spread is defined as the margin yielded by the 
security at issue above a corresponding currency treasury benchmark with a comparable 
maturity. The credit spread is presented in basis points. 
Both measures are not perfect proxies for the credit risk associated with loans and 
bonds. In particular, the spread over Euribor or Libor does not represent the full 
economic cost of credit. Loans also carry fees that can be related to creditworthiness 
and performance. As pointed out by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), “…additional pricing 
factors, such as commitment fees, underwriting fees, participation fees, and utilization 
fees are typically charged during loan syndications and indeed during the whole 
lifetime of the loan.”304 Additionally, the bond issue also carries fees, namely up-front 
fees. 
Considering the scarcity of secondary market prices and the absence of ratings data on 
the borrowers, the spread over Euribor or Libor for loans and the margin yielded by the 
security at issue above a comparable risk-free government security for bonds, have 
become standard pricing measures in the literature.
305
 Even for AS bonds, we exclude 
                                                 
303
 All of our 1,090 available observations on PF loans credit spread are floating rate issues.  
304
 Previous studies of PF loans have used either the initial spread (the spread at issue), the all-in spread 
(initial spread over Libor plus annual fees) or the average ex ante spread (this considers the different 
spreads over Libor, if they change, during the economic life of the loan). Due to the scarcity of 
information on the spreads applicable during the life of each loan as well as on the annual fees, we use the 
spread at issue. 
305
 One has to remember that the probability of default of a project finance loan is only indirectly related 
to the creditworthiness of the project sponsors. In project finance, debt repayment comes from the project 
company only rather than from any other entity. Similarly, in an asset securitization issue the repayment 
depends only or primarily on the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral to the issue, and not on the 
overall financial strengths of the originator. On the other hand, in conventional corporate financing, 
lenders rely on the overall creditworthiness of the enterprise financing a new project to provide them 
security. 
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secondary market spreads, because of the relatively poor liquidity of the secondary 
market for these issues. The comparability of our pricing variables across loans and 
bonds can be improved by making the following adjustment:
306
 while in PF loans the 
benchmark priced off Euribor or Libor is a three-month interbank rate, bonds typically 
carry a spread over a benchmark government security (e.g., German Treasury Bonds). 
Therefore, there is a difference between the two benchmarks represented by different 
credit risk levels involving unsecured short-term bank risk and a risk-free government 
rate. Following the approach of Thomas and Wang (2004) and Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008), we adjust for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks by adding to 
the Euribor or Libor spread of the PF loans the difference between the three-month Euro 
Libor and the three-month German Treasury bill at the time when the loans were 
granted.
307
 
308
 
 
Default and recovery risk variables 
The first set of pricing variables represents default and recovery risk characteristics. A 
discussion of credit rating, loan to value, time to maturity, guarantee, and country risk 
variables will follow below. 
Credit rating evaluates the credit worthiness of a debtor. It is an evaluation of the 
capacity of the borrower to repay interest and principal on time as promised. By 
including credit rating in our analysis, we can study the impact of default on PF, AS and 
CB issues. Since we need a consistent rating classification scheme, we use the rating 
scales as shown in Table 4.8. This classification scheme consists of 22 rating scales for 
two rating agencies: Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s Investors Service. Loan 
                                                 
306
 Despite the adjustment, we are aware that the comparability between loans and bonds has some 
drawbacks, including that most bonds are fixed rate while loans are priced over a floating rate, and that 
bonds and loans may have quite different covenants. In Chapter 5, we include dummies in our baseline 
regressions that attempt to control for these differences. 
307
 The average difference is 31 basis points and has a standard deviation of 44 basis points during our 
sample period; i.e., between January 1
st
, 2000 and December 31
st
, 2011. DealScan includes four fields 
that can be used to measure a borrowers’ credit rating. Moody’s and S&P ratings for the vehicle (group) 
company, plus the separate Moody’s and S&P ratings for the company’s senior debt. In order to maintain 
as large a sample as possible, we include all loans that contain at least one rating from any of these four 
possible rating fields. 
308
 Additionally, as loans are priced over a three month rate while bonds tend to be priced off longer-term 
benchmarks, we will include as additional control in our regression analysis (Chapter 5) the slope of the 
Euro swap curve as the difference between the 5 year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor at the time of 
the signing of the loan or issuing the bonds. 
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and bond ratings are based on the S&P and Moody’s bank loan rating at close. If 
missing, S&P and Moody’s senior debt rating at close are used. If both ratings are 
available, the average rating is calculated and used.
309
 
 
Standard & 
Poor's
Moody's
AAA Aaa 1
AA+ Aa1 2
AA Aa2 3
AA- Aa3 4
A+ A1 5
A A2 6
A- A3 7
BBB+ Baa1 8
BBB Baa2 9
BBB- Baa3 10
BB+ Ba1 11
BB Ba2 12
BB- Ba3 13
B+ B1 14
B B2 15
B- B3 16
CCC+ Caa1 17
CCC Caa2 18
CCC- Caa3 19
CC Ca 20
SD C 21
D - 22
Rating agency
Value
 
 Table 4.8: Credit rating scales. 
 
Loan to value ratio represents the ratio of the tranche size to the transaction size of a 
given loan or bond.
310
 This variable is included in our analysis because we intend to 
control for credit protection of all positions taken by lenders. To compute loan to value 
ratios, we manually calculated the weight of each loan or bond tranche in each 
transaction that contains more than one tranche. If the transaction contains one tranche 
only, the loan to value ratio is 100%. This variable should have an important role in SF 
instruments. For example, in an AS transaction, each senior class (or tranche) has 
absolute priority in the cash flow over the more junior classes (the so-called 
subordination credit enhancement mechanism). As junior tranches are typically smaller 
than the senior ones, we find lower loan to value ratios for these tranches. 
                                                 
309
 This classification scheme follows the approach proposed by Gatti et al. (2007) and Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008). 
310
 In constructing this variable we follow the methodology proposed by Vink and Thibeault (2008). 
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Time to maturity represents the lifetime of the loan or the bond, expressed in years. We 
calculated the time to maturity as the difference between the contractual maturity date 
of the issue and the active date or launch date.
311
 
In our sample, tranches with guarantee refer to tranches with a third-party guarantee. 
Dummy variable takes the value of 1 if a loan is guarantee and 0 otherwise.  
Country risk is approximated by Standard & Poor’s country rating; i.e., the S&P's 
country credit rating at close. The rating is converted as presented in Table 4.8. Thus, 
this variable measures from 1 for the countries with the lowest risk to 22 for the 
countries of highest risk. Other measures of country risk are available and have been 
used in other studies – such as the monthly data compiled by the International Country 
Risk Guide (ICRG) or the country risk rank provided semi-annually by Euromoney 
magazine. The use of S&P’s country rating is justified by its strong correlation with 
these alternative measures.
312
 
 
Marketability variables 
The second set of variables represents the marketability of the loan. A discussion of 
tranche size, number of tranches, number of bookrunners, number of banks, floating 
rate issue, fixed rate issue, U.K. borrowers, financial institutions, and finally 
management fee variables will follow below. 
The tranche size is the face value of the loan or bond tranche in Euro millions. Each 
transaction is divided into one or more tranches. For every issue in a given transaction, 
we documented the number of tranches for each transaction.  
The number of bookrunners represents the number of financial institutions participating 
in the loan issuance as bookrunners.
313
 A broader variable is the number of banks which 
represents the number of financial institutions participating in the loan issuance. All 
                                                 
311
 Legal maturity is the date before which a specified tranche of securities must be repaid in order not be 
in default. 
312
 Erb, Harvey, and Viskanta (1996) find that S&P’s and Moody’s ratings have a 90% rank-order 
correlation with the IRCG financial rating. Corielli et al. (2008) present a high correlation (0.902) 
between S&P ratings and Euromoney country risk scores. 
313
 In a large transaction that involves multiple companies, the bookrunner takes the responsibility of 
‘running’ or handling the books, and is listed first among the other underwriters participating in the 
issuance. More than one bookrunner can manage a security issuance, in which case the involved parties 
are called ‘joint bookrunners’. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 130 
roles are included here. We collected this information in order to analyze any 
differences in syndicate; i.e., in order to assess the extent to which risk is being shared 
among many institutions, as opposed to the case where the syndicate is small. 
We include type of interest rate to analyze the impact of fixed and floating interest rates 
on the spread. We construct two dummy variables based on the type of interest rate. 
Floating rate issue is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a loan is floating price 
and zero otherwise. Fixed rate issue is also a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a 
loan is fixed price and zero otherwise. 
U.K. borrowers is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the borrower/issuer-country 
belongs to U.K. and 0 otherwise. We include financial institutions variable to analyze 
the impact of a borrower/issuer belonging or not to the financial industry on the credit 
spread. We construct a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the loan goes to 
borrowers/issuers in financial industry and zero otherwise. 
Finally, management fee represents a periodic payment that is made to the syndicate of 
banks for managing the transaction. In the syndication market, management fees are 
also called commitment fees. The management fee is presented in basis points. 
 
Systematic risk variable 
For PF transactions, currency risk occurs when loan tranches (and its currency of 
payments) are denominated in a currency different from the currency in the borrower's 
home country.
314
 For corporate bonds or securitization transactions, currency risk 
occurs when they are denominated in a foreign currency. Thus, a dummy variable is 
constructed which takes the value one if this is the case and currency risk exists. 
 
In summary, with the exception of variables guarantee, floating rate issue, fixed rate 
issue, currency risk, U.K. borrowers, and financial institutions, all of which are discrete, 
all other variables are continuous. The univariate analysis is presented in the next 
section. 
                                                 
314
 For example, a German borrower arranging a dollar loan would be subject to currency risk, whereas 
that same borrower arranging a euro-denominated loan would not be. 
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4.4.3 Univariate Analysis 
This section examines how credit spread and common pricing factors compare for the 
three types of financing instruments. The purpose is to provide insight into the common 
pricing characteristics associated with SF and SDF instruments. In short, the first two 
hypotheses (Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2) are tested with respect to SF and SDF 
pricing. We hypothesize that not only the credit spread but also the common pricing 
factors differ significantly in value between SF and SDF issues. We use a parametric 
test (Student’s t-test) for continuous variables and a non-parametric test (Fisher's exact 
test) for dummy variables, to compare whether the values reported for each variable are 
significantly different not only between SF and SDF transactions, but also between PF 
and AS issues. The purpose is to find out whether the common pricing factors do in fact 
significantly differ in value between them. 
 
Table 4.10 provides t-tests and Fisher's exact tests comparing the values of each 
variable in AS bonds full sample with the corresponding values in the PF loan full 
sample; the values of each variable in AS bonds full sample with the corresponding 
values in the CB full sample; and the values of each variable in PF loan full sample with 
the corresponding values in the CB full sample. The numbers are t-statistics for 
continuous variables and p-values for dummy variables (this is because the Fisher's 
exact test does not have a "test statistic", but outputs the p-value directly) and almost all 
of the pair-wise comparisons indicate statistically significant differences between the 
common pricing variables associated with PF, AS, and CB issues. We will discuss 
below the main finding included in Table 4.9 – which presents univariate analysis for 
continuous and dummy variables – and in Table 4.10. 
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PF AS CB PF AS CB
Univariate analysis - continuous variables
Credit spread (bps) Number of tranches
Number 1,090 439 10,551 Number 2,845 599 20,575
Mean 198.3 148.9 157.6 Mean 2.9 4.5 18.4
Min. 9.2 -220.4 -213.8 Min. 1 1 1
Max. 2,042.7 1,098.9 1,651.5 Max. 10 12 99
Std. Dev. 138.5 167.4 193.3 Std. Dev. 1.7 2.7 29.8
Credit rating [1-22 weak] Number of bookrunners
Number 80 497 16,080 Number 955 599 20,973
Mean 7 4.3 4.9 Mean 2.1 1.4 1.6
Min. 1 1 1 Min. 1 1 0
Max. 16 17 21 Max. 15 5 21
Std. Dev. 3.9 3.5 2.7 Std. Dev. 1.9 0.7 1.2
Loan to value (% ) Number of banks
Number 2,859 599 20,977 Number 2,829 599 20,973
Mean 47.3% 36.4% 61.8% Mean 6.9 2.4 2.9
Min. 0.07% 0.01% 0.05% Min. 1 1 1
Max. 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% Max. 51 14 50
Std. Dev. 39.4% 35.6% 45.4% Std. Dev. 6.7 1.9 3.4
Time to maturity (years) Country risk [1-22 weak]
Number 2,573 599 20,977 Number 2,859 599 20,977
Mean 13.6 20.9 5.3 Mean 2.1 1.3 1.4
Min. 0.03 0.22 0.21 Min. 1 1 1
Max. 42.9 85.9 100.1 Max. 11 6 20
Std. Dev. 9.3 14.8 5.9 Std. Dev. 1.7 0.9 1.2
Tranche size (Euro millions) Management fee (bps)
Number 2,859 599 20,977 Number 140 48 2,235
Mean 116.2 299.1 275.9 Mean 49.0 33.1 22.7
Min. 0.05 0.05 0.02 Min. 0.8 2.0 0.0
Max. 3,800 22,298 7,763.2 Max. 200.0 100.0 200.0
Std. Dev. 225.9 1,070.4 439.5 Std. Dev. 34.4 26.9 18.9
Univariate analysis - dummy variables
Guarantee Currency risk
N. of issues with data available 2,270 599 20,977 N. of issues with data available 2,859 599 20,977
N. of issues with dummy = 1 2,200 599 449 N. of issues with dummy = 1 315 188 6,967
% of total available data 96.9% 100.0% 2.1% % of total available data 11.0% 31.4% 33.2%
Floating rate issue U.K. borrowers
N. of issues with data available 1,110 599 20,977 N. of issues with data available 2,859 599 20,977
N. of issues with dummy = 1 1,094 450 4,400 N. of issues with dummy = 1 2,253 292 2,836
% of total available data 98.6% 75.1% 21.0% % of total available data 21.2% 48.7% 13.5%
Fixed rate issue Financial institutions
N. of issues with data available 1,110 599 20,977 N. of issues with data available 2,805 599 20,977
N. of issues with dummy = 1 16 149 16,577 N. of issues with dummy = 1 12 444 16,952
% of total available data 1.4% 24.9% 79.0% % of total available data 0.4% 74.1% 80.8%
Variable of interest
Type of loan issue Type of loan issue
Variable of interest
 
Table 4.9: Univariate statistics - pricing features associated with Loans and Bonds compared.
315
 
 
The relative pricing of SF (PF and AS issues) versus SDF (CB issues) issues is one of 
the most important findings detailed in Tables 4.9 and 4.10. Average credit spreads are 
statistically and significantly higher for PF loans (198.3 bps) than they are for AS bonds 
(148.9 bps) and CB (157.6 bps).
316
 On the contrary, average credit spreads for AS and 
                                                 
315
 Table 4.9 provides a univariate analysis for the full sample of PF, AS, and CB issues. 
316
 This is in line with the prediction of Fabozzi et al. (2006), who present higher costs of borrowing when 
compared to conventional financing as one of the major disadvantages of project finance. 
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CB issues do not differ significantly at 5% significance level.
317
 Therefore, we accept 
only the hypothesis that the credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit 
spread on SDF for AS issues (Hypothesis 2). Our findings diverge from those presented 
by Hu and Cantor (2006) and Maris and Segal (2002), which state that securitization 
securities credit spreads have been higher than corporate bond credit spreads.
318
 If we 
compare the average spread exhibited in Table 4.9 with the average spread exhibited by 
PF loans and all syndicated loans in the study of Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), we 
notice that PF loans in Western Europe have higher average spread (198.3 bps versus 
130 bps) and that PF, AS, and CB issues have higher average spread in comparison with 
the spread for all syndicated loans (134 bps).
319
 
 
AS versus PF AS versus CB CB versus PF
Continuous variables: two-sample t -tests assuming unequal variances
Credit spread (bps) -5.47 -1.06
#
-8.85
Credit rating [1-22 weak] -5.70 -3.77 -4.68
Loan to value (% ) -6.67 -17.11 18.19
Time to maturity (years) 11.75 25.84 -43.92
Tranche size (Euro millions) 4.16 0.53
#
30.70
Number of tranches 12.94 -59.35 73.65
Number of bookrunners -9.44 -6.43 -7.18
Number of banks -30.14 -6.22 -30.78
Country risk [1-22 weak] -16.70 -2.72 -21.66
Management fee (bp) -3.28 2.68 -8.99
Dummy variables: Fisher's exact test (p-values)
Guarantee (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Fixed rate issue (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Currency risk (0/1) 0.000 0.356
*
0.000
U.K. borrowers (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Financial institutions (0/1) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Variable of interest
Type of loan issue
 
Table 4.10: Tests of significance for the difference in values among PF, AS and CB issues.
320
 
                                                 
317
 These results were primarily confirmed by the ANOVA F test. We reject the hypothesis of equal 
means (p=0.0000). Our overall conclusion that these three types of issues are not the same arise mainly 
from the contrast between PF loans and the other two types of bond issues (AS and CB tranches). 
318
 Hu and Cantor (2006), based on a sample of 16,516 securitization securities (ABS, MBS, and CDOs), 
issued in the U.S. market between 1998 and 2004, analyze the relationship between securitization 
issuance spreads, credit ratings, and credit performance. Maris and Segal (2002) argue that the lack of 
familiarity might have caused investors to overestimate the risks, and could explain why yield spreads 
were high in the early 1990s for CMBS. 
319
 Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) compare the characteristics of a sample of 4,956 project finance 
loans (worth $634 billion) to comparable samples of non-project finance loans, all of which are drawn 
from a comprehensive sample of 90,784 syndicated loans (worth $13.2 trillion). All syndicated loans 
include project finance loans, corporate control loans, capital structure loans, fixed asset-based loans, and 
general corporate purpose loans. 
320
 For continuous variables, 
#
 indicates that the values do not differ significantly between the two loan 
issues at the 5% significance level. All other values are statistically and significantly different at the 5% 
level or higher. For dummy variables, 
*
 indicates that the proportion of tranches for which dummy = 1 
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Even if we compare the average credit spread for PF loans exhibited in our study 
without the adjustment for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks (31 bps 
during our sample period) we continue to notice that PF loans in Western Europe have a 
higher average spread (167.3 bps versus 130 bps).
321
 However, based on recent samples 
Gatti et al. (2007) and Corielli et al. (2008) find a similar average spread for PF loans 
(169.18 bps and 171.8 bps, respectively).
322
 Vink and Thibeault (2008) present lower 
average spread for ABS (99.2 bps) and MBS (73.9 bps) in comparison with the average 
credit spread for AS bonds (148.9 bps) exhibited in our study.
323
  
AS and CB issues, on average, tend to be less risky than their PF counterparts. The 
average credit rating for AS (4.3) and CB (4.9) issues is significantly lower than the 
credit rating for PF loans (7).
324
 When comparing SF with SDF tranches, we conclude 
that the average credit rating for AS bonds is significantly lower than the average credit 
rating for CB issues. Table 4.11 provides the breakdown by credit rating of tranche size 
and credit spread specific variables. Average credit spread increase with rating levels; 
i.e., credit spreads increase as ratings worsen.
325
 Additionally, the observed level of 
management fees and the number of participating banks do provide indirect evidence 
that PF lending may be considered relatively more risky than other types of lending. 
The average level of management fees for PF loans (49 bps) is significantly higher than 
the level for AS (33.1 bps) and CB (22.7 bps) issues. The average number of banks 
participating in PF loans is 6.9 and is significantly larger than the average of 2.4 for AS 
                                                                                                                                               
does not differ significantly between the issue class. Note that the Fisher's exact test does not have a "test 
statistic", but outputs the p-value directly. 
321
 The same conclusion is reached if we compare our results with those of Esty and Megginson (2003) 
and Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007). They present a mean spread of 122.8 bps (based on a sample of 495 
PF tranches for projects in 61 different countries) and 109.52 bps (for a sample of 177 UK PFI PPPs), 
respectively. 
322
 Using a sample of 4,122 PF loans (worth $585 billion), Gatti, Kleimeier, Megginson, and Steffanoni 
(2007) show, that certification by lead arrangers creates economic value by reducing overall loan spreads. 
Corielli et al. (2008) use a sample of 1,093 PF loans closed between January 1998 and May 2003. 
323
 Vink and Thibeault (2008) compare the characteristics of a sample of 2,427 ABS issues (worth 
€363.19 billion), 3,650 MBS issues (worth €715.21 billion) and 2,504 CDO issues (worth €316.72 
billion). They compare the common pricing characteristics associated with the main security class and 
investigate to what extent ABS, MBS, and CDO issues are priced by common factors. 
324
 Gatti et al. (2007) find an average credit rating for PF loans significantly lower than the average credit 
rating for PF loans presented in Table 4.9: BB versus A- in our study. 
325
 Similar findings are presented by Hu and Cantor (2006), which assert that asset securitization ratings 
are highly correlated with credit spreads. 
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bonds and 2.9 for CB.
326
 These findings suggest that banks wish to increase the number 
of institutions participating in a PF credit of a given size in order to spread risks over a 
large number of banks. AS bonds have the lowest average number of bookrunners (1.4), 
which differ significantly (at 5% significance level) from the average number of 
bookrunners in CB (1.6) and PF (2.1) issues. 
 
Average Tranche 
Size (Euro millions)
Average Credit 
Spread (bps)
Average Tranche 
Size (Euro millions)
Average Credit 
Spread (bps)
Average Tranche 
Size (Euro millions)
Average Credit 
Spread (bps)
AAA / Aaa 242.8 121.7 466.7 63.6 336.5 73.2
AA+ / Aa1 107.8 82.3 436.9 103.7
AA / Aa2 70.0 124.4 860.6 103.7 263.3 95.6
AA- / Aa3 107.3 80.0 75.2 111.8 394.5 117.3
A+ / A1 37.2 31.2 121.9 300.5 93.3
A / A2 89.7 77.4 120.3 157.0 275.9 112.6
A- / A3 339.6 174.5 164.4 109.3 406.6 122.5
BBB+ / Baa1 264.8 154.9 116.2 217.0 514.0 164.9
BBB / Baa2 320.9 150.4 65.0 212.1 456.3 203.1
BBB- / Baa3 248.0 150.5 50.8 304.6 417.3 250.5
BB+ / Ba1 36.0 597.3 522.2 383.7
BB / Ba2 44.5 413.0 463.1 414.9
BB- / Ba3 199.8 232.1 67.4 579.8 319.8 440.2
B+ / B1 827.3 404.2 573.8
B / B2 700.0 21.7 572.9 301.5 604.3
B- / B3 700.0 205.9 250.2 637.0
CCC+ / Caa1 607.5 215.6 313.9 709.3
CCC / Caa2 140.0 740.1
CCC- / Caa3 203.6 810.9
CC / Ca 64.2 811.3
SD / C 153.7 638.2
N/A 112.4 200.8 172.2 200.7 78.0 246.2
Total 116.2 198.3 299.1 148.9 275.9 157.6
Corporate BondsAsset Securitization Bonds
Credit Rating 
(S&P's / Moody's)
Project Finance Loans
 
Table 4.11: Breakdown by credit rating of tranche size and credit spread specific variables. 
 
PF lending exhibits the lowest average tranche size of 116.2 M€ – an average 182.9 M€ 
less than the average tranche size exhibited by AS bonds and 159.7 M€ less than the 
average tranche size exhibited by CB. Although PF loans are significantly different 
from AS and CB issues, the average tranche size exhibited by AS bonds do not differ 
significantly at 5% significance level from the average tranche size exhibited by CB. 
Conversely to what can be observed for PF and CB issues, in AS bonds the average 
tranche size decreases significantly as the credit rating worsens (with the exception of 
CCC+ / Caa1 rating class). This finding is presented in Table 4.11 and clearly reflects 
                                                 
326
 However, Esty and Megginson (2003) document a significantly larger average number of banks 
participating in PF loans. The average number of banks increases from 14.4 in the average tranche to 28 
banks in the largest tranches. 
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the approach commonly used by originators in securitization deals. In these 
transactions, in fact, an issue is structured in order to obtain a given credit rating. Lead 
managers concentrate their efforts on making the AAA tranche as large as possible in 
order to reduce costs and improve transaction attractiveness for investors. If we 
compare the average tranche size exhibited in Table 4.11 for AS bonds with the average 
loan tranche presented by Vink and Thibeault (2008), we notice that it is relatively large 
when compared to 150.3 M€ and 209.6 M€ for ABS and MBS, respectively. The same 
pattern in observed when we compare AS and CB issues average tranche size in our 
study to the average tranche size of all syndicated loans. Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000) report that all syndicated credits have an average tranche size of $203 million. 
Furthermore, we found that CB issues have the highest average loan to value level with 
61.8%, followed by PF loans with 47.3%, and AS bonds with 36.4%. 
Currency risk clearly suggests that AS bond issues are often similar to CB issues, but 
otherwise fundamentally different financial instruments from PF loans. PF loans in 
Western Europe are much less likely to be subject to currency risk than AS and CB 
issues are (11% for PF loans versus 31.4% and 33.2% for AS and CB issues, 
respectively).
327
 PF loan borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier countries than 
in the case of any other issue category. The average country rating for PF borrowers 
(2.1) is significantly higher than the corresponding value for AS bonds (1.3) and CB 
(1.4).
328
 Despite a similar average country rating presented for AS bonds and CB they 
are statistically and significantly different at the 5% level or higher. 
Most of the non-price variables detailed in Table 4.9 clearly suggest that PF, AS, and 
CB issues are fundamentally different financial instruments. A far lower fraction of CB 
issues are arranged for U.K. borrowers (13.5%) than is true for PF loans (21.2%) and 
AS bonds (48.7%). As before, CB issues are much more likely to go to 
borrowers/issuers in financial industry (80.8%) than SF transactions (0.4% for PF loans 
and 74.1% for AS bonds). Additionally, a significantly larger number of tranches per 
transaction are issued in a CB transaction. In a typical CB transaction, the average 
                                                 
327
 If we compare the percentage of PF loan tranches subject to currency risk exhibited in Table 4.9 – 
11% – with the percentage exhibited in Gatti et al. (2007) – 47% – , we notice that PF loans in Western 
Europe are much less likely to be subject to currency risk. 
328
 Similar findings are presented by Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) when comparing the average 
country risk rank for PF borrowers with the corresponding value for FAB loans and for all syndicated 
loans. 
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number of tranches per transaction is 18.4, which is larger than the average number of 
2.9 for PF loans and 4.5 for AS bonds. However, this number requires further analysis. 
The average number of tranches in the CB high-information sample (Table 4.7) falls 
significantly to 1.8, while it remains similar for PF (3) and AS (4.2) issues.
329
 The 
average number of tranches presented for AS bonds in our study is on average similar to 
the one presented by Vink and Thibeault (2008) for ABS (3.2) and MBS (5.8). 
An AS tranche of average size matures over just 20.9 years, which is a long period if we 
compare this with the average 13.6 and 5.3 years for PF and CB tranches, 
respectively.
330
 Still, AS issues, as indicated by the standard deviation, exhibit 
significant heterogeneity with respect to maturity. For example, average standard 
deviation for maturity of AS issues is 14.8 years, while it is 9.3 and 5.9 years for PF and 
CB issues, respectively. The difference can be explained by the fact that certain types of 
assets underlying an AS structure have long maturities (e.g., residential mortgage 
loans). In general, the cash flow profile of the underlying assets is closely related to the 
maturity of the SF issues. 
Finally, a significantly larger fraction of CB issues are fixed price (79%) than the full 
sample of PF loans (1.4%) and the full sample of AS bonds (24.9%). Locking in a 
specific rate in general, eliminates a major source of cash flows uncertainty. 
Nevertheless, floating rate issues tend to offer more flexibility due to the prepayment 
option in most loans. 
 
Before proceeding to the next section, we will briefly summarize the results of our 
univariate comparison between SF and SDF issues. We found that most of the common 
pricing characteristics in fact differ significantly, not only between SF and SDF issues 
but also among SF transactions. Table 4.10 shows that all pair-wise comparisons 
indicate statistically significant differences in value, with the exception of credit spread, 
tranche size, and currency risk between AS and CB issues. Therefore, we reject the 
                                                 
329
 Thus, considering the average number of tranches in high-information samples we can conclude that in 
a typical AS transaction the average number of tranches per transaction is 4.2 (Table 4.6), which is higher 
than the average number of 3 for PF loans (Table 4.5). Closer analysis reveals that the assets underlying 
an asset securitization transaction may benefit from tranching to a larger degree [see Riddiough (1997) 
and DeMarzo (2005)]. 
330
 The mean loan maturity of PF loans is 8.6 and 8.7 years in Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) and Gatti 
et al. (2007), respectively. A higher average maturity of 10.5 years is presented by Corielli et al. (2008). 
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hypothesis (Hypothesis 1) that pricing factors of SF credit spreads do not differ 
significantly in relevance from the pricing factors of SDF credit spreads. Additionally, 
we also found that the common pricing characteristics among SF tranches (PF loans and 
AS bonds) do differ significantly. Considering the financial instruments as a whole, we 
have documented that the warranties and transaction structures differ between the three 
types of loan issues, but that there are also important univariate differences to consider, 
namely: 
1. PF loans’ average credit spreads are statistically and significantly higher than 
they are for AS and CB issues. On the contrary, average credit spreads for AS 
and CB issues do not differ significantly at 5% significance level. Thus, we 
reject the hypothesis (Hypothesis 2) that credit spread on SF is lower than or 
equal to the credit spread on SDF. This hypothesis would be accepted only if our 
SF full sample was merely composed of AS bonds. 
2. Both AS and CB issues have a significant higher tranche size in comparison with 
PF loans. 
3. AS bonds have much longer average maturity and are more likely to be arranged 
for U.K. borrowers (instead of borrowers belonging to continental Europe) than 
PF and CB issues. 
4. PF lending may be considered relatively more risky because either the average 
level of management fee or the average number of banks participating are 
significantly larger than the average for AS and CB issues. 
5. PF loans in Western Europe are much less likely to be subject to currency risk 
and borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier countries than in the case of 
any other issue category. 
6. CB issues are more likely to be fixed rate rather than floating rate credits as are 
AS and PF tranches. 
 
We will examine loan pricing more fully in Chapter 5, when we employ OLS regression 
to determine what factors influence SF and SDF instruments’ credit spreads. However, 
our results indicate that the common pricing characteristics differ significantly in value 
between the three types of loan issues, and therefore we would expect the impact on 
pricing to be loan-specific. Before proceeding to a multivariate regression analysis, sub-
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section 4.4.4 presents an analysis of the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, on loans and bonds pricing factors. We 
investigate whether our results hold before (pre-crisis period) and during the global 
financial crisis (crisis period). 
 
4.4.4 The Impact of the Financial Crisis on Credit Spreads and Pricing Factors 
Until 2008 loans and bonds issues had been progressively growing (both in number of 
tranches and in volume), yet the 2007/2008 global financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis led to a drop in sponsor/issuer interest (see Table 4.1). 
Similar to sponsors/issuers, lenders might have also changed their attitude towards SF 
and SDF, in terms of pricing and compensation. We are therefore investigating whether 
our univariate results are robust over time considering a pre-crisis period from January 
1
st
, 2000 and September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th
, through 
December 31
st
, 2011.
331
 
We hypothesize (Hypothesis 4) that after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and 
loan characteristics, the financial crisis does not impact significantly on SF credit 
spreads. Thus, it is important to understand if the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the 
subsequent European sovereign debt crisis impact significantly not only on credit spread 
but also on the common pricing factors of loans and bonds tranches. We use a non-
parametric test (Wilcoxon z-test for continuous variables and Fisher's exact test for 
dummy variables) to compare whether the values reported for each variable are 
significantly different in the two periods. Table 4.12 provides z-tests comparing the 
values for two sub-samples: pre-crisis period sub-sample and crisis period sub-sample. 
The numbers are z-statistics and almost all of the pair-wise comparisons indicate that 
equality of means of continuous variables can be rejected for PF, AS, and CB issues. 
The only exceptions are the average credit rating for PF loans and AS bonds, the 
average loan to value for AS bonds, and the average management fee for CB. 
                                                 
331
 September 15
th
, 2008 is the Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy filing date, commonly regarded as the major 
milestone of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. Despite the problems experienced by Bear Stearns (in 
March 2008, it was forced to sell itself to J.P. Morgan) and by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (they had to 
be propped up by the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve in July), the worst was yet to come. On 
Monday September 15
th
, 2008, after suffering huge losses in the subprime market, Lehman Brothers, the 
fourth-largest investment bank by asset size, filed for bankruptcy, making it the largest bankruptcy filing 
in U.S. history. 
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Similar findings are presented in Table 4.13 for dummy variables, which strongly 
support that, the proportion of tranches for which dummy = 1 differ significantly 
between the sub-samples pre-crisis period and crisis period. The exceptions are the 
guarantee for PF loans, fixed rate issue for PF loans and AS bonds, and financial 
institutions for PF loans. 
 
Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev. Number Mean Std. Dev.
Continuous variables
Credit spread (bps)
pre-crisis 742 136.9 97.9 401 143.5 156.7 6,981 125.5 197.6
crisis 348 329.1 120.5 38 206.5 250.3 3,570 220.3 167.6
Credit rating [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 65 6.9 4.3 465 4.3 3.5 12,353 4.8 2.4
crisis 15 7.6 2.2 32 4.0 4.1 3,727 5.4 3.2
Loan to value (% )
pre-crisis 1,449 48.7% 39.3% 555 35.7% 35.4% 16,673 55.6% 47.0%
crisis 1,410 45.8% 39.4% 44 45.5% 36.5% 4,304 86.1% 27.0%
Time to maturity (years)
pre-crisis 1,288 14.1 9.5 555 20.5 14.6 16,673 5.0 5.4
crisis 1,285 13.0 8.9 44 26.7 16.0 4,304 6.8 7.2
Tranche size (Euro millions)
pre-crisis 1,449 124.0 231.3 555 240.6 509.6 16,673 235.7 395.2
crisis 1,410 108.2 219.9 44 1,035.9 3,462.4 4,304 431.3 553.3
Number of tranches
pre-crisis 1,437 2.9 1.6 555 4.6 2.8 16,278 22.9 32.0
crisis 1,408 3.0 1.7 44 2.5 0.7 4,297 1.5 1.1
Number of bookrunners
pre-crisis 723 1.9 1.4 555 1.4 0.7 16,669 1.4 0.8
crisis 232 2.7 2.8 44 1.2 0.7 4,304 2.5 1.9
Number of banks
pre-crisis 1,437 8.0 7.1 555 2.5 1.9 16,669 2.8 3.4
crisis 1,392 5.7 6.1 44 1.3 0.7 4,304 3.4 3.3
Country risk [1-22 weak]
pre-crisis 1,449 1.8 1.4 555 1.3 0.8 16,673 1.3 1.0
crisis 1,410 2.5 1.8 44 2.3 1.6 4,304 1.8 1.8
Management fee (bps)
pre-crisis 107 40.8 23.1 48 33.1 26.9 2,009 22.3 17.9
crisis 33 75.7 49.0 0 - - 226 25.8 25.9
Variable of interest
Wilcoxon 
z-test
Project Finance
Wilcoxon 
z-test
-23.87 ***
0.93
Asset Securitization
Wilcoxon 
z-test
Type of loan issue
Corporate Bonds
-2.44 ** -44.90 ***
-9.89 ***-0.40
-1.52 -38.93 ***2.54 **
***
-2.65 *** -30.58 ***2.75 ***
*** 37.63 ***-1.88 *
-3.26 *** -29.20 ***5.71
10.76 ***
2.36 ** -44.55 ***-3.99 ***
-4.83 ***
-7.65 *** -20.51 ***-13.05 ***
- -0.47
5.46 *** -24.79 ***
5.35
 
Table 4.12: The impact of the global financial crisis on the characteristics of PF, AS, and CB tranches: 
continuous variables.
332
 
 333
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 This table reports statistics for characteristics of PF, AS, and CB issues which are separated into two 
sub-samples: pre-crisis period and crisis period. The number of observations are reported in the column 
‘Number’ and the standard deviation in column ‘Std. Dev.’. ***, **, * indicate that equality of means can be 
rejected at the 1%, 5%, and 10% significance level, respectively. 
333
 Since almost all variables do not follow a normal distribution – with the exception of credit rating 
variable for PF loans in the pre-crisis period sub-sample and maturity variable for AS bonds in the crisis 
period sub-sample – and the number of observations is small for some of them, we run the Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test. The Wilcoxon test is a non-parametric test, which assesses the difference in means 
between the pre-crisis period and crisis period sub-samples based on a one-sided probability. 
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The evidence regarding credit spread strongly supports the assumption that the average 
credit spread is statistically and significantly higher for PF loans (329.1 bps versus 
136.9 bps), AS bonds (206.5 bps versus 143.5 bps), and CB (220.3 bps versus 125.5) 
during the crisis period. Thus, we reject the hypothesis (Hypothesis 4) that the crisis do 
not impact significantly on SF credit spread. These simple sample analyses, however, 
do not allow us to control for other microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing factors. 
We thus proceed, in Chapter 5, with regression analysis where we can take these factors 
directly into account and are thus able to obtain better founded results for our 
hypothesis. 
Number
Number 
(d=1)
% of 
total 
Number
Number 
(d=1)
% of 
total 
Number
Number 
(d=1)
% of 
total 
Dummy variablesDummy variables
Guarantee
pre-crisis 888 866 97.5% 555 555 100.0% 16,673 322 1.9%
crisis 1,382 1,334 96.5% 44 44 100.0% 4,304 127 3.0%
Fixed rate issue
pre-crisis 749 7 0.9% 555 143 25.8% 16,673 13,113 78.6%
crisis 361 9 2.5% 44 6 13.6% 4,304 3,464 80.5%
Currency risk
pre-crisis 1,449 186 12.8% 555 186 33.5% 16,673 5,631 33.8%
crisis 1,410 129 9.1% 44 2 4.5% 4,304 1,336 31.0%
U.K. borrowers
pre-crisis 1,449 369 25.5% 555 286 51.5% 16,673 2,047 12.3%
crisis 1,410 237 16.8% 44 6 13.6% 4,304 789 18.3%
Financial institutions
pre-crisis 1,438 4 0.3% 555 400 72.1% 16,673 14,255 85.5%
crisis 1,367 8 0.6% 44 44 100.0% 4,304 2,697 62.7%
Variable of interest
*
Fisher's 
exact test
Corporate Bonds
Type of loan issue
Project Finance Asset Securitization
Fisher's 
exact test
Fisher's 
exact test
-0.214
0.057
0.002
0.000
0.255
0.101
0.000
0.000
*
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.001
0.000
0.000 *
*
*
*
*
*
*
*
 
Table 4.13: The impact of the financial crisis on the characteristics of PF, AS, and CB tranches: dummy 
variables.
334
 
 
Taking the remaining variables, we are able to document the following important 
findings: 
1. CB issues have a significant higher credit rating during the crisis period in 
comparison with the pre-crisis period. 
2. Contrary to PF loans, AS and CB issues average maturity and tranche size have 
increased significantly during the crisis period. 
                                                 
334
 
*
 indicates that there is a statistically significant relationship between the dummy variable and the 
global financial crisis. Note that the Fisher's exact test does not have a "test statistic", but outputs the p-
value directly. The number of observations are reported in the column ‘Number’ and the number of issues 
with dummy = 1 in column ‘Number (d=1)’. 
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3. During the crisis period, loans and bonds in Western Europe are located in far 
riskier countries. This can be explained by the European sovereign debt crisis, 
which has made it difficult or impossible for some countries in the euro area to 
re-finance their government debt without the assistance of third parties. 
4. PF issues are more likely to have a higher average number of tranches and 
bookrunners during the crisis period than during the pre-crisis period, when 
compared with AS and CB issues. 
5. During the financial crisis period, all types of issues are much less likely to be 
subject to currency risk. 
6. During the crisis period issuers belonging to the financial industry increased 
their use of SF instruments (namely AS bonds) as compared with SDF 
instruments: 100% of the AS tranches are issued by financial institutions during 
the crisis period, which compare to 72.1% in the pre-crisis period (85.5% versus 
62.7% for CB). 
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5. The Pricing of Structured Finance Transactions 
5.1. Introduction 
Although the academic literature analyzing the credit spread of corporate bonds – 
considered in our study as straight debt finance (SDF) transactions – is vast and 
growing, research on the credit spread of structured finance bonds and loans is scant. 
Empirical studies on the price determinants of project finance loans and asset 
securitization bonds – both considered in our study as structured finance (SF) 
transactions – are very limited, but a few can still be found. However, a comparative 
empirical examination of the price determinants of project finance (PF), asset 
securitization (AS), and corporate bonds (CB) is something completely new. 
In this chapter, we subject the various high-information samples detailed in Tables 4.5, 
4.6, and 4.7 (sub-section 4.4.2) to OLS regression analysis. Our purposes for employing 
OLS regression are four-fold. 
First, we intend to determine which of the variables detailed in Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 
have significant and independent effect on credit spreads once the effects of other 
variables are accounted for. We hypothesized (hypothesis 3) that the impact of pricing 
factors on credit spread does not differ significantly among and between SF and SDF 
transactions. Thus, we start our analysis by determining if SF and SDF transactions are 
priced in the same way, if this equivalent to testing whether PF, AS, and CB issues are 
priced in segmented or integrated capital markets; i.e., whether the coefficient values 
and numbers of significant factors are the same for SF and SDF issues. 
Second, we aim to determine whether SF transactions are more or less expensive than 
SDF transactions, after controlling for other factors (hypothesis 2). Third, we intend to 
determine whether the 2007/2008 financial crisis impacted significantly on SF credit 
spreads – again, after controlling for other microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing 
factors (hypothesis 4). 
Finally, the term structure of SF and even of SDF transactions appears as a particular 
puzzle.
335
 Therefore, we aim to analyze the pricing of our cross section dataset of loan 
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 For PF loans, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) conclude that PF loan pricing is not a positive function 
of maturity. Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) study this apparent absence of a clear relationship between 
spreads and maturity in PF loans and show that the term structure of credit spreads is ‘hump-shaped’. 
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and bond issues within a multivariate regression framework focusing on the relationship 
between credit spread and maturity, while controlling for other relevant micro and 
macro risk factors that also affect the credit spread. 
This chapter is organized as follows: The first section introduces the main purpose of 
this chapter. Section 2 reviews the most prominent papers on loan pricing literature. The 
third section compares ex ante credit spreads among and between SF and SDF issues; 
i.e., it examines the extent to which SF and SDF transactions are priced by common 
factors. It starts by presenting the methodology and discussing the sets of variables 
(micro and macro variables) and their expected impact on the credit spread. Next, it 
presents the regression analysis results. Section 4 presents a summary and our final 
conclusions. 
 
5.2. Loan Pricing Literature Review 
The academic literature contains numerous loan pricing studies, both theoretical and 
empirical. As we intend to study the determinants of loan and bond pricing for SF and 
SDF transactions (i.e., how borrower, transaction-specific factors, and economic factors 
influence credit spreads), the review of loan pricing literature focuses essentially on 
empirical studies.
336
 Three different streams of empirical research are useful for the 
purpose of studying the pricing of SF vis-a-vis SDF transactions. Regarding SF, the first 
one refers to empirical studies on the pricing of PF loans and the second refers to 
                                                                                                                                               
Regarding CB, several authors [e.g., He et al. (2000), Duffie and Singleton (2001), and Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008)] argue that, on average, the term structure of credit spreads for investment grade bonds 
appears upward-sloping. However, the literature has been more controversial regarding the term structure 
of credit spreads for non-investment grade bonds [Sarig and Warga (1989) and Fons (1987) find 
downward-sloping term structures of credit spreads for non-investment grade bonds]. 
336
 Theoretical pricing models are presented, among others, by Merton (1974), Black and Cox (1976), 
Eaton, Gersovitz, and Stiglitz (1986), Maksimovic (1990), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), and Duffee 
(1998). The Merton/Black-Scholes’ (MBS) option pricing framework is particularly attractive for the 
development of a pricing theory for corporate liabilities in general and has been the basis for most loan 
pricing models. Based on this model, Merton (1974) developed a systematic theory for pricing debt where 
there is risk of default and concluded that the default risk premium depends on: (i) the risk-free rate on the 
debt; (ii) the characteristics of the debt contract (e.g., maturity, coupon rate, seniority, etc.); and (iii) the 
issuers’ probability of default. More recently, other studies have presented extended versions of the MBS 
framework that produced results more in line with empirical investigation. For example, Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) show that credit spreads are strongly negatively correlated with corporate assets with 
significant exposures to interest rates. 
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empirical studies on AS bonds pricing. Concerning SDF, the third one refers to 
empirical studies on CB price determinants. 
 
Scott and Smith (1986), who analyze the effect of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 
on the cost of loan production, find a positive impact of the risk free rate and the loan 
size on the contract rate and a negative impact of year of incorporation, form of 
business, and the existence of collateral on contract rates. Melnik and Plaut (1986) find 
a positive relationship between the risk premium and loan size, thus larger loans have 
higher interest rates. Contrary to Scott and Smith (1986), Blackwell and Winters (1991) 
find a positive impact on the spread for the existence of collateral and the loan class. 
Additionally, they find that the debt-to-equity ratio has a marginally significant positive 
effect. Negative effects on spread have both size proxies and reputation proxies.  
Booth (1992) analyzes the impact of monitoring-related contract costs on bank loan 
spread and concludes that: (i) total sales, loan size, the existence of price options, the 
bond rating of the borrower, and the existence of public debt have a negative impact on 
spread; and (ii) the existence of collateral, the variance of equity returns, the fees on 
unused balances, the contract structure of the loans commitment, and the use of the loan 
proceeds for corporate restructuring or for funding an LBO have positive impact on 
spread.
337
 Harjoto et al. (2006) and Bharath et al. (2007) have used firm size to control 
for credit risk, and have shown that loans to larger borrowers carry lower spreads, 
everything else equal. 
 
Only a few studies have been developed on pricing PF loans.
338
 Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000), based on a sample of over 5,000 PF loans within a control group of 
90,000 syndicated loans, find that PF loan spreads are directly related to variables such 
as country risk, the use of covenants in the loan contract, and project leverage. In their 
paper, they show that PF loans are significantly different from any other types of 
syndicated loans, with longer maturities, more frequent third-party guarantees, and 
                                                 
337
 Other empirical pricing studies include Berger and Udell (1990), Boehmer and Megginson (1990), 
Blackwell and Winters (1997), and Chen, Mazumdar, and Yan (2000). 
338
 See Dailami and Hauswald (2003, 2007) and Tung et al. (2008) for an analysis of PF bonds pricing 
determinants. 
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lower spreads. Finally, the study concluded that a third-party guarantee significantly 
reduces PF loan spreads, while PF loan pricing is not a positive function of maturity and 
loan size – in contrast to straight or standard debt financing.339 Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008) detect that whereas credit spreads for both investment-grade and speculative-
grade bonds other than project finance are a positive linear function of maturity, in PF 
loans the term structure of credit spreads is ‘hump-shaped’. The authors emphasize 
several key features of PF transactions that might explain this finding, namely: (i) the 
‘sequential resolution of risks’ in fairly predictable risk advancement phases; and (ii) 
higher leverage decreasing over time. 
Further evidence on pricing of PF loans is provided by Corielli et al. (2010), who 
demonstrate that lenders rely upon the network of nonfinancial contracts (NFCs) as a 
mechanism to control agency costs and project risks. They point out that (1) effective 
ring fencing via NFCs (contract design prevents agency problems and establishes an 
effective risk management package) causes a drop of 19 bps in the credit spread 
charged; (2) a project located in a country with higher rating pays lowers credit spreads; 
and (3) industrial sectors do not influence the level of credit spread. Blanc-Brude and 
Strande (2007) argue that, in a PF transaction, lenders should price any risk that is not 
explicitly managed through contracts. Based on a sample of 125 EU Roads PPPs and 
177 UK PFI PPPs, closed between 1994 and 2005, they conclude that: (1) maturity, 
which is a major systematic driver of the cost of debt in standard corporate finance, has 
a marginal effect on PPPs; (2) tranche size is not a driver in PPPs; and (3) when risks 
other than systematic risks are not managed through contracts and project design, debt 
spreads reflect the unallocated portion of risk. 
Syndication is also presented as playing a potential role in driving the credit spreads in 
PF loans. Esty and Megginson (2000, 2003) show a positive relation between syndicate 
size (and concentration) and loan pricing. On the contrary, Strahan (1999), Kleimeier 
and Megginson (2000), and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) report that the presence of 
larger syndicates reduces credit spreads. Gatti et al. (2007) show that certification by 
prestigious lead arranging banks can create economic value by reducing loan spreads 
compared to loans arranged by less prestigious arrangers. They also find a correlation 
                                                 
339
 For example, Flannery (1986) indicates that longer maturity loans would have higher credit risk. 
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between more leveraged projects and larger loans when they are syndicated by 
prestigious mandated lead arrangers.
340
 However, they do not reveal statistical 
significance for the relationship between project risks and loan spread. Finally, the 
nationality and the type of banks involved in the syndicate may also influence the credit 
spread. Esty (2004c) shows that loan spreads are positively related to the fraction of 
funds provided by foreign banks; i.e., sponsors pay significantly more if they choose 
foreign banks to finance their projects. Harjoto et al. (2006) show that investment banks 
charge higher spreads than commercial banks. 
 
Compared with the large amount of empirical studies on CB credit spreads, research on 
AS bond credit spreads has been scant.
341
 Virtually all of the empirical studies on CB 
credit spreads have found credit ratings to be one of its most important determinants. 
Some of the more recent papers include Arvantis, Gregory, and Laurent (1999), Duffie 
and Singleton (1999), Elton et al. (2001), Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin 
(2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Hull, Predescu, and White (2004), and Gabbi and 
Sironi (2005). In searching for determinants of CB credit spreads, researchers also 
found other factors to be important, like liquidity, systematic risk, incomplete 
accounting information, and taxes. An important stream of the literature analyzes the 
relationship between spread and maturity.
342
 Several authors [e.g., Jones et al. (1984), 
Sarig and Warga (1989), He et al. (2000), Duffie and Singleton (2001), and Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008)] argue that lenders get a higher remuneration for being exposed to risk 
for a longer period of time; i.e., on average, the term structure of credit spreads for 
investment grade bonds appears upward-sloping. However, the literature has been more 
controversial regarding the term structure of credit spreads for non-investment grade 
bonds. Contrary to Sarig and Warga (1989) and Fons (1987), who find downward-
sloping term structures of credit spreads for non-investment grade bonds, Helwege and 
Turner (1999) conclude that spread curves for B- and BB- rated US industrial issues are 
actually upward-sloping. The same line of reasoning is presented by He et al. (2000), 
                                                 
340
 They also find that: (1) loans with currency risk have statistically lower spreads; (2) longer term loans 
have stable spreads; and (3) spreads differ across industries. 
341
 As pointed out by Hu and Cantor (2006) “[T]his is largely due to the lack of some economic models 
and reliable data for pricing complex and relatively less liquid structured securities.” 
342
 Most of the empirical literature on the term structure of credit spreads has so far concentrated on CB. 
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who confirm that BB- and B- rated firms mostly show upward-sloping term structure of 
credit spreads, whereas only curves for CCC- or CC- rated firms are downward-sloping. 
After controlling for micro and macro risk factors, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) find that 
for non-project finance bonds and loans, the term structure of credit spread can be 
represented by a linear positive function of maturity, either for investment grade or non-
investment grade issues.
343
 
 
The analysis of AS bond credit spreads relies on the determination of the risk and value 
of pooling and tranching, based on historical data and projected cash flow 
distributions.
344
 Rothberg et al. (1989) argue that liquidity and credit risk significantly 
affect the pricing of pass-through securities. Maris and Segal (2002) study the 
determinants of credit spread on CMBS and find that (i) default probability, (ii) tranche 
size (with a negative slope), (iii) transaction size (larger deals are associated with higher 
spread), and (iv) year (credit spread decrease from year to year) influence CMBS credit 
spreads. Ammer and Clinton (2004) find that rating downgrades are accompanied by 
negative returns and widening spreads. 
Firla-Cuchra (2005) argues that credit rating is the most important pricing factor for this 
asset class at issue. This idea is corroborated by Gorton and Souleles (2005), who find 
that the sponsor’s credit rating has an impact on the issuance spread of senior tranches 
of credit card securitizations. Vink and Thibeault (2008) examine how common pricing 
factors compare for the main classes of securitization securities; i.e., ABS, MBS, and 
CDO issues. They demonstrate that the credit spread is influenced differently by 
common pricing factors and they find that default and recovery risk characteristics are 
the most important variables explaining loan spread variability. Consistently with Firla-
Cuchra (2005) and Hu and Cantor (2006), the authors present credit rating as the most 
significant factor in determining credit spread at issue – the credit spread rises when the 
rating worsens. Hu and Cantor (2006) also point out that securities with higher issuance 
spreads in a given rating category may indicate higher downgrade risk. 
                                                 
343
 The authors find that the difference in the shape of the term structure of investment grade versus non-
investment grade bonds, as commonly reported in the literature, largely disappears. 
344
 This analysis is often complicated by the strong interactions of a number of joint risk factors that 
determine the credit spread, namely [Hu and Cantor (2006)]: (i) credit risk; (ii) prepayment risk; (iii) 
liquidity risk; (iv) legal or regulatory risk; (v) maturity risk; and (vi) sponsor and servicer risk. 
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Buscaino et al. (2009) interrelate AS and PF issues studying the issue of collateralized 
loan/debt obligations (CLOs/CDOs) based on a portfolio of PF loans. The authors 
reveal that credit rating and the nature of the underlying assets are the most important 
determinants of CDO pricing at close. 
 
In short, the existing loan pricing models are not completely successful in explaining 
what determines the cost of debt in SF transactions. Lenders may either seek 
compensation for risk through credit spreads and fees or use other non-price 
characteristics like maturity, size or collaterals when lending to risky borrowers. 
 
 
5.3. A Comparative Analysis of Ex Ante Credit Spreads: Structured 
Finance versus Straight Debt Finance 
5.3.1. Data and Methodology 
This section examines the extent to which SF and SDF transactions are priced by 
common factors; i.e., we intend to analyze the impact of the common pricing features 
on credit spread by type of issue class. In hypothesis 3, we hypothesize that the impact 
of pricing factors on credit spread does not differ significantly among and between SF 
and SDF transactions. Various different variables determine credit spreads, and it may 
well be that the impact of these variables on the credit spreads is different among and 
between SF (PF and AS issues) and SDF transactions (CB issues). According to 
statistics, relevant pricing variables can be identified by their statistical significance, 
while the equality of the impact of each variable can be determined by comparing 
coefficient values. 
A test of structural change will be used to test hypothesis 3. The classical test of 
structural change is the Chow test, also defined as an econometric test used to determine 
whether the coefficients in a regression model are equal in separate sub-samples.
345
 To 
implement the Chow test we first run one ordinary least squares regression on the 
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 See Chow (1960) and Davidson and Mackinnon (1993) for further explanation.  
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common pricing variables (independent variables) and the credit spread (dependent 
variable), under the assumption that all types of issues (PF, AS and CB issues) have the 
same explanatory variables. Second, coefficients from separate regressions are obtained 
from each type of issue, and we run thus three regressions: one for PF loans, one for AS 
bonds, and one for CB. Then, based on the residual sum of changes of each regression, 
an F-test of structural change is computed (also called a Chow test). Finally, hypothesis 
3 will be rejected if the computed F value exceeds the critical value, and will be 
accepted if the F value remains smaller than its critical level. 
Should hypothesis 3 be accepted, examining the coefficients will allow us to determine 
loan pricing factors for AS, PF, and CB issues; i.e., a regression test will be run on one 
sample only to determine the pricing variables. If it is the case that hypothesis 3 is 
rejected, regressions on AS, PF, and CB will be run to examine the relationship between 
the pricing variables and the credit spread for each type of loan issue separately for 
comparison. 
Considering the discussion in sections 4.4 and 5.2, the credit spread on SF and SDF is 
modeled as a function of microeconomic variables. Additionally, we control for the 
macroeconomic conditions (e.g., level of interest rates, volatility, slope of the Euro 
swap rate).
346
 The data on macroeconomic variables are obtained from DataStream. We 
linked the macroeconomic variables and the microeconomic information contained in 
the loans (DealScan) and bonds (DCM Analytics) databases on the active date (PF 
loans) or issue date (AS and CB issues). The main problem in choosing a set of 
variables for each type of issue is the requirement that each set must be meaningful for 
PF, AS, and CB issues. For example, whether or not the issue is retained in an AS 
transaction, it has no counterpart in CB and even in PF issues. Thus, it cannot be 
included in the model. Several variables were available for the three types of financing 
instruments used, which allows us to directly compare the main pricing factors for SF 
and SDF instruments. 
We estimate the determinants of loans and bonds pricing using the model described in 
equation 5.1. The dependent variable is the credit spread, in basis points, and the 
                                                 
346
 We identified the possible variables to use as instruments for the credit spread based on the available 
literature [in particular, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Altunbas and Gadanecz (2004), Gatti el al. 
(2007), Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), and Vink and Thibeault (2008)], and furthermore the opinions 
collected during verbal discussions with top investment banks confirms our choices. 
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independent variables are those presented and described in the next sub-section. We 
employ standard OLS regression techniques and adjust for heteroskedasticity using the 
methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980).
347
 The model estimated is: 
 
 
(5.1) 
 
 
From the total sample of PF loans, CB and AS instruments, we collect all tranches for 
which credit spread information is available (high-information samples). This results in 
a total of 1,090 observations for PF, 439 for AS, and 10,551 for CB (see Tables 4.5, 4.6, 
and 4.7 in sub-section 4.4.2). 
For credit spread, we first estimate a complete model using all independent variables 
presented in equation 5.1 and seven new models, each including one key additional 
variable at a time, to test the influence of each one on the dependent variable. Thus, the 
following variables will be included separately in our regression models: (i) Rating, 
Management fee, and Credit accessibility due to their limited number of observations; 
(ii) Upfront fee because it is available for PF loans only; (iii) Collateral because it is 
available for AS bonds only; and (iv) Fixed rate and Callable because they are available 
for AS and CB issues only. 
In the next sub-section, we present the sets of variables and their expected impact on the 
SF and SDF credit spreads. 
 
                                                 
347
 We use the Huber-White-sandwich estimator of the variance of the linear regression estimator. The 
names Huber and White refer to the seminal references for this estimator. Huber (1967) and White (1980) 
independently derived this estimator, and the name ‘sandwich’ refers to the mathematical form of the 
estimate, namely, that it is calculated as the product of three matrices: the matrix formed by taking the 
outer product of the observation-level likelihood/pseudolikelihood score vectors is used as the middle of 
these matrices (the meat of the sandwich), and this matrix is in turn pre- and postmultiplied by the usual 
model-based variance matrix (the bread of the sandwich). For further discussion of this subject see Froot 
(1989), Wooldridge (2002), and Baum (2006). 
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5.3.2. Structured and Straight Debt Finance Pricing Factors 
Comparing the empirical studies reviewed in section 5.2., it is evident that each study 
employs a different set of explanatory variables according to its research objective. 
Some variables associated with the loan or bond are used in all regressions, whereas 
variables describing the macroeconomic environment differ significantly. With respect 
to loan variables, size, maturity, collateral, and sector are commonly used. With respect 
to macroeconomic factors, empirical studies commonly use the risk free rate, inflation, 
currency risk, and country risk.  
Next, we present the two sets of variables and their expected impact on the credit 
spread. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the variables and their expected sign and Annex 
9 presents a further discussion of variables and their expected impact on the cost of 
funding, taking into consideration the existing theoretical and empirical literature. 
 
5.3.2.1. Dependent Variable 
Credit spread is defined as the price for the risk associated with the financing 
instrument, on the basis of available information, at the time of issue. For bonds, the 
credit spread is defined as the margin yielded by the security at issue on a corresponding 
currency treasury benchmark with a comparable maturity. For PF loans, the credit 
spread represents the spread paid by the borrower over 3-month Euribor (the three-
month Euro Interbank Offered Rate) or 3-month Libor (the three-month London inter-
bank offered rate). To allow us to compare the credit spread across loans and bonds we 
adjust for the risk difference of the bond and loan benchmarks, by adding to the Euribor 
or Libor spread of the PF loans, the difference between the three-month Euro Libor and 
the three-month German Treasury bill at the time when the loans were granted.
348
 
Additionally, as loans are priced over a three month rate, while bonds tend to be priced 
off longer-term benchmarks, we include as an additional control in our regression, the 
slope of the Euro swap curve as the difference between the 5-year Euro swap rate and 
the 3-month Libor at the time of the signing of the loan or issuing of the bonds 
[following the approach presented by Thomas and Wang (2004) and Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008)]. 
                                                 
348
 For further discussion of how credit spreads were computed see sub-section 4.4.2. 
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5.3.2.2. Microeconomic Variables 
From the literature, several variables emerge as relevant in affecting the credit spread of 
PF, AS, and CB issues. We use the following microeconomic variables in this study: (i) 
Log transaction size; (ii) Log loan to value; (iii) Maturity; (iv) Number of tranches; (v) 
Currency Risk; (vi) Number of banks; (vii) U.K. borrowers; (viii) Sector (Commercial; 
Industrial; Utilities; Financial Institutions; Transportation; Government; Other); (ix) 
Rating; (x) Management fee; (xi) Upfront fee; (xii) Collateral; (xiii) Fixed rate; and 
(xiv) Callable.
349
 
350
 
 
5.3.2.3. Macroeconomic Variables 
The pricing of SF loans and bonds might be significantly affected by several sources of 
macroeconomic factors. One weakness of existing studies of PF loans and AS bonds is 
their lack of control for macro determinants. We start by using eighteen dummy 
variables (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland) to capture systematic differential effects relative to the U.K. We also 
included a measure of inflation to reflect lenders’ perceptions of inflation risk. 
However, adding these variables did not add significant explanatory power to the 
model. Hence, these were excluded from the final specifications.  
A second group of variables in our regression model is thus intended to reflect these 
macro effects, namely: (i) Country risk; (ii) Crisis; (iii) Risk free rate; (iv) Volatility; (v) 
EUSA5y-Libor3M; and (vi) Credit accessibility.
351
 
 
                                                 
349
 For a more thorough explanation of microeconomic variables see sub-section 4.4.2 and Annex 9. 
350
 It is important to notice that some variables were not included in the AS bond credit spreads analysis 
because of lack of information. An example is credit enhancement, which may refer to issues with a third-
party guarantee in the form of, e.g., an insurance policy used by one of the monoline insurance 
companies. Additionally, some variables discussed in Chapter 4 were excluded from our regression 
analysis. Guarantee was excluded due to multicolinearity problems in the AS high-information sample. 
The number of bookrunners was also excluded because it showed an insignificant impact on SF and SDF 
credit spreads and would remove a significant number of observations. 
351
 For a more thorough explanation of macroeconomic variables see Annex 9. 
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PF AS CB
Dependent variable:
Credit spread
For loans: Libor spread plus difference between three-month Libor and 
three-month German Treasury yield at the time of the signing of the 
loan. For bonds: spread at issue over comparable risk-free government 
security with a comparable maturity.
Independent variables:
Microeconomic independent variables
Log transaction size Natural log of the loan or bond transaction size. Transaction size is 
converted into Euro millions when necessary.
- / I - ?
Log loan to value Natural log of the loan to value ratio, which represents the ratio of the 
tranche size to the transaction size of a given loan or bond.
+ - / I +
Maturity Maturity of loan or bond, in years. ? - / I ?
Number of tranches The number of tranches for each transaction. + - +
Number of banks The number of financial institutions participating in the loan or bond 
issuance.
? - / I -
Currency risk Dummy equal to 1 for loans that are denominated in a currency different 
from the currency in the borrower's home country. Dummy equal to 1 for 
bonds that are denominated in a currency different from the currency in 
the deal's nationality.
- + +
U.K. borrowers Dummy equal to 1 if the borrower/issuer belongs to U.K. - - -
Sector Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a borrower/issuer in a 
certain industry. For each of the following industry groups, a dummy is 
created: commercial, industrial, utilities, transportation, government, and 
other. The control group includes financial institutions.
? + ?
Rating Loan and bond rating based on the S&P and Moody's rating at close. If 
missing for loans, S&P and Moody's senior debt rating at close are 
used. If both rating are available, the average rating is calculated. The 
rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on 
until D=22.
+ + +
Management fee Fees (in bps) that are periodically paid to the bank syndicates. + + +
Upfront fee A fee (in bps) paid by a borrower to a bank or a syndicate of banks for 
arranging a PF loan.
+ NA NA
Collateral Dummy equal to 1 if an AS bond is backed by mortgages and 0 
otherwise.
NA - NA
Fixed rate Dummy equal to 1 if a loan or bond is fixed price and 0 otherwise. + + +
Callable Dummy equal to 1 if the bond has a call option and 0 otherwise. NA + +
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic independent variables
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until D=22. 
+ ? +
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the crisis period and 0 
otherwise.
+ + +
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of the signing of the 
loan or issuing the bonds - a proxy for the general level of interest rates.
I + +
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). VIX 
reflects a market estimate of future volatility.
+ + +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The slope of the Euro swap curve. Obtained as the difference between 
the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor rate.
? - -
Credit accessibility The iTraxx Europe index.  iTraxx is used as a proxy for credit conditions 
and therefore for credit accessibility by borrowers.
+ + +
Name Description
Expected Sign
 
           Table 5.1: Definition of variables and their expected sign.
352
 
                                                 
352
 The following characters in Table 5.1 mean: – = negative impact on the credit spread | + = positive 
impact on the credit spread | I = insignificant impact on the credit spread | ? = sign cannot be clearly 
determined from either the theoretical or empirical literature | NA = information about this variable is not 
available | HS = hump-shaped. 
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5.3.3. Analysis and Results 
5.3.3.1. Determinants of Credit Spreads for the High-Information SF and SDF Samples 
A Chow test of structural change is used to test the hypothesis that SF and SDF 
transactions are functionally equivalent financial instruments priced in a single market; 
i.e., we use a Chow test to investigate whether the credit spread associated with SF (PF 
loans and AS bonds) and SDF (CB) issues are influenced differently by common 
pricing factors (Hypothesis 3). In essence, we are testing whether the pricing factors 
used in equation 5.1 are significant in both SF and SDF transactions and, if so, whether 
they have the same coefficient values. When running the ordinary least squares 
regressions for computing Chow statistics we adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the 
methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980). Table 5.2 examines whether 
the three financial instruments are priced in segmented or integrated capital markets. 
 
Type of loan issue PF AS CB
PF - - -
AS 6.62 - -
CB 37.67 6.77 -  
                            Table 5.2: Chow test for differences in pricing factor coefficients.
353
 
 
Hypothesis 3 has to be rejected because the Chow test statistics in Table 5.2 are all 
higher than the critical levels. The credit spread associated with PF, AS, and CB issues 
are influenced differently by common pricing factors. Following our analysis, we may 
conclude that: (i) SF and SDF transactions are distinct financial instruments; and (ii) PF 
loans and AS bonds are financial instruments influenced differently by common pricing 
factors. Thus, they are not priced in a single integrated market and we cannot estimate 
the full sample of loans and bonds in a single regression. This also means that we 
cannot directly test whether the spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit spread 
on SDF (Hypothesis 2) by including a PF and an AS dummy variable in a regression of 
a sample of all loan types.
354
 
                                                 
353
 This table shows the results obtained when a Chow test was used to determine whether the samples 
could be pooled into a single sample. All the reported test statistics are larger than the corresponding 
critical values. The test statistic follows the F distribution with k and N1+N2-2k degrees of freedom. 
354
 However, and based on our univariate analysis, we conclude (see sub-section 4.4.3) that average credit 
spreads are statistically and significantly higher for PF loans than they are for AS bonds and CB. On the 
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Considering that we reject Hypothesis 3, next we examine the determinants of credit 
spreads for each type of issue using ordinary least squares regression framework. Table 
5.3 presents the results of estimating equation 5.1 using each of the three high-
information samples discussed in sub-section 4.4.2 (see Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7). F-
statistics on whether coefficients are jointly different from zero, as well as adjusted R
2
 
are reported at the bottom of the Table 5.3. 
 
Dependent variable:
Credit spread (bps)
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
113.44
*
81.57
**
(9.43) (2.37) (7.78)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
-6.75 -8.80
**
(-4.93) (-1.52) (-6.43)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
-40.91
**
(2.04) (-5.48)
Maturity 0.51 -0.72 -1.12
**
(1.67) (-1.52) (-3.87)
Number of tranches -1.02 -3.08 19.62
**
(-0.56) (-0.95) (36.87)
Number of banks 1.42
**
-9.36
**
-1.63
**
(3.87) (-2.58) (-3.47)
Country risk 7.78
**
-12.80 0.46
(2.91) (-1.04) (0.29)
Currency risk 38.11
**
16.95 3.01
(2.88) (0.79) (0.60)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
10.39 17.49
**
(5.23) (0.46) (3.41)
Crisis 174.01
**
121.25
*
77.41
**
(16.26) (2.43) (15.43)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
0.12
(-4.46) (1.28)
Volatility 0.49 2.25
*
2.06
**
(1.64) (2.13) (9.91)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.45
**
-0.02
(-7.41) (-3.30) (-0.60)
Commercial 101.80
**
102.44
**
(3.28) (17.20)
Industrial 10.29 57.95 98.75
**
(1.14) (1.56) (19.30)
Utilities 12.92 -16.49 20.66
**
(1.41) (-0.42) (4.17)
Transportation 14.33 128.94 68.80
**
(1.39) (1.88) (5.94)
Government 7.18 14.93
(0.31) (0.38)
Other 163.47
**
(5.83)
Number of observations 1,029 439 10,543
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.19 0.21
F 90.00 6.55 238.24
[1a]
All PF Loans
[1b]
All AS Bonds
[1c]
All CB
 
Table 5.3: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit 
spreads.
355
 
356
 
                                                                                                                                               
contrary, average credit spreads for AS and CB issues do not differ significantly at 5% significance level. 
Therefore, we accept only the hypothesis that the credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit 
spread on SDF for AS issues (Hypothesis 2). 
355
 Table 5.3 presents an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of loans and bonds 
credit spread for SF (PF and AS) and SDF (CB) samples. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are 
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The regression intercepts for each type of loan issue show – although a direct 
comparison is not possible since some of the variables are omitted because of 
collinearity –, as pointed out in the univariate analysis (Table 4.9), the highest credit 
spread for PF loans in Western Europe when compared to AS and CB issues. This 
finding, coupled with the univariate test results (Table 4.10) – average credit spreads are 
statistically and significantly higher for PF loans (198.3 bps) than they are for AS bonds 
(148.9 bps) and CB (157.6 bps) – shows that PF loans have significantly higher credit 
spreads than AS and CB issues. These findings are contrary to those of Kleimeier and 
Megginson (2000), who find that PF loans have significantly lower spreads than other 
syndicated loans (corporate control; capital structure; and general corporate purpose). 
However, this is in line with the prediction of Fabozzi et al. (2006), who present higher 
costs of borrowing when compared to conventional financing as one of the major 
disadvantages of project finance. PF transactions have some drawbacks, particularly as 
they are costly to set up, take a long time to execute, and are highly restrictive once in 
place.
357
 
The second line of Table 5.3 details the influence of transaction size on credit spread, 
which is insignificant for AS but negative and significant for PF and CB.
358
 This 
suggests that increasing the transaction size by 100 M€ will reduce the required credit 
spread by 89.89 basis points (bps) and 40.53 bps for PF loans and CB, respectively. One 
could interpret this significant negative relationship between transaction size and credit 
spread as evidence of a positive price liquidity effect related to the size of the entire 
issue. 
                                                                                                                                               
based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
**
 and 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is 
statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
356
 Variable log tranche size was omitted because of collinearity for all the regressions. We used this 
variable instead of the natural log of transaction size and the results remain the same. The following 
variables were also omitted because of collinearity: (i) commercial and other dummy variables in 
estimating model [1a]; and (ii) log loan to value and risk free rate in estimating model [1c]. Government 
and other dummy variables do not exist for AS transactions. 
357
 Similarly, Gatti (2008) states that the principal drawback of project finance is that structuring such a 
deal is more costly than the corporate financing option. The author presents the following reasons: “1. 
The legal, technical, and insurance advisors of the sponsors and the loan arranger need a great deal of 
time to evaluate the project and negotiate the contract terms to be included in the documentation; 2. The 
cost of monitoring the project in process is very high; 3. Lenders are expected to pay significant costs in 
exchange for taking on greater risks.” 
358
 We expected a significantly negative relationship between credit spread and transaction size for AS 
transactions. However, our results are different from the results presented by Vink and Thibeault (2008), 
who find that transaction size has a significantly negative relationship with spread for ABS and MBS. 
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Loan to value ratio behaves differently for PF loans than for AS bonds. Whereas spread 
and loan to value are significantly, positively related for PF loans, they have a 
significant negative relationship for AS bonds. These results are in line with the 
expected coefficient sign for PF and AS issues. AS bonds demonstrate a larger 
coefficient compared to PF loans, which means that lenders associate an increase in the 
loan to value ratio with a significant reduction of credit risk for these types of securities. 
Whereas credit spread and maturity are significantly, negatively related for CB issues, 
they have insignificant relationship for PF and AS issues. The coefficient value 
indicates that issuing a CB, with an original maturity one year longer than the median, 
decreases credit spread by 1.12 bps. Considering that the literature has been 
controversial regarding the term structure of credit spreads for PF and CB issues, these 
findings merit greater in-depth analysis into the nature of assets and cash flows related 
to each type of issue. Sub-section 5.3.5 presents further discussion on the term structure 
of SF and SDF credit spreads. 
The number of tranches has an insignificant relationship with credit spread across SF 
transactions, but significant for CB issues. Thus, we do not find any support that issuers 
exploit market factors to their advantage via tranching of AS bonds. For CB issues, as 
expected, riskier transactions imply a higher number of tranches as each investor is 
available to constitute a lower share in their portfolio; i.e., an issuer will benefit from 
more tranches in the transaction especially in the situation of a higher degree of 
information asymmetry between issuer and investors. Our results are consistent with 
those presented in literature and empirical studies for CB issues. 
The variable number of banks behave differently for PF loans than for AS and CB 
issues. Whereas credit spread and number of banks are significantly and positively 
related for PF loans, they have a significantly negative relationship for AS and CB 
issues. The need for a higher number of banks in arranging a PF transaction can 
possibly be associated with an increase in risk and thus an extra premium is demanded. 
For AS and CB issues, a larger number of banks involved is able to lower the spread 
once investors associate a larger number of banks with an increase in the certification of 
the transaction. 
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The country risk variable is significantly positive for PF loans, indicating that lending to 
a borrower located in a country with a rating of AAA (AAA=1) versus one with a rating 
of BB+ (BB+=11) will increase loans credit spread by 77.80 bps. On the contrary to 
what we expected based on empirical literature [e.g., Kleimeier and Megginson (2000)], 
currency risk dummy has a significant, positive relationship with the credit spread for 
PF loans. This finding for Western European PF transactions suggests that a mismatch 
in the currency of the borrower’s home country and the currency of the PF loan 
repayment significantly increases the rate charged on an average loan by 38.11 bps. 
We expected borrowers from the U.K. to raise funds at a lower spread compared to 
borrowers from continental Europe. However, U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable is 
significantly positive for both PF and CB issues, indicating that lending to a borrower 
located in U.K. versus one in Continental Europe will increase credit spreads by 49.85 
bps and 17.49 bps for PF and CB issues, respectively. 
As expected, the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt 
crisis have imposed a significant increase in credit spreads of all the types of financing. 
A transaction with the issue date or active date belonging to the crisis period will have a 
higher average credit spread of 174.01 bps, 121.25 bps, and 77.41 bps for PF, AS, and 
CB issues, respectively. 
The risk-free rate has an insignificant relationship with AS bonds credit spread, but a 
significantly negative relationship with PF loans credit spread. Our finding for PF loans 
are contrary to those of Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), who find for a sample of EU 
and UK PPPs that risk-free rate variable proves to have no statistically significance on 
the pricing of PF tranches. 
The variable volatility behave differently for PF loans than for AS and CB issues. 
Whereas credit spread and volatility are significantly and positively related for AS and 
CB issues, they have an insignificant relationship for PF loans. In the presence of higher 
volatility, AS and CB issuers will pay a higher return. The finding for PF loan credit 
spreads can be explained by the fact that PF loans are not traded on a secondary market 
and thus are not subject to a change in value over time. 
Credit spread and the slope of the Euro swap curve are significantly and negatively 
related for SF transactions; i.e., a steeper Euro swap curve is associated with lower 
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credit spreads. This suggests that SF credit spread contains strong systematic risk 
components. On the contrary, the relationship between credit spreads and the slope of 
the Euro swap curve is insignificant for SDF transactions. Our results are in line with 
those of Hu and Cantor (2006), but contrary to those of Sorge and Gadanecz (2008). 
The last six variables are dummy variables resulting from the categorical variable 
sector. The control group includes financial institutions. Thus, the interpretation of the 
coefficients for sector dummy variables (Commercial, Industrial, Utilities, 
Transportation, Government, and Other) occurs with reference to that omitted variable. 
We discover, in line with Corielli et al. (2010), that sector does not influence the level 
of credit spreads in PF transactions. While the commercial dummy variable has a 
significantly positive relationship with AS bond credit spreads, industrial, utilities, and 
transportation dummy variables have insignificant coefficients. This means that in 
model [1b] the predicted credit spread is approximately 108.80 bps higher for issuers 
belonging to the commercial sector than in the financial institutions sector. For CB 
issues, and with the exception of the government dummy variable (the coefficient is 
insignificant), all other sector dummy variables have predicted credit spreads higher 
than those for the financial institutions sector or industry. 
 
DealScan and DCM Analytics databases provide varying information about individual 
loans and bonds, respectively. Depending upon factors such as sector, nationality of 
borrower, the facility type (e.g., term loan, bridge loan, and revolver) for PF loans and 
factors such as deal type (e.g., corporate bond investment-grade, corporate bond high-
yield, asset-backed security, and mortgage-backed security), sector, issuer nationality, 
and issue type (e.g., public transaction versus private placement) for AS and CB issues, 
databases provide varying amounts of information. Thus, information on rating, fee 
level, type of interest rate, credit accessibility, if the bond is callable, and collateral is 
available only for some of the transactions belonging to our high-information sub-
samples. Rather than restrict ourselves to analyzing a single sample with all of this 
information available (which, e.g., yield a sample size of less than 39 loans for PF 
transactions), we study and compare several different PF, AS, and CB sub-samples, 
grouped based on the availability of key data items. These samples and their 
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comparison with our first regression analysis are presented in Annex 7 (models grouped 
by new introduced variables) and Annex 8 (models grouped by issue type). 
Additionally, the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European 
sovereign debt crisis on SF credit spreads is presented in sub-section 5.3.4. The analysis 
of the relationship between credit spread and maturity, while controlling for other 
relevant micro and macro risk factors, will be conducted in sub-section 5.3.5. 
 
5.3.3.2. The Impact of Credit Risk on SF and SDF Credit Spreads 
It is difficult to obtain credit risk information for PF loans. This is because the 
information about the credit rating for PF loans at close provided by DealScan is scant 
when compared with the credit rating information provided by DCM Analytics database 
for AS and CB issues. Models [2a], [2b], and [2c] present loan pricing regression results 
for a sample of 39 PF loans, 364 AS bonds, and 8,686 CB with a credit rating at close 
from either Standard & Poor’s (S&P) or Moody’s. We compare these results with those 
obtained from the estimation of equation 5.1, using each of the three high-information 
samples (models [1a], [1b], and [1c]). 
 
Models [2a], [2b], and [2c] in Table 5.4 show exactly the results expected; i.e., the 
higher the credit risk of the borrower or issuer the higher the credit spread.
359
 However, 
the impact of a credit rating on the spread differs substantially from loan type to loan 
type. A one unit increase in credit rating (corresponding to a downgrade from AAA to 
AA+) is associated with an increase of 7.37 bps, 27.44 bps, and 29.06 bps in PF, AS, 
and CB issues credit spread, respectively. Note also that inclusion of a direct measure of 
credit risk has a considerable impact on the regressions intercept, causing a reduction of 
154.00 bps for PF loans, 100.17 bps for AS bonds, and 220.92 bps for CB. 
Considering SDF (CB) issues, model [2c] yields an adjusted R
2
 value of 0.43, which 
compares with a value of 0.21 for model [1c]. This shows, as referred virtually by all of 
the empirical studies on CB, that credit ratings are one of the most important 
determinants of CB credit spreads. 
                                                 
359
 Rating variable is statistically significant at the 1% level. Thus, the pattern of rating variable indicates 
that credit spreads rise when ratings worsen for all three types of financial instruments. 
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Dependent variable: [1a] [2a] [1b] [2b] [1c] [2c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans PF Loans with 
rating
All AS Bonds AS Bonds with 
rating
All CB CB with 
rating
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
103.66 113.44
*
13.27 81.57
**
-139.35
**
(9.43) (1.08) (2.37) (0.31) (7.78) (-14.39)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
16.81 -6.75 3.74 -8.80
**
0.75
(-4.93) (1.13) (-1.52) (0.92) (-6.43) (0.58)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
10.44 -40.91
**
0.79
(2.04) (1.32) (-5.48) (0.10)
Maturity 0.51 -0.59 -0.72 -0.36 -1.12
**
1.00
**
(1.67) (-0.69) (-1.52) (-0.67) (-3.87) (4.60)
Number of tranches -1.02 7.68 -3.08 2.39 19.62
**
23.97
**
(-0.56) (1.32) (-0.95) (0.86) (36.87) (9.10)
Number of banks 1.42
**
0.32 -9.36
**
-8.24
*
-1.63
**
-1.65
**
(3.87) (0.26) (-2.58) (-2.10) (-3.47) (-4.35)
Country risk 7.78
**
-13.97 -12.80 -4.99 0.46 -2.04
(2.91) (-1.48) (-1.04) (-0.74) (0.29) (-1.51)
Currency risk 38.11
**
4.24 16.95 35.36 3.01 27.46
**
(2.88) (0.19) (0.79) (1.96) (0.60) (6.64)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
10.39 -10.10 17.49
**
6.43
(5.23) (0.46) (-0.53) (3.41) (1.58)
Crisis 174.01
**
78.50 121.25
*
33.70 77.41
**
86.53
**
(16.26) (1.30) (2.43) (0.74) (15.43) (20.73)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
-0.33
*
0.12 -0.03
(-4.46) (-2.24) (1.28) (-0.31)
Volatility 0.49 2.25
*
2.42
**
2.06
**
2.98
**
(1.64) (2.13) (2.81) (9.91) (17.88)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.45 -0.45
**
-0.52
**
-0.02 -0.16
**
(-7.41) (-1.98) (-3.30) (-4.35) (-0.60) (-6.31)
Commercial 101.80
**
25.01 102.44
**
-17.93
**
(3.28) (0.99) (17.20) (-3.82)
Industrial 10.29 39.82 57.95 27.34 98.75
**
0.69
(1.14) (24.51) (1.56) (0.99) (19.30) (0.17)
Utilities 12.92 16.60 -16.49 -55.51 20.66
**
-39.93
**
(1.41) (0.57) (-0.42) (-1.52) (4.17) (-8.59)
Transportation 14.33 128.94 110.02
**
68.80
**
12.16
(1.39) (1.88) (3.64) (5.94) (1.47)
Government 7.18 28.77 14.93 25.68
*
(0.31) (0.52) (0.38) (2.20)
Other 163.47
**
69.91
**
(5.83) (3.42)
Rating 7.37
**
27.44
**
29.06
**
(2.99) (8.65) (43.11)
Number of observations 1,029 39 439 364 10,543 8,686
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.67 0.19 0.46 0.21 0.43
F 90.00 6.60 6.55 11.45 238.24 261.21  
Table 5.4: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads – the impact of credit risk.360 361 
 
Comparing the results presented in model [2c] with those presented in model [1c], 
important differences either in significance and size of the coefficients can be pointed 
out, namely: 
1. The coefficients on log transaction size, U.K. borrowers, and industrial and 
transportation dummy variables become insignificant. 
                                                 
360
 This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of determinants of loan 
pricing credit spreads for the PF, AS, and CB high-information samples and the sub-samples created 
using the data available on rating. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
**
 and 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 
1% and 5% level, respectively. 
361
 The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: (i) U.K. borrowers, volatility, 
commercial, transportation and other in estimating model [2a]; and (ii) log loan to value and risk free 
rate in estimating model [2c]. Government and other dummy variables do not exist for AS transactions. 
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2. Currency risk and government dummy variable become significantly and 
positively related with credit spread (the predicted credit spread is approximately 
25.68 bps higher for issuers belonging to government industry than in the 
financial institutions industry), while the slope of the Euro swap curve 
(EUSA5y-Libor3M) significantly reduces a CB issue credit spread. 
3. The sign of the impact of the time to maturity on credit spread changes between 
regressions; i.e., in model [1c] maturity is significantly negative and becomes 
significantly positive in model [2c]. This effect can be explained by the 
reduction of the sample, as we do not have multicollinearity problems – the 
higher pair-wise correlation coefficient is 0.25 in absolute values between the 
maturity and utilities dummy variable. Thus, for CB issues with rating, a one-
year increase in maturity is associated with a 1 bps increase in credit spread. 
4. A change in coefficient sign also takes place for commercial and utilities dummy 
variables. This means that when controlling for rating, issuers belonging to the 
commercial and utilities industry pay lower credit spreads than issuers in the 
financial industry.
362
 
For PF loans (model [2a]), the coefficient of the risk-free rate remains significantly and 
negatively related to credit spread. Coefficients on log transaction size, log loan to 
value, number of banks, country risk, currency risk, crisis, and EUSA5y-Libor3M 
become insignificant. Thus, the credit spread is basically explained by credit risk and 
level of interest rate, the last ones roughly reflecting the monetary policy. It is also 
important to notice that this change in coefficients is also related to the significant 
reduction in the number of observations between models [1a] and [2a] – from 1,029 to 
39 observations –, which implies that significant precaution is needed in the analysis of 
the results for PF loans when we include the rating variable. Each of these regressions 
explains a non-trivial fraction of the total variation in observed PF loan spreads, 
yielding adjusted R
2
 values of 0.51 and 0.67. 
Results in estimating Model [2b] show that the number of banks and the slope of the 
Euro swap curve significantly reduce the credit spread. The coefficients on log loan to 
                                                 
362
 In model [2c] the predicted credit spread is approximately 17.93 bps and 39.93 bps lower for issuers 
belonging to the commercial and utilities industry, respectively, than in the financial institutions industry. 
It is important to notice that we do not have multicollinearity problems when running model [2c]. 
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value and on crisis and commercial dummy variables become insignificant, while 
volatility and transportation dummy variable both are significantly and positively 
related to credit spread. Our findings are in line with empirical studies, which found 
credit ratings to be one of the most important determinants of AS bonds credit spread. 
The adjusted R
2
 value increases form 0.19 in model [1b] to 0.46 in model [2b]. 
In short, the inclusion of a credit risk variable significantly increases the explanatory 
power of models for either SF and SDF transactions. 
 
5.3.3.3. The Impact of Credit Accessibility on SF and SDF Credit Spreads 
As referred in sub-section 5.3.2, variable credit accessibility tries to capture the effect of 
credit conditions on the cost of funding. Models [3a], [3b], and [3c] present loan pricing 
regression results for a sample of 763 PF loans, 171 AS bonds, and 6,139 CB with 
information on credit accessibility (measured by iTraxx Europe index) at the issue or 
active date. We compare these results with those obtained from the estimation of 
equation 5.1 using each of three high-information samples (models [1a], [1b], and [1c]). 
While models [3a] and [3c] show, as expected, a significantly and positive relation 
between credit accessibility and credit spread, model [3b] shows that the coefficient of 
credit accessibility is insignificant for AS bonds. However, the impact of credit 
conditions on the credit spread differs in magnitude from PF loans to CB issues. A one 
unit increase in iTraxx Europe index is associated with an increase of 0.54 bps and 0.82 
bps in PF and AS issue credit spreads, respectively.
363
 
Models [3a], [3b], and [3c] yield adjusted R
2
 values of 0.49, 0.24, and 0.53 for PF, AS, 
and CB issues, respectively. It is important to notice the significant increase in the 
adjusted R
2
 for CB issues – from 0.21 in model [1c] to 0.53 in model [3c]. 
                                                 
363
 Regarding CB issues, important differences either in significance and size of the coefficients – 
between model [1c] and model [3c] – can be pointed out, namely: (i) the coefficient on transportation 
dummy variable becomes insignificant; (ii) currency risk and government dummy variables become 
significantly and positively related with credit spread; (iii) the sign of the impact of time to maturity and 
transaction size on credit spread is significantly negative in model [1c] and becomes significantly positive 
in model [2c], i.e., when controlling for rating and credit accessibility, variables log transaction size and 
maturity are significantly and positively related to credit spread; and (iv) a change in coefficient sign also 
takes place for commercial, industrial, and utilities dummy variables, i.e., when controlling for rating and 
credit accessibility, issuers belonging to commercial, industrial and utilities industry pay lower credit 
spreads than issuers in the financial industry. 
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Dependent variable: [1a] [3a] [1b] [3b] [1c] [3c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans PF Loans with 
credit 
accessibility
All AS Bonds AS Bonds with 
credit 
accessibility
All CB CB with rating 
and credit 
accessibility 
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
242.39
**
113.44
*
275.34
**
81.57
**
-242.27
**
(9.43) (7.21) (2.37) (3.25) (7.78) (-24.47)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
-21.62
**
-6.75 -10.95 -8.80
**
11.10
**
(-4.93) (-4.46) (-1.52) (-1.09) (-6.43) (9.56)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
7.35
**
-40.91
**
-47.65
**
(2.04) (2.79) (-5.48) (-4.28)
Maturity 0.51 0.25 -0.72 -0.34 -1.12
**
1.30
**
(1.67) (0.66) (-1.52) (-0.49) (-3.87) (5.62)
Number of tranches -1.02 -3.62 -3.08 -18.25
**
19.62
**
28.39
**
(-0.56) (-1.53) (-0.95) (-3.08) (36.87) (9.46)
Number of banks 1.42
**
1.94
**
-9.36
**
-27.57
**
-1.63
**
-1.55
**
(3.87) (3.50) (-2.58) (-3.51) (-3.47) (-2.90)
Country risk 7.78
**
9.88
**
-12.80 -16.60 0.46 1.79
(2.91) (3.63) (-1.04) (-1.10) (0.29) (1.31)
Currency risk 38.11
**
48.39
**
16.95 129.28
**
3.01 8.96
*
(2.88) (2.65) (0.79) (2.93) (0.60) (2.04)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
58.30
**
10.39 -111.97
*
17.49
**
20.11
**
(5.23) (4.25) (0.46) (-2.43) (3.41) (4.17)
Crisis 174.01
**
154.60
**
121.25
*
77.41
**
37.39
**
(16.26) (8.07) (2.43) (15.43) (4.88)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
-0.12
*
0.12
(-4.46) (-2.24) (1.28)
Volatility 0.49 -0.53 2.25
*
6.37
**
2.06
**
1.63
**
(1.64) (-1.26) (2.13) (3.59) (9.91) (5.80)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.40
**
-0.45
**
-0.56
**
-0.02 -0.05
(-7.41) (-4.31) (-3.30) (-3.34) (-0.60) (-1.39)
Commercial 101.80
**
131.04 102.44
**
-37.90
**
(3.28) (1.95) (17.20) (-6.36)
Industrial 10.29 12.87 57.95 0.07 98.75
**
-12.07
*
(1.14) (1.08) (1.56) (0.00) (19.30) (-2.24)
Utilities 12.92 13.71 -16.49 30.30 20.66
**
-61.72
**
(1.41) (1.20) (-0.42) (0.40) (4.17) (-11.13)
Transportation 14.33 19.55 128.94 68.80
**
-0.60
(1.39) (1.37) (1.88) (5.94) (-0.06)
Government 7.18 14.38 14.93 36.64
*
(0.31) (0.57) (0.38) (2.33)
Other 163.47
**
74.13
**
(5.83) (3.06)
Rating 30.80
**
(38.84)
Credit accessibility 0.54
**
-0.66 0.82
**
(3.39) (-1.02) (10.27)
Number of observations 1,029 763 439 171 10,543 6,139
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.49 0.19 0.24 0.21 0.53
F 90.00 77.32 6.55 6.03 238.24 232.48  
Table 5.5: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads – the impact of credit accessibility.364 
365
 
                                                 
364
 This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of determinants of loan 
pricing credit spreads for the PF, AS, and CB high-information samples and the sub-samples created 
using the data available on credit accessibility. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
365
 The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: (i) commercial and other dummy 
variables in estimating model [3a]; (ii) crisis, risk free rate and transportation dummy variable in 
estimating model [3b]; and (iii) log loan to value and risk free rate in estimating model [3c]. Rating 
variable was included in estimating model [3c] because the lost in observations is not significant. 
Government and other dummy variables do not exist for AS transactions. 
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5.3.3.4. The Impact of Fees on SF and SDF Credit Spreads 
Credit spreads are not the only measure of risk premium, because loans and bonds also 
carry fees that can be related to creditworthiness and performance. In the syndication 
market (PF loans) two types of fees are usually charged by lenders: (i) commitment or 
annual fees and paid on an annual basis on the balance of the undrawn portion of a loan; 
and (ii) participation or upfront fees, which are paid upfront to banks participating in a 
syndicate. In the bond market a type of fee is usually charged by underwriters: 
management fees, which are paid annually on the balance of the undrawn (if any) 
portion of the bond. Thus, we use the following two variables to capture the impact of 
fees on SF and SDF credit spreads: (i) management fee (management fees for AS and 
CB issues and commitment or annual fees for PF loans); and (ii) upfront fees (only 
available for PF loans). Unfortunately, data on fees were not available for all of the 
observations in our high-information samples. Data on management fees were available 
for 125, 439, and 10,543 tranches for PF, AS, and CB issues, respectively. Data on 
upfront fees were available for 199 PF loans. 
 
Models [4a], [4b], and [4c] of Table 5.6 present the results of our loan and bond pricing 
regressions for three sub-samples of 125, 37, and 1,334 PF, AS, and CB issues, 
respectively. These regressions examine whether loans and bonds credit spread and fees 
are complements or substitutes. For PF and CB issues, the coefficients on the 
management fee variable are significantly positive, suggesting that fees and spreads are 
complements. On average, each additional basis point increase in the management fee 
increases the credit spread by 0.85 bps and 0.51 bps for PF and CB issues, respectively. 
The logical interpretation of this finding for PF loans is that banks are enticed to 
participate in riskier loans by being offered both higher fees and higher spreads. 
Regarding CB transactions, banks increase their effort to underwrite riskier securities if 
the management fee they receive over the life of the transaction increases. Not 
surprisingly, including management fees in the regressions also significantly reduces the 
regression intercept, although it remains positive in both cases. Additionally, the model 
for PF loans (model [4a]) also has by far the highest explanatory power (adjusted R
2
 
value of 0.70) on any of the estimations presented in Tables 5.3, 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6. 
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Dependent variable: [1a] [4a] [1b] [4b] [1c] [4c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans PF Loans with 
management 
fee
All AS Bonds AS Bonds with 
management 
fee
All CB CB with 
management 
fee
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
123.38
**
113.44
*
-257.06 81.57
**
10.45
(9.43) (3.60) (2.37) (-0.91) (7.78) (0.59)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
-13.00 -6.75 49.66 -8.80
**
-11.17
**
(-4.93) (-1.97) (-1.52) (1.18) (-6.43) (-4.67)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
1.33 -40.91
**
39.33
(2.04) (0.27) (-5.48) (1.72)
Maturity 0.51 0.75 -0.72 0.84 -1.12
**
3.63
**
(1.67) (0.99) (-1.52) (0.30) (-3.87) (7.42)
Number of tranches -1.02 12.02
**
-3.08 -6.37 19.62
**
10.07
(-0.56) (2.88) (-0.95) (-0.60) (36.87) (1.87)
Number of banks 1.42
**
1.15 -9.36
**
-16.55 -1.63
**
1.53
**
(3.87) (1.32) (-2.58) (-1.95) (-3.47) (3.32)
Country risk 7.78
**
-7.21 -12.80 0.46 10.40
**
(2.91) (-1.93) (-1.04) (0.29) (5.39)
Currency risk 38.11
**
5.02 16.95 109.20 3.01 21.81
**
(2.88) (0.21) (0.79) (1.83) (0.60) (4.44)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
19.71 10.39 17.49
**
-2.37
(5.23) (1.02) (0.46) (3.41) (-0.38)
Crisis 174.01
**
177.94
**
121.25
*
77.41
**
127.29
**
(16.26) (8.48) (2.43) (15.43) (8.29)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
0.12
(-4.46) (1.28)
Volatility 0.49 2.25
*
2.06
**
1.86
**
(1.64) (2.13) (9.91) (5.25)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.24
*
-0.45
**
0.11 -0.02 -0.09
**
(-7.41) (-2.54) (-3.30) (0.22) (-0.60) (-2.98)
Commercial 101.80
**
248.55
**
102.44
**
70.56
**
(3.28) (2.84) (17.20) (8.81)
Industrial 10.29 12.55 57.95 -130.38 98.75
**
56.23
**
(1.14) (0.82) (1.56) (-1.79) (19.30) (10.05)
Utilities 12.92 6.96 -16.49 -10.24 20.66
**
2.58
(1.41) (0.41) (-0.42) (-0.17) (4.17) (0.27)
Transportation 14.33 -13.58 128.94 -71.68 68.80
**
16.65
(1.39) (-0.75) (1.88) (-0.60) (5.94) (0.67)
Government 7.18 -5.82 14.93
(0.31) (-0.09) (0.38)
Other 163.47
**
121.17
**
(5.83) (3.37)
Management fee 0.85
**
1.84 0.51
**
(3.17) (1.35) (2.74)
Number of observations 1,029 125 439 37 10,543 1,334
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.70 0.19 0.37 0.21 0.40
F 90.00 18.56 6.55 2.75 238.24 32.82  
Table 5.6: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads – the impact of management fee.366 
367
 
 
The coefficient of the management fee is insignificant for AS transactions. This makes 
sense because in an AS transaction (i) banks are usually the originator; i.e., banks sell 
the assets to a separate entity (SPV), which then issues securities; and (ii) the originator 
                                                 
366
 This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of 
loan pricing credit spreads for the PF, AS, and CB high-information samples and the sub-samples created 
using the data available on management fee. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
367
 The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: (i) risk free rate, volatility and 
commercial and other dummy variables in estimating model [4a]; (ii) country risk, U.K. borrowers, crisis, 
risk free rate, and volatility in estimating model [4b]; and (iii) log loan to value, risk free rate, and 
government dummy variable in estimating model [4c]. Government and other dummy variables do not 
exist for AS transactions. 
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retains the servicing function and thus receives the servicing fee. With the exception of 
the commercial dummy variable, all of the other variables in AS bonds management fee 
regression are insignificant. However, the results have to be analyzed carefully as we 
verify a significant reduction in the number of observations between models [1b] and 
[4b] – from 439 to 37 observations. 
Only two variables in the PF loans management fee sample model remain significantly 
related with credit spread (model [1a] versus model [4a]). As it has frequently been the 
case, dummy variable crisis is significantly, positively related to credit spread. The 
coefficient of this variable indicates that the PF loans credit spread is 177.94 bps higher 
during the crisis period over the pre-crisis period. Moreover, the slope of the Euro swap 
curve (EUSA5y-Libor3M) significantly reduces a PF loan credit spread. The coefficient 
of the number of tranches, however, is significantly, positively related to spread, 
although the coefficient of this variable indicates that increasing the number of tranches 
by 1 unit will increase the spread of PF loans by an average of 12.02 bps. 
In CB issues management fee model (model [4c]), the variables’ log transaction size, 
crisis, volatility, and commercial, industrial and other dummy variables remain 
statistically significant in explaining the credit spread. The coefficient of the number of 
tranches and U.K. borrowers, utilities and transportation dummy variables become 
insignificant (when compared with the results presented in regression [1c]), while the 
coefficients of the country risk, currency risk (both with a positive sign), and EUSA5y-
Libor3M (with a negative sign) become statistically significant. As usual, the coefficient 
of the time to maturity changes its sign; i.e., when controlling for management fees, 
maturity significantly increases the CB issues credit spread. Finally, the coefficient of 
the number of banks becomes significantly, positively related to credit spread. The 
coefficient of this variable indicates that, increasing the number of banks by 1 unit will 
increase the spread of CB issues by an average of 1.53 bps. 
 
The upfront fee is a fee paid by a borrower to a bank syndicate for syndicating a loan in 
a PF transaction. Credit spreads and fees are usually complements or substitutes in 
syndicated loans; i.e., arrangers are usually ‘paid’ by spreads and fees. Model [5a] in 
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Table 5.7 presents loan pricing regression results for a sample of 196 PF loans with 
information on upfront fee. We also include Models [1a] and [4a] for comparison. 
 
Dependent variable: [1a] [4a] [5a]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans PF Loans with 
management 
fee
PF Loans with 
upfront fee
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
123.38
**
89.13
**
(9.43) (3.60) (3.18)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
-13.00 0.30
(-4.93) (-1.97) (0.06)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
1.33 -0.08
(2.04) (0.27) (-0.02)
Maturity 0.51 0.75 0.83
(1.67) (0.99) (1.77)
Number of tranches -1.02 12.02
**
2.08
(-0.56) (2.88) (0.68)
Number of banks 1.42
**
1.15 -0.98
*
(3.87) (1.32) (-2.05)
Country risk 7.78
**
-7.21 2.89
(2.91) (-1.93) (0.91)
Currency risk 38.11
**
5.02 -6.78
(2.88) (0.21) (-0.59)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
19.71 39.27
**
(5.23) (1.02) (3.92)
Crisis 174.01
**
177.94
**
131.57
**
(16.26) (8.48) (7.10)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
(-4.46)
Volatility 0.49
(1.64)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.24
*
-0.33
**
(-7.41) (-2.54) (-5.43)
Commercial
Industrial 10.29 12.55 6.79
(1.14) (0.82) (0.38)
Utilities 12.92 6.96 -1.91
(1.41) (0.41) (-0.11)
Transportation 14.33 -13.58 -32.99
(1.39) (-0.75) (-1.68)
Government 7.18 -5.82 -22.53
(0.31) (-0.09) (-0.90)
Other
Management fee 0.85
**
(3.17)
Upfront fee 0.74
**
(8.57)
Number of observations 1,029 125 196
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.70 0.66
F 90.00 18.56 25.76  
Table 5.7: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit 
spreads – the impact of upfront fee on PF loan credit 
spreads.
368
 
369
 
 
                                                 
368
 This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of 
loan pricing credit spreads for the PF high-information sample and two sub-samples created using the 
data available on management fee and upfront fee. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically 
significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
369
 The following variables were omitted because of collinearity in estimating model [5a]: risk free rate, 
volatility and commercial and other dummy variables. 
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It is worth noting that for PF loans both management fee and upfront fees are very 
significantly and positively correlated with credit spreads, which supports the idea that 
risk is priced jointly through spreads and fees. Again, model [5a] has a relatively 
significant explanatory power, yielding an adjusted R
2
 value of 0.66. 
These findings are consistent to those presented by Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) – 
for PPPs in the European Union and the United Kingdom – and by Gatti et al. (2007), 
who find that top arrangers are paid by higher fees even if the overall cost of the loan 
tranche is reduced by certification. 
 
5.3.3.5. The Impact of Bonds’ Specific Variables on Credit Spreads  
There are specific variables that can only be included in regression models for bond 
credit spreads. Collateral is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if securities are 
MBS and 0 otherwise; i.e., collateral is available only for AS bonds. Similarly, callable 
and fixed rate are variables available only for AS and CB issues. Thus, these variables 
cannot be included in the model for PF loans since they are only meaningful in the 
context of bond issues. Models [6b] and [7c] in Table 5.8 present loan pricing 
regression results for a sample of 364 and 6,139 AS and CB issues, respectively. 
 
As expected, we find a significantly negative coefficient for the collateral dummy 
variable. This means that MBS (i.e., securities backed by mortgages) have an average 
credit spread lower than ABS (i.e., securities backed by consumer-backed products) by 
47.37 bps. One interpretation is that the collateral of MBS is less diverse and subject to 
less price volatility than the collateral of ABS. Additionally, the existence of a mortgage 
reduces the expected loss in a scenario of default. 
Although insignificant for AS bond issues, fixed rate and callable dummy variables 
have a strong positive relationship with credit spreads for CB issues. Regarding the 
fixed rate dummy variable, the result for CB issues can clearly be explained since the 
coupon rates on these bonds do not fluctuate and are typically protected to avoid the risk 
of rising interest rates. This indicates that CB borrowers on average have to pay an extra 
risk premium through fixed price issues in comparison with floating price issues by 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 171 
29.24 bps. The insignificant relationship for AS bonds may be explained by the fact that 
AS securities are especially attractive for fixed-income investors who want to diversify 
high-yield bonds without any interest sensitivity. The introduction of a call option in a 
CB issue increases the credit spread by 50.68 bps. Thus, an issuer has to pay a premium 
to have the right to redeem the bond before the bond maturity. 
With regard to model [6b], the results are in line with the expected coefficient signs for 
all the variables that significantly affect AS bond credit spreads; i.e., the volatility, 
rating and transportation dummy variable are significantly and positively related with 
credit spread, while the slope of the Euro swap curve and collateral dummy variable 
significantly reduce AS bond credit spreads. Fifteen variables in the CB sub-sample 
model remain significantly related with credit spread (model [7c]). While variables’ log 
transaction size, number of tranches, volatility, rating, credit accessibility, and U.K. 
borrowers, crisis, fixed rate, callable, government and other dummy variables are 
significantly, positively related to credit spread, the number of banks and commercial, 
industrial and utilities dummy variables significantly reduces a CB issue credit spread. 
 
Models [6b] and [7c] have, by far, the highest explanatory power, yielding an adjusted 
R
2
 value of 0.48 and 0.55 for AS and CB issues, respectively. 
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Dependent variable: [6b] [7c]
Credit spread (bps) AS with rating, 
collateral, fixed rate 
and callable
CB with rating, 
credit accessibility, 
fixed rate and 
callable
Independent variables:
Intercept 22.34 -254.90
**
(0.60) (-24.60)
Log transaction size 2.76 13.34
**
(0.71) (11.45)
Maturity 0.16 0.26
(0.26) (0.97)
Number of tranches 1.37 25.87
**
(0.49) (8.53)
Number of banks -4.51 -2.05
**
(-1.17) (-3.80)
Country risk -8.06 2.33
(-1.21) (1.71)
Currency risk 27.21 1.25
(1.50) (0.29)
U.K. borrowers -9.61 21.08
**
(-0.48) (4.45)
Crisis 31.82 33.85
**
(0.88) (4.38)
Volatility 2.73
**
1.53
**
(3.51) (5.50)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.50
**
-0.05
(-4.42) (-1.53)
Commercial 19.12 -47.60
**
(0.69) (-7.72)
Industrial 26.61 -24.22
**
(0.89) (-4.33)
Utilities -65.45 -64.43
**
(-1.72) (-10.78)
Transportation 103.77
**
-9.19
(3.03) (-0.90)
Government 49.16
*
(2.30)
Other 52.66
*
(2.28)
Rating 27.24
**
29.19
**
(10.42) (37.00)
Credit accessibility 0.83
**
(10.27)
Collateral -47.37
**
(-2.68)
Fixed rate -26.93 29.24
**
(-1.13) (8.79)
Callable -15.89 50.68
**
(-1.08) (9.54)
Number of observations 364 6,139
Adjusted R
2 0.48 0.55
F 11.57 223.82  
Table 5.8: Regression analyses of the determinants of 
credit spreads – the impact of collateral, fixed 
rate and callable on AS and CB issues credit 
spread.
370
 
371
 
                                                 
370
 This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of the determinants of 
loan pricing credit spreads for AS and CB sub-samples created using the data available on collateral for 
AS transactions and on fixed rate and callable for both AS and CB issues. The t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
371
 Variables risk free rate and log loan to value were omitted because of collinearity in estimating model 
[7c]. These variables were also omitted in estimating regression [6b] because they are not relevant in 
explaining AS bonds credit spread. 
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5.3.4. The Impact of the Financial Crisis on SF and SDF Credit Spreads 
In order to test the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis on SF credit spreads, we hypothesize (Hypothesis 4) that 
after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, the financial 
crisis does not have a significant impact on SF credit spreads. In sub-section 4.4.4 we 
reject hypothesis 4 since the average credit spread is statistically and significantly 
higher for PF loans (329.1 bps versus 136.9 bps), AS bonds (206.5 bps versus 143.5 
bps), and CB (220.3 bps versus 125.5) during the crisis period. However, in this 
analysis we do not control for other microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing factors. 
Based on the regression analysis presented in the previous sub-sections, where we take 
these factors directly into account, we also reject hypothesis 4, as the coefficient for the 
crisis dummy variable is significantly, positively related to credit spread. Only in 
models [2b] and [6b] for AS transactions we find an insignificant relationship between 
the crisis dummy variable and credit spread. This insignificant relationship can be 
explained by the fact that our sub-sample for AS issues in the crisis period is relatively 
smaller (38 observations) compared to the pre-crisis period (401 observations). 
Our purpose is to understand if the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis significantly influenced the explanatory power of the 
regressions, as well as the coefficients on the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign 
and in significance). We are therefore examining whether our results are robust over 
time by considering a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 and September 14
th
, 2008, 
and a crisis period from September 15
th
, 2008 through to December 31
st
, 2011. The 
results are presented in Table 5.9. 
Model [1a] for both pre-crisis and crisis period shows exactly the results expected; i.e., 
PF loans credit spread has increased significantly during the crisis period. The split of 
our PF loans sample has a considerable impact on the regressions intercept, causing an 
increase of 342.96 bps between pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples. 
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Dependent variable: [1a] [1a] [2b] [2b] [2c] [2c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans | 
pre-crisis 
period
All PF Loans | 
crisis period
AS Bonds with 
rating | pre-
crisis period
AS Bonds with 
rating | crisis 
period
CB with 
rating | pre-
crisis period
CB with 
rating | crisis 
period
Independent variables:
Intercept 203.26
**
546.22
**
-6.98 609.12 -27.04
*
-249.28
**
(6.96) (11.44) (-0.17) (1.83) (-2.25) (-13.30)
Log transaction size -15.34
**
-21.36
**
3.98 -30.11 -15.10
**
28.30
**
(-3.35) (-2.75) (0.91) (-0.83) (-8.87) (17.11)
Log loan to value 2.03 10.98
*
1.91 -18.31
(0.92) (2.50) (0.16) (-0.60)
Maturity 1.05
**
-0.74 -0.48 4.85 0.92
**
1.17
**
(2.97) (-1.12) (-0.88) (1.77) (3.35) (3.34)
Number of tranches 1.35 -2.44 2.86 -141.20 32.37
**
-12.11
**
(0.62) (-0.62) (1.00) (-1.81) (10.72) (-3.13)
Number of banks 1.44
**
0.86 -9.46
*
-1.06 -2.11
**
-1.27
(3.99) (0.75) (-2.35) (-0.02) (-5.50) (-1.70)
Country risk 1.71 12.91
**
-0.77 -39.16 -14.34
**
8.93
**
(0.94) (2.70) (-0.11) (-1.49) (-13.59) (4.72)
Currency risk 30.31
*
52.83 29.44 -164.36 38.03
**
12.95
*
(2.44) (1.49) (1.64) (-0.73) (7.66) (2.12)
U.K. borrowers 36.27
**
60.90
**
-3.81 -165.67 -14.40
**
32.45
**
(4.15) (2.78) (-0.20) (-1.10) (-2.98) (4.87)
Risk free rate -0.14
**
-0.71
**
-0.01 1.18
(-3.51) (-4.36) (-0.03) (1.39)
Volatility 1.91
*
-0.25 1.73 3.74
**
3.37
**
(2.27) (-0.48) (1.83) (14.30) (11.74)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.87
**
-0.38
**
-0.25
**
-0.08
(-5.59) (-5.20) (-2.62) (-8.86) (-1.49)
Commercial 14.47 -1.83 -50.80
**
(0.60) (-0.36) (-5.71)
Industrial 0.48 48.82
*
18.97 4.52 -26.63
**
(0.05) (2.46) (0.71) (1.08) (-3.31)
Utilities 4.42 38.26
**
-58.21
**
-28.20
**
-72.31
**
(0.37) (2.80) (-1.55) (-4.83) (-9.45)
Transportation 1.16 38.71 98.98
**
15.96 -17.28
(0.10) (1.36) (3.98) (1.64) (-1.37)
Government -5.11 68.99 23.58
*
(-0.18) (1.96) (2.03)
Other 53.26
**
41.27
(6.77) (1.20)
Rating 30.38
**
-1.93 25.61
**
38.02
**
(10.05) (-0.22) (29.30) (36.57)
Number of observations 702 327 334 30 5,594 3,092
Adjusted R
2
0.11 0.27 0.52 0.23 0.35 0.53
F 8.49 7.77 15.38 1.87 155.09 145.10  
Table 5.9: Regression analyses of the determinants of credit spreads – the impact of the financial crisis.372 
373
 
 
The coefficients of the log transaction size, risk free rate and EUSA5y-Libor3M remain 
(when comparing regression results for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples) significantly, 
                                                 
372
 This table presents the results of an ordinary least squares regression analysis of determinants of loan 
pricing credit spreads for the PF, AS, and CB sub-samples created by considering a pre-crisis period from 
January 1
st
, 2000 through September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th
, 2008 through 
December 31
st
, 2011. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% 
level, respectively. 
373
 The following variables were omitted because of collinearity: (i) commercial and other dummy 
variables in estimating model [1a], either in pre-crisis period and crisis period; (ii) volatility and EUSA5y-
Libor3M and all sector dummy variables in estimating model [2b] for the crisis period; and (iii) log loan 
to value and risk free rate for both periods and government dummy variable for crisis period in estimating 
model [2c]. The rating variable was omitted because it would cause a significant reduction in the number 
of observations in estimating model [1a] (36 and 3 observations for the pre-crisis and the crisis period, 
respectively). 
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negatively related to credit spread. Similarly, coefficient of the U.K. borrowers remains 
significantly, positively related to credit spread. It is important to notice that all the 
referred coefficients increased their values. Coefficient of maturity, number of banks, 
currency risk and volatility become insignificant. Finally, variables’ log loan to value, 
country risk and industrial and utilities dummy variables become significantly, 
positively related to credit spread. Thus, we can identify a change in the type of factors 
that explain PF loan credit spreads, from marketability factors (maturity and number of 
banks) to default factors (loan to value and country risk). The statistical significance of 
log loan to value might be explained by the fact that a higher loan to value ratio means 
greater risk for lenders since that loan constitutes a larger share in their loan portfolio. 
Additionally, during the crisis period banks lost balance sheet capacity to lend (huge 
losses in assets lead to questions regarding bank solvency). The significant and positive 
relationship between country risk and credit spread during the crisis period is not a 
surprise, since rating agencies downgraded sovereign bond ratings from several Western 
European countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain). 
For AS bonds (model [2b] for pre-crisis and crisis sub-samples), none of the 
coefficients are statistically significant for the crisis period. This can be explained by 
the significant reduction in the number of observations of model [2b] for pre-crisis 
period vis-a-vis model [2b] for crisis period – from 334 to 30 observations. 
Unfortunately, the small number of observations for AS transactions during the crisis 
period does not allow for an in-depth analysis. We believe that this result presents an 
important opportunity for future research. 
With respect to SDF (CB) issues (model [2c]), the coefficients of maturity, currency 
risk, volatility, utilities dummy variable, and rating remain statistically significant, 
while the coefficients of the number of banks, EUSA5y-Libor3M, and other dummy 
variables become insignificant. On the contrary, commercial and industrial dummy 
variables become significantly, negatively related with credit spread, which means that 
during the crisis period issuers in the financial institution sector pay higher credit 
spreads than in commercial and industrial sectors – the predicted credit spread is 
approximately 50.80 bps and 26.63 bps lower for issuers belonging to commercial and 
industrial sectors, respectively, than in the financial sector. 
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A change in coefficient signs takes place for four variables. As for PF loans, variables 
of U.K. borrowers and country risk are significantly and positively related to CB issues 
credit spread during the crisis period. Log transaction size variable becomes 
significantly, positively related to credit spread while the number of tranches become 
significantly, negatively related to credit spread – comparing the pre-crisis with the 
crisis period. The change in sign for transaction size and number of tranches could be 
explained by a liquidity shortfall in financial markets. The critical phase of the 
2007/2008 financial crisis manifested a shortage of liquidity, which was reflected in a 
fall in asset prices below their long run fundamental price and a deterioration in external 
financing conditions. U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable becomes significantly, 
positively related to CB issue credit spread during the crisis period because the resulting 
liquidity problems (funding liquidity and balance sheet liquidity) vehemently affected 
U.K. financial institutions, which issued almost 50% of all CB issued in the U.K. 
Based on our regression analysis, we again reject hypothesis 4, as the 2007/2008 
financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis does have a 
significant impact on PF loans credit spread. The same finding is obtained for CB 
issues. Thus, the financial crisis substantially influences the explanatory power of the 
regressions, as well as the coefficients of the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign 
and in significance) both for SF and SDF transactions.  
 
5.3.5. The Term Structure of SF Transactions 
In contrast to SDF, for which credit spreads are a positive linear function of maturity, 
the term structure of PF loans is somewhat an empirical puzzle. For example, Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008) detect that whereas credit spreads for both investment-grade and 
speculative-grade bonds, other than for project finance, are a positive linear function of 
maturity, in PF loans the term structure of credit spreads is ‘hump-shaped’. Even for 
CB, the empirical literature has been controversial regarding the term structure of credit 
spreads for non-investment grade bonds (see section 5.2). Regarding AS, empirical 
research [e.g., Vink and Thibeault (2008)] find an insignificant (for ABS) or significant 
negative relationship (for MBS and CDOs) between spread and maturity.  
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Given the controversy on the term structure of credit spreads for speculative-grade 
issuers, a recent strand of the CB literature has emphasized the importance of 
constructing homogeneous samples of bonds when studying the term structure of credit 
spreads [see, among others, Helwege and Turner (1999) and He et al. (2000)].
374
 This 
means that when attempting to establish a relationship between credit spread and 
maturity using a heterogeneous sample of bonds, it is important to control for the 
different risk characteristics of individual issues (other than maturity), otherwise the 
analyzes might lead to misleading results. This sub-section will therefore take a 
multivariate regression approach, attempting to analyze the relationship between credit 
spread and maturity, controlling for other relevant micro and macro risk factors that 
affect credit spread. Our purpose it to understand the economics underlying the term 
structure of credit spreads, as derived from a large cross-section of Western European 
SF and SDF loans and bonds.  
As presented in sub-section 4.3.3, time to maturity differs significantly between PF, AS, 
and CB issues at the 5% significance level. An AS tranche of average size matures just 
over 20.9 years, which is a long period if we compare this with the average 13.6 and 5.3 
years for PF and CB tranches, respectively. SF transactions are thus characterized by 
much longer maturities compared to other forms of financing. This raises the following 
question: are longer maturities perceived by lenders as a risk per se? Answering this 
question is crucial to understand the peculiar nature of credit risk in SF; i.e., given the 
characteristics of SF transactions discussed in Chapter 4, should we expect the term 
structure of credit spreads for SF issues to behave differently from that of SDF issues? 
Based on presented regression results for SF and SDF issues, a linear positive 
relationship between credit spread and maturity appears strongly significant for SDF 
transactions (CB issues) – see models [2c], [3c], and [4c] in Annex 8 –, in line with the 
intuition that lenders should get a higher remuneration for being exposed to risk for a 
longer period of time, and insignificant for SF transactions (PF loans and AS bonds) – 
see models [1a], [2a], [3a], [4a], [5a], [1b], [2b], [3b], [4b], and [6b] in Annex 8. Thus, 
our main conclusion so far is that, when controlled for other micro and macro risk 
factors, a linear positive relationship between spread and maturity shows up as very 
                                                 
374
 Helwege and Turner (1999) and He et al. (2000) argue that the findings in many studies reflect a 
sample selection bias due to better-quality speculative grade issuers tending to issue longer-term bonds. 
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significant for SDF transactions. This is demonstrated in Graph 1, which plots credit 
spread against maturity, it plots the prediction from a quadratic regression and adds the 
confidence interval on the basis of the standard error of forecast. 
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Graph 1: Credit spread versus maturity with confidence bands: CB. 
 
 
As with other confidence intervals and hypothesis tests in an OLS regression, the 
standard errors and bands described depend on the assumption of independent and 
identically distributed errors. Hence, next we present the augmented component-plus-
residual plot after adjusting for heteroskedasticity using the methodology proposed by 
Huber (1967) and White (1980). Based on model [2c], the augmented component-plus-
residual plot shown in Graph 2, depict the partial relationship between bond credit 
spreads and maturity, once all other micro and macro factors have been controlled for.375 
Our results are similar to those presented by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) for Bonds. 
                                                 
375
 The augmented component-plus-residual plot [Mallows (1986)] are diagnostic tools which for variable 
x1 graphs each observation’s residual plus its component predicted from x1, ei+b1x1i. According to 
Hamilton (2006), ‘… such plots might help diagnose nonlinearities and suggest alternative functional 
forms.’ For more details see Baum (2006) and Hamilton (2006). 
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Graph 2: Term structure of CB credit spreads. 
 
Using these results as benchmarks, we now turn our attention to analyzing the term 
structure of credit spreads for SF transactions. Controlling for a set of other micro and 
macroeconomic factors, we find no significant linear relationship between credit spread 
and maturity for PF loans and AS bonds. Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that, 
ceteris paribus, longer-maturity PF loans appear to be associated with lower spreads. 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) begin with this finding, characterized by the authors as 
‘surprising’, and verify the hypothesis of a hump-shaped term structure of credit spreads 
for PF loans. Regarding AS, Vink and Thibeault (2008) only find a significant negative 
relationship between spread and CDOs with a maturity lower than 5 years and between 
spread and MBS with a maturity longer than 15 years – coefficients on ABS are 
insignificant. 
The empirical results reported lead us to verify the hypothesis of a hump-shaped term 
structure of credit spreads for PF loans and a negative relationship for AS bonds. We 
therefore augment our baseline multiple regression (equation 5.1) with non-linear 
maturity components. Table 5.10 reports regression results where the natural logarithm 
of maturity is included as an additional regressor in the models to test for the presence 
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of any non-linear effects of maturity on credit spread form for SDF and SF samples.
376
 
The results show that both the explanatory power of regressions, as well as the 
coefficients on the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign and in significance) are 
largely the same for AS and CB issues (models [8b] and [8c]), as in the original 
specifications. However, considering PF loans, the explanatory power (adjusted R
2
) 
increases significantly between models [1a] and [8a] – from 0.51 to 0.63. 
 
Dependent variable: [1a] [8a] [2b] [8b] [2c] [8c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans All PF Loans 
with 
log maturity
AS Bonds with 
rating
AS Bonds with 
rating and 
log maturity
CB with 
rating
CB with 
rating and 
log maturity
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
228.31
**
13.27 34.71 -139.35
**
-127.95
**
(9.43) (9.69) (0.31) (0.69) (-14.39) (-10.33)
Maturity 0.51 -1.72
**
-0.36 0.23 1.00
**
2.04
**
(1.67) (-2.60) (-0.67) (0.23) (4.60) (4.68)
Log Maturity 21.47
**
-13.55 -11.04
*
(3.54) (-0.83) (-2.22)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
-17.53
**
3.74 4.11 0.75 0.67
(-4.93) (-5.12) (0.92) (1.01) (0.58) (0.52)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
2.57 0.79 0.89
(2.04) (1.27) (0.10) (0.12)
Number of tranches -1.02 -1.19 2.39 2.83 23.97
**
23.57
**
(-0.56) (-0.68) (0.86) (1.05) (9.10) (9.12)
Number of banks 1.42
**
1.22
**
-8.24
*
-8.21
*
-1.65
**
-1.55
**
(3.87) (3.32) (-2.10) (-2.10) (-4.35) (-4.09)
Country risk 7.78
**
8.32
**
-4.99 -5.23 -2.04 -2.20
(2.91) (3.35) (-0.74) (-0.77) (-1.51) (-1.62)
Currency risk 38.11
**
36.70
**
35.36 31.28 27.46
**
27.46
**
(2.88) (2.81) (1.96) (1.68) (6.64) (6.64)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
52.64
**
-10.10 -6.30 6.43 6.44
(5.23) (5.64) (-0.53) (-0.32) (1.58) (1.58)
Crisis 174.01
**
175.83
**
33.70 37.16 86.53
**
85.91
**
(16.26) (16.59) (0.74) (0.81) (20.73) (20.05)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
-0.16
**
-0.03 -0.02
(-4.46) (-4.54) (-0.31) (-0.26)
Volatility 0.49 0.44 2.42
**
2.36
**
2.98
**
2.97
**
(1.64) (1.51) (2.81) (2.71) (17.88) (17.89)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.45
**
-0.52
**
-0.52
**
-0.16
**
-0.16
**
(-7.41) (-8.43) (-4.35) (-4.44) (-6.31) (-6.13)
Commercial 25.01 22.90 -17.93
**
-16.88
**
(0.99) (0.90) (-3.82) (-3.56)
Industrial 10.29 9.98 27.34 25.80 0.69 1.77
(1.14) (1.12) (0.99) (0.93) (0.17) (0.43)
Utilities 12.92 6.34 -55.51 -58.11 -39.93
**
-38.77
**
(1.41) (0.81) (-1.52) (-1.59) (-8.59) (-8.14)
Transportation 14.33 13.12 110.02
**
109.56
**
12.16 13.94
(1.39) (1.32) (3.64) (3.74) (1.47) (1.66)
Government 7.18 8.56 25.68
*
27.60
*
(0.31) (0.37) (2.20) (2.53)
Other 69.91
**
71.75
**
(3.42) (3.52)
Rating 27.44
**
27.56
**
29.06
**
29.21
**
(8.65) (8.74) (43.11) (43.56)
Number of observations 1,029 1,029 364 364 8,686 8,686
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.63 0.46 0.46 0.43 0.43
F 90.00 87.18 11.45 11.06 261.21 257.06  
Table 5.10: Regression analyses of the term structure of credit spreads.
377 
                                                 
376
 We have also attempted alternative quadratic and square-root specifications, but the results were not 
significant for this work and therefore are not reported. 
377
 Model [8a] is similar to model [1a] adding the logarithmic of maturity. Rating variable was omitted 
either because of collinearity or because of the significant reduction in the number of observations (from 
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For PF loans, a robust hump-shaped relationship between credit spread and maturity is 
found and plotted in Graphs 3 and 4. Graph 4 presents the augmented component-plus-
residual plot based on regression [8a] and depicts the partial relationship between PF 
loans credit spread and maturity, once all other micro and macro factors have been 
controlled for. The straight line in Graph 4 corresponds to the regression model. The 
curved line reflects the fitting process based on non-parametric regression called local 
weighted scatterplot smoothing (lowess). 
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Graph 3: Credit spread versus maturity with confidence bands: PF loans.
378 
 
                                                                                                                                               
1,029 to 39) that it would impose. The t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% 
and 5% level, respectively. 
378
 As with other confidence intervals and hypothesis tests in OLS regression, the standard errors and 
bands described depend on the assumption of independent and identically distributed errors. Hence, next 
we present the augmented component-plus-residual plot (Graph 4) after adjusting for heteroskedasticity 
using the methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980). 
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Graph 4: Term structure of credit spreads for PF loans.
379 
 
 
Our findings are similar to those presented by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), who show a 
hump-shaped term structure of credit spreads for PF loans. In project finance, projects 
usually start to generate revenues after a relatively long construction period. As loan 
repayment relies primarily on the project’s cash flows, obtaining credit at longer 
maturities might be critical to ensure a project’s financial viability. This short-term 
liquidity risk may explain why a standard upward-sloping relationship between maturity 
and credit spread do not apply to PF, as is the case for CB. Additionally, project lenders 
usually exercise a much more active control and supervision over the project’s 
advancement than they would in SDF transactions.
380
 
 
In models [8b] and [8c] we also augmented our baseline regression results for AS and 
CB issues, respectively, including the natural logarithm of maturity as an independent 
                                                 
379
 The curved line reflects lowess smoothing based on the default bandwidth of .5, or half the data. 
According to Hamilton (2006), “[I]n general the lowess command is more specialized and more 
powerful… for fitting process.” 
380
 Based on the Merton’s (1974) contingent claims approach, we can argue that highly leveraged 
obligors, typical of project financing, might exhibit a hump-shaped term structure of credit spreads. See 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) for further discussion of this subject. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 183 
variable. The logarithmic term turns out insignificant for AS bonds, which is in line 
with our previous results and with the relationship between credit spread and maturity 
plotted in Graph 5. If we analyze the augmented component-plus-residual plot shown in 
Graph 6 – based on model [8b] – we can conclude that although not significant, there is 
a negative relationship between credit spread and maturity. Further empirical analysis of 
this question would be beneficial for future research, by using a database with a higher 
number of observations.
381
 
The insignificant linear relationship between credit spread and maturity can be easily 
explained by the intrinsic characteristics of AS transactions. Contrary to the traditional 
secured bonds, where it is the ability of the originator (or issuer) to generate sufficient 
cash flows to service the debt that determines the risks of the transaction, in 
securitization the source of repayments/funds shifts from the cash flows of the issuer to 
the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral to the issue. Therefore, the length of the 
securities issued in an AS transaction typically matches the length of the assets used as 
collateral; i.e., in general, the payoff profile of the underlying assets is closely related to 
the maturity of the issues. 
Finally, the negative slope of the straight line in Graph 6 can be explained by the term 
structure of credit spreads shown by different AS instruments. Certain types of assets 
underlying an AS structure lend themselves more easily to issues with longer maturity 
levels. Mortgages in general are considered to have longer maturities – the most 
common type of residential mortgage loan is a 30-year loan – and thus an MBS tranche 
of average size matures just over 30.31 years, which is a long period if we compare this 
with the average 17.29 years for ABS. Additionally, the relative pricing of AS issues 
shows that average credit spreads are lower for MBS, with 115.64 bps, than they are for 
ABS, with 162.01 bps.  
 
                                                 
381
 We have also run model [8b] for ABS and MBS sub-samples and we find interaction terms of maturity 
with credit spread to be insignificant in both linear and non-linear specifications. 
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Graph 5: Credit spread versus maturity with confidence bands: AS Bonds.
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Graph 6: Term structure of credit spreads for AS bonds.
383 
                                                 
382
 As with other confidence intervals and hypothesis tests in an OLS regression, the standard errors and 
bands described depend on the assumption of independent and identically distributed errors. Hence, next 
we present the augmented component-plus-residual plot (Graph 6) after adjusting for heteroskedasticity 
using the methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980). 
383
 The curved line reflects lowess smoothing based on the default bandwidth of .5, or half the data. The 
curve’s upturn at the far right can be disregarded as a lowess artifact, as only a few cases determine its 
location toward the extremes. We thus have no doubt about the model’s adequacy. 
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Table 5.10 also shows that a linear positive relationship between credit spread and 
maturity remains strongly significant for CB issues. This idea is corroborated by Graph 
7, which presents the augmented component-plus-residual plot based on model [8c]. 
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Graph 7: Term structure of credit spreads for CB.
384 
 
 
Our results and analysis help to explain why maturity, which is a major systematic 
driver of the cost of debt in SDF transactions, only has a marginal linear effect on the 
credit spread of SF transactions. In a portfolio of SDF (CB) issues, the risk associated 
with longer maturities can never be fully diversified as, to some extent, future market 
conditions are uncertain for every borrower; i.e., a portfolio of CB with longer 
maturities contains at least some systematic risk that in turn makes maturity a positive 
driver of credit spread. By contrast, a portfolio of PF and AS issues effectively 
eliminates most of this source of systematic risk by virtue of credit enhancement 
mechanisms or other structuring devices that reduce lender exposure by altering 
borrowers risk profiles over time. This can help to understand why SF transactions seem 
less risky than lending directly to corporate by means of an SDF financial instrument. 
                                                 
384
 The curved line reflects lowess smoothing based on the default bandwidth of .5, or half the data. The 
curve’s downturn at the far right can be disregarded as a lowess artifact, because only a few cases 
determine its location toward the extremes. We thus have no doubt about the model’s adequacy. 
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5.4. Concluding Remarks 
Previous sub-sections investigated the extent to which SF and SDF are priced by 
common factors. Our purpose was to analyze the impact of common pricing features on 
credit spread by type of transaction. Taking these financial instruments as a whole, we 
saw that all Chow test statistics were higher than the critical levels, and therefore we 
rejected the hypothesis that the impact of pricing factors on credit spread do not differ 
significantly among and between SF and SDF transactions. The regression analyses we 
performed suggest that SF and SDF are in fact different instruments. Even among SF 
transactions, despite some similarities between PF loans and AS bonds the impact of the 
pricing factors on credit spread differs between them. Thus, we reject hypothesis 3.
385
 
This also means that we cannot directly test whether spread on SF is lower than or equal 
to the credit spread on SDF (Hypothesis 2) by including a PF and an AS dummy 
variable in a regression of a sample of all loan types. However, and based on our 
univariate analysis, we conclude (see sub-section 4.4.3) that average credit spreads are 
statistically and significantly higher for PF loans than they are for AS bonds and CB and 
that the average credit spreads for AS and CB issues do not differ significantly. 
Therefore, we only accept the hypothesis that the credit spread on SF is lower than or 
equal to the credit spread on SDF for AS issues. 
Our main conclusion is that capital markets for SF and SDF transactions are distinct and 
thus the relevant pricing factors of these financial instruments also differ. We have 
started by estimating equation 5.1 for PF loans, AS and CB issues for high-information 
samples (tranches for which credit spread information is available). This resulted in a 
total of 1,029 observations for PF loans, 439 for AS bonds, and 10,543 for CB. Despite 
the additional information available on SF and SDF, rather than restrict ourselves to 
analyzing a single sample with all of the information available (which would yield a 
sample size of less than 39 tranches), we studied seven different sub-samples, grouped 
based on the availability of key data items (e.g., rating, credit accessibility, fees, and 
collateral). These samples and their comparison with our first regression analysis are 
                                                 
385
 The substantial differences we found between SF and SDF transactions regarding the impact of 
common pricing factors on credit spread indicate SF and SDF transactions are priced in segmented capital 
markets. As such, our results form a significant contribution to current research in the field of structured 
finance, as the estimates concerning the impact size of each variable’s impact on the credit spread by type 
of transaction may help financial institutions in structuring the technical features of SF transactions. 
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presented in Annex 7 (models grouped by new introduced variables) and Annex 8 
(models grouped by the type of issue). 
We can summarize our findings in Table 5.11, which gives an overview of the 
variables, their expected sign, and our findings. We find, for example, that: 
1. The impact of credit rating on the credit spread does not differ for SF and SDF 
transactions. The pattern indicates that the spread rises when the rating worsens, 
which is consistent with the empirical literature. 
2. As expected, the loan to value ratio has a different impact on SF transactions. 
Loan to value ratio is positively related with PF loans, since larger tranches 
might imply higher risk for lenders, as they constitute a larger share in their loan 
portfolio. In contrast, we find a negative coefficient sign for AS bonds, as 
tranches with a higher loan to value ratio (senior tranches) have a higher 
expected recovery rate and therefore require a lower return. 
3. The impact of the number of banks on the credit spread differs for PF loans and 
AS and CB issues. While the number of banks has a negative impact on the 
credit spread for AS and CB issues, it has a positive or insignificant impact for 
PF loans. However, it is important to notice that when we control for upfront 
fee, the impact of the number of banks on PF loan credit spreads becomes 
positive. This shows, as pointed out by the significantly and positive relationship 
between upfront fee and credit spread, that credit spreads and fees are usually 
complements or substitutes in syndicated loans – arrangers are usually ‘paid’ by 
spreads and fees. 
4. Currency risk dummy variable has a significant, positive relationship with the 
credit spread for SF, as well as for SDF transactions. Although currency risk 
coefficients for AS and CB issues have the expected features, our findings for 
PF loans are different from those presented in the empirical literature [e.g., 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000)]. 
5. Contrary to what was expected, borrowers from the U.K. raise funds in PF and 
CB markets at a higher credit spread compared to borrowers from Continental 
Europe. For AS bonds, we find that U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable is 
significantly negative or insignificant. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 188 
6. As expected, dummy variables resulting from variable sector have a significantly 
positive relationship with credit spread for AS bonds. This means that the 
predicted credit spread is higher for issuers not belonging to the financial 
institution sector. We also discover, in line with some empirical literature [e.g., 
Corielli et al. (2010)], that sector does not influence the level of credit spread in 
PF transactions. 
7. The impact of country risk on credit spread differs for SF and SDF transactions. 
The pattern indicates that spread rises when country risk worsens for PF and CB 
issues. For AS bonds, our findings show that country risk coefficients are 
insignificant. This can be explained by the intrinsic characteristics of AS 
transactions; i.e., they are structured based on the segregation of the assets from 
bankruptcy risks of the originator and on the implementation of different credit 
enhancement strategies to meet specific risk levels. 
8. Credit accessibility and the slope of the Euro swap curve are highly significant 
and their coefficients have the expected features: they are positive for credit 
accessibility (when credit accessibility is lower, borrowers raise funds at a 
higher credit spread) and negative for EUSA5y-Libor3M (a steeper Euro swap 
curve is associated with lower spreads). 
9. The influence of volatility on credit spread is positive for AS and CB issues and 
insignificant for PF loans. The finding for PF loan credit spreads can be 
explained by the fact that PF loans are not traded on a secondary market and 
thus are not subject to mark-to-market or fair value accounting. 
10. As expected, the type of collateral in an AS transaction determines the credit 
spread. The average credit spreads are statistically and significantly lower for 
MBS than they are for ABS. 
11. Fixed rate and callable variables are highly significant for SDF transactions and 
their coefficients have the expected features: they are positive and thus when 
their values increase, an increase in credit spreads is verified. However, we do 
not find this pattern for AS transactions. 
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PF AS CB PF AS CB
Dependent variable:
Credit spread
For loans: Libor spread plus difference between three-month Libor and 
three-month German Treasury yield at the time of the signing of the 
loan. For bonds: spread at issue over comparable risk-free government 
security with a comparable maturity.
Independent variables:
Microeconomic independent variables
Log transaction size Natural log of the loan or bond transaction size. Transaction size is 
converted into Euro millions when necessary.
- / I - ? - / I I ?
Log loan to value Natural log of the loan to value ratio, which represents the ratio of the 
tranche size to the transaction size of a given loan or bond.
+ - / I + + / I - / I NA
Maturity Maturity of loan or bond, in years. ? - / I ? HS I +
Number of tranches The number of tranches for each transaction. + - + I / + I / - +
Number of banks The number of financial institutions participating in the loan or bond 
issuance.
? - / I - + / I - -
Currency risk Dummy equal to 1 for loans that are denominated in a currency different 
from the currency in the borrower's home country. Dummy equal to 1 for 
bonds that are denominated in a currency different from the currency in 
the deal's nationality.
- + + + + / I +
U.K. borrowers Dummy equal to 1 if the borrower/issuer belongs to U.K. - - - + I / - +
Sector Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a borrower/issuer in a 
certain industry. For each of the following industry groups, a dummy is 
created: commercial, industrial, utilities, transportation, government, and 
other. The control group includes financial institutions.
? + ? I + ?
Rating Loan and bond rating based on the S&P and Moody's rating at close. If 
missing for loans, S&P and Moody's senior debt rating at close are 
used. If both rating are available, the average rating is calculated. The 
rating is converted as follows: AAA=Aaa=1, AA+=Aa1=2, and so on 
until D=22.
+ + + + + +
Management fee Fees (in bps) that are periodically paid to the bank syndicates. + + + + I +
Upfront fee A fee (in bps) paid by a borrower to a bank or a syndicate of banks for 
arranging a PF loan.
+ NA NA + NA NA
Collateral Dummy equal to 1 if an AS bond is backed by mortgages and 0 
otherwise.
NA - NA NA - NA
Fixed rate Dummy equal to 1 if a loan or bond is fixed price and 0 otherwise. + + + NA I +
Callable Dummy equal to 1 if the bond has a call option and 0 otherwise. NA + + NA I +
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic independent variables
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is converted as follows: 
AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until D=22. 
+ ? + + I I / +
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the crisis period and 0 
otherwise.
+ + + + + / I +
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of the signing of the 
loan or issuing the bonds - a proxy for the general level of interest rates.
I + + - I NA
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX). VIX 
reflects a market estimate of future volatility.
+ + + I + +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The slope of the Euro swap curve. Obtained as the difference between 
the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-month Libor rate.
? - - - - -
Credit accessibility The iTraxx Europe index.  iTraxx is used as a proxy for credit conditions 
and therefore for credit accessibility by borrowers.
+ + + + I +
Name Description
Expected Sign Findings
 
Table 5.11: Definition of variables, expected sign, and findings.
386
 
 
                                                 
386
 The following characters in Table 5.11 mean: – = negative impact on the credit spread | + = positive 
impact on the credit spread | I = insignificant impact on the credit spread | ? = sign cannot be determined 
clearly from either the theoretical or empirical literature | NA = information about this variable is not 
available | HS = hump-shaped. 
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In order to test the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis on SF credit spreads, we hypothesize (Hypothesis 4) that 
after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, the financial 
crisis does not have a significant impact on SF credit spreads. Based on the results 
presented in sub-sections 4.4.4 and 5.3.3 we have rejected hypothesis 4, since: (i) the 
average credit spread is statistically and significantly higher for PF loans (329.1 bps 
versus 136.9 bps), AS bonds (206.5 bps versus 143.5 bps), and CB (220.3 bps versus 
125.5) during the crisis period; and (ii) when we control for other microeconomic and 
macroeconomic pricing factors the coefficient for the crisis dummy variable is 
significantly, positively related to credit spread. In section 5.3.4, we again test this 
hypothesis, investigating whether our results are robust over time by considering a pre-
crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 and September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from 
September 15
th
, 2008 through to December 31
st
, 2011. We have rejected, once again, 
hypothesis 4, as the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis do significantly influence the explanatory power of the regressions, as well 
as the coefficients on the macro and micro pricing factors (in sign and in significance) 
for SF transactions. The same finding was obtained for CB issues. 
 
Given the controversy on the literature regarding the term structure of credit spreads for 
PF loans and for speculative-grade CB issues, we carried out a multivariate regression 
analysis (section 5.3.5), attempting to analyze the relationship between credit spread 
and maturity, controlling for other relevant micro and macro risk factors. Our purpose 
was to understand the economics underlying the term structure of credit spreads as 
derived from a large cross-section of Western European SF and SDF loans and bonds. 
We find that: (i) a hump-shaped term structure of credit spreads constitutes a specific 
feature of credit risk in PF transactions; (ii) the impact of maturity on AS bond credit 
spreads is insignificant; and (iii) a linear, positive relationship between credit spread and 
maturity is strongly significant for CB issues. These findings clearly help to explain 
why maturity, which is a major systematic driver of the cost of debt in SDF 
transactions, only has a marginal linear effect on the credit spread of SF transactions. 
While in a portfolio of CB issues the risk associated to longer maturities can never be 
fully diversified, a portfolio of PF and AS issues effectively eliminates most of the 
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systematic risk by virtue of credit enhancement mechanisms or other structuring devices 
that reduce lender exposure by altering borrowers’ risk profiles over time. 
Additionally, our results regarding the term structure of credit spreads for PF loans have 
several policy implications. The most important relates to the need to align the term 
structure of regulatory capital requirements with the term structure of credit risk in 
project finance. As asserted by Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), “… a linear maturity 
adjustment for regulatory capital – albeit a good approximation for bonds and other 
loans – might be less applicable to project finance exposures”. Considering that we find 
a hump-shaped relationship between credit spread and maturity, a linear maturity 
adjustment to capital requirements (credit risk is usually viewed as increasing with 
maturity) might be less applicable to PF loans. Thus, regulatory capital arbitrage could 
induce banks to concentrate their loan portfolio in the short-term vis-a-vis long-term 
project finance transactions, which might not be necessarily safer. 
 
From our regression analyses, we can also conclude that, in SDF lending, the borrower 
usually specifies the amount of debt he/she is seeking, and their creditworthiness 
becomes the main determinant of loan spreads. By contrast, when an SF transaction is 
arranged by investment banks, the goal is to come up with the most efficient mix of 
maturities, spreads, tranches, warrantees, and other credit enhancement mechanisms to 
manage what lenders perceive to be the risk and the probability of default on the debt. 
This means that for SF transactions, mainly in AS issues, credit rating becomes the most 
important pricing factor for this asset class at launch. Our findings are in line with those 
of Fender and Mitchell (2005), who argue that the increasing complexity of structured 
finance products creates incentives to rely more heavily on ratings than for other 
financing instruments, which is usually presented as one of the principal limitations of 
AS with regard to the 2007/2008 financial crisis. 
 
The nature of the firm as a nexus of contracts is even more apparent in SF than in SDF 
settings. In PF and AS, a specially incorporated new firm (SPV) is created to manage all 
contracts and to make cash flows more readily verifiable for lenders. In such cases, it is 
crucial to design financial contracts with the objective of pre-committing when possible, 
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the possible behavior of SPV management. Careful contract design prevents agency 
problems between SPV sponsoring firms and lenders, and establishes an effective risk 
management package. Pre-committing future obligations also reduces the volatility of 
cash flows available for debt service.  
 
Finally, we should explicitly state that our regression models did not include variables 
reflecting some characteristics of the borrowers in any direct way – such as borrower 
liquidity or leverage ratios – despite the likelihood that such variables would prove 
useful. There are two reasons for this. First, DealScan and DCM Analytics databases 
does not provide an identification code (i.e., Datastream identification number) for 
borrowers, so there is no feasible method of matching borrowers to their corresponding 
accounting or stock price data. Second, it is not at all clear that debt or liquidity ratios 
for PF and AS borrowers would be comparable to similar ratios for borrowers of CB 
issuers. Whereas the CB issuer is usually an operating company, the PF and AS 
borrower is, by definition, a vehicle company without external assets or sources of 
repayment. However, the extent to which any of these variables could have an impact 
on SF and SDF credit spreads remains to be explored. 
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6. The Financing Choice: Structured versus Straight Debt Finance 
6.1. Introduction 
As Chapter 4 has shown, Project Finance (PF) loans are a more expensive type of 
financing than Corporate Bonds (CB) [Straight Debt Finance (SDF)] and even than 
other Structured Finance (SF) transactions [Asset Securitization (AS) bonds]. PF issues 
have lower credit rating and a higher number of banks involved. The sample used in the 
loan pricing factors also revealed that SF loans and bonds (PF loans and AS bonds) 
have lower loan to value ratios than SDF issues and have longer time to maturity. 
These observations are ex post in nature. They do, however, lead to a question 
concerning the choice between SF and SDF transactions and even between PF loans and 
AS bonds: What factors determine a manager’s choice between these financing 
alternatives? In order to answer this question, the effects of each of the two financing 
approaches on the overall cost of financing have to be clear. For example, referring to 
PF transactions, the choice between PF loans and CB is the choice between a higher 
cost of financing for one investment and the constant cost of capital of the firm (PF 
loans) versus a lower cost of financing for one investment and an increase in the cost of 
capital of the firm (CB).
387
 
We thus want to determine what affects the probability of a new borrower choosing 
between SF and SDF transactions. Additionally, and given the fact that all common 
pricing values between AS bonds and PF loans are statistically and significantly 
different at the 5% level or higher – see Table 4.10 in sub-section 4.4.3 – we have also 
studied the probability of a new sponsor choosing to structure a new loan as a PF or AS. 
Similarly, and given certain similarities between AS and CB issues – credit spread, 
tranche size, and currency risk factors do not differ significantly between the two 
security classes at the 5% significance level – we also studied the main factors affecting 
the probability of a new borrower’s choice between AS and CB issues. 
Additionally, as described in Section 4.3 and further illustrated in Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 
4.7, our sample includes SF loans and bonds, as well as SDF bonds signed/issued by 
borrowers in Western Europe over the years 2000-2011. Given that during this period of 
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 The increased amount of debt increases the risk of bankruptcy. With increased risk of bankruptcy, 
bondholders and equity holders require higher rates of return. 
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time we experienced two crises – (1) the early 2000 recession, which affected the 
European Union mostly during 2000 and 2001, (2) and the 2007/2008 financial crisis 
and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis which has been affecting Western 
European countries since 2008 – we cannot rule out that a flight to quality might have 
left many borrowers in these countries credit-rationed. As a result, the probability of 
observing SF deals with relevant pricing information (i.e., our sample selection) might 
not be random but rather somewhat determined by the same risk characteristics that 
enter our pricing regressions. 
Therefore, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979). We 
perform a maximum likelihood estimation on our credit spread samples of our model 
specification (models [1a], [1b], and [1c]), simultaneously with a probit selection 
equation, where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function of either micro 
and macro variables. To construct the dependent binary variable for this selection 
equation, we allocate ones and zeros, respectively, to each type of financing instrument 
according to whether the issue is presented in the analysis or not. 
The remainder of this Chapter is organized as follows: section 2 presents the 
determinants of the financing choice. Data and methodology used to empirically 
analyze the factors that explain the choice between and among SF and SDF transactions 
are presented in section 3. Section 4 describes the empirical results and concludes. 
 
6.2. Determinants of the Financing Choice 
As stated in the introduction, choosing between SF and SDF includes a decision related 
to the firm’s cost of capital, because an increase in leverage increases the required cost 
of capital. This is the case as SF typically refers to the transfer of a subset of a 
company’s assets (an ‘activity’) into a bankruptcy-remote corporation or other special 
purpose vehicle or entity (SPV/SPE). Thus, the assets instrumental to managing the 
project are separated from the remaining assets of the parties that create the vehicle.  
Therefore, the factors affecting the differences in credit spread for SF and SDF 
transactions also affect the financing choice. The previous analysis of loan and bond 
pricing factors (Chapter 5) revealed that several pricing factors apply for both SF and 
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SDF transactions. Thus, differences in credit spreads must originate from differences in 
these underlying factors. The relevant factors found in the loan pricing analysis are: (i) 
the tranche size, the loan to value ratio, the number of banks, and currency risk dummy 
variable – microeconomic variables; and (ii) crisis and EUSA5y-Libor3M – 
macroeconomic variables. Marginally significant are the time to maturity, the country 
risk (rating), U.K. borrowers’ dummy variable, the seven borrower/issuer business 
group dummy variables, and risk free rate, volatility, and credit accessibility 
macroeconomic variables. All these factors should also be important in the financing 
choice. All variables are the same as defined in equation 5.1 (sub-section 5.3.1). 
In influencing the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, we consider the 
fourteen variables presented in Table 6.1, which gives an overview of the variables and 
their expected impact on the sponsor financing choice. With respect to the influence of 
the individual determinants, the sample characteristics presented in Chapter 4 convey 
the impression that, when compared to CB, SF tranches are on average larger for AS 
bonds and smaller for PF loans. On average, we expect that SF tranches are smaller than 
SDF tranches since tranching (issuance of multiple debt security classes) and the 
consequent risk dispersion is often cited as one of the major structured finance benefits. 
Also, loans exposed to currency risk are more likely to be structured as SDF 
transactions. Conversely, loans with longer maturity and issued by borrowers belonging 
to countries with higher credit risk are more likely to be structured as SF. Comparing PF 
loans with AS bonds, we expect that if a sponsor would like to obtain funding for a 
longer period of time, he will choose to issue securities backed by receivables, rather 
than structuring a PF transaction. 
With respect to the sector or business group, PF is most commonly used for capital-
intensive ventures – such as power plants, refineries, toll roads, pipelines, 
telecommunications facilities, and industrial plants – with relatively transparent cash 
flows. Thus, we expect that borrowers belonging to industrial, utilities, and 
transportation industries are more likely to use PF loans. Moreover, and given the 
importance of the PPPs in Western Europe – PPPs reduce the need for government 
borrowing, shift part of the risks presented by the project to the private sector, and aim 
at achieving more effective management of the project –, we also expect that 
government and public sector entities rely on PF as an important form of allowing a 
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project to proceed without being a direct burden on the government’s budget. AS is the 
process whereby financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, and 
converted into negotiable securities to be placed into the market; i.e., it is a technique 
used to transform illiquid assets into securities. The major issuers of AS bonds are 
companies belonging to commercial and financial industries, with particular emphasis 
on banks – securitization technique allows the transformation of heterogeneous assets 
that are mostly not negotiable by banks into liquid and homogenous securities, suitable 
for trade. With respect to CB, issues are highly concentrated in the financial institution 
industry (Table 4.2 reports that 67.2% of the total value and 80.8% of the total number 
of CB transactions are issued by financial institutions). Industrial and commercial 
industries also account for a significant volume of CB issues. 
There is broad consensus that structured finance, more specifically asset securitization, 
played an important role in the development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis (see section 3.5). Thus, transactions developed during the crisis period are more 
likely to be arranged as SDF transactions. However, transactions were more likely to be 
structured as PF, rather than AS during that period. 
The general level of interest rates (risk free rate), the slope of the Euro swap curve (a 
proxy of the expectations about the future evolution of interest rates), and the market 
volatility seem to support the use of SF. Finally, an improvement in credit conditions, 
and therefore of credit accessibility by borrowers, will increase the usage of either SF or 
SDF. Thus, we cannot clearly determine the impact of credit accessibility on the 
probability of a sponsor to choose SF over SDF. 
 
In order to test these expected impacts, a generalized Tobit model, following Heckman 
(1979), has been designed. This methodology and the underlying sample for the 
empirical analysis are presented in the following section. 
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SF vs 
SDF
PF vs 
AS
AS vs 
CB
Independent variables:
Microeconomic independent variables
Log tranche size Natural log of the loan or bond tranche size. Tranche size is 
converted into Euro millions when necessary.
- - +
Maturity Maturity of loan or bond, in years. + - +
Currency risk Dummy equal to 1 for loans and bonds that are 
denominated in a currency different from the currency in 
the borrower's home country or deal's nationality.
- - -
Industrial Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the industrial sector.
+ + -
Utilities Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the utilities sector.
+ + -
Financial intitutions Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the financial institutions sector.
? - +
Transportation Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the transportation sector.
+ + -
Governement Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the government sector.
+ + -
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic independent variables
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is 
converted as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until 
D=22. 
+ + +
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the crisis 
period and 0 otherwise.
- + -
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of the 
signing of the loan or issuing the bonds - a proxy for the 
general level of interest rates.
+ ? +
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(VIX). VIX reflects a market estimate of future volatility.
+ ? +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The slope of the Euro swap curve. Obtained as the 
difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-
month Libor rate.
+ ? +
Credit accessibility The iTraxx Europe index.  iTraxx is used as a proxy for 
credit conditions and therefore for credit accessibility by 
borrowers.
? ? NA
Name Description
Expected Impact
 
       Table 6.1: Definition of variables and their expected impact.
388
 
 
 
6.3. Data and Methodology 
In order to test the expected impact on the probability of a sponsor to choose SF over 
SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB, we resort to a generalized Tobit model, following 
                                                 
388
 The following characters in Table 6.1 mean: – = negative impact on the probability of a sponsor to 
choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB | + = positive impact on the probability of a sponsor to 
choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB | I = insignificant impact | ? = sign cannot be 
determined clearly | NA = information about this variables is not available. 
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Heckman (1979). We perform maximum likelihood estimations on our credit spread 
samples of our model specification (models [1a], [1b], and [1c]) simultaneously with a 
probit selection equation, where the probability of signing a loan or bond is a function 
of either micro and macro variables.
389
  
We have observed credit spread when a loan is an SF loan or bond versus SDF bond (or 
a PF loan versus AS bond or an AS bond versus a CB). Then we fit a binomial probit 
model that predicts the loan’s probability of being arranged as an SF transaction. In this 
circumstance, si – the selection indicator – is set to zero or one on the factors underlying 
that decision. Thus, the selection indicator which is analyzed here is of a binary format: 
1 for SF (or PF or AS), 0 for SDF (or AS or CB), whether the issue is presented in the 
analysis or not. The Heckman selection model assumes that there exists an underlying 
regression relationship, 
(6.1) 
The dependent variable, however, is not always observed. Rather, the dependent 
variable for observation i is observed if 
(6.2) 
where: 
 
 
 
Equation 6.1 is the determination equation or outcome equation and equation 6.2 is the 
selection equation. When ρ ≠ 0, standard regression techniques applied to the first 
equation yield biased results. Heckman provides consistent, asymptotically efficient 
estimates for all the parameters in such models.
390
 
The I(·) function equals 1 if the argument is true – if the loan is an SF transaction – and 
zero otherwise. We observe yi if si = 1. The selection function (6.2) contains a set of 
explanatory factors Z, which must be a superset of X; i.e., for us to identify the model, Z 
                                                 
389
 For a discussion of maximum likelihood estimation see Greene (2012). 
390
 For further analysis of Heckman selection models see, among others, Heckman (1979), Baum (2006), 
Cameron and Trivedi (2010), and Greene (2012). 
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should contain at least one variable that is not in the outcome equation. The error either 
in equation 6.1 and equation 6.2, u and v, respectively, are assumed to have a zero-
conditional mean: E[Xu] = 0 and E[Zv] = 0. 
The Heckman (1979) selection model is driven by the notion that some of the Z factors 
for a loan are different from the factors in X. For example, whether a sponsor belongs or 
not to the financial institution industry is likely to influence whether a borrower chooses 
an SF transaction but might be omitted from credit spread determination equation: it 
appears in Z but not in X. Other factors are likely to appear in both equations. For 
example, the tranche size and whether the loan is arranged during the crisis period will 
likely influence the borrower decision to choose an SF transaction as well as the credit 
spread that will be paid in that transaction. 
 
Thus, we fit the model 
 
(6.3) 
 
 
and we assume that credit spread is observed if 
 
(6.4) 
 
 
We use a full maximum-likelihood procedure to jointly estimate β, γ, and ρ. The model 
is fitted over the entire sample and gives an estimate of the crucial correlation ρ – the 
correlation of u and v –, along with a test or the hypothesis that ρ = 0. The rejection of 
this hypothesis means that an OLS estimation of equation 6.1 will produce inconsistent 
estimates of β. When running our model we adjusted for heteroskedasticity using the 
methodology proposed by Huber (1967) and White (1980). We can thus obtain robust 
standard errors for our credit spread model.  
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The above described methodology is used to analyze a sample of 599 AS issues, 20,977 
CB issues, and 2,859 PF issues. From this entire sample, we have available information 
on credit spread (high-information samples) for a total of 1,090 PF loans, 439 AS 
bonds, and 10,551 CB issues (see Tables 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 in sub-section 4.4.2). The 
results of this estimation are presented in the following section. 
 
6.4. Results 
Results are reported in Table 6.2 for three models: model [1d] – SF loans and bonds 
versus SDF bonds –, model [1e] – PF loans versus AS bonds –, and model [1f] – AS 
bonds versus SDF bonds (or CB). We identified several microeconomic and 
macroeconomic factors as significant determinants of choosing each of the analyzed 
financial instruments. The reported model chi2 test is a Wald test where all coefficients 
in the regression model (except the constant) are 0. We clearly reject the null 
hypothesis. 
We start our analysis by looking at the estimation of the determination equation in 
model [1d]. It is the first time we regress credit spread against micro and macro 
variables for a sample that simultaneously includes PF loans and AS bonds.
391
 The 
coefficients of maturity, country risk, risk free rate, volatility, and U.K. borrowers’ 
dummy variable are statistically insignificant. The natural log of the tranche size 
negatively influences the credit spread. This suggests that increasing the tranche size by 
100 M€ will reduce the required credit spread by 101.53 bps. Similarly, the slope of the 
Euro swap curve is significantly and negatively related to credit spread. The loan to 
value ratio, the number of banks, and the currency risk and crisis dummy variables are 
significantly and positively related with credit spread. An SF transaction implemented 
during the crisis period has an average credit spread 192.44 bps higher than an SF 
transaction arranged during the pre-crisis period. 
Next, we will analyze the signs and magnitude of the coefficients obtained for the 
explanatory factors Z in our selection equations. 
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 Despite the fact that we have concluded that the credit spread associated with PF and AS issues are 
influenced differently by common pricing factors (we rejected hypothesis 3 because the Chow test 
statistics in Table 5.2 are all higher than the critical levels), we have decided to implement an analysis of 
SF issues by aggregating PF loans and AS bonds in one unique sample. 
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Dependent variable:
Credit spread (bps)
Independent variables:
Intercept 279.252
**
297.993
**
67.357
(7.58) (9.02) (0.26)
Log tranche size -22.048
**
-24.39
**
-7.035
(-4.82) (-5.53) (-1.62)
Log loan to value 21.379
**
33.601
**
-29.327
**
(4.40) (6.58) (-4.60)
Maturity 0.386 0.235 -0.493
(0.84) (0.65) (-0.17)
Number of banks 1.404
*
1.939
**
-10.369
**
(2.53) (3.48) (-2.69)
Country risk 5.057 9.663
**
-11.168
(1.59) (3.58) (-0.85)
Currency risk 56.088
**
49.479
**
-10.028
(3.51) (2.75) (-0.48)
U.K. borrowers 19.961 57.462
**
43.518
*
(1.66) (4.20) (2.30)
Crisis 192.439
**
178.772
**
113.874
*
(11.42) (11.91) (2.17)
Risk free rate -0.099 -0.161
**
0.164
(-1.45) (-2.85) (0.96)
Volatility 0.036 0.274 2.106
(0.08) (0.69) (1.72)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.549
**
-0.517
**
-0.304
(-5.17) (-5.87) (-1.08)
Dependent variable:
Probability of observing:
Independent variables:
Log tranche size -0.258
**
-0.209
*
-0.024
(-17.00) (-2.48) (-1.62)
Maturity 0.046
**
-0.046
**
0.062
**
(17.02) (-3.73) (22.99)
Country risk 0.095
**
0.741
**
0.064
**
(8.44) (3.14) (3.57)
Currency risk -0.451
**
-1.134
**
0.161
**
(-6.94) (-3.13) (3.15)
Crisis -0.724
**
7.261
**
-0.499
**
(-5.54) (8.66) (-3.77)
Risk free rate 0.001
**
0.005
*
0.002
**
(3.70) (2.12) (7.28)
Volatility 0.014
**
0.014 0.017
**
(3.50) (0.37) (4.11)
EUSA5y-Libor3M 0.003
**
-0.03 0.005
**
(4.48) (-0.62) (8.96)
Industrial 0.445
**
1.995
**
-0.106
(6.18) (6.72) (-0.84)
Utilities 0.750
**
2.208
**
-0.368
(9.77) (7.39) (-1.78)
Financial institutions -1.369
**
-10.989
**
0.018
(-15.14) (-7.06) (0.15)
Transportation 0.485
**
7.751
**
-0.367
(4.26) (10.88) (-1.47)
Government 1.311
**
5.967
**
-3.468
**
(3.24) (19.72) (-18.25)
Credit accessibility 0.004
**
0.014
(3.77) (1.44)
Number of observations 15,255 1,036 21,416
Censored observations 14,317 269 20,977
Uncensored observations 938 767 439
Lambda -3.424 -14.705 12.377
Wald chi2 test PI-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Wald test (rho=0) PI-value 0.659 0.004 0.846
Log likelihood -7,776.081 -4,735.209 -4,345.866
SF loan or bond (versus SDF 
bond)
PF loan (versus AS bond) AS bond (versus SDF bond)
Structured Finance (SF) Project Finance (PF) Asset Securitization (AS)
[1d] [1e] [1f]
 
           Table 6.2: Regression analyses of the probability of observing an SF loan or bond.
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 Credit accessibility variable was omitted in model [1f] because of the significant reduction in the 
number of observations (from 599 to 269) that it would have imposed. The z-statistics reported in 
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With respect to model [1d], borrowers chose an SF transaction when they seek long-
term financing and when they belong to a country with higher risk. Similarly, 
borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government increase the 
likelihood of an SF transaction. On the contrary, the probability of observing an SF 
transaction decreases with the tranche size and currency risk. Several macroeconomic 
factors significantly determine the selection of an SF transaction. Among these, risk free 
rate, volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility influence 
positively the probability of observing an SF loan or bond over a SDF bond. As 
expected, the 2007/2008 financial crisis decreased the probability of observing an SF 
loan or bond. Somewhat counter intuitively, the financial institutions’ dummy variable 
is found to decrease the likelihood of a borrower/issuer choosing an SF transaction. 
However, this can be explained by the fact that from the total number of uncensored 
observations the major part belongs to PF loans, where financial institutions are the 
lenders and not the borrowers/issuers. Our findings are in line with the expected impact 
of micro and macro factors in the financing decision between SF and SDF. 
Considering the choice between PF and AS, the following (macro) factors do not 
influence the decision: volatility, credit accessibility, and the slope of the Euro swap 
curve (EUSA5y-Libor3M). For these factors, the expected sign of coefficients was not 
possible to determine clearly (see Table 6.1). As expected, for all sector dummy 
variables, with the exception of the financial institutions, the coefficients are positive 
and significant at the 5% level. The coefficient of the financial institutions dummy 
variable is negative and significant, which means that sponsors belonging to the 
financial institution industry are less likely to use PF loans; i.e., are more likely to use 
securitization as a funding instrument. The country risk rating is positive and significant 
at the 5% level. This leads to the conclusion that a sponsor located in a risky country is 
more likely to be financed with a PF loan than an AS bond. The same sign can be found 
for the other analyzed macro variables; i.e., crisis and risk free rate. We can thus 
conclude that the financial crisis (as expected) led to a transfer in the form of funding 
based on SF transactions, increasing the use of PF and reducing the use of AS. The 
negative and significant coefficient for the currency risk dummy variable indicates that 
                                                                                                                                               
parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors. 
**
, 
*
 indicate that the reported 
coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
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in the case of currency risk AS is preferred. Finally, sponsors prefer AS bonds for larger 
tranches and funding with a higher time to maturity. Again, these findings are in line 
with the expected impact on the choice of PF over AS. 
The regression results for model [1f] reveal that the tranche size and industrial, utilities, 
financial institutions, and transportation dummy variables do not have an influence on 
the financing choice between AS and CB. AS is chosen when issuers seek longer-term 
sources of funding, are established in riskier countries and bonds face currency risk. As 
expected, risk free rate, volatility, and the slope of the Euro swap curve positively 
influence the probability of observing an AS bond versus a CB. Again, and due to the 
relevant role played by securitization in the development and propagation of the 
2007/2008 financial crisis, the crisis dummy variable is negative and significant at the 
5% level. Finally, the unique sector with a significant impact on the probability of 
observing an AS instead of a CB issue is government; i.e., issuers in government 
industry decrease the likelihood of observing an AS transaction. 
In models [1d] and [1f] the likelihood-ratio test for ρ = 0 – Wald test (rho=0) – lead us 
to accept the hypothesis of equations (6.3) and (6.4) above being independent.
393
 On the 
contrary, we reject this hypothesis for model [1e], pointing out the presence of selection 
bias. However, despite loan pricing and the choice between PF and AS being 
simultaneously determined, re-estimates of the models controlling for this selection bias 
do not appear to yield results fundamentally different from the ordinary least squares 
estimation of model [1a] – the sign and significance of micro and macro variables 
remain the same. 
 
Table 6.3 summarizes our findings, providing an overview of the variables, their 
expected impact on the financing choice, and our findings. We find, for example, that: 
1. The effect of lower tranche size increases the probability of selecting an SF 
transaction, rather than an SDF transaction. The same takes place in the 
selection process between PF loans and AS bonds. 
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 The likelihood-ratio test is computationally the comparison of the joint likelihood of an independent 
probit model for the selection equation and a regression model on the observed credit spread data against 
the Heckman model likelihood. 
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SF vs 
SDF
PF vs 
AS
AS vs 
CB
SF vs 
SDF
PF vs 
AS
AS vs 
CB
Independent variables:
Microeconomic independent variables
Log tranche size Natural log of the loan or bond tranche size. Tranche size is 
converted into Euro millions when necessary.
- - + - - I
Maturity Maturity of loan or bond, in years. + - + + - +
Currency risk Dummy equal to 1 for loans and bonds that are 
denominated in a currency different from the currency in 
the borrower's home country or deal's nationality.
- - - - - +
Industrial Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the industrial sector.
+ + - + + I
Utilities Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the utilities sector.
+ + - + + I
Financial intitutions Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the financial institutions sector.
? - + - - I
Transportation Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the transportation sector.
+ + - + + I
Governement Dummies equal to 1 if loan or bond finances a 
borrower/issuer in the government sector.
+ + - + + -
Independent variables:
Macroeconomic independent variables
Country risk S&P's country credit rating at close. The rating is 
converted as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, and so on until 
D=22. 
+ + + + + +
Crisis Dummy equal to 1 if the issue date belongs to the crisis 
period and 0 otherwise.
- + - - + -
Risk free rate The three-month German Treasury bill at the time of the 
signing of the loan or issuing the bonds - a proxy for the 
general level of interest rates.
+ ? + + + +
Volatility The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index 
(VIX). VIX reflects a market estimate of future volatility.
+ ? + + I +
EUSA5y-Libor3M The slope of the Euro swap curve. Obtained as the 
difference between the five-year Euro swap rate and the 3-
month Libor rate.
+ ? + + I +
Credit accessibility The iTraxx Europe index.  iTraxx is used as a proxy for 
credit conditions and therefore for credit accessibility by 
borrowers.
? ? NA + I NA
Name Description
Expected Impact Findings
 
Table 6.3: Definition of variables, expected impact, and findings.
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2. Borrowers chose an SF transaction when they are looking for long-term 
financing and when they belong to a country with higher risk. 
3. Borrowers/issuers in industrial, utilities, transportation and government increase 
the likelihood of an SF transaction, more specifically a PF transaction. The 
probability of observing an AS bond issue increases if the borrower belongs to 
the financial industry. The coefficient of financial institutions for model [1f] is 
statistically insignificant because financial institutions use either AS bonds and 
CB to get funding in capital markets. 
                                                 
394
 The following characters in Table 6.3 mean: – = negative impact on the probability of a sponsor to 
choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB | + = positive impact on the probability of a sponsor to 
choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB | I = insignificant impact | ? = sign cannot be 
determined clearly | NA = information about this variables is not available. 
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4. As expected, the 2007/2008 financial crisis decreased the probability of 
observing an AS transaction. However, when choosing among SF transactions, 
the crisis increased the probability of observing a PF loan. 
5. Other macroeconomic factors significantly determine the selection of an SF over 
an SDF transaction. Among these, the level of the interest rates, market 
volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility positively 
influence the probability of observing an SF loan or bond. 
6. Market volatility, the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility 
proves to be irrelevant in the process of the financing decision between PF and 
AS. 
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7. Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter summarizes and concludes this dissertation. A discussion on the 
conclusions, as well as some of their implications are summarized in the first section. 
The second section presents the main results of the empirical research carried out. 
Suggestions for further research conclude the chapter. 
 
7.1. Concluding Remarks 
Structured finance is a relatively new, yet a large and rapidly growing field of Corporate 
Finance. Despite its importance, there has been very little academic research on 
structured finance. This dissertation is an attempt to fill that void and to explain what 
structured finance is and why firms use it. Additionally, structured transactions such as 
securitization, structured leases, leveraged acquisitions, and project finance are 
important financing instruments and should be included in a financial manager’s toolkit. 
Hence, we ought to bring together in one document a set of relevant contributions, 
developing a synthesis portraying the state of the art of structured finance transactions. 
This work offers interesting findings of both theoretical and practical interest. For 
academic research, the dissertation provides a set of examples showing why financial 
structures matter and how. Contrary to the perfect markets world of Modigliani and 
Miller (1958), financial structures matter because they affect investment incentives, 
deadweight costs, and asset cash flows. For practitioners, this dissertation presents a 
framework for understanding why structured finance creates value and when to choose 
it instead of straight debt financing. We argue that structured finance reduces the all-in 
cost of financing. 
In particular, firms use structured finance to reduce costly agency conflicts resulting 
from creating asset-specific governance solutions to mitigate free cash flow problems 
and prevent opportunistic behavior. Moreover, any transaction which is specifically 
structured using an SPV and is secured by ring-fencing assets producing cash flows 
solely for supporting the transaction, allows the issuer to obtain better credit ratings 
and/or leverage than it would be possible by issuing senior secured debt, because it 
reduces asymmetric information problems. 
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Another interesting finding of our research lies in the fact that the existence of 
substantial differences among and between structured finance and straight debt finance 
transactions, with respect to the impact of common pricing variables on credit spread, 
indicates that these transactions are priced differently. The investment banks in charge 
of structuring the technical features of certain PF and AS issues may find the estimates a 
useful tool concerning the size of each variable’s impact on the issuance credit spread, 
primarily after the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign 
debt crisis. 
Empirically, some papers have been published on the performance of such transactions 
in several countries, but always on an individual basis. Thus, the contribution of this 
dissertation is to assess simultaneously the key theoretical aspects for the different types 
of structured finance products. Considering the increasing complexity and 
sophistication of financial products, and the increasing interdependence of financial 
markets, it becomes important to understand what is structured finance and what are the 
main challenges arising from this important segment of capital markets, in a way that 
prudential standards can guarantee the market stability across periods of crises. 
Ultimately, the dissertation contributes to the European debate on structured finance, 
always having in mind the fundamentals and benefits behind these type of transactions. 
To understand the benefits of structured finance we need to identify its motivations. 
Taking into account the available literature on the subject, we have identified the 
following categories of key economic benefits provided by structured finance: (1) it 
enables the financing of a unique asset class that (i) previously may have been financed 
only through traditional borrowing instruments or (ii) could not be financed at all 
without structured finance; (2) it can reduce borrowing costs; (3) it contributes to more 
complete capital markets, improving operational and informational efficiency; (4) it can 
reduce agency costs; (5) it contributes to a reduction of information asymmetries; (6) it 
allows the issuer to reach higher leverage levels, as compared to senior unsecured debt, 
thus increasing tax shields/savings; (7) it permits the originator/sponsor to 
improve/protect financial and regulatory ratios; (8) it may transfer the risk of assets or 
liabilities and allow an originator to do additional business without expanding its 
balance sheet; and (9) it grants more flexibility to issuers, in terms of maturity structure, 
security design, and asset types. 
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Despite the common motivations that characterize all types of structured finance 
transactions (i.e., reduction of information asymmetries and higher leverage and tax 
shields/savings), we have concluded that securitization and project finance are the 
transactions with more common economic motivations or benefits (see Table 3.2). This 
is a very relevant conclusion, as we have used asset securitization bonds and project 
finance loans as proxies for structured finance transactions in our univariate and 
multivariate regression analysis. 
Structured finance transactions are, however, fairly complex and involve a significant 
amount of cash flow evaluation, due diligence, negotiation, and legal procedures. 
Consequently, structuring such deals is more costly than common corporate financing. 
We found that complexity and higher transaction costs are common problems to all of 
structured finance transactions. 
Several authors pointed out that structured finance – more specifically securitization – 
played a significant role in the development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis. The transition from the traditional originate-to-hold model to the originate-to-
distribute model, as well as its reliance on credit markets as a continuing source of 
credit, has been blamed by academics and practitioners for the financial crisis of 
2007/2008. If the originator does not hold the credit it originates, but distributes the 
loans and their risks to other entities through securitization, the originator has a reduced 
incentive to monitor the credit granting process. 
Hence, this model brings with it a major principal-agent problem in the credit screening 
process, because the credit incentives of the originator are not aligned with those of the 
entity that ultimately holds the loan. When we add the growing complexity associated 
with securitization transactions, the result is a ‘market for lemons’ problem, leading to 
the collapse of the market for securitized assets. In short, the major problem underlying 
the financial crisis was an asymmetric information problem; specifically an 
‘information distance’ problem between the two extremes of any structured financial 
contractual architecture. 
The 2007/2008 financial crisis demonstrated that, in securitization, the value of the 
underlying cash flows varies with their repackaging, and that repackaging risk does not 
just eliminate it. Additionally, when market deterioration becomes systemic, SPVs may 
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be unable to withstand market inertia, and triggers will eventually be breached – 
complex securitization products have introduced systemic risk into the financial system 
and might indeed have multiplied it. However, the logical conclusion is not that the 
concept of structured finance is inherently flawed, but rather that we need to improve its 
associated contractual architecture. Like in any new tool or concept, there still remain 
some imperfections. 
Looking forward, investors need to learn more about which structures are most 
appropriate for which assets and cash flows, and regulators and policy makers as well 
have to introduce important changes in the way such transactions can be implemented. 
Some key factors can thus be presented that may help to overcome problems related to 
structured finance transactions and prevent future financial crises, namely: (1) reduce 
complexity; (2) increase transparency; (3) increase standardization; (4) improve 
disclosure of underwriting standards; (5) increase the alignment of incentives between 
originators/borrowers and investors/lenders; (6) reduce overreliance on credit ratings; 
(8) increase risk management and implement risk mitigation procedures; and (9) allow 
investors to understand the benefits and drawbacks of these type of transactions. 
Looking to the securitization market, the use of securitization transactions has increased 
since the beginning of the financial crisis. However, the European sovereign debt crisis 
has limited the increase of securitized products; and its use has changed since that time, 
namely because an increasing number of banks have underwritten their own 
securitization programs, to use them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the 
auctions of the European Central Bank (ECB), issuing the so-called Covered Bonds. 
Referring to PF, the financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis, 
as well as the contagion effect that they have had on the real economy, forced many 
governments to carry out intense interventions, aiming at increasing the level of private 
investment, in an effort to strengthen their respective economies, namely by increasing 
infrastructure capital of their countries. However, this goal clashes with the severe 
budget constraints that many European governments are already facing today. The 
bottom line is the need for private investment in public infrastructure, which in turn 
calls for a substantial increase of PF transactions, in the form of PPPs projects.  
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7.2. Summary of Empirical Findings 
This work compared the financial characteristics of a large sample of structured finance 
(SF) transactions (project finance loans and asset securitization bonds) with a sample of 
straight debt finance (SDF) transactions (corporate bonds). Our ‘full sample’ contained 
information on 24,435 debt tranches (worth Euro 6,297.8 billion) issued in the 
international capital markets from January 1
st
, 2000 through to December 31
st
, 2011. 
‘Structured finance full sample’ contained information on 599 asset securitization issues 
(worth Euro 179.1 billion) and 2,859 project finance issues (worth Euro 332.1 billion), 
extracted from DCM Analytics database and Dealscan database, respectively. Our 
‘straight debt finance full sample’ contained information on 20,977 corporate bond 
issues (worth Euro 5,786.5 billion), extracted from DCM Analytics database.  
 
We found that: 
1. Project finance (PF) loans have higher credit spreads (198.3 bps) than AS bonds 
(148.9 bps) and CB (157.6 bps) and that average credit spreads for AS and CB 
issues do not differ significantly. Therefore, we only accepted the hypothesis 
that the credit spread on SF is lower than or equal to the credit spread on SDF 
for AS issues (Hypothesis 2). Our findings diverged from those presented by Hu 
and Cantor (2006) and Maris and Segal (2002), which stated that securitization 
bonds credit spread have been higher than corporate bonds credit spread. 
2. PF loans in Western Europe have higher average credit spread (198.3 bps versus 
130 bps) and that PF, AS (148.9 bps), and CB (157.6 bps) issues have higher 
average credit spread in comparison with the spread for all syndicated loans 
(134 bps) in the study of Kleimeier and Megginson (2000). However, based on 
recent samples Gatti et al. (2007) and Corielli et al. (2008) found a similar 
average spread for PF loans. Finally, Vink and Thibeault (2008) presented lower 
average spread for ABS (99.2 bps) and MBS (73.9 bps). 
3. There are important univariate differences between the three types of debt issues 
and thus we rejected Hypothesis 1. Both AS (299.1 M€) and CB (275.9 M€) 
issues have a significant higher tranche size in comparison with PF loans (116.2 
M€). SF transactions (PF loans and AS bonds) have longer average maturity, 
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higher management fees, lower loan to value ratios, and are more likely to have 
floating price and to be guaranteed. PF loans have a higher number of banks 
involved, which calls for higher management fees, have a lower credit rating, 
tranche size and number of tranches. 
4. Comparing PF loans with AS bonds, if a sponsor aims at obtaining funding for a 
longer period of time, they will choose to issue securities backed by receivables, 
rather than structuring a PF transaction – an AS of average size matures just 
over 20.9 years, which is a long period if compared with the average 13.6 years 
for PF loans. 
5. PF loans in Western Europe are much less likely to be subject to currency risk 
and PF loan borrowers are, on average, located in far riskier countries. 
Additionally, PF lending tends to be more risky than AS and CB issues, because 
the average credit rating for PF loans is significantly higher and either the 
average level of management fee or the average number of banks participating 
are significantly larger than the average for AS and CB issues. 
6. Credit spread, tranche size and currency risk do not differ significantly between 
AS and CB issues. On the contrary, AS bonds have an average lower credit 
rating, lower loan to value ratio, lower number of bookrunners and a higher 
management fee when compared to CB. Finally, a far higher fraction of AS 
bonds are arranged for U.K. borrowers. 
7. With respect to sector or business group, PF is most commonly used for capital-
intensive facilities and utilities – such as power plants, refineries, toll roads, 
pipelines, telecommunications facilities, and industrial plants – with relatively 
transparent cash flows. The major issuers of AS bonds are companies belonging 
to commercial and financial industries, with particular emphasis on banks – the 
securitization technique allows the transformation of heterogeneous and mostly 
non negotiable assets into liquid and homogenous securities, suitable for trade. 
With respect to CB, issues are highly concentrated in the financial industry. 
Industrial and commercial industries also account for a significant volume of CB 
issues. 
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In an attempt to contribute to the existing literature on debt pricing determinants we 
analyzed the impact of the common pricing features on SF (PF loans and AS bonds) and 
SDF (CB) credit spread. To compare the common pricing characteristics associated 
with PF, AS and CB issues, we selected from our ‘full sample’ those issues for which 
we could find complete data on credit spread. This screen has yielded a “high-
information” sub-sample of 12,080 loans (worth 4,962,996 M€), of which 1,090 (worth 
158,487 M€) have been classified as PF loans, AS bonds represent 439 issues (worth 
140,733 M€), and 10,551 are CB issues (4,663,777 M€). 
We investigated the extent to which SF and SDF are priced by common factors. Our 
purpose was to analyze if SF and SDF transactions are functionally equivalent financial 
instruments priced in a single market. Taking these financial instruments as a whole, we 
saw that all Chow test statistics were higher than the critical levels, and therefore we 
rejected the hypothesis (Hypothesis 3) that the impact of pricing factors on credit spread 
do not differ significantly among and between SF and SDF transactions. This means 
that it was not possible to directly include a PF and an AS dummy variable in a 
regression of a sample of all loan types. Applying the same pricing estimation models to 
each type of issue, revealed that most of the common pricing characteristics associated 
with these transactions have a different impact on the credit spread exhibited by the 
value of the coefficients. The regression analyses we performed suggest that SF and 
SDF are in fact different instruments. Even among SF transactions, despite some 
similarities between PF loans and AS bonds the impact of the pricing factors on credit 
spread differs between them. 
We started by estimating equation 5.1 for PF loans, AS and CB issues, for high-
information samples. Despite the fact that additional information on SF and SDF has 
been available, rather than restrict ourselves to analyzing a single sample with all of this 
information available (which would yield a sample size of less than 39 tranches), we 
studied seven different sub-samples, grouped based on the availability of key data items 
(e.g., rating, credit accessibility, fees, and collateral). We found, for example, that: 
1. The impact of credit rating on the credit spread does not differ between SF and 
SDF transactions. The pattern indicates that the spread rises when the rating 
worsens, which is consistent with the empirical literature. 
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2. As expected, the loan to value ratio showed a different impact on SF 
transactions. Loan to value ratio proved positively related to PF loans, since 
larger tranches might imply higher risk for lenders, as they constitute a larger 
share in their loan portfolio. In contrast, we found a negative coefficient sign for 
AS bonds, as tranches with a higher loan to value ratio (senior tranches) have a 
higher expected recovery rate and therefore require a lower return. 
3. The impact of the number of banks on the credit spread diverges between PF 
loans and AS and CB issues. While the number of banks had a negative impact 
on the credit spread for AS and CB issues, it had a positive or insignificant 
impact for PF loans. However, it is important to notice that when we controlled 
for upfront fees, the impact of the number of banks on PF loan credit spreads 
became positive. This shows, as pointed out by the significantly and positive 
relationship between upfront fees and credit spread, that credit spreads and fees 
are usually complements or substitutes in syndicated loans. 
4. Currency risk dummy variable had a significant, positive relationship with the 
credit spread for SF, as well as for SDF transactions. Although currency risk 
coefficients for AS and CB issues showed the expected features, our findings for 
PF loans were different from those presented in the empirical literature [e.g., 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000)]. 
5. Contrary to what was expected, borrowers from the U.K. raised funds in PF and 
CB markets at a higher credit spread compared to borrowers from Continental 
Europe. 
6. As expected, dummy variables resulting from the categorical variable sector had 
a significantly positive relationship with credit spread for AS bonds. This means 
that the predicted credit spread is higher for issuers not belonging to the 
financial sector. We also found, in line with some empirical literature [e.g., 
Corielli et al. (2010)], that sector does not influence the level of credit spread in 
PF transactions. 
7. The impact of country risk on the credit spread was positive for PF and CB 
issues and insignificant for AS bonds. This can be explained by the intrinsic 
characteristics of AS transactions. Credit accessibility and the slope of the Euro 
swap curve were highly significant and their coefficients had the expected 
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features: they were positive for credit accessibility (when credit accessibility is 
lower borrowers raise funds at a higher credit spread) and negative for EUSA5y-
Libor3M (a steeper Euro swap curve is associated with lower spreads). The 
influence of volatility on credit spread was positive for AS and CB issues and 
insignificant for PF loans. The finding for PF loan credit spreads can be 
explained by the fact that PF loans are not traded on secondary markets and thus 
are not subject to mark-to-market accounting. 
8. As expected, the type of collateral in an AS transaction determined the credit 
spread. The average credit spreads were statistically and significantly lower for 
MBS than they were for ABS. Contrary to AS, fixed rate and callable variables 
were highly significant for SDF transactions and their coefficients were positive, 
as expected. 
 
Given the controversy in the literature with respect to the term structure of credit 
spreads for PF loans and for speculative-grade CB issuers, we have implemented a 
multivariate regression approach, attempting to analyze the relationship between credit 
spread and maturity, controlling for other relevant micro and macro risk factors. Based 
on a loan pricing literature review, we verified the hypothesis of a hump-shaped term 
structure of credit spreads for PF loans, a positive relationship for CB, and a negative 
relationship for AS bonds. For PF loans, a robust hump-shaped relationship between 
credit spread and maturity was found – maturity becomes significant after augmenting 
our baseline multiple regression with a non-linear maturity component (logarithm of 
maturity). The logarithmic term turned out insignificant for AS bonds and a linear 
positive relationship between credit spread and maturity remained strongly significant 
for CB issues. Our results and analysis help to explain why maturity, as a major 
systematic driver of the cost of debt in SDF transactions, only has a marginal linear 
effect on credit spread of SF transactions. A portfolio of SDF (CB) issues with longer 
maturities contains at least some systematic risk, which in turn makes maturity a 
positive driver of credit spread. By contrast, a portfolio of PF and AS issues effectively 
eliminates most of this source of systematic risk, by virtue of credit enhancement 
mechanisms or other structuring devices, which reduce lender exposure, by altering 
borrowers’ risk profiles across time. 
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Our results relating to the term structure of credit spreads for PF loans have several 
policy implications. Our work offered a suggestion for bank regulators on how to 
effectively align capital requirements with the term structure of credit risk in PF 
transactions. Our results suggest that a linear maturity adjustment might not fit PF 
exposures well, despite being appropriate for bonds and other loans in general. This is 
particularly important, because bank capital regulators should provide market 
participants with incentives for a prudent and, at the same time, efficient allocation of 
resources across asset classes and maturities. Additionally, given the fundamental 
contribution of PF to economic growth, especially in a time of financial crisis in 
Europe, an incentive should be given to internationally active banks in the PF lending 
business. 
 
In order to test the impact of the 2007/2008 financial crisis and the subsequent 
European sovereign debt crisis on SF credit spreads, we hypothesized (Hypothesis 4) 
that, after controlling for macroeconomic conditions and loan characteristics, the 
financial crisis did not have a significant impact on SF credit spreads. We have rejected 
hypothesis 4, since: 
1. The average credit spread is statistically and significantly higher for PF loans 
(329.1 bps versus 136.9 bps), AS bonds (206.5 bps versus 143.5 bps), and CB 
(220.3 bps versus 125.5) during the crisis period. 
2. When we controlled for other microeconomic and macroeconomic pricing 
factors, the coefficient of the crisis dummy variable was significantly and 
positively related to credit spread. 
3. When examining whether our results were robust across time, by considering a 
pre-crisis period – from January 1st, 2000 through to September 14th, 2008 – and 
a crisis period – from September 15th, 2008 through to December 31st, 2011 – 
we have rejected, once again, hypothesis 4, as the 2007/2008 financial crisis and 
the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis did significantly influence the 
explanatory power of the regressions, as well as the coefficients of the macro 
and micro pricing factors (in sign and in significance) for SF transactions. 
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The same finding was obtained for CB issues. For PF loans, we have identified a change 
in the type of factors explaining credit spreads, from marketability factors (maturity and 
number of banks) to default factors (loan to value and country risk). The statistical 
significance of log loan to value might be explained by the fact that a higher loan to 
value ratio means greater risk for lenders, since such a loan constitutes a larger share in 
its loan portfolio. Additionally, during the crisis period, banks lost balance sheet 
capacity to lend (huge losses in assets lead to difficulties related to bank solvency). 
The significantly and positive relationship between country risk and credit spread 
during the crisis period was not a surprise, since rating agencies downgraded sovereign 
bond ratings from several Western European countries (e.g., Belgium, Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, and Spain). With regard to SDF transactions, a change in coefficient 
signs happened for four variables: variables for U.K. borrowers and country risk were 
significantly and positively related to CB issues credit spread. U.K. borrowers’ dummy 
variable became significantly, positively related to CB issue credit spread during the 
crisis period, due to resulting liquidity problems (funding liquidity and balance sheet 
liquidity) that strongly affected U.K. financial institutions, which issued almost 50% of 
all CB issued in the U.K. Log transaction size variable became significantly, positively 
related to credit spread while the number of tranches became significantly, negatively 
related to credit spread. The change in sign for transaction size and number of tranches 
might be explained by a liquidity shortfall in financial markets. Commercial and 
industrial dummy variables became significantly and negatively related with credit 
spread, which means that, during the crisis period, issuers in the financial sector paid 
higher credit spreads than their counterparts in the commercial and industrial sectors. 
Finally, coefficients of the number of banks, EUSA5y-Libor3M, and other dummy 
variable became insignificant. 
 
We completed our study by applying an organizational choice model to SF and SDF 
transactions. Our goal was to determine what affects the probability of a new borrower 
choosing between SF and SDF transactions, and even between PF loans and AS bonds 
or between AS and CB issues. In order to test the expected impact on the probability of 
a sponsor to choose SF over SDF, PF over AS, or AS over CB, we resorted to a 
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generalized Tobit model, following Heckman (1979). We performed maximum 
likelihood estimation on our credit spread samples of our model specification (models 
[1a], [1b], and [1c]) simultaneously with a probit selection equation, where the 
probability of underwriting a loan or bond was a function of either micro and macro 
variables. 
We found that: (1) borrowers chose an SF transaction when they are looking for long-
term financing and when they operate in a higher risk country; (2) borrowers/issuers in 
industrial, utilities, transportation and government showed higher likelihood to choose 
SF transactions; (3) the probability of observing an SF transaction decreased with the 
tranche size and currency risk; (4) several macroeconomic factors significantly 
determined the selection of an SF transaction – among these, risk free rate, volatility, 
the slope of the Euro swap curve, and credit accessibility influenced positively the 
probability of observing an SF loan or bond over an SDF bond; and (5) the 2007/2008 
financial crisis, as expected, decreased the probability of observing an SF loan or bond. 
Considering the choice between PF and AS: (1) the coefficients of the industrial, 
utilities, transportation, and government dummy variables were positive; i.e., sponsors 
belonging to the financial industry were more likely to use securitization as a funding 
source; (2) a sponsor located in a higher risk country proved more likely to be financed 
with a PF loan than an AS bond; (3) the financial crisis, as expected, led to a transfer in 
the form of funding based on SF transactions, increasing the use of PF and reducing the 
use of AS; (4) the negative and significant coefficient for the currency risk dummy 
variable indicated that in the case of currency risk, AS is preferred; and (5) sponsors 
preferred AS bonds for larger tranches and when they sought funding with a higher time 
to maturity. 
Finally, with respect to the choice between AS and CB, we concluded that: (1) AS was 
chosen when issuers are looking for longer-term sources of funding, are established in 
riskier countries and bonds face currency risk; (2) risk free rate, volatility, and the slope 
of the Euro swap curve, as expected, influenced positively the probability of observing 
an AS bond versus a CB; (3) again, and due to the relevant role played by securitization 
in the development and propagation of the 2007/2008 financial crisis, the crisis dummy 
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variable was significantly negative; and (4) the unique sector that had a significant 
impact on the probability of observing an AS instead of a CB issue, was government. 
 
7.3. Suggestions for Future Research 
This study indicates clear avenues for further research. The effect of rating on PF loans 
credit spread could be researched further, because the available data on rating for PF 
transactions is scant, when compared with AS or CB issues. The same takes place with 
AS bonds. Perhaps the inclusion of a servicing fee, instead of management fee, might 
improve the results. 
Further research could also explore the microeconomic features of PF associated 
contracts. With additional data on financial and nonfinancial contracts (e.g., operation 
and management agreement, construction agreement, off-taking agreement), as in 
Corielli et al. (2010), one might better understand how these contracts are linked to 
credit spread levels. 
The effect of Basel III on AS bonds credit spread could be researched further. From a 
bank regulatory perspective, the originator is required, under new regulation from 
January 2011 onwards (Basel III), to retain at least 5% of the transaction for a funded 
securitization. In a synthetic securitization, the originator would equally keep the first-
loss piece, by transferring only the risk of higher tranches – via credit default swaps 
(CDS) or similar instruments – to investors. Thus, it would be very interesting to 
understand the impact of the new requirements of Basel III on AS tranches credit 
spread. 
Further research could also explore the impact of market liquidity on credit spreads for 
SF vis-a-vis SDF transactions, namely between AS and CB issues. Hu and Cantor 
(2006) argue that SF securities are less liquid than CB and that this has an impact on 
credit spreads. Gupta et al. (2008) examine the impact of liquidity on syndicated loan 
spreads. After controlling for other determinants of loan spread such as borrower, loan, 
syndicate and macroeconomic variables, they show that loans with higher expected 
liquidity – loans that are more likely to be traded on the secondary markets – have 
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significantly lower spreads at the time of origination. The introduction of a proxy for 
market liquidity on our models could increase the adjusted R
2
. 
We found that the logarithm of maturity, included as an additional regressor in the 
models to test for the presence of any non-linear effects of maturity on credit spread for 
SDF and SF samples, is insignificant for AS bonds. However, based on the augmented 
component-plus-residual plot shown in Graph 6, we concluded that although not 
significant, there is a negative relationship between credit spread and maturity. We 
leave further empirical analysis of this question for future research, mainly with an 
underlying database with a higher number of observations. 
Finally, our regression models did not include variables reflecting some specific 
characteristics of the borrowers in any direct way – such as borrower liquidity or 
leverage ratios – despite the likelihood that such variables would prove useful. There 
were two reasons for this. First, DealScan and DCM Analytics databases do not provide 
an identification code (i.e., Datastream identification number) for borrowers, so there is 
no feasible method of matching borrowers to their corresponding accounting or debt 
price data. Second, it is not at all clear that debt or liquidity ratios for PF and AS 
borrowers would be comparable to similar ratios for CB issuers. Whereas the issuer of 
CB is usually an operating company, the PF and AS borrower is, by definition, a vehicle 
company without external assets or sources of repayment. However, the extent to which 
any of these variables could have an impact on SF and SDF credit spreads remains to be 
explored. 
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Annex 1: Securitization Instruments 
 
In this annex we will be taking a close look at securitization financing deals. As there 
are so many different deals, spanning across many different asset classes as well as 
jurisdictions, we will look to the prominent classes of asset securitization transactions. 
The main objective of this annex is to analyze the basic characteristics and market 
structure of securitization activity and to answer the following questions: (1) What is 
securitization?; (2) How is the transaction structured?; (3) What is the role of each party 
involved in the securitization process?; (4) What are the main advantages (motivations) 
and disadvantages of securitization?; (5) What are the major tax, accounting, and legal 
issues?; and (6) How has the market for securitization changed after the 2007/2008 
financial crisis? 
 
Definition of Securitization 
Generally speaking, the term securitization is used to represent the process whereby 
financial assets are pooled together, with their cash flows, and converted into negotiable 
securities to be placed into the market; i.e., it is a technique used to transform illiquid 
assets into securities.
395
 As asserted by Fabozzi et al. (2006), securitization “… refers to 
the sale of assets, which generate cash flows, from the entity that owns them to another 
entity that has been specially set up for the purpose, and the issuing of notes by this 
second entity. These notes […] are referred to as asset-backed securities.” Asset 
securitization is thus a structured finance technique allowing for credit to be provided 
directly through market processes rather than through financial intermediaries – the so-
called financial disintermediation.
396
 
The key element of securitization is that the obligation of the issuer to repay investors is 
backed by the value of a pool of financial assets or credit support provided by a third 
party to the transaction. Contrary to the traditional secured bonds, where it is the ability 
                                                 
395
 When we refer to financial assets we mean, e.g., a loan, an account receivable or a note receivable. In a 
securitization transaction, the originator is using a pool of loans or receivables it owns as collateral for 
debt instruments that are issued. These financial assets are referred to as securitized assets. 
396
 According to Jobst (2006a), “[S]ecuritisation substitutes capital market-based finance for credit 
finance by sponsoring relationships without the lending and deposit-taking capabilities of banks 
(disintermediation).” 
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of the originator (or issuer) to generate sufficient cash flows to reimburse the debt that 
determines the risks of the transaction, in securitization the source of repayments/funds 
shifts from the cash flows of the issuer to the cash flows generated by the securitized 
assets and/or a third party that guarantees the payments whenever cash flows become 
insufficient. This idea is corroborated by Vink and Thibeault (2008), which point out 
that the essential “… element of an asset securitization issue is the fact that repayment 
depends only or primarily on the assets and cash flows pledged as collateral to the 
issue, and not on the overall financial strengths of the originator (sponsor or parent 
company).” Therefore, before performing a transaction it is essential to evaluate the 
assets’ characteristics, because they will affect (1) the creditworthiness of the related 
securities – represented by a rating assigned by a rating agency;397 and (2) the type and 
magnitude of credit enhancement mechanisms necessary to improve the rating of the 
securities issued.
398
 
The markets for the securities issued through securitization are composed of three main 
classes [Blum and DiAngelo (1997) and Choudhry and Fabozzi (2004)]: asset-backed 
securities (ABS), mortgage-backed securities (MBS), and collateralized debt obligations 
(CDOs). Securities backed by mortgages are called MBS, securities backed by debt 
obligations are called CDOs, and securities backed by consumer-backed products – e.g., 
car loans, consumer loans, and credit cards – are called ABS. 
According to Jobst (2006a), asset-backed securities are issued “… as subordinated, 
negotiable contingent claims (‘tranches’) with varying seniority and maturity, backed 
by the credit payment performance of securitised assets (integration and differentiation 
process).” These tranches represent different risk-return profiles, with the underlying 
reference portfolio to be allocated among the various tranches through prioritized 
contractual repartitioning. Fabozzi et al. (2006) present the following issuers of asset-
backed securities: (1) captive finance companies of manufacturing firms that provide 
financing only for their parent company’s products; (2) financing subsidiaries of major 
industrial corporations; (3) independent finance companies; and (4) domestic and 
foreign commercial banks. With regard to banks, securitization technique allows the 
                                                 
397
 See Krebsz (2011) for further discussion of the issues addressed by rating agencies when rating a 
particular transaction.  
398
 See Annex 6 for further discussion of structured finance and special purpose vehicles. 
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transformation of heterogeneous assets that are mostly not negotiable into liquid and 
homogenous securities, suitable for trade. The range of assets that can be securitized by 
banks is very wide and includes mortgage loans, credit card receivables, bonds, auto 
loans, and loans to small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), among others. 
 
The Typical Securitization Transaction Scheme 
As pointed out, a securitization transaction is implemented through a transfer of assets 
from the originator to an SPV, which then issues securities, in the form of debt 
instruments, to be placed into the market through a private or public offering. Exhibit 1 
presents a graphic representation of the fund flows in a typical securitization 
transaction. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1: Fund flows in a securitization transaction. 
Source: Adapted from Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Tasca and Zambelli (2005). 
 
The exhibit shows the two basic deals involved: (1) asset sale; and (2) the issuance of 
securities (considering ABS in this case). For example, if a bank intends to raise money 
by selling a specific pool of loans through securitization, it is possible to identify the 
subsequent fund flows during the life of a securitization transaction: (1) the bank 
(originator) sells the assets to a separate entity (SPV); (2) the SPV transforms them into 
negotiable securities to be placed into the capital market; (3) the issuance of securities 
(usually debt obligation instruments) – backed by the acquired assets – in order to 
finance the asset purchase; and (4) the cash flows originated by the acquired pool of 
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assets are then used to pay the principal and interest of the securities to the final 
investors.
399
 
According to Davidson et al. (2003) “[T]he standard structure for securitization in 
Europe is somewhat different from U.S. ‘pass-through’.” In the U.S. trusts play an 
important role. They own assets such mortgage loans, and investors have a direct 
ownership interest in the trust. In Europe, all deals use a variant of the following 
structure: (1) the originator sells the assets to an SPV; and (2) the SPV then issues a 
bond, which is purchased by various investors, backed by the assets owned by the SPV. 
This vehicle company is usually a company subject to corporate law, but restricted in 
activity, and may be exempted from certain taxes.
400
 But in Europe, as in any other part 
of the world, the securitization process involves a standard set of analysis prior to the 
issuance of securities, namely: (1) assessing the collateral – i.e., understanding the 
collateral; (2) modeling cash flows; (3) quantify risk factors via stress tests or other 
techniques;
401
 and (4) structuring the transaction – having in mind several factors, such 
as the client’s wishes, the type of assets, the opinion of the rating agencies, the 
availability of data, and the investor attraction for the deal.
402
 
 
In order to understand the whole securitization process, Exhibit 2 describes the major 
steps required to accomplish a typical securitization transaction.  
 
 
                                                 
399
 The cash collection related to the securitized portfolio is managed by a third party, the Servicer, which 
receives a servicing fee. Servicing involves collecting cash from borrowers, notifying borrowers who may 
fail, and, when necessary, recovering and disposing of the collateral if the borrower does not make loan 
repayments by a specified time. 
400
 As asserted by Davidson et al. (2003), this type of structure “… can be much more costly than a U.S. 
trust company because in continental Europe it is very common to have a minimum amount of share 
capital necessary to set up a company.” For example, in Belgium, the minimum is Euro 62 thousand, in 
the Netherlands Euro 20 thousand, and in Portugal Euro 250 thousand (applied to ‘Sociedades de 
Titularização de Créditos’) – that is the reason why most securitization transactions occurred through old 
offshore vehicles or structures. The U.K. tends to be the most popular jurisdictions for SPVs, as well as 
Ireland, because there is no minimum share capital necessary. 
401
 Generally speaking, the idea is to try to determine, based on historical loss and default statistics, a 
stress on the cash flow that is commensurate with a rating level. 
402
 Structuring the transaction requires to deal with the following issues: (1) timing; (2) risk; (3) credit 
enhancement and rating; (4) legal process and counterparties – collateral arrangements, counterparty 
arrangements, bond description, legal opinions, and rating letters –; and (5) costs. 
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Exhibit 2: Basic securitization process. 
Source: The author. 
 
Step 1: the originator identifies a pool of assets (receivables) that satisfy certain features 
that make them acceptable to be securitized;
403
 Step 2: the pool of assets is transferred 
to an SPV at par value and based on a true sale transaction;
404
 Step 3: the SPV holds the 
asset pool, paying for it by issuing securities;
405
 Step 4: securities are offered to capital 
markets and structured into different classes;
406
 Step 5: payment of the asset 
purchase;
407
 and Step 6: the originator – who has proximity with the borrowers and 
                                                 
403
 The originator typically identifies assets with similar characteristics. Theoretically, any asset 
producing regular cash flows (e.g., residential and commercial mortgages, credit card receivables, etc.) 
can be securitized. 
404
 True sale or mutually exclusive use of asset pool’s cash flows means that the originator would not 
have any direct claim on the receivables, nor would the investors in the securities issued by the SPC or 
the SPV itself have any claim against the general assets of the originator. 
405
 To finance the acquisition of the assets, the SPV issues securities sold to investors in the capital 
markets. The credit rating of those securities will be based solely on the strength of the asset pool. The 
issued securities may be senior and junior, or they may be senior, mezzanine, and junior, or they may 
have various classes, such as class A, class B, class C, and so on. These various classes are created in 
order to generate differential interests in the pool, such that the senior investors have superior rights over 
the pool than the subordinated investors. 
406
 The SPV sells securities in the capital markets through a private placement or public offering, with the 
help of underwriters. These securities are usually purchased by banks, insurance companies, pension 
funds and other institutional investors. 
407
 The funds raised by the SPV from the market placement are used to pay the pool of assets originally 
acquired by the vehicle. 
I 
N 
V 
E 
S 
T 
O 
R 
S 
Step 2: Asset Pool Sale 
 
Obligors 
 
 
SPV 
 
 
Originator/ 
Servicer 
Class A 
Class B 
Class C 
Class D 
… 
Receivables 
Step 1: Selection of 
a Pool of Assets 
Step 3: SPV holds 
the Asset Pool and 
issues Securities 
Step 4: Placement of 
Securities in the 
Capital Markets 
Step 5: Asset Purchase 
Step 6: Interest and 
Principal 
Step 5: Asset Purchase 
Step 6: Interest and 
Principal 
 
 
Arranger 
External 
Auditors / 
Legal 
Advisers 
 
 
Rating 
Agencies 
 
Underwriter 
Servicing Fee Credit 
Enhancement 
(e.g.,  
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 270 
typically has an infrastructure and systems in place for doing so – collects cash flows 
related to the assets (interest and principal); i.e., retains the servicing function.
408
 
The highest rating for Class A (the most senior class) is explained by two factors: (1) 
segregation of the assets from bankruptcy risks of the originator; and (2) the 
implementation of different credit enhancement strategies. One strategy is the creation 
of a credit risk mitigation device by subordination of Classes B, C, D, …, such that 
those lower classes provide credit support to Class A. It is possible to say that the size 
of classes B and C has been determined as to meet the rating objective for Class A. 
Likewise, the size of Class C has been determined as to have Class B accorded the 
desired rating. In other words, the entire transaction is structured to meet specific 
investor needs. That’s why, in a narrow sense, the term structured finance is used almost 
interchangeably with securitization.
409
 
Different credit enhancement mechanisms may be necessary to improve the credit rating 
of the issued securities and reduce the risks transferred to investors; i.e., credit 
enhancement serves to protect investors from the risk of collateral not being repaid as 
expected.
410
 These mechanisms can be either internally determined within the 
transaction structure – internal credit enhancement mechanisms – or externally provided 
by a third party – external credit enhancement mechanisms. The issuer should examine 
the various mechanisms of credit enhancement prior to issuance, to determine the most 
effective combination of credit enhancement mechanisms. As referred by Fabozzi et al 
(2006), “… the reason why an issuer does not simply seek a triple-A rating for all the 
securities in the structure is that there is a cost to doing so […] In general the issuer, in 
deciding to improve the credit rating on some securities in a structure, will evaluate the 
tradeoff associated with the cost of enhancement versus the reduction in yield required 
to sell the security.” External credit enhancement mechanisms are provided by third-
                                                 
408
 The servicer collects the cash associated with the acquired assets and forwards these cash flows to the 
trustee, receiving a servicing fee. In the end, the trustee forwards these payments to the final investors. 
Servicing activities can be implemented by the originator, a subsidiary of the originator or a separate 
servicer. According to Tasca and Zambelli (2005) “[R]egarding the securitization process initiated by 
big-size corporate, the Servicer activity is usually done by a separate financial institution, who takes care 
of all collection activity. Small-medium size firms, on the other hands, usually sign a contract of sub-
service with a financial institution, acting as a primary servicer.” 
409
 See Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) for further discussion of the process of creating different classes or 
tranching. 
410
 See, for example, Roever and Fabozzi (2003) and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) for an in depth 
description of internal and external credit enhancement mechanisms. 
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party guarantees, granting for first-loss protection against losses up to certain amount. 
Examples are: (1) guarantees; (2) letters of credit;
411
 and (3) bond insurance.
412
 This 
kind of guarantee can either apply to all the issued tranches or, more typically, only to 
one particular tranche. Moreover, internal credit enhancement mechanisms are: (1) 
subordination;
413
 (2) overcollateralization;
414
 (3) cash reserve accounts;
415
 (4) excess 
spread;
416
 (5) trigger events; and (6) minimum debt or interest service coverage levels. 
The type and amount of credit enhancement employed in a transaction represents the 
matching point of the issuer’s need to maximize deal proceeds and the rating agencies’ 
judgment with respect to how much credit enhancement is required to achieve the 
desired rating on the senior bond classes.
417
 According to Roever and Fabozzi (2003) 
one important difference between the approach used to rate securitized debt and bonds 
“… is that corporate obligations are rated ex post while securitized products are rated 
ex ante […] ABS generally are structured with the idea of issuing securities that meet a 
specific rating profile.” Thus, rating agencies play a critical role in the process. 
 
                                                 
411
 It is a financial guarantee through which a bank becomes committed to reimburse credit losses up to a 
predetermined amount. 
412
 Also called a surety bond, a bond insurance is a financial guarantee from an insurance company, 
commonly called monoline insurance company [e.g., Ambac Assurance Corporation (AMBAC); 
Financial Guaranty Insurance Corporation (FGIC); Financial Security Assurance (FSA); Municipal Bond 
Insurance Corporation (MBIA); and XL Capital Assurance]. The guarantee provided is for the timely 
payments of principal and interest if these payments cannot be satisfied from the cash flow from the 
underlying loan pool. 
413
 Issuers can increase their advance rates by selling additional bonds of lesser credit quality, which are 
subordinated in payment priority to the senior bonds issued from the structuring. Subordinated tranches 
will absorb collateral losses for the benefit of senior bonds. Structuring the transaction means that: (1) 
rating agencies consults with the issuer and its investment bank regarding the optimal capital structure; 
(2) investment bank gauge market demand for particular types of risk, attempting to determine what 
average lives and what credit ratings are most saleable; and (3) given a proposed capital structure, the 
rating agencies determine how much enhancement is needed for each class of bonds. 
414
 The overlying bonds are lower in value compared to the underlying asset pool: for example, Euro 250 
million nominal of assets are used as backing for Euro 200 million nominal of issued bonds. 
415
 Usually from part of the debt proceeds, a cash reserve is maintained in a account and used to cover 
initial losses. 
416
 The excess spread results from the positive difference between cash inflows from assets and the 
interest service requirements of liabilities. It acts as the first line of credit support for the deal and if losses 
are low, the excess spread will increase. 
417
 Referring to the level of enhancement needed for a particular transaction, Fabozzi et al. (2006) posit 
that “[T]ypically, securitizations where underlying credit performance is historically strong utilize 
senior/subordinated structures, since the credit enhancement required is relatively small and the 
senior/subordinate structure offers efficient execution. Deals backed by lower-quality loans require 
higher levels of enhancement, and typically utilize a combination of the above-mentioned credit 
enhancement forms.” 
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A central and defining characteristic of securitization is that the cash flows generated by 
a company’s financial assets can support one or more securities that may be of higher 
credit quality then the company’s secured debt. To achieve this higher credit quality, the 
securities used to fund the securitization rely on the cash flow created by the assets – or 
guarantee by a third party – rather than on the payment promise of the company. 
Regarding the securitization financing structure, there are two essential characteristics 
to be highlighted. The first concerns to the SPV, which represents a critical player 
within the process. Secondly, the transaction is realized through a ‘true sale’ of assets 
by the originator to the SPV. The ‘true sale’ mechanism allows a company to isolate a 
group of financial assets, separating their risk from the firm.
418
 Therefore, the expected 
return to investors relies mainly on the risk of the cash flows guaranteed by the pool of 
assets, rather than the default risk of the originator.
419
 The SPV role is critical and 
provides an investor with greater protection. With the separate incorporation of the SPV 
– which is intended to isolate the assets – the assets are no longer available to the 
originator or its creditors.
420
 Furthermore, the SPV activity is strictly limited to holding 
the asset pool and issue in turn securities backed by these assets; i.e., the SPV is not 
allowed to perform other business activities and to assume other obligations. 
 
Financial intermediaries play a crucial role within the securitization process, which 
includes the following activities: (1) identification of homogeneous financial assets to 
be securitized; (2) identification, together with the credit agency (or credit agencies 
when necessary), of the financial structure of the securities; (3) if the credit rating 
analysis is positive, the arranger writes a pre-sale report (and external auditors 
implement a due diligence of the asset portfolio); (4) in line with legal firms, the legal 
                                                 
418
 Contrary to U.S., in Europe, in many jurisdiction (e.g., Germanic type of law), there is a sale or 
assignment of the assets to a SPV but the perfection of the sale is often postpone until various trigger 
events occur in order to avoid complicated borrower notification laws. See Davidson et al. (2003) for 
further discussion of European securitization legislation. 
419
 In order to protect final investors against the bankruptcy risk of the originator, it is necessary to 
structure the transaction as ‘true sale’ of assets between the originator and the SPV (a third party 
established exclusively as a vehicle to accomplish a securitization transaction). 
420
 Although the remoteness from bankruptcy may be achieved ensuring independence of the SPV from 
the originator, “… in practice this has been thrown somewhat into doubt during the credit crisis as the 
true sale status has been challenged in some federal courts in the U.S.” [Roever and Fabozzi (2003)]. 
Originators need to ensure carefully that the assets transferred to the SPV are ring-fenced from further 
originator interaction and have to analyze cautiously if any structural feature of the transaction may 
threaten the true sale claim. 
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contracts are developed (e.g., transfer agreement, indemnity and warranty agreement, 
corporate services agreement, servicing agreement, cash management agreement and 
collateral management agreement, trust deed, deed of pledge, and subscription 
agreement); (5) planning of marketing activities, including a road show aimed at 
presenting the transaction characteristics to institutional investors; and (6) issuance and 
placement of the securities in the primary market.
421
 The next phase in the process is the 
acquisition of the securities by investors.
422
 
 
Securitization Structures 
Tasca and Zambelli (2005) split securitization transactions into two main types: (1) cash 
flow based (CFB) securitization or funded securitization – structured as a sale of assets 
by a company (originator) to a special entity (SPV), which then issues securities backed 
by the underlying assets;
423
 and (2) synthetic securitization – structured in such a way 
that the credit risk associated with a pool of assets is transferred to a separated entity 
(SPV).
424
 As in synthetic securitization there is no sale of assets, the originator does not 
receive any cash flow and the SPV is not the owner of the pool of assets, but rather the 
entity carrying the associated credit risk.
425
 
 
Exhibit 3 provides an overview of the main securitization instruments. Funded 
securitizations include three main categories: (1) Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS); 
Asset-Backed Securities (ABS); and (3) cash flow Collateralized Debt Obligations 
                                                 
421
 Usually a offering circular has to be design to provide information to investors. The underwriter works 
together with the SPV to place securities in the primary market and usually ensures to the originator the 
acquisition of those securities that may remain unsold. 
422
 It is important to notice that interest rate derivatives play an important role in securitization 
transactions for hedging and yield enhancement. The most commonly used interest rate derivatives are 
interest rate swaps, interest rate caps, and interest rates corridors. See, e.g., Fabozzi et al. (2005) for 
further discussion of this subject. 
423
 In a so-called true sale securitization, the underlying assets are indeed actually sold by the originator to 
the SPV and thus removed from the balance sheet of the originator. 
424
 See, among others, Krebsz (2011) for further development on advantages and disadvantages, financial 
benefits, regulatory issues, and operational differences between funded and synthetic transactions. 
425
 This is realized through the use of derivatives like total return swaps and credit derivatives. A credit 
derivative is a derivative contract used to transfer credit risk on a reference entity or reference obligor 
between a credit protection seller that is short the credit risk, and a credit protection buyer that is long the 
credit risk. The most widely used credit derivative is the credit default swap (CDS) that is a bilateral 
contract between the protection buyer that is short the credit risk and the protection seller that is long the 
credit risk. 
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(CDOs).
426
 In practice, CDOs can be classified either as funded securitization, synthetic 
securitization or a hybrid form incorporating elements of both.
427
 In this dissertation, a 
cash flow CDO is a form of a funded securitization and a synthetic CDO a form of a 
synthetic securitization, because synthetic CDOs are much more specific instruments to 
transfer credit risk from one party to another.
428
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 3: Securitization instruments. 
Source: Adapted from Criado and Rixtel (2008). 
                                                 
426
 See, among others, Jobst (2003 and 2006b) and Vink and Thibeault (2008) for further discussion of 
this subject. Criado and Rixtel (2008) present a enlightening description of each type of securitization 
instruments. In practice, when the term ABS is used, it means asset-backed securities with the exception 
of MBS and CDOs. 
427
 See, among others, IMF (2008a) and Duffie (2008). 
428
 According to Criado and Rixtel (2008) different types of securitization instruments played different 
roles in the 2007-2008 financial turmoil. The ones most involved were short-term Asset-Backed 
Securities (or asset-backed commercial paper – ABCP), subprime RMBS and CDOs both cash flow and 
synthetic. Additionally, other instruments such as CDS were involved indirectly in the turmoil and 
provided useful information on the development of the financial market tensions. 
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From a bank regulatory perspective, the originator is required, under new regulation 
from January 2011 onwards (Basel III), to retain at least 5% of the transaction for a 
funded transaction. In a synthetic transaction the originator would equally keep the first-
loss piece, by transferring only the risk of higher tranches – via credit default swaps 
(CDS) or similar instruments – to investors. 
Given the important role played by CDOs in the 2007/2008 financial turmoil, we 
carried out a more detailed analysis of such structures. 
CDOs, first introduced in 1988, are a type of securitization in which an SPV issues 
bonds or notes backed by cash flows of an underlying pool of assets. According to 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) “[T]hese assets include one or more of the following types of debt 
obligations: investment-grade and high-yield corporate bonds; emerging market bonds; 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS); commercial mortgage-backed 
securities (CMBS); asset-backed securities (ABS); real estate investment trusts (REIT) 
debt; bank loans; special-situation loans and distressed debt; and other CDOs.”429 
As for ABS and RMBS, CDOs can also be divided into two main types: (1) cash flow 
CDOs – backed by a pool of cash-market debt instruments; and (2) synthetic CDOs – 
investors have economic exposures to a pool of debt instruments, but this exposure 
occurs via a credit derivative rather than the purchase of the cash-market instruments. 
Cash flow CDOs are designed to split the credit risk of the underlying pool of assets 
into various tranches, each of which with a different credit exposure from the other. 
Thus, the notes issued have different risk profiles as a result of their relative 
subordination – that is, the notes are structured in a descending order of seniority – and 
the utilization of additional credit enhancement mechanisms. 
Contrary to cash flow CDOs deals, synthetic CDOs are engineering so that the credit 
risk of the assets is transferred synthetically – rather than by a true sale – by the sponsor 
to investors, by means of credit derivatives instruments. Using this approach, 
underlying or reference assets are not necessarily moved off the originator’s balance 
                                                 
429
 When the underlying pool of debt obligations consists of bond-type instruments is referred as 
collateralized bond obligation (CBO). When the underlying pool of debt obligations is a bank loan, a 
CDO is referred to as a collateralized loan obligation (CLO). 
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sheet, so it is adopted whenever the primary objective is to achieve risk transfer rather 
than balance sheet funding.
430
 
A specific type of CDOs are Multisector CDOs, also known as ABS CDOs, ABS of 
ABS, CDOs squared (CDOs
2
), or CDOs cubed (CDOs
3
). According to Tavakoli (2008) 
Multisector CDOs “… appeared in 1999 in response to investors’ desire to securitize 
their own positions of structured product. Both balance-sheet and off-balance-sheet 
arbitrage deals have been done.” These products were used and misused in a way that 
complexity masked the risk. For example, in a Multisector CDO including subprime 
collateral, one can find subprime mortgage loans, subprime auto loans, credit card 
receivables, and mezzanine corporate loans backing mezzanine tranches of CDOs used 
as collateral in a CDOs
2
. Thus, “[T]hese deals are nearly impossible for sophisticated 
investors to fairly value…” [Tavakoli (2008)]. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Securitization Transactions 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) capital structure irrelevance theorem holds that 
capital structure is irrelevant to firm value. Financial transactions, such as securitization, 
would not exist as it would offer no advantages over less costly alternatives. 
Considering that in the real world there are a plethora of different capital structures and 
securitization has been one of the principal means by which firms create their capital 
structures, securitization largely affects the value of the firm.  
According to Hill (1996) securitization can help to reduce real-world costs, like 
regulatory costs and information costs.
431
 Information costs reduction seems largest for 
firms who face severe ‘lemons problems’ [Akerlof (1970)] – available information 
about such firms is limited, unfavorable, or particularly difficult to appraise. As asserted 
by Hill (1996), securitization offers a low cost and credible way for information about 
                                                 
430
 See, among others, Fabozzi et al. (2006), Lancaster et al. (2008), and Tavakoli (2008) for further 
discussion of CDOs deals, namely on the difference between cash flow structures and synthetic 
securitization vehicles. 
431
 For example, Pavel (1986), Cumming (1987), Pavel and Phillis (1987), Penacchi (1988), and Flannery 
(1989) suggest that banks use securitization because of high costs of traditional intermediation due 
essentially to capital requirements and a more competitive environment. 
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the firm’s receivables to be produced and provided to investors.432 Similarly, Iacobucci 
and Winter (2005) argue that “… asset securitization is driven by the propensity of the 
market to allocate assets to investors who are best informed about asset values.” 
It is possible to identify three major explanations for securitization in the literature: (1) 
signaling; (2) prevent underinvestment; and (3) using comparative advantage. 
Regarding signaling, Greenbaum and Thakor (1987) develop a signaling model to 
explain how projects suffering from informational asymmetries can be financed through 
securitization. These authors argue that private information about the originated assets 
would induce financial institutions to prefer the securitization of better quality assets to 
mitigate their regulatory capital requirements for ‘overcharged’ asset exposure, whilst 
worse quality assets are retained.
433
 DeMarzo (2005) develops a model in which 
informed financial intermediaries with superior information about asset valuation 
enhance their returns on capital by tranching their pools of assets based on specific risk 
characteristics. The same line of reasoning is presented by Pais (2009), which assert that 
“… poor performing risky institutions or institutions with high information asymmetries 
are more likely to engage in securitisation.” 
With regard to agency costs, securitization may redress conflicts of interest between 
creditors and shareholders in the capital structure choice, concerning possible agency 
costs from underinvestment [Myers (1977, 1984)] and asset substitution [Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)] due to excessive levels of debt or the presence of non-value 
maximizing investment behavior, respectively.
434
 
Regarding comparative advantages, Berger and Udell (1993) argue that the ‘monitoring 
technology hypothesis’ of securitization allows companies to obtain technological gains 
from specializing in niches of comparative advantage (which suggests economies of 
scale in those activities). This idea is corroborated by Thomas (2001), which states that 
                                                 
432
 Additionally, Hill (1996) argues that securitization may increase the future cash inflows of a firm due 
to (1) effects of specialization in receivables’ origination and retention – economies of scope; (2) agency 
costs reduction; and (3) regulatory costs reduction. 
433
 This idea is corroborated by Ambrose et al. (2005) who find that, similar to Calem and LaCour-Little 
(2004) and DeMarzo and Duffie (1999), lower risk loans tend to be securitized. 
434
 Using optimal risk allocation models, Benveniste and Berger (1987) and James (1988) show that 
securitization can improve risk sharing and increase project funding by avoiding the Myers (1977) 
underinvestment problem. See Jobst (2006a) for further discussion of this subject. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 278 
“… securitization allows companies – FIs as well as non-FIs – to specialize on the 
activities of their comparative advantage.” 
The rationale for the emergence of securitization transactions should be found in the 
economic advantages of: (1) increased liquidity and funding [e.g., Roever and Fabozzi 
(2003),
435
 Jobst (2006a),
436
 and Krebsz (2011)
437
]; (2) reduction of the cost of funding 
[e.g., Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Davidson et al. (2003),
438
 Roever and Fabozzi 
(2003), Jost (2006), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Fabozzi et al. (2006)];
439
 (3) 
allowing originators to reach a funding sources diversification [e.g., Davidson et al. 
(2003), Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011)];
440
 
(4) improving originators’ risk management [e.g., Cumming (1987), Goldberg and 
Rogers (1988), Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988),
441
 Davidson et al. (2003), Jobst (2006a), 
and Fabozzi and Kothari (2007)]; (5) increasing the segmentation between the 
                                                 
435
 Roever and Fabozzi (2003) refer to securitization as a reliable and relatively unconstrained source of 
off-balance sheet financing that mitigates traditional funding constrains and can promote a company’s 
growth. 
436
 As referred by Jobst (2006a), securitization “… allows issuers to raise funds and improve their 
liquidity position without increasing their on-balance sheet liabilities and capital base in a bid to 
refinance asset origination or investments…” 
437
 Krebsz (2011) points out that “[T]he credit crisis with its far-reaching implications for the global 
financial markets has put the liquidity and funding strategy on the top of the agenda of most banks and 
financial institutions.” Although securitization has played an relevant role in the development and 
propagation of the financial crisis, it also allowed financial institutions to solve liquidity and funding 
problems in the post-crisis period, namely as an active tool to access various lending schemes (SLSs) by 
central banks around the world. 
438
 According to Davidson et al. (2003) “… firms with high-quality assets may be able to reduce their 
financing costs through securitization.” This happens when bonds created through securitization have a 
higher credit rating or are otherwise perceived to have less risk than the originator’s general obligations. 
439
 If a corporation wants to issue bonds collateralized by a pool of assets it probably will have the same 
funding cost as if it issues a corporate bond. But if the company creates another legal entity (SPV) and 
sell the assets – in a way that if the company is forced into bankruptcy (there is a ‘true sale’) its creditors 
cannot try to recover the financial assets because they are legally owned by the SPV – to that entity who 
issue bonds backed by those assets, investors interested in buying the bonds will evaluate the credit risk 
of the assets. Additionally, the SPV will show the characteristics of the collateral to a rating agency which 
evaluates the credit quality of the collateral and inform the issuer what must be done to obtain a desired 
credit rating. In this case, the issuer must be asked to ‘credit enhance’ the structure. Basically, rating 
agencies looks at the potential losses from the collateral and make a determination of how much credit 
enhancement is needed for the bond classes issued to achieve the ratings targeted by the issuer. Thus, the 
company can obtain funding using its assets to achieve a better credit rating for the bonds issued than 
otherwise will be obtained if the company will chose to issue corporate bonds – with enough credit 
enhancement, it can issue a bond with a rating triple A. 
440
 Once an originator is well established in the asset-backed securities market it can look at both the 
corporate bond market and the asset-backed securities market when assessing its best funding source. 
441
 Rosenthal and Ocampo (1988) argue that “… securitization transactions manage these risks [credit, 
interest rate, and prepayment risks] more explicitly, and therefore more efficiently, than does conventional 
lending [… and…] it makes these risks more transparent and it also allocates them far more precisely to 
the players who are best able to absorb them.”  
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origination and investment functions [e.g., Davidson et al. (2003)]; (6) allowing 
originators to benefit from regulatory and/or tax arbitrage [e.g., Cumming (1987), Jones 
(2000), Davidson et al. (2003), and Krebsz (2011)];
442
 and (7) allowing originators to 
improve key financial ratios [e.g., Goldberg and Rogers (1988), Roever and Fabozzi 
(2003), Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011)].
443
 
It is possible to discuss the main motivations for securitization from both the 
perspectives of a nonbank corporation and a bank corporation.
444
 According to Fabozzi 
et al. (2006) the principal reasons a nonbank corporation may elect to issue an asset-
backed security are: (1) to reduce funding costs; (2) to diversify funding sources; and 
(3) to accelerate earnings for financial reporting purposes.
445
 Looking to bank 
corporations, the literature presents four main motivations behind securitization: (1) the 
need for new sources of funding – alternative to raising deposits [e.g., Goldberg et al. 
(1988), Estrella (2002), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Loutskina and Strahan (2009), and 
Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)];
446
 (2) risk management and the transfer of credit risk, 
to fund risky financial assets and minimize financial distress costs [e.g., Goldberg et al. 
(1988), Fabozzi et al. (2006), Jobst (2006a),
447
 and Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010)];
448
 
                                                 
442
 One of the major economic drivers of a new securitization transaction is Basel II (and ongoing forward 
Basel III). The applicable calculation rules (e.g., standardized approach vs internal ratings-based approach 
vs advanced ratings-based approach) highly influence the regulatory capital charge. 
443
 According to Goldberg and Rogers (1988) “… if the transaction is considered a sale of assets, firms 
can realize a gains (or a loss) upon sale, thereby accelerating income recognition.” Furthermore, by 
removing assets from balance sheet, securitization can improve a company’s return on assets and return 
on equity ratios. The same line of reasoning is presented by Roever and Fabozzi (2003), Fabozzi and 
Kothari (2007), and Krebsz (2011). 
444
 According to Jobst (2006a), the more pertinent advantages of securitization enjoyed by financial 
institutions are: (1) the reduction of economic cost of capital (economic motive) and regulatory minimum 
capital requirements (regulatory motive); (2) the diversification of asset exposures (hedging motive); and 
(3) the recognition the gains (or losses) within the moment of the true sale of the asset pool. Moreover, 
the reduction of agency costs that arise from asymmetric information (e.g., underinvestment and asset 
substitution) and the asset-liability management improvement “… are particularly instrumental to the 
efficient capital management of non-financial corporate issuers.” 
445
 Similarly, Lupica (1998) presents the following motivations for a nonbank corporation to choose 
securitize its assets: (1) improving liquidity; (2) increasing diversification of funding sources; (3) 
lowering the effective interest rate; (4) improving risk management; and (5) achieving accounting-related 
advantages. 
446
 Fabozzi et al. (2006) argue that “[B]anks can use securitization to (1) support asset growth, (2) 
diversify their funding mix and reduce cost of funding, and (3) reduce maturity mismatches.” 
Securitization enables banks to reduce their funding costs because most of the notes issued by SPVs are 
higher rated than the bonds issued directly by the originating bank itself. 
447
 As pointed out by Jobst (2006a), securitization “… is one operational means of risk management, 
which allows issuers to reallocate, commoditise and transfer different types of risks (e.g., credit risk, 
interest rate risk, liquidity risk or pricing risk) to capital market investors at a fair market price.” 
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(3) the search for new profit opportunities, by recognizing accounting gains when the 
market value of loans exceed their book value [e.g., Flanery (1989) and DeMarzo 
(2005)]; and (4) the adjustment of capital ratios [e.g., Donahoo and Shaffer (1991), 
Berger and Udell (1993), Jagtiani et al. (1995), Carlstrom and Samolyk (1995), Berger 
et al. (1995), Jones (2000), Calomiris and Mason (2004), Ambrose et al. (2005), and 
Fabozzi et al. (2006)].
449
 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) present the benefits of securitization from the perspective of 
investors. Securitization transactions allow investors to diversify sector interest, access 
different risk-rewards profiles, and access sectors that are otherwise not open to them. 
Thus, the key benefit to investors is the ability of securitization to tailor risk-return 
profiles.
450
 This idea is corroborated by Jobst (2006a), who states that “[I]nvestors of 
securitized debt can quickly adjust their investment holdings at low transaction costs in 
response to a change of personal risk sensitivity, market sentiment or consumption 
preferences.” Krebsz (2011) presents diversification, additional protection mechanisms, 
the ability to address different type of investors, wider pricing, and rating stability as the 
main advantages of asset securitization in the perspective of investors. 
 
Although all of the above-mentioned advantages, securitization also has disadvantages, 
especially when used inappropriately. Asset securitization transactions are fairly 
complex and involve a significant amount of due diligence, negotiation, and legal 
activities. As asserted by Davidson et al. (2003), “[A] first transaction from an 
                                                                                                                                               
448
 Cumming (1987) and Flannery (1994) argue that banks with a higher share of risky loans may 
securitize more. Contrary, Greenbaum and Thakor (1987), Kohen and Santomero (1980), Kim and 
Santomero (1988), Flannery (1989), and Blum (1999) argue that banks could have an incentive to 
securitize high-quality loans and to retain low-quality loans. Thus, securitization leads to an improvement 
in the management of interest rate and credit risks [Hess and Smith (1988), and Rosenthal and Ocampo 
(1988)] if the originator securitizes its worst assets. However, securitization may also increase the level of 
risk if the bank securitizes its better assets [Murray (2005)]. 
449
 The use of securitization to reduce banks’ capital requirements involves exploiting the opportunity to 
arbitrage the regulatory capital required under the Capital Accord of 1998 – Basel I [see, e.g., Jones 
(2000)]. Basel II agreement, which came into effect in 2008, remedies some of the weaknesses of the 
Basel I Accord. As pointed out by Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), with Basel II agreement, “… the 
possible reduction in the capital requirements is closely associated both with the quality of the underlying 
portfolio and with the amount of risk exposure retained by the originator entity, which prevents the 
possible arbitrage of capital.” 
450
 Hill (1996) argues that securities issued in a securitization transaction “… can have a risk and reward 
configuration the investor otherwise could have obtained only by acquiring, at higher cost, several 
securities.” 
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originator can take anywhere from 1 to 2 years to complete […] Securitization is quite 
costly in terms of up-front and ongoing fees compared to other types of financing.”451 
This idea is corroborated by Cardone-Riportella et al. (2010), which point out that the 
disadvantages of securitization include the fixed costs of setting up the SPV and a 
potential reduction in the flow of tax benefits from keeping the assets in the balance 
sheet and financing them with debt. Similarly, Jobst (2006a) presents the structural 
complexity of securitization as the main driver for the major concerns about this type of 
structured finance, which are: (1) high accumulation of interest rate risks; (2) the 
potential for errors in the rating and pricing of complex security designs; and (3) the 
shortcomings of analytical models for assessing risks. 
The credit crisis of 2007/2008 has somewhat tarnished the positive image prevailing of 
the positive role played by securitization in dispersing credit risk, thereby enhancing the 
resilience of the financial system to default by borrowers.
452
 Linking singular credit 
facilities to the aggregate pricing and valuation discipline of capital markets, 
securitization was expected to help remedy deficiencies in financial markets arising 
from incomplete capital allocation. But the collapse of the securitization market and the 
ensuing market turbulence have cast serious doubt on this economic proposition of 
unbundling, transforming, and redistributing credit risk via structured finance 
instruments.
453
 As pointed out by Shin (2009), “[I]n its place, there is a new received 
                                                 
451
 According to Davidson et al. (2003) for a Euro 100 million transaction developed in Europe, “… these 
costs add to the overall financing costs anywhere from about 15 to 50 basis points, assuming a 7-year 
bullet financing.” As these costs are essentially fixed, the larger the transactions, the lower is the impact 
on the final funding level. 
452
 See, among others, BIS (2008), IMF (2008b), Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009), Brunnermeier (2009), 
and Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2011) for further description of the credit crisis and the role played by 
asset securitization. 
453
 Jobst (2009) posits the following main drivers of the financial crisis: (1) low interest rates which 
fostered mortgage lending and the expansion of house supply; (2) mortgage brokers and banks rely 
heavily on securitization to refinance themselves; (3) the availability of cheaper credit resulted in a 
general deterioration of lending standards – the off-balance sheet treatment of securitization allowed 
originators to accept marginal borrowers, displacing concerns about raising credit risk; (4) the complexity 
of securitization transactions obscured actual loss exposures and incubated fallacious investor 
complacency; (5) the downturn of the credit cycle brought doubts about the quality, security design, and 
pricing of high-yield securitization instruments – investors increased the risk premia and curtailed the 
capacity of asset managers to meet liability pressures; (6) short-term funding pressures and growing 
investor distrust and fly to safe assets conspired to magnify asset price deflation caused by mark-to-
market valuation under fair value accounting standards; (7) issuers created structured investment vehicles 
that borrowed short-term money by issuing asset-backed commercial paper to fund the purchase of long-
term credit-linked securities, thus creating a ill-fated maturity mismatch; and (8) the decrease of asset 
values leads to a liquidity reduction, a elevated asset price volatility, and funding constrains, causing 
significant market distress. 
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wisdom which emphasizes the distorted incentives that developed at all stages of the 
securitization process, and which allowed the ‘hot potato’ of bad loans to pass through 
the financial system to be held finally in the hands of unsuspecting final investors.” 
Several authors [e.g., Alles (2001), Jobst (2006a), and Jobst (2009)] argue that 
securitization may lead to a severe principal-agent problem when the originator retains 
little or no interest in the pool of securitized assets. In this case, the originator does not 
have the same incentive to pay attention to the creditworthiness of its customers as 
would be the case when the assets remains in its balance sheet. This idea is corroborated 
by Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), which assert that “[G]iven the ability of lenders to pass 
along subprime loans into the capital markets via credit enhancement […] lenders have 
been viewed by critics of securitization as abandoning their responsibility of evaluating 
the creditworthiness of potential borrowers.” 
Gorton (2009) argues that an important problem is the loss of information when high 
complex structures are used to implement a securitization transaction. In the presence of 
asymmetric information, originators and issuers might be tempted to pursue their own 
economic incentives, which imposes a substantial agency cost on efficient asset 
securitization.
454
 Asymmetric information problems can come from (1) the information 
advantage of the originator with respect to the quality of borrowers and the historical 
performance of individual asset exposures – adverse selection; and (2) the complex 
security design of securitized assets, which suggests superior information of arrangers 
about the true valuation of issued securities. Jobst (2009) points out that “[T]he cause of 
the crisis can be traced to market failure stemming from conflicts of interest in the 
securitization process and ill-designed mechanisms to mitigate the impact of 
asymmetric information.”455 
Finally, the process of financial disintermediation via securitization may reduce the 
effectiveness of monetary policy, because banks derive more of their funding from 
                                                 
454
 Asymmetric information could lead to moral hazard on part of the issuers (asset originators in true sale 
transactions) if their effort level before and after the issue date is not incentive compatible with investor 
interests. 
455
 Empirically, Downing, Jaffee, and Wallace (2009), based on a data set of MBS issued between 1991 
and 2002, found that informed originators trade lemons in the mortgage market; i.e., the assets sold to the 
SPV are of lower quality compared to assets that are retained on the balance sheet. This idea is also 
corroborated by Titman and Tsyplakov (2010). They show that poorly performing originators are more 
willing to originate riskier mortgages because they have less incentive to carefully evaluate the credit 
quality of prospective borrowers. 
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capital markets. As asserted by Fabozzi and Kothari (2007), “… during periods of tight 
monetary policy, banks can originate loans and then securitize the loans rather than 
holding them in their portfolio. This avoids the need for banks to fund the loans 
originated.” For example, Loutskina and Strahan (2009) show that securitization has 
weakened the link between bank funding conditions and credit supply.
456
 
 
Tax, Accounting, and Legal Issues 
The main tax issue in securitization is related to whether there will be taxation at the 
level of the vehicle company; i.e., will the payments of the borrowers be considered 
taxable income to the SPV? Because the sole purpose of the SPV is to buy and hold 
assets until they liquidate, SPVs have no outside sources of income. The introduction of 
an entity-level tax would render most securitizations uneconomic. Moreover, originators 
desire to treat securitization as a financing for tax purposes rather than as a sale. As 
pointed out by Davidson et al. (2003), “[S]ale treatment from a tax standpoint would 
generally accelerate taxable income. Issuers are also concerned that the securitization 
is tax effective and does not result in nondeductible interest costs or double taxation of 
residual income.” In a typical securitization, a trust is used to receive the pool of assets 
and issue securities backed by these assets, because it allows to minimize the issuer’s 
tax burden and it also establishes a legal separation between the originator and the pool 
of assets deposited in the trust.
457
 
The key accounting issue is whether the securitization will be treated as a ‘true sale’ or 
a financing operation. Originators generally seek to record a securitization as a sale 
which requires immediate recognition of gain or loss on the transaction. Thus, based on 
                                                 
456
 Based on mortgages loans, Estrella (2002) and Kuttner (2000) support that securitization has had a 
significant impact on monetary policy. Similarly, Goswami, Jobst, and Long (2009) argue that the “… 
transmission of monetary policy and its impact on the real economy may have become more complex, 
owing partly to financial innovation, such as securitization.” They show that in mature markets 
securitization has lowered the impact of the monetary policy. 
457
 See Davidson et al. (2003) for a more detailed description of issuing vehicles – e.g., grantor trusts, 
owner trusts, revolving trusts, master trusts, real estate mortgage investment conduits (REMICs), and 
financial asset securitization investment trusts (FASITs). 
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the proceeds of the sale of the bonds and the value of retained interests, firms may 
record a gain (or loss) on sale when completing a securitization transaction.
458
 
The fundamental legal issue in securitization is whether the vehicle company, created 
for the purpose of holding the collateral, has sufficient title to the assets and is protected 
from bankruptcy or other disruptions at the issuing.
459
 
In summary, the key elements of any securitization transaction are legislation, 
regulatory framework, and tax environment; i.e., if an originator considers to securitize 
a portfolio of assets it has to be aware of applicable laws, security regulation, and tax 
regime that may impact on the transaction. This holds particularly true for a post-credit 
crisis market. The securitization market has seen considerable regulatory changes 
during and following the credit crisis, which are likely to continue until 2013/2014.
460
 
 
The Securitization Market 
According to Tasca and Zambelli (2005), “[T]he concept of asset securitization was 
introduced in the US financial system in the 1970s, when the Government National 
Mortgage Association issued securities backed by a pool of loans, represented by 
residential mortgages.” This is the major reason for the development of the strong U.S. 
housing finance market. Afterwards, securitization technique has been applied to other 
assets such as credit card payments and auto loans receivables. It has also been 
employed as part of asset/liability management, in order to manage balance sheet risk 
for financial institutions. The first European transaction was also a RMBS, issued in the 
U.K. in 1987. Around the early 1990s the first securitizations from other European 
countries have started. The first countries to join the U.K. in issuing ABS were Spain 
and France. These countries continued to be the main issuers until the mid-1990s, when 
Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Italy, and Germany joined the growing list of countries using 
                                                 
458
 As pointed out by Roever and Fabozzi (2003), the principal “… among the accounting issues is 
whether the financing meets the requirements for off-balance-sheet treatment.” Usually, an asset transfer 
that is treated as a true sale for legal purposes qualifies as off-balance sheet financing if the SPV is a 
legally independent company from the seller. 
459
 See, e.g., Rutledge and Raynes (2010) for a further explanation of the legal and accounting treatment 
of securitization transactions. 
460
 See Krebsz (2011) for further discussion of the legislative initiatives implemented in E.U. and U.S.; 
e.g., Basel III, EU Green Paper on Corporate Governance, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act – Asset-backed securities, and proposals to strengthen financial supervision in 
Europe. 
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securitization. But it was in the second half of the 1990s that securitization really began 
to take off as legislative changes in many countries began to simplify the process and to 
allow securitization to expand into new countries and asset classes. Finally, the 
introduction of the euro in 1999 has significantly increased the importance of the 
European securitization market.
461
 Thus, till mid-2007 it has rapidly developed within 
U.S. and Europe. 
The diversity of the assets and the direct involvement of the public sector are 
characteristics differentiating the European market from the much larger and developed 
U.S. market. While, in U.S., the catalyst for securitization was the U.S. government’s 
objective for encouraging home ownership and creating a secondary market for 
mortgages, in Europe, there has been no government body to act as a catalyst. In most 
European countries, larger commercial banks have issued the first MBS with the 
objectives of regulatory arbitrage, diversification of funding sources, and as a response 
to the appeal of international investors. A number of governments started to use 
securitization as a means of reducing public budget deficits in order to meet the 
Maastricht criteria. Additionally, “[T]he lack of a large powerful body to provide for 
homogenization and standards and the differing legal frameworks on each European 
government provide a very different setting for securitization than in the United States.” 
[Adams (2005)].
462
 
The span and maturity of U.S. market means that most legal issues (at least the basics) 
have long since been settled. However, in Europe, the legal setup of a deal is crucial, 
complicated, and is the main upfront cost for originators. In a securitization transaction 
in Europe, there are three important areas to think about with respect to legislation: (1) 
type of law – Napoleonic (e.g., Belgium, Spain, France, Luxemburg, and Portugal), 
Anglo-Saxon (e.g., United Kingdom), or Germanic (e.g., Sweden, Denmark, Finland, 
Norway, Austria, Netherlands, and Germany); (2) securing the assets and cash flows; 
and (3) local framework for securitization. That is why Adams (2005) asserts that “… 
although we may at times discuss the European securitization market as if it were a 
                                                 
461
 According to Altunbas et al. (2009), in addition to the inception of the single currency “… more 
regional factors such as the closer integration in European financial markets as well as a move towards a 
more market-based financial system…” can explain the escalation in securitization in Euro zone. 
462
 The wide divergence in market sizes within the European countries is a reflection of the very different 
economic, political, historical, legal, and social frameworks. 
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single market, it is in fact a collection of quite distinct markets, which differ 
considerably in their legal systems, the nature of their financial sectors, and social 
attributes. These differences are reflected in the variety of securitization structures and 
transactions types.” 
 
The use of securitization has increased since the beginning of the financial crisis in 
August 2007. However, the European sovereign debt crisis has limited the increase of 
securitized products; and its use has changed since that time, namely because an 
increasing number of banks have underwritten their own securitization programs, to use 
them as a guarantee for obtaining resources in the auctions of the European Central 
Bank (ECB), issuing the so-called Covered Bonds. According to Cardone-Riportella et 
al. (2010), this practice have partially replaced the issue of debt, or the interbank market 
itself, as sources of finance to enable banks to grant loans.
463
 
Looking to the evolution of the structured finance markets, it is possible to conclude 
that asset securitization has become one of the most visible consequences of financial 
innovation in recent years. In Europe, the volume of securitized assets grew from Euros 
78.2 billion in 2000 to Euros 711.1 billion in 2008. Although the current financial crisis, 
in which securitization seems to have played a determinant role, the pressing need for 
liquidity among financial entities provoked a sharp change after the first quarter of 
2008. In 2010, a total of Euros 382.9 billion of securitized products were issued in 
Europe, a decline of 7.52% from 2009 (Euros 414.1 billion). RMBS continues to make 
up the majority of placed issuance (Euros 271.7 billion in 2010), followed by SME 
loans (Euros 39.7 billion), ABS (Euros 31.4 billion), CDO (Euros 29.6 billion), CMBS 
(Euros 6.1 billion), and WBS (Euros 4.5 billion).
464
 
                                                 
463
 See Krebsz (2011) for a further discussion of the market evolution of securitization post 2007/2008 
financial crisis. 
464
 Data according to the Association for Financial Markets in Europe Securitisation Data Report Q3: 
2011, available at http://www.afme.eu/reports.aspx. 
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Annex 2: Project Finance
465
 
 
Definition of Project Finance 
Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001) present project finance as the process of financing “… a 
particular economic unit in which a lender is satisfied to look initially to the cash flows 
and earnings of that economic unit as the source of funds from which a loan will be 
repaid and to the assets of the economic unit as collateral for the loan.” Thus, the 
funding does not depend on the reliability and creditworthiness of the sponsors and does 
not even depend on the value of assets that sponsors make available to financiers. In this 
line of reasoning, Gatti (2005) refers to project finance as “… the structured financing 
of a specific economic unit that the sponsors create by means of share capital, and for 
which the financier considers cash flows as the source of loan reimbursement, whereas 
project assets only represent collateral.” 
Considering that debt repayment comes from the project only rather from any other 
entity (nonrecourse debt),
466
 Esty (2004b) defines project finance as a transaction that 
“… involves the creation of a legally independent project company financed with equity 
from one or more sponsoring firms and non-recourse debt for the purpose of investing 
in a capital asset.” Esty focuses on the following three key decisions related to the use 
of project finance: (1) investment decision (involving industrial assets); (2) 
organizational decision (creation of a legally independent company to own the assets – 
off-balance sheet form of financing); and (3) financing decision (nonrecourse debt – 
debt can be structured without recourse to the sponsors). This definition distinguishes 
project finance from other (structured) financing vehicles like securitization, leveraged 
acquisitions, and structured leasing. 
                                                 
465
 For enlightening theoretical studies of project finance see, among others, Shah and Thakor (1987), 
John and John (1991), Chemmanur and John (1996), and An and Cheung (2010). Brealey, Cooper, and 
Habib (1996), Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007), and Esty (2001, 
2002b, 2007), among others, present important descriptive studies on this area of research. For interesting 
empirical studies see, e.g., Esty and Megginson (2003), Sorge (2004), Dailami and Hauswald (2007), 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), and Kleimeier and Versteeg (2010). 
466
 At the other extreme, in conventional corporate financing, lenders rely on the overall creditworthiness 
of the enterprise financing a new project to provide them security. Project finance differs from asset 
securitization because while the borrower is a legal independent entity as it is in asset securitization, the 
structure is project financing and do not involve financial assets. 
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Over the last 35 years, project finance has been an important source of funding for 
public and private ventures around the world. It is most commonly used for capital-
intensive facilities and utilities – such as power plants, refineries, toll roads, pipelines, 
telecommunications facilities, and industrial plants – with relatively transparent cash 
flows, in riskier than average countries, using relatively long-term financing.
467
 In Gatti 
(2008), Megginson refers that “... the distinguishing features of project finance (PF) 
are, first, that creditors share much of the venture’s business risk and, second, that 
funding is obtained strictly for the project itself…”. 
The given definitions of project finance emphasize the idea that lenders have no claim 
to any other assets than the project itself. Therefore, lenders must completely satisfy 
themselves with a project fully capable of meeting its debt and equity liabilities. The 
success of a project finance transaction is highly associated with structuring the 
financing of a project through as little recourse as possible to the sponsor, while at the 
same time providing sufficient credit support through guarantees or undertakings of a 
sponsor or third party so that lenders will be satisfied with the credit risk.
468
 As pointed 
out by Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996), the allocation of specific project risks to 
those parties best able to manage them is one of the key comparative advantages of 
project finance. 
 
Project Finance Characteristics and Players 
Project finance, commonly referred as ‘off-balance-sheet’ financing, is often used to 
segregate the credit risk of the project from that of its sponsors so that lenders, 
investors, and other parties will appraise the project strictly on its own merits.
469
 It 
involves the creation of an entirely new vehicle company, with a limited life, for each 
new investment project. Project companies (1) are legally independent entities with very 
                                                 
467
 This idea is corroborated by Megginson (2010) who asserts that project finance “… has proven to be 
an especially efficient method of obtaining long-term, relatively low-cost financing for capital intensive 
projects in relatively risky countries.” Project finance is not used in funding high-risk investments with 
uncertain returns. So it is rarely used to fund research and development activities, new product 
introductions or other intangible investments. 
468
 See Fabozzi et al. (2006) for a description of the key elements of a successful project financing 
transaction. 
469
 The idea is not to hide a liability of the sponsor from creditors, stockholders or rating agencies since 
the obligations of a sponsor with respect to the project may have to be shown in the sponsor’s financial 
statements or in footnotes thereto. 
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concentrated equity ownership; (2) have high leverage;
470
 and (3) are funded through a 
series of legal contracts.
471
 This idea is corroborated by Esty (2004b), who describes 
project finance as a form of financing based on a standalone entity (project company), 
with highly levered capital structures, concentrated equity ownership,
472
 and 
concentrated debt ownership.
473
  
The core of project finance is the analysis of project risks, namely: (i) construction risk; 
(ii) operating risk; (iii) market risk; (iv) regulatory risk; (v) insurance risk; and (vi) 
currency risk.
474
 These risks are allocated contractually to the parties best able to 
manage them.
475
 The process of risk management is usually based on the following 
interrelated steps: (1) risk identification; (2) risk analysis; (3) risk transfer and 
allocation; and (4) residual risk management. Gatti (2008) argues that the process of 
risk management is crucial in project finance transactions and they must be identified 
and allocated to create an efficient incentivizing tool for the parties involved.
476
 
Gatti (2005) points out the following five distinctive features of a project finance 
transaction: (1) the debtor is a project company (special purpose vehicle) that is 
financially and legally independent from the sponsors – project companies are 
standalone entities; (2) financiers have only limited or no recourse to the sponsors – 
                                                 
470
 According to Esty (2004b), project companies’ “… average book value debt-to-total capitalization 
ratio is 70%, which is roughly two to three times higher than the average leverage ratio of a typical 
publicly traded company.” 
471
 Esty (2003) identifies the following structural attributes of project companies: (1) involve separate 
legal incorporation; (2) employ very high leverage compared to public companies; (3) have highly 
concentrated debt and equity ownership structures; (4) board of directors are comprised primarily of 
affiliated directors from sponsoring firms; and (5) have complex contractual structures. 
472
 The typical project finance transaction has few shareholders (three of four) compared to hundred or 
thousand shareholders in public companies. 
473
 Using a sample of 495 project finance loan tranches (made between 1986 and 2000), Esty and 
Megginson (2003) conclude that “[T]he tranches exhibit high absolute levels of debt ownership 
concentration: the largest single bank holds 23% while the top five banks collectively hold 61.2% of a 
typical tranche.” See, e.g., Esty (2003) and Esty and Sesia (2004) for more extensive description of the 
institutional details of project companies. 
474
 Fabozzi et al. (2006) present three main timeframes in which project finance risks can be divided: (i) 
engineering and construction phase; (ii) start-up phase; and (iii) operations phase. Gatti (2008) identifies 
risks related to the precompletion phase – activity planning risk, technological risk, and construction risk 
or completion risk; risks related to the postcompletion phase – supply risk, operating risk, and demand 
risk; and risks related to both phases – interest rate risk, exchange risk, inflation risk, environmental risk, 
regulatory risk, political risk, country risk, legal risk, and credit risk or counterparty risk. 
475
 For example, through construction guarantees, purchase agreements and other type of output contracts, 
supply agreements, insurance policies, indemnifications, and other contractual agreements. 
476
 Thus, project finance can be seen as a system for distributing risk among the parties involved in a 
venture; i.e., the effective identification and allocation of risks allows the minimization of the volatility of 
cash flows generated by the project. 
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their involvement is limited in terms of time, amount and quality;
477
 (3) project risks are 
allocated to those parties that are best able to manage them;
478
 (4) the cash flow 
generated by the project must be sufficient to cover operating cash flows and service the 
debt in terms of interest and debt repayment; and (5) collateral is given by sponsors to 
financiers as security for cash inflows and assets tied up in managing the project. 
Corielli et al. (2010) argue that one of the key characteristics of project finance 
transactions is the existence of a network of nonfinancial contracts (NFCs),
479
 organized 
by the SPV with third parties, often involving the sponsoring firms as well; i.e., a 
project finance transaction can be viewed as a nexus of contracts between the players 
involved in such a deal.
480
 According to Corielli et al. (2010), of the numerous contracts 
four are particularly important, which are: (1) construction contracts and engineering, 
procurement, and construction (EPC) – closed on a turnkey basis; (2) purchasing 
agreements – to guarantee raw materials to the SPV at predefined quantities, quality, 
and prices; (3) selling agreements – enables the SPV to sell part or all of its output to a 
third party that commits to buy unconditionally at predefined prices and for a given 
period of time; and (4) operation and maintenance agreements – compliant with 
predefined service-level agreements. This contractual bundle is then presented to 
creditors to seek debt financing, serving as the basis for negotiating the quantity and the 
cost of external funding. Exhibit 1 presents a graphic representation of typical 
contractual framework in project financing. 
 
 
                                                 
477
 Banks have no recourse to assets of parties launching the project in the event of default. As referred by 
Gatti (2008), “[T]his means that risks associated with the deal must be assessed in a different way than 
risks concerning companies already in operation.” 
478
 A Project finance transaction must first of all demonstrate that it has a balanced and viable allocation 
of risks between the various parties concerned. Even when there is limited recourse instead of no 
recourse, the situation is the same. For example, construction risk is borne by the contractor, the risk of 
insufficient demands for the project output by the purchaser, etc. See Gatti (2005) for a comprehensive 
comparison between project financing and corporate financing. 
479
 They define nonfinancial contracts as “… contracts that generate cash inflows and outflows that affect 
the unlevered free cash flows of the SPV.” 
480
 Project finance is commonly referred as ‘contractual finance’: the project company sign contracts with 
construction firms, suppliers, customers, host governments, and lenders. As referred by Esty and 
Megginson (2003), “[T]his nexus of contracts, to use Jensen and Meckling (1976) characterization of the 
firm, is intended to ensure loans repayment when the project is solvent and loan recoverability when the 
project is in default.” See, e.g., Gatti (2008) for a description and explanation of the network of contracts 
that the SPV sets up with all the different counterparties. 
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Exhibit 1: Typical contract structure of a project finance deal. 
Source: Adapted from Buljevich and Park (1999). 
 
It is possible to identify the following key players in project finance (see Exhibit 1): (1) 
the project sponsors;
481
 (2) the host government (and often state-owned enterprises);
482
 
(3) the constructing and engineering firms; (4) the legal specialists; (5) the accounting, 
financial, and risk assessment professionals; (6) the lead arranging banks;
483
 (7) the 
                                                 
481
 A controlling stake in the equity of the separate company established for the purpose of undertaking 
the project will typically be owned by a single project sponsor, or by a group of sponsors. There are four 
types of sponsors that are often involved in project finance transactions and invest in the SPV [Gatti 
(2008)]: (1) industrial sponsors – see project finance as an initiative linked to their core business; (2) 
public sponsors – government or other public bodies whose aims center on social welfare; (3) contract 
sponsors – they develop, build and run the projects and provide equity and/or subordinated debt to the 
SPV; and (4) purely financial sponsors – they invest capital with the aim of gathering high returns (e.g., 
commercial banks, multilateral development banks, and private equity funds). 
482
 The project company will in most cases need to obtain a concession from the host government. 
Additionally, sometimes the host government needs to establish a new regulatory framework or provide 
environmental permits. 
483
 If the inception of the SPV is the first step in all project finance transactions, the work developed by 
the lead arranging bank is crucial. We can identify the following three key tasks executed by lead 
arrangers: (1) perform the due diligence on the vehicle company and the project itself to ensure that all 
potential adverse information is revealed before loan syndication; (2) design an optimal loan syndicate 
that will deters strategic defaults but allows for efficient negotiation in the event of liquidity defaults; and 
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participating banks;
484
 and (8) the suppliers and customers. A single participant in a 
project finance deal can take on a number of roles; e.g., a contractor can be sponsor, 
builder, and operator at the same time; banks can be sponsors and lenders 
simultaneously. As asserted by Gatti (2008), “… in project finance transactions, the fact 
that only a few players (i.e., the sponsors) participate in a variety of ways is perfectly 
natural. In fact, the primary interest of sponsors is to appropriate the highest share of 
cash flows generated by the project.” Furthermore, not all the organizations shown in 
Exhibit 1 are necessarily involved. For example, a deal with exclusively private actors 
would not count sponsors belonging to the public sector. Finally, we present a structure 
in which financing is provided directly to the SPV. However, financing may also be 
structured through leasing vehicles or with a bond offer to the financial market. 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of Project Financing  
Nevitt and Fabozzi (2001) assert that any one or a combination of the following 
objectives may be a motivation for a borrower to use a project finance transaction: (1) to 
avoid affecting its credit rating; (2) to avoid showing increased debt on the balance 
sheet – so as not to impact financial ratios;485 (3) to limit direct liability to a certain 
period of time, to avoid a liability for the remaining life of the project; (4) to avoid 
being within the scope of restrictive covenants in an indenture or loan agreement that 
precludes direct debt financing or leases for the project. The authors claim that 
“[P]roject financing can sometimes be used to improve the return on the capital 
invested in a project by leveraging the investment to a greater extent than would be 
possible in a straight commercial financing of the project.” Being true that leverage 
increases expected equity returns, a higher leverage also increases equity risk and 
                                                                                                                                               
(3) spearhead monitoring of the borrower after the loan closes and discourage the sponsor from 
strategically defaulting or otherwise expropriating project cash flows [Gatti (2008)]. 
484
 A large fraction of the needed finance for the infrastructure projects is generally raised in the form of 
debt from a syndicate of lenders such as banks and specialized lending institutions and, less frequently, 
from bond markets. Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996) present ownership structure differences between 
these two forms of financing as the main reason for the widespread use of bank finance. They assert that 
“[T]he concentrated ownership of bank debt encourages lending banks to devote considerable resources 
to evaluating the project.” 
485
 The off-balance sheet treatment of the funding raised by the SPV is crucial for sponsors since it has 
only limited impact on sponsors’ creditworthiness, and does not impact sponsors’ ability to access 
additional financing in the future. This advantage of project finance for sponsors is also presented in 
literature by Shah and Thakor (1987), John and John (1991), and Chemmanur and John (1996). 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 293 
expected distress costs [Esty (2003)]. Thus, we need more compelling motivations to 
use project finance. 
To understand the motivations for using project finance we need a thorough 
understanding of why the combination of a firm plus a project might be worth more 
when financed separately with nonrecourse debt (project finance) than when they are 
financed jointly with corporate funds (corporate financing).
486
 Brealey, Cooper, and 
Habib (1996) argue that project finance creates value by resolving agency problems and 
improving risk management. Esty (2003, 2004a, 2004b) takes a more general view of 
the problem and presents the following four primary motivations for using this type of 
structured finance transactions: (1) agency cost motivation;
487
 (2) debt overhang 
motivation;
488
 (3) risk management motivation;
489
 and (4) asymmetric information 
motivation.
490
 Another economic benefit pointed out by Esty (1999) is the reduction of 
                                                 
486
 A sponsor can select to finance a new investment project using two alternatives: (1) the new project is 
financed on-balance sheet – corporate financing; (2) the new project is financed off-balance sheet by 
incorporation into a newly created economic entity (SPV) – project financing. See Gatti (2008) for further 
discussion of the main differences, advantages, and disadvantages between corporate financing and 
project financing. 
487
 Project finance can be used to mitigate costly agency conflicts (1) inside project companies – conflicts 
between sponsors (ownership) and managers (control) and conflicts between sponsors and related parties; 
and (2) among capital providers – conflicts between debt holders and equity holders. Project finance 
highly levered capital structures plays an important disciplinary role because it prevents managers from 
wasting free cash flow, and deters related parties from trying to appropriate it [Esty (2004b)]. 
488
 Esty (2004a) argues that project finance transactions “… reduce leverage-induced underinvestment in 
sponsoring companies, a phenomenon known as ‘debt-overhang’.” So, this type of structured finance 
transactions allows companies with little spare debt capacity to avoid the opportunity cost of 
underinvestment in positive NPV projects. According to Esty (2003) project finance solves this problem 
“… by allocating project returns to new capital providers in a way that cannot be replicated using 
corporate debt.” Because this conflict occurs at the sponsor rather than the project level we distinguish 
the debt-overhang problem from agency cost motivation. See Myers (1977) for further development of 
debt overhang phenomenon. 
489
 Underinvestment problems due to distress costs and/or managerial risk aversion [Stulz (1984)] can be 
reduced through project finance transactions. The nonrecourse nature of project debt protects the 
sponsoring firm from risk contamination (i.e., when a failing project drags a healthy sponsoring firm into 
default or impose increased distress costs on it). As asserted by Esty (2004b), project finance “… allows 
the firm to isolate asset risk in separate entity where it has limited ability to inflict collateral damage on 
the sponsoring firm; in essence, it allows firms to truncate large left-hand tail outcomes, which Stulz 
(1996) claims is the primary goal of risk management.” Additionally, project finance creates value by 
improving risk management inside the project. Risks are allocated with the goals of reducing cost and 
ensuring proper benefits; i.e., they are allocated to the parties that are in the best position to manage them. 
490
 Project finance can help to reduce underinvestment due to asymmetric information. According to Esty 
(1999) “[T]he separation of projects from the sponsoring firm or firms facilitates initial credit decisions 
[…] With a small lending syndicate and extensive negotiations, it is relatively easy to convey information 
that would either be more difficult with a larger group of creditors or undesirable for competitive 
reasons.” In a incomplete information framework, the joint evaluation of the project and existing assets 
can be problematic. In this line of reasoning, Shah and Thakor (1987) point out that the main benefit of 
project finance is to reduce the information search costs. Similarly, Kensinger and Martin (1988) argue, 
based on a signaling model, that riskier projects should be projected-financed to reduce signaling costs. 
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corporate taxes, namely: (1) tax rate reductions and tax holidays are commonly 
observed in project finance deals; and (2) high leverage increments interest tax 
shields.
491
 
Project finance is of great demand when it does not have a substantial impact on the 
balance sheet or the creditworthiness of the sponsoring entity or entities. According to 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) “[T]he ultimate goal in project financing is to arrange a 
borrowing for a project that will benefit the sponsor but at the same time have 
absolutely no recourse to the sponsor, and therefore no effect on its credit standing or 
balance sheet.” They point out the following benefits from using project financing: (1) 
improvement in the return on invested capital by leveraging investment – higher 
leverage may be achieved; (2) availability of credit sources and/or guarantees to the 
project that would not otherwise be accessible to the sponsor; (3) better credit terms and 
lower interest costs;
492
 (4) prevention of regulatory problems affecting the sponsor; and 
(5) segregation of costs for regulatory purposes. 
Gatti (2005) argues that the use of project finance potentially enables sponsors to obtain 
several benefits, namely: (1) reduction of funding costs;
493
 (2) maintenance of the 
sponsors’ financial flexibility;494 (3) higher debt-to-equity ratios;495 and (4) ‘insurance’ 
                                                 
491
 This idea is corroborated by John and John (1991), who refer that project financing increases value by 
increasing value of tax shields. 
492
 Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that “… floating-rate PF loans have lower credit spreads (over 
LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans.” According to Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), the distinctive 
role of banks is to overcome information problems and minimize adverse selection in the lending market. 
Financial intermediation, information revelations, and monitoring are the channels through which banks 
reduce the costs of funds [Diamond (1984)]. Project finance enables lenders to distinguish project 
performance from firm performance, monitor project management decisions, and determine the cash flow 
available for interest and principal repayment. 
493
 As asserted by Gatti (2005), this happens when the “… structuring cost for the initiative (that in any 
event is very high, especially if the deal is extremely complex) is less than the saving on funding cost, 
owing to the improved credit rating obtainable by the venture when compared to that of the sponsor.” 
The same intuition is presented by Esty (2003) which states that “… project finance reduces the net cost 
of financing these assets [i.e.] project companies have evolved as institutional structures that reduce the 
cost of performing important financial functions such as pooling resources, managing risk, and 
transferring resources through time and space…” In short, project finance reduces risk by virtue of credit 
enhancement and other structuring devices that reduce lender exposure by altering borrowers risk profiles 
over time. 
494
 If the project to be implemented will represent a significant part of the sponsor’s assets, its 
implementation will increase debt and the cost of future credit lines and eventually preclude future 
initiatives with a positive NPV. By using project finance – a off-balance sheet structured deal – the 
funding concerns an ad hoc legal entity involving no or limited recourse to the sponsor. 
495
 According to Gatti (2008) this is possible because “[P]roject finance allows for a high level of risk 
allocation among participants in the transaction.” Esty (2002a) argues that project companies located in 
countries with a high sovereign debt rating – measured according to Standard and Poor's rating system – 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 295 
against any eventual negative impact of the project.
496
 In 2008, Gatti focused on two 
essential benefits: (1) separate incorporation and prevention of contamination risk – the 
separation of large, risky projects in an SPV, that is, off-balance sheet, avoids that the 
new project contaminates the company or other projects; and (2) conflicts of interest 
between sponsors and lenders and wealth expropriation – the separation between the 
company and the new investment project is always the first best option for shareholders, 
but can cause wealth expropriation from creditors. 
In conclusion, sponsors use project finance where the structure can reduce the costs 
associated with market imperfections. As pointed out by Esty (1999), “… the size of the 
transactions costs incurred in structuring deals suggests that the benefits from reducing 
information asymmetries, incentive conflicts, taxes, and distress costs must be 
significant.” 
 
Despite the advantages, it is possible to identify several disadvantages of project 
finance. According to Fabozzi et al. (2006) the main disadvantages are: (1) complexity 
(in terms of designing the transaction and writing the required documentation); (2) 
higher costs of borrowing when compared to conventional financing; (3) the negotiation 
of the financing and operating agreements is time-consuming. As pointed out by Esty 
(2004a), project finance also has some drawbacks, particularly: it is expensive to set up, 
it takes a long time to execute, and it is highly restrictive once in place.
497
 Similarly, 
Gatti (2008) refers that the principal drawback of project finance is that structuring such 
a deal is more costly than the corporate financing option. The author presents the 
following reasons: “1. The legal, technical, and insurance advisors of the sponsors and 
the loan arranger need a great deal of time to evaluate the project and negotiate the 
contracts term to be included in the documentation; 2. The cost of monitoring the 
project in process is very high; 3. Lenders are expected to pay significant costs in 
exchange for taking on greater risks.” 
                                                                                                                                               
have higher debt to total capitalization ratios than those project companies located in countries with a low 
debt rating. Similarly, Vaaler, James, and Aguilera (2008) find that project firms located in countries with 
common law legal systems, stronger creditor rights, and wealthier economies generally have higher 
leverages, indicative of lower project risk. 
496
 The author argues that in project finance the only collateral is the project’s cash flows and assets, 
whereas the sponsor’s assets remain unencumbered. 
497
 Esty (2003) estimates transaction costs to be around 5% of the deal value. 
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Although some counter-intuitive features of project finance when compared to 
corporate financing – e.g., the creation of a stand-alone company takes more time, 
entails greater transaction costs, higher leverage increases the probability of default, 
and, in most cases, this implies higher debt rates – Esty (2004b) refers that in practice 
“… the individual structural components fit together in a very coherent and symbiotic 
way, and can reduce the net financing costs associated with large capital 
investments…” Similarly, Bonetti et al. (2010) refer that “… a cost/benefit analysis 
reveals that the additional expenses are more than compensated for by the advantages 
that arise from off-balance sheet financing and appropriate risk allocation.” 
 
Financing the Deal
498
 
According to Megginson (2010) project finance projects are “… funded with small 
amounts of private equity contributions and much larger amounts of nonrecourse 
syndicated loans, which are the principal external, capital-market financing.” Thus, 
equity and bank debt are the principal financing instruments in a project finance 
transaction. The SPV’s shareholders are expected to provide a certain amount of equity 
capital in order to demonstrate their commitment to the project.
499
 Debt funding can 
consist of either bank debt – this has been the common means of financing – or 
financing from bond issues or a combination of both. Bank debt tends to be more 
expensive than bonds with higher rates and shorter loan duration. However, once a 
project has completed the development phase including construction, the risk profile 
alters and the SPV can obtain better refinancing terms and lower rates for the rest of its 
projected life. 
Syndicated loans are the prominent form of funding for project-financed investments.
500
 
Esty and Megginson (2003) find that: (1) debt ownership is highly and significantly 
more concentrated than equity ownership; and (2) debt ownership concentration is 
                                                 
498
 See Gatti (2008) – Chapter 6 – for further discussion of how syndicated loans and bond issues are 
organized and how sponsors can obtain funds to invest in their projects. 
499
 According to Fox and Tott (1999) this proportion depends upon the risk profile of the project, 
commonly between 10% and 15% of the total project costs. 
500
 As asserted by Esty and Megginson (2003), “[A] bank syndicate is a collection of banks that jointly 
extends a loan to a specific borrower […] Lending syndicates resemble pyramids with a few arranging 
banks (arrangers) at the top and many providing banks (providers) at the bottom.” See Esty (2001) for a 
more detailed description of the syndication process. 
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positively related to the strength of creditor rights and the reliability of legal 
enforcement. 
Large-scale projects require substantial investments up-front and only start to generate 
cash inflows after a relatively long construction period. Thus, as pointed out by Sorge 
and Gadanecz (2008), “… matching debt repayment obligations with project revenue 
cash flows implies that, on average, project finance is characterized by much longer 
maturities compared to other forms of financing.” In terms of the cost of funding, 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) assert that “… floating-rate PF loans have lower 
credit spreads (over LIBOR) than do most comparable non-PF loans.” The absence of a 
clear relationship between spreads and maturity in PF seemed a particular puzzle. Sorge 
and Gadanecz (2008) argue that whereas spreads for both investment and speculative-
grade loans other than project finance are a positive linear function of maturity, PF 
loans have a ‘hump-shaped’ or non-linear term structure. This occurs because: (1) as PF 
loans tend to have short-term liquidity constrains, lenders grant longer maturities to 
avoid increasing the projects’ probability of default; and (2) projects go through fairly 
predictable risk phases that are gradually resolved, with spreads first raising and then 
falling over time. 
 
Project Financing Recent Trends
501
 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) point out that “[T]he use of project finance to fund 
natural resources, electric power, transportation, and other ventures around the world 
has risen steadily for the past four decades, from its modern beginnings financing 
development of the North Sea oil fields during the 1970s.” Data reported by Esty and 
Sesia (2007) indicate that, in the United States, the project finance market is smaller 
than the total value of corporate bond issues but larger than the total value of funds 
raised through initial public offerings or venture capital funds – considering all global 
markets, project finance bank loans and project bonds recorded 23% and 15% 
compound annual growth rates, respectively, from 1994 to 2006. Project finance hasn’t 
contracted significantly during current financial crisis when compared to other forms of 
                                                 
501
 See Fabozzi et al. (2006) for further discussion of project finance recent trends. Gatti (2005, 2008), 
among others, presents an interesting perspective of the market evolution over the years, focusing on the 
European situation and on sectors that adopt project finance techniques and PPP initiatives. 
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financing. Indeed, the total value of project finance arranged worldwide hit a record of 
$320.9 billion during 2008, and dropped only 9% to $292.5 billion during 2009.
502
 As 
asserted by Megginson (2010), “[C]learly, PF has been gaining global financing 
market share over the past two decades, especially as a vehicle for channeling 
development capital to emerging markets.” This indicates that the financial crisis has 
had a small impact on the financing of large infrastructures and still represents a 
promising segment of global lending activity. 
According to Gatti (2005) the growth trend of project finance transactions in the 
eighties and nineties moved along two lines: (1) expansion of project finance in 
developed countries – promoters begun to promote project finance technique to 
developing country governments as a way to rapidly create basic infrastructures and 
ensure a greater involvement of private capital, guaranteed by Export Credit Agencies 
in their own countries; and (2) development of project finance in developed countries as 
a way to realize projects that had lower market risk coverage or projects in which the 
government intervened to promote realization of public works (public-private 
partnerships). 
As far as financing is concerned, sponsors have been reverting to more structured deals, 
as a way to shift market risk from companies back to the buyers of the project’s output. 
Additionally, sponsors can use various hybrid structures to mitigate risks, which are 
better suited for certain types of assets and have the potential to expand the boundaries 
of project finance into new asset classes. Public private partnerships (PPPs) are an 
example of a hybrid structure that is become more common. As referred by Esty 
(2004a), “PPPs use private capital and private companies to construct and then operate 
project assets, such roads, prisons, and schools, which historically have been financed 
with public resources and operated on a not-for-profit basis. Through PPP structures, 
governments shift construction and operating risks to the private sector, which is 
usually more efficient in building and then running the asset. However, governments 
assume the market risk…”503 In these partnerships the role of public bodies is usually 
based on a concession agreement. 
                                                 
502
 Source: Dealogic. 
503
 Blanc-Brude and Strande (2007) define PPP as “… an increasingly popular method of procurement of 
public infrastructure projects – one in which a public authority commissions the design, construction, 
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Various acronyms are used in practice for the different type of concession agreements, 
namely: (1) BOT (build, operate, and transfer); (2) BOOT (build, own, operate, and 
transfer); and (3) BOO (build, operate, and own).
504
 In UK (the first country to launch a 
systematic program of such projects) PPPs are part of what is known as the Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI), which is a strategic economic policy to migrate public 
administration from being the owner of the assets and infrastructures, becoming rather a 
purchaser of services from private parties.
505
 A government that uses project finance 
obtains both private-sector funding and private-sector management. Project finance 
thereby reduces the need for government borrowing, shifts part of the risks presented by 
the project to the private sector, and aims to achieve more effective management of the 
project [Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996)].
506
 As referred by Blanc-Brude and 
Strange (2007), “… risk transfer is the fundamental theoretical justification of PPP: the 
benefits of efficient risk management by private investors (keeping down construction 
and operating costs delays) are expected to more than offset the cost of risk-pricing by 
private financiers.”507 Klompjan and Wouters (2002) refer that one of the main 
advantages of a PPP for a government or a public entity is allowing a project to proceed 
without being a direct burden on the government’s budget.  
In this regard, a distinction is commonly made among operators: (1) project finance 
initiatives which are fully self-financed (project finance in the strict sense) – the 
assessment is based on the soundness of the contractual framework and the 
counterparties; and (2) those that are partially self-financed – the bankability depends 
considerably on the level of public grants conferred. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
operation, maintenance, and financing of a public infrastructure project from a private consortium within 
a single contractual framework.” Standard and Poor’s definition of a PPP is any medium-to-long term 
relationship between the public and private sectors, involving the sharing of risks and rewards of 
multisector skills, expertise and finance to deliver desired policy outcomes (Standard & Poor’s PPP 
Credit Survey, 2005). 
504
 See Gatti (2008) for an explanation of the different concession agreements. 
505
 See, e.g., Akbiyikli et al. (2006) for further discussion of PFI. 
506
 However, a question can be raised: why project finance if privatization can lead to the same results 
when talking about PPPs? Brealey, Cooper, and Habib (1996) give the following reasons: (1) 
privatization is more complex and involves the entire industry; (2) there are areas (e.g., health and 
education) where it may be possible to involve private funding for particular projects but not for all the 
sector; and (3) “… unless the industry is to be entirely foreign-owned, privatization requires a large 
capital market, in contrast to project financings, which take place piecemeal and over a period of time.” 
507
 Despite all of the advantages connected to PPPs, there also are pivotal points of concern and criticism. 
For example, some critics argue that the cost of funding in a PPP is higher than the cost of public funds. 
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Another important influence on the future of project finance is the impact of bank 
regulation. According to the Basel II accord
508
 (The New Basel Capital Accord), project 
finance loans have higher default and loss rates than commercial loans and, therefore, 
deserve higher capital requirements. In its preliminary assessment, the Committee 
argues that project loans “… posses unique loss distribution and risk characteristics…”, 
including “… greater risk volatility…” than other types of bank loans, which could lead 
to “… both high default rates and high loss rates…” [BIS (2001)]. Thus, spreads on 
low-rated project finance loans would have to increase. 
Casting doubt on such arguments, however, exiting research indicates that project loans 
perform substantially better than corporate loans, and default rates and recovery rates 
are not necessarily correlated. Using a sample of 759 loans, Standard & Poor’s (2004) 
found that the loss given default (LGD) of project finance loans is quite low (25% on 
average) and that, thanks to restructurings, 100% of loan values were maintained in 
their sample. Moreover, the study also reported that PF loans have better LGD rates 
than secured, senior, and senior unsecured corporate debt.
509
 Notwithstanding, the New 
Capital Accord (and even the Basel III accord) states that unless banks qualifies for the 
internal rating based (IRB) approach, the capital reserve requirements for project loans 
must be increased, especially for transactions falling within in the best rating classes.  
Considering the referred change in the regulatory environment, the development of 
methods for offsetting the impact of the New Capital Accord rules on project finance 
loans become a relevant issue. For example, banks developed till mid-2007 their 
capabilities to securitize project finance loans – issuing collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs) or collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), thereby creating a new asset class for 
institutional investors.
510
 Credit Suisse First Boston was the first institution to securitize 
                                                 
508
 Developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, established by the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) with the objective to create international banking standards and develop new standards 
for banks. The BIS, headquartered in Basel, Switzerland, has the mission to serve as a central banks in 
their pursuit of monetary and financial stability, to foster international cooperation in those areas and to 
act as a bank for central banks. 
509
 See also Beale et al. (2002) for a first analysis of this subject. They argue that “[S]ince the loss-given-
default and expected-loss results for project finance loans are lower than corporate finance loans of an 
equivalent rating, less capital is required to reserve against their expected losses.” 
510
 A CDO is a transaction which involves repackaging the risk of a portfolio of financial assets. This risk 
is transferred to an SPV, either by transferring the portfolio to the SPV or using credit derivative 
techniques. The risk is then sold to the capital markets by a way of the issuance of securities by the SPV, 
whereby investors in those securities bear the risk of losses suffered by the portfolio (see Annex 1 for 
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the first portfolio of project loans in 1998, later followed by other banks. Sponsors 
benefit from securitization by gaining quicker access to funds, while banks benefit by 
increasing the speed of lending and useful instruments in order to comply with 
regulatory capital requirements and to increase funds available to finance infrastructure 
and development projects. As asserted by Buscaino et al. (2009) “… PF CDOs still 
remain a valuable means to respond to the unmet need for infrastructural development 
funds considering future reopening of structured credit market.” Although the referred 
benefits, there have been few securitized transactions, as a result of the lack of sufficient 
data available to banks and rating agencies on loss characteristics.
511
 Additionally, 
project loans securitization will remain difficult, and institutional investors are going to 
be reluctant to enter the market after the financial 2007/2008 turmoil. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
further discussion of securitization and CDOs). An ordinary CDO deal consists of a mix of loans, bonds, 
and other type of securities. In this case, CDOs are associated to PF loans only. 
511
 Structuring these type of deals is more complex than tradition CDOs. Buscaino et al. (2009) point out 
four main reasons: (1) in traditional CDOs, the assets included in the pool are usually more homogeneous 
than in project CDOs; (2) reaching an appropriate size for the pool of assets is not as easy as for 
traditional CDOs; (3) the intrinsic complexity of project finance transactions; and (4) the definition of 
credit events for the PF loans can be problematic, given the different nature of the projects in the pool. 
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Annex 3: Structured Leasing Transactions 
 
What Is a Leasing Transaction? 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) define leasing as “… a contract over the term of which the owner 
of the equipments permits another entity to use it in exchange for a promise by the latter 
to make a series of payments. The owner of the equipment is referred to as the lessor. 
The entity that is being granted permission to use the equipment is referred to as the 
lessee.” Based on the idea that earnings are originated from the use of an asset, not its 
ownership, leasing is commonly considered as an alternative method of financing.
512
  
It is possible to identify the following steps in the design of a leasing transaction: (1) the 
lessee identifies the equipment needed, the model and the manufacturer; (2) the lessee 
defines the features desired in terms of warranties, installation, services, etc.; (3) the 
lessee defines the price; (4) the lessee enters into a lease agreement with the lessor, in 
which they define the length of the lease, the rental, if installation charges should be 
included in the lease, and other optional characteristics; (5) the lessee assigns its 
purchase rights to the lessor, who buys the equipment as specified by the lessee; (6) the 
lessor pays the price for the equipment and the lease enters into effect; (7) at the end of 
the contract, the lessee usually has the option to renew the lease, to buy the equipment, 
or to terminate the agreement and return the equipment.
513
 
Equipment leases can be classified as (1) Nontax-Oriented Leases or Tax-Oriented 
Leases; (2) Single-Investor Leases or Leveraged Leases; and (3) Full Payout Leases or 
Operating Leases.
514
 If a lease transaction is classified as a conditional sale lease or 
nontax-oriented lease: (i) all of the benefits and risks are substantially transferred to the 
lessee; (ii) the purchase or renewal option is not based on fair market value of the 
equipment at the time of exercise; (iii) the lessee depreciates the property (treated as 
                                                 
512
 According to Fowkes (2000) “[L]easing can and has been used to finance all types of assets including, 
but not limited to, industrial facilities (manufacturing, power generation, etc.), real estate (office, 
warehouse, retail locations, etc.), and equipment (manufacturing, transportation, etc.).” Similarly, 
Fabozzi et al. (2006) point out that “[N]early asset that can be purchased can also be leased, from 
aircraft, ships, satellites, computers, refineries, and steam-generating plants, on one hand, to typewriters, 
duplicating equipment, automobiles, and dairy cattle, on the other hand.” 
513
 It is important to notice that the option selected by the lessee define (1) the lease nature for tax 
purposes, and (2) the lease classification for financial accounting purposes. 
514
 For a further discussion of lease typologies see, among others, Caselli (2005) and Fabozzi et al. 
(2006). 
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owned) for tax purposes; (iv) the lessee deducts the interest portion of the lease 
payments as an expense; and (v) the lessor treats the transaction as a loan.
515
 
Conversely, if a lease transaction is classified as a tax-oriented true lease: (i) the lessor 
claims and retains tax benefits resulting from equipment ownership – depreciation cost 
deduction; (ii) the lessor transfers to the lessee a portion of those benefits in the form of 
reduced lease payments – via interest rate (or credit spread) reduction; (iii) the lessee 
deducts the full lease payment as a cost; (iv) the lessor owns the leased equipment at the 
end of the lease term – the lease contract has no purchase option or a purchase option 
based on the market value. As asserted by Fabozzi (2006), “[T]he principal advantage 
to a lessee of using a true lease to finance an equipment acquisition is the economic 
benefit that comes from the indirect realization of tax benefits that might otherwise be 
lost because the lessee cannot use the tax benefits. This occurs when the lessee neither 
has a sufficient tax liability, nor expects to be able to fully use the tax benefits in the 
future if those benefits are carried forward.”516 
Single-investor leases and leveraged leases are two categories of true leases. The first 
category is a two-party transaction in which the lessor purchases the leased equipment 
with its own funds. A leveraged leasing is similar to a single-investor lease – in terms of 
equipment selection and negotiation (rentals, options, responsibility for taxes, insurance, 
and maintenance) – but with low cost, when compared to other methods of finance and 
“… appreciably more complex in size, documentation, legal involvement, and, most 
importantly, the number of parties involved and the unique advantages that each party 
gains.” [Fabozzi et al. (2006)]. Usually offered by corporations and financial 
institutions (tax benefits available to individual lessors are more limited), in a leveraged 
lease, the lessor – which provides only 20% to 30% of the capital needed to purchase 
the equipment and the remainder is borrowed from institutional investor on a 
nonrecourse basis to the lessor – claims all of the tax benefits related to the ownership 
                                                 
515
 In these circumstances, the lessor “… cannot offer the low lease rates associated with a true lease 
because the lessor does not retain the tax benefits available to the owner of the equipment.” In United 
States of America the Internal Revenue Code (IRC) establish requirements for a lease to be treated as a 
true sale. The distinction between tax-oriented and nontax-oriented true leases is the type of purchase 
option – conditional sale leases have nominal fixed-price options while true leases have market-value 
purchase options. 
516
 One of the mostly common motivations for using structured leasing is the possibility of the lessee to 
obtain a lower funding cost vis-a-vis borrowing directly from a financial institution. This reduction comes 
from the fact that when the lessee is unable to generate a sufficient tax liability to currently use all tax 
benefits, the cost of owning the equipment is higher than leasing it.  
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of the equipment and offers the lessee much lower lease rates when compared to single-
investor lease. 
Full payout leases, in contrast to operating leases, are basically financing transactions. 
An operating lease transaction is a true sale lease for tax purposes and thus the lessee 
can deduct the lease payments and the lessor is entitled to all tax benefits related to the 
equipments’ ownership. For financial accounting purposes, an operating lease is not 
disclosed in the lessee balance sheet as financial obligations – the lease equipment is not 
capitalized and the lease obligation is not shown as a liability on the balance sheet.
517
 
However, the lessee must disclose information about the lease transaction on footnotes 
to its financial statements.
518
 As pointed out by Caselli (2005), the “… increased tax 
benefits afforded by operating leasing have provided a strong stimulus to create 
‘structured’ transactions that give operating leasing the same characteristics as true 
financial leasing. [The so-called…] synthetic leasing transactions.” 
 
While there is an extensive literature on leasing, most of it focuses on the differential 
tax position of the lessee and the lessor as the primary rationale for leasing [e.g. Bower 
(1973), Miller and Upton (1976), Brealey and Young (1980), Smith and Wakeman 
(1985), and Brick, Fung, and Subrahmanyam (1987)].
519
 Miller and Upton (1976) 
conclude that no financial advantages accrue from leasing. Contrary, Lowellen, Long, 
and McConnell (1976) and Myers, Dill, and Bautista (1976) argue that, under a set of 
assumptions, there is a potential for gains in valuation for the firm involved in leasing 
because government can suffer a loss in taxes. Graham et al. (1998) show a negative 
relationship between operating leases and tax rates, and a positive relationship between 
                                                 
517
 For accounting purposes, a lease can be classified as either an operating lease or a capital lease. 
According to FASB Statement No. 13 “[A] lease that transfers substantially all of the benefits and risks 
incident to ownership of property should be accounted for as the acquisition of an asset and the 
incurrence of an obligation by the lessee.” Thus, all other leases should be accounted for as operating 
leases. FAS 13 specifies that if one of the following four criteria are met for a noncancelable lease at the 
date of the lease agreement, the lease is to be accounted for as a capital lease: (1) the lease transfers 
ownership of the property to the lessee by the end of the lease term; (2) the lease contains a bargain 
purchase option; (3) the lease term is equal to 75% or more of the estimated economic life of the leased 
property; (4) the present value of the minimum lease payments (excluding executor costs) equals or 
exceeds 90% of the fair value of the leased property. 
518
 An operating leasing transaction in theory has a greater ‘tax acceleration’ than financial leasing. 
519
 Krishnan and Moyer (1994) present a very concise and complete literature review on this subject. 
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debt levels and tax rates. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2009) argue that the benefit of leasing is 
that the repossession of leased assets is easier than foreclosure of secured loans.
520
 
Some authors study the debt versus leasing decision. Ang and Peterson (1984) failed to 
demonstrate that debt and leasing are substitutes and found instead a complementary 
relationship. Although Lewis and Schallheim (1992) found similar results, Marston and 
Harris (1988), and Adedeji and Stapleton (1996) support substitutability. More recently, 
Mehran et al. (1997) presented a mixed evidence and Beatti et al. (2000) argue that 
leasing and debt are partial substitutes.
521
 
 
Basic Characteristics of Structured Leasing Transactions 
Structured leasing is a specific and recent type of transaction, confirmed by the fact that 
references to it have only appeared recently. As pointed out by Caselli (2005) “… 
structured leasing was recognized as new transaction and an independent form of 
leasing within the structured finance and asset finance sector.” Additionally, banks and 
sponsors try to protect their expertise in the sector, believed to offer a competitive 
advantage. 
It is a very versatile instrument that “… enables the lessee to position the deal in an 
optimal manner in relation to cash flow structure, its sustainability over time and the 
distribution of tax benefits.” [Caselli (2005)]. As in other tax-based techniques, the 
implementation of a structured leasing transaction is more significant when the value of 
the asset is large and allows for a potentially greater tax benefits’ appropriation. 
Considering the nature and the role of the asset, which affects the financial flows and 
risk set-up for the transaction, we can identify diverse structured leasing transactions. 
Thus, bearing in mind the asset nature in terms of product category, real estate can be 
residential, administrative, commercial, industrial or infrastructural. In terms of the 
asset nature, from a legal point of view, it can already exist and be owned by the lessee, 
can already exist and be owned by a third party, or may even not yet be built. The next 
figure provides a map of possible structured leasing transactions, where we overlap the 
two mentioned perspectives. 
                                                 
520
 Lease financing has an advantage over straight debt and even secured debt in that it has a stronger 
financial claim, being effectively senior to any other financial claim. 
521
 See Braund (1989) for a review of the empirical studies on leasing. 
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Source: Adapted from Caselli (2005). 
 
As asserted by Caselli (2005), “… while the asset’s product category heavily conditions 
the nature and intensity of financial and equity risks associated with the transaction, the 
legal profile, if the asset already exists, conditions the financial structure and overall 
arrangement of the transaction itself.”522 This analysis in relation to legal profile and 
product-category profile can be extended, by considering size and whether the deal is of 
a domestic or of cross border nature.
523
 
 
Considering the existing literature, structured leasing transactions can fall within one of 
the two following categories: (1) leveraged leases (or tax or true leases); and (2) 
synthetic leases (or synthetic structured leases). 
                                                 
522
 Contrary to commercial, industrial, and infrastructural real estate, and above all industrial plant and 
equipment, residential, and to a degree, administrative real estate, ships and aircraft represent, ceteris 
paribus, a lower financial and equity risk because they tend to have a better defined market value – the 
secondary market for this assets is wider. 
523
 See Caselli (2005) for a further discussion of the structured leasing transaction market, with a focus on 
European market. 
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A leveraged lease – a true lease – is similar to a single-investor lease (also called 
nonleveraged leases or direct leases) but more complex in size and in the number of 
involved parties – it involves a minimum of three parties with diverse interests: a lessee, 
a lessor, and a nonrecourse lender.
524
 In a leveraged lease (sometimes called a three-
party transaction) the lessor becomes the owner of the leased equipment by providing a 
fraction of the capital necessary to purchase the equipment. The rest “… of the capital 
(70% to 80%) is borrowed from institutional investors on a nonrecourse basis to the 
lessor… ”525 and the lease all-in cost varies with the credit standing of the lessee and 
with the risk of the transaction [Fabozzi et al. (2006)].
526
 
The ‘leverage’ in leveraged leases comes from the fact that: (1) the lessor provides only 
20% or 30% of the capital needed to purchase the equipment and stay at risk only for 
that portion; (2) the lessor can claim all of the tax benefits related to ownership – a 
leveraged lease is always a true lease; and (3) the lessor has the right to 100% of the 
residual value provided by the lease.
527
 It is this leverage that allows the lessor to offer 
the lessee a lower lease rate than the lessor could offer under a nonleveraged lease or 
direct lease – the equity investor passes a portion of his tax benefit back to the lessee in 
the form of reduced lease payments.
528
 Leveraged transactions tend to be used in 
markets offering specific tax advantages to leveraged leasing transactions. Caselli 
(2005) argue that “[T]his occurs mainly in two different situations: in international 
cross-border leasing, and when trusts are used.”529 
                                                 
524
 See, e.g., Shank and Gough (1999), Amembal (2000), Boobyer (2003) and Deo (2009) for a discussion 
of the economics of leveraged leasing. 
525
 As asserted by Fabozzi et al. (2006), in a leveraged lease the largest part of the “… debt is raised on 
the private placement market at little or no premium over what the lessee would expect to pay directly for 
such debt. The sources include insurance companies; pension plans; profit-sharing plans; commercial 
banks; finance companies; saving banks; domestic leasing companies; foreign banks; foreign leasing 
companies; foreign investors; and institutional investors.” 
526
 A guarantor of the lessee obligations – a lessees’ parent or sister company, a third party, or a 
government agency – may be necessary if the credit of the lessee is insufficient to support the transaction. 
527
 See Fabozzi et al. (2006) for a description of the various steps and milestones in structuring, 
negotiating and closing leveraged lease transactions. 
528
 In a large leverage lease – several owners and lenders are involved – an owner trustee is usually 
constituted to hold title to the equipment and represent the owners or equity participants. 
529
 Cross-border leasing refers to German (GELL - German Leveraged Leasing), French (FDDL - French 
Double Dip Leasing), US (USPL - US Pickle Leasing), and UK (BDDL – British Double Dip Leasing) 
markets where its use “… offers specific tax advantages to the lessor, making the transaction more 
attractive both for the foreign lessee and for potential financiers of the leveraged transaction, who can 
‘participate in’ the increased tax benefits produced by the deal.” Cross Border Leases have become a 
source of financing for European Companies. The U.S. Cross Border Lease (closed on a variety of assets) 
is structured to benefit from tax arbitrage between US and an European Lessee [see, e.g., Wanzenboeck 
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When a sponsor is facing low expected marginal tax rates, a leveraged leasing may 
provide the lowest after-tax cost of funding. Additionally, if a sponsor cannot efficiently 
use the maximum depreciation or interest deduction benefits associated with tax 
ownership of assets, an institutional equity investor who can efficiently use these 
benefits may be willing to give back a portion of these benefits to the sponsor in the 
form of lower lease payments. Lesses who foresee that they may not be able to use the 
tax benefits of ownership (e.g., tax depreciation) generally tend to use leveraged leases. 
Though, as referred by Fowkes (2000), “[F]ully taxable sponsors seeking the earnings 
benefits associated with operating leases should consider synthetic leases.” 
 
Having in mind that, in a leveraged lease, the lessee selects the assets, enjoys the 
benefits from their use – although it loses the tax benefits – and enjoys the lower lease 
rates, Exhibit 1 depict the activities and cash flows involved. The main steps in the 
implementation of a leveraged leasing transaction are: Step 1: the lessor establishes an 
SPV or a Trust – usually a bank, also known as the owner trustee or equity trustee; Step 
2: the lessor makes an equity investment (typically 20% or more of the purchase price) 
in the SPV; Step 3: the lessee assigns the purchase agreement to the owner trustee; Step 
4: the trust borrows the remaining 80% or less from lenders;
530
 Step 5: the lessor 
purchases the asset with 100% funding (a mix between equity and debt) from the 
manufacturer; Step 6: the lessor becomes the owner of the asset; Step 7: the lessee is 
being granted the permission to use the asset; Step 8: the lessee makes a series of 
payments – lease payments. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
(2001) for further discussion of U.S. Cross Border Lease]. When the leasing is structured based on the 
interposition of a trust between the lessor and lessees the tax benefits produced are duplicated – nowadays 
it is possible to identify the Trust Leasing and the Japanese Leveraged Leasing [see, e.g., Deo (2008) for a 
explanation of Cross-Border Japanese Leveraged Leases]. 
530
 As referred by Deo (2009), the borrowing process is “… accomplished as follows: the lenders select a 
trustee (usually a bank), also known as an indenture trustee or loan trustee; on behalf of the lender, the 
indenture trustee issues a loan to the owner trustee…” The loan has the following characteristics: (1) is 
secured by a mortgage of the asset; (2) the income from the lease is assigned to the indenture trustee; and 
(3) a guarantee of payment may be issued by the lessee. 
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Exhibit 1: Activities and cash flows involved in a Leveraged Lease. 
Source: Adapted from Deo (2009). 
 
However, Fabozzi et al. (2006) point out that “[O]ne of the drawbacks of a true sale of 
equipment for many lessees (and particularly those able to utilize tax benefits 
associated with equipment ownership) is the possible loss to be experienced when the 
true lease terminates and the equipment may have to be acquired from the lessor.” The 
synthetic lease was developed to solve this limitation, by providing at the same time off-
balance sheet treatment of the lease obligation and protecting the lessee’s cost of 
acquiring the equipment when lease terminates.
531
 Thus, synthetic leases are operating 
leases for accounting purposes and financing operations for tax purposes; i.e., they are 
off-balance sheet leases, in which the lessee remains the owner of the financed assets 
and retain the tax benefits associated with ownership, while simultaneously enjoying the 
benefits of an operating lease. To be classified as an operating lease, a synthetic lease is 
                                                 
531
 Weidner (2000) defines synthetic lease as a “… method used to provide off-balance sheet financing to 
a corporate entity for the acquisition and development of a commercial facility or site, with substantial 
credit support for debt issued by or through an investor or capital source, usually a financial institution.” 
A Synthetic lease transaction if typically structured using an SPV that is created solely for the purpose of 
a transaction or into a series of transactions.  
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structured on the basis of a lease agreement between the lessee (as the user or owner) 
and the lessor (as an investor), which complies with the requirements established by 
FAS 13 and related accounting rules. For tax purposes, a synthetic lease is structured so 
that the lessee may reclaim that it is, in substance, the owner of encumbered property, 
with a rental obligation that should be treated as debt service. Additionally, the lessee 
claims a depreciable interest in the asset and a depreciable basis that includes the 
portion of the cost financed with borrowed funds.
532
 
A synthetic leasing transaction is based on the establishment of an SPV exclusively for 
the transaction. This means that the SPV is the owner of the asset / equipment, which 
then proceeds to organize the leasing with the lessee and to raise the funding needed to 
purchase the asset itself. According to Caselli (2005), the motivations behind synthetic 
leasing are: “… a search for countries in which to domicile the SPV enabling greater 
tax benefits to be obtained than in the country of origin; the optimization of tax benefits 
by transforming financial leasing into operating leasing.”533 In the first motivation, the 
SPV’s income statement will comprise: (1) depreciation of the asset; (2) financial costs 
for servicing the debt; and (3) installments received from leasing contracts.
534
 In the 
second case, the use of an SPV is justified (apart from the reasons referred for the first 
case) to implement an operating leasing than a financial leasing and, consequently, 
increasing the tax benefits from the transaction. This is particularly relevant when the 
lessee wants to set up an off-balance sheet transaction to improve its structural margin. 
According to Fowkes (2000), “[S]ynthetic leasing may be the most cost-effective option 
for lessees with high marginal tax rates.” 
Exhibit 2 depicts the activities involved in a synthetic lease structure. The core steps in 
the execution of a synthetic lease transaction are: Step 1: the SPV is incorporated; Step 
2: the lessor, together with the lessee (typically a very small part of the SPV’s equity), 
makes an equity investment in the SPV; Step 3: the SPV borrows the remaining from 
                                                 
532
 As referred by Weidner (2000), “[E]specially in the early years of the financing arrangement, the 
combined depreciation and interest deductions typically exceed the rental deduction.” 
533
 Altamuro (2006) asserts that the proponents of synthetic lease argue that economic benefits outweigh 
the costs of complexity and opacity, while critics argue that the economic benefits of these off-balance 
sheet transactions “… are the result of short-sighted opportunistic behavior by managers that lead to 
wealth extraction at the expense of other groups of stakeholders.” 
534
 The lessee will select the most advantageous country from a tax treatment point of view, in which 
there is a significant difference between installments received by the SPV and the depreciation of the 
asset. Thus, the lessee can reduce the transaction all-in cost. 
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lenders;
535
 Step 4: the SPV purchases the asset price from the supplier; Step 5: the lessor 
becomes the owner of the asset; Step 6: the SPV signs a leasing contract with the lessee 
giving the permission to use the asset; Step 7: the lessee makes a series of payments – 
lease payments; Step 8: the SPV uses the periodic installments to repay the lenders; 
Step 9: the lessee exercises a the call option on the asset or on the SPV shares.
536
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: activities and cash flows involved in a Synthetic Lease. 
Source: The Author. 
 
Fowkes (2000) summarizes the two types of structured leasing in a very concise way. 
He argues that with a leveraged lease, which is structured as a lease for tax purposes, 
the tax benefits of depreciation and interest deduction are retained by the lessor but 
partially passed back to the lessee through lower rents. A synthetic lease is an operating 
lease for accounting purposes but structured as a financing for tax purposes. Both use a 
SPE to act as a owner (or lessor) of the assets, and achieve off-balance sheet operating 
lease treatment for the lessee under FAS 13. 
 
                                                 
535
 The Lenders can fund the debt capital by a direct loan made through a pool or by issuing bonds. 
536
 At the end of the transaction the lessee may, if it wishes, exercise the call option on the asset owned by 
the SPV or on shares in the SPV, so becoming the owner. 
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Structured Leasing and Taxes 
The review of factors underlying the growth of the leasing market highlighted the 
centrality of taxation. With structured leasing, lessees can use tax benefit in the most 
appropriate manner to achieve their economic and financial objectives. The regulatory 
framework is crucial when we are dealing with this type of transactions. Thus, 
understanding the tax framework in force in the country concerned allows the 
perception of economic maneuvering room of structured leasing. In Europe, the 
regulatory framework is quite well-defined and stable.
537
 
 
Concluding remarks 
According to Caselli (2005) there are three macro-trends helping to define a scenario 
and explain the structured leases’ market evolution: (1) tax regime – a significant 
change in tax framework (at home and overseas) strongly increases or decreases the size 
of the market; (2) private banking and family office – the growth of the real estate 
leasing market is highly driven by these operators, who manage real estate investment 
portfolios; and (3) international and synthetic-type transactions – “[T]he effective match 
between the leasing instrument and requirements of large real estate deals (in 
developing countries and others too) is a factor representing a substantial and 
structural stimulus for market growth.” 
Empirically, Slovin et al. (1990) study the impact on share prices of announcements of 
sale-and-leasebacks. They show that this type of transactions enhance lessee value but 
have no significant effects on lessors.
538
 
                                                 
537
 See Caselli (2003) for an comprehensive evaluation of tax effects on corporate financing decisions. 
538
 In a sale-and-leaseback transaction, a firm sells an asset it owns to another entity and at the same time 
leases it back from the new owner (the lessor). The lessor obtains the benefits from ownership, namely: 
depreciation allowances and tax credits. According to Slovin et al. (1990), the principal motive for such 
transactions is the “… potential for differences in applicable tax rates for lessees and lessors to create 
value enhancement.” 
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Annex 4: Leveraged Acquisitions 
 
Definition 
Leveraged acquisitions refer to the class of operations which belong to a larger family 
called merger and acquisition (M&A) activities.
539
 Capizzi (2005) refers that 
“[L]everaged Acquisitions constitute an important category in the area of structured 
finance, namely those that result in leaving the acquired company with a debt ratio that 
is higher than what it was before the acquisition.” With regard to the literature and the 
business area of leveraged acquisitions, the author presents the following typologies: (1) 
Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO); (2) Management Buy-Out (MBO); (3) Management Buy-
In; (4) Buy-In Management Buy-Out (BIMBO); (5) Family Buy-Out (FBO); (6) 
Workers Buy-Out (WBO); (7) Corporate Buy-Out (CBO); and (8) Fiscal Buy-Out 
(FBO).
540
 However, in practice, it is hard to find any one of the referred operations in 
‘pure form’; e.g., it is easy to find LBOs that have simultaneously characteristics of an 
MBO (the proponents are a group of managers of the target firm) and of a FBO 
(developed with the aim of creating interest tax shields for of the acquirer). 
There are a number of authors who have studied this subject in the field of Corporate 
Finance. Perhaps the most studied type of leveraged acquisitions are LBOs.
541
 They 
have been subject to wide discussion, concerning problems of financial structure, and 
the financial and economic performance of firm. Although the higher debt typical to 
such financing transactions allows for the exploitation of the financial leverage effect, 
these operations increase the financial risks, exposing management to pressures to 
guarantee the repayment of the debt and the debt service. Thus, the literature “… is 
                                                 
539
 M&A activities can be viewed as those operations that affect permanently the ownership structure of 
one or more enterprises. Among the most diffusive types of operations we can find [Arzac (2005)]: 
fusions; splits; exchange of shares; equity carve-outs; public offers of purchase and exchange; 
restructurings of businesses in crisis; and initial public offerings. 
540
 See, among others, Renneboog and Simons (2005) and Capizzi (2005) for further details on leveraged 
acquisitions (typologies and European market evolution). When the incumbent management team takes 
over the firm, the LBO is called a management buyout (MBO). If an outside management team acquires 
the firm and takes it private, we refer to this transaction as a management buy-in (MBI). When the owners 
of a delisted firm are solely institutional investors (e.g., private equity firms) we call these transactions as 
institutional buyouts (IBOs). 
541
 Considering that LBOs are the most widespread category of such transactions, from now on we will 
use indistinctly throughout the dissertation Leveraged Acquisitions and LBOs. See, e.g., Jensen (1993), 
Thompson and Wright (1995), and Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007) for literature reviews on LBOs. 
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concentrated particularly upon the determination of the ideal characteristics that need 
to be possessed by a firm, for it to be a good candidate for a leveraged acquisition, and 
also, on estimating the value for the shareholders of such an acquisition.” [Capizzi 
(2005)].  
 
Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO): Major Characteristics 
Weston et al. (2001) present a LBO as “… the purchase of a company by small group of 
investors using a high percentage of debt financing.” According to Arzac (2005) a LBO 
is a leveraged acquisition transaction in which a “… a group of investors finance the 
acquisition of a corporation or division mainly by borrowing against the target´s future 
cash flows.” The promoters, which include a sponsor and, frequently, existing 
management, organize and implement the buy-out.
542
 A similar definition is presented 
by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) which state that in a LBO “… a company is acquired 
by a specialized investment firm using a relatively small portion of equity and a 
relatively large portion of outside debt financing. The leveraged buyout investment 
firms today refer to themselves (and are generally referred to) as private equity 
firms.”543 Especially when financial groups akin to private equity funds, venture capital 
companies or other types of buyout specialists are involved, the LBO transaction is 
expected to be reversed with a public offering. The aim is to increase the profitability of 
the company taken private and thereby increase market value. 
It is possible to find certain unique characteristics in an LBO transaction, namely: (1) 
usually require the incorporation of an SPV (sometimes referred to as ‘NewCo’ or the 
acquirer) for the transfer of the ownership which, after being capitalized by the 
proponents, will launch the offer for the company to be acquired – the so-called ‘target 
firm’;544 (2) the acquisition happens off-balance sheet for the proponents; (3) the bulk of 
                                                 
542
 When managers or executives of the company are an important part of the promotion group, the LBO 
is called a Management Buy-Out (MBO) and it results in a significant increase in the ownership of equity 
shares by managers. 
543
 In a LBO the private equity typically buys the majority control of the target firm – usually an existing 
or mature firm. As pointed out by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), private equity “… is distinct from 
venture capital firms that typically invest in young or emerging companies, and typically do not obtain 
majority of control.” See Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) for a further discussion of private equity firms, 
funds, and transactions. 
544
 The offer can be public, in the case that the target firm is quoted or, otherwise, through private 
negotiations. 
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the capital needed for the operation is supplied by the debt securities provided by banks 
and financial intermediaries – equity raised by the SPV represents a slight part of the 
resources required;
545
 and (4) the debt capital supplied by the banking system is a 
function of the capacity of the target firm to generate cash flows.
546
 
According to Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009) “[I]n a traditional LBO, debt has typically 
comprised 60% to 70% of the financing structure, with equity comprising the remaining 
30% to 40%.” Given the inherently high leverage associated with an LBO, debt portion 
of the LBO financing structure may include a broad array of loans, securities, or other 
debt instruments with varying terms and conditions. Exhibit 1 presents the primary 
types of LBO financing sources by capital structure ranking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 1: Financing sources in an LBO capital structure. 
Source: Adapted from Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009). 
                                                 
545
 The ‘leverage’ in LBOs comes from the fact that the transaction is very ‘pushed’ by the recourse to 
indebtedness. This allows the exploitation of financial leverage benefits – allows for sponsors to achieve 
acceptable returns – but introduce a higher intrinsic structural risk when compared to other M&A 
transactions. 
546
 According to Capizzi (2005), “…the banks finance the acquirer on the basis of the residual debt 
capacity of the acquired firm and its consequent capacity to repay the debt and the servicing charges for 
the same.” Hence, only target firms that are able to repay the financial obligations of the acquisition are 
good candidates for a leveraged acquisition. 
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In an LBO, debt always includes two types of loans: (1) a senior and secured loan 
portion, purchased by banks (mainly in the 1980s and 1990s) and institutional investors 
(hedge funds and collateralized loan obligations managers); and (2) a junior and 
unsecured portion, financed by high-yield bonds or ‘mezzanine debt’.547 The equity 
contribution is usually provided by private equity firms and by the new management 
team that typically contributes to the new equity, although with a small fraction.
548
 
 
The implementation process of an LBO can be divided into several phases: (1) 
identification and selection of the target company; (2) identification of the financial 
intermediary to assist the buyer;
549
 (3) development of the business plan (summarizes 
the sustainability of the NewCo business model and the financial feasibility of the 
transaction); (4) identification of the investors to share the capital on the NewCo (the 
work of the financial advisor in involving the industrial of financial investors becomes 
crucial); (5) capitalization of the NewCo (usually a company incorporated for the deal – 
an SPV);
550
 (6) negotiation of the lines of credit needed to add to the capital of the SPV, 
to ensure the payment of the price accepted by the owners of the target firm;
551
 (7) the 
NewCo acquires all the target´s shares; and (8) merger of the target with the NewCo. 
Thus, the scheme of a typical LBO transaction can be summarized through the 
following steps (as can be seen in Exhibit 2): Step 1: creation of a new company 
(NewCo or SPV) and equity raising; Step 2: debt financing based on bridge loans 
                                                 
547
 Mezzanine debt is debt that is subordinated to the senior debt. 
548
 See, e.g., Axelson, Jenkinson, Strömberg, and Weisbach (2008) for a detailed description of capital 
structures in LBOs. 
549
 As asserted by Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009), “[I]nvestment banks traditionally play a critical role in 
this respect, primarily as arrangers/underwriters of the debt used to fund the purchase price.” The 
activity of structuring the transaction performed by the financial advisor is critical. Firstly, because it has 
to consider carefully how the target firm will survive with the heavy debt burden and a financial leverage 
above that which is physiologically acceptable for working in a certain economic context. Secondly, the 
business plan, prepared by the advisor on the basis of the directions provided by the proponents, is 
fundamental in providing information on the advantages, in monetary terms, of the subjects participating 
in the operation.  
550
 By changing the relative participation of debt and equity in the capital structure, an LBO redistributes 
returns and risks among providers of capital. 
551
 Traditionally, the lenders request that the shares of the target firm or it real assets be considered as 
collateral. LBOs are financed mainly with secured bank debt and unsecured subordinated debt – big 
transactions may be able to raise subordinated debt in the public high yield marker, while small 
transactions rely on secured bank debt and private placement of subordinated debt. Hence, it is necessary 
to involve a pool of financial investors holding the debt capital in the initiative via a syndicated loan. 
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financial contracts; Step 3: acquisition of the target; Step 4: merger of the SPV with the 
target; and Step 5: new debt contracts against the new post-LBO Target company.
552
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 2: Activities and cash flows involved in an LBO transaction. 
Source: Adapted from Capizzi (2005). 
 
 
The Participants in LBO Market 
There are five key participants in an LBO: (1) financial sponsors; (2) investment banks; 
(3) bank and institutional lenders; (4) bond investors; and (5) target management. Prior 
to the description of the role played by each participant, it is important to notice that 
promoters would want to organize an LBO only if they expect to obtain a significant 
gain from the transaction; i.e., if they can increase free cash flows above the level 
expected by the seller.  
The term ‘financial sponsor’ refers to institutional investors in risk capital; i.e., those 
entities investing in risk capital of non financial companies, that is: private equity firms; 
merchant banking divisions of investment banks; commercial banks; hedge funds; 
                                                 
552
 See Weston et al. (2001) for a description of the critical stages in a typical LBO. 
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closed end mutual funds; venture capital funds; and special purpose acquisition 
companies.
553
 Private equity funds have taken an increasing magnitude in the LBO 
market. Venture capital funds are operators with specific competences who participate 
in the capital of recent small/medium enterprises, in order to help them during the 
difficult startup phase. A private equity firm, which serves as the fund’s general partner, 
raises equity capital through a private equity fund. Most of these funds are ‘closed-end’ 
vehicles organized as limited partnerships in which the general partners manage the 
fund and the limited partners provide most of the capital – typically institutional 
investors, such as corporate and public pension funds, insurance companies, and 
wealthy individuals. 
Investment banks are key participants in LBOs, both as advisors and as providers of 
financing. As referred by Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009), they “… perform thorough due 
diligence on LBO targets (usually alongside their sponsor clients) and go through an 
extensive internal credit process in order to validate the target’s business plan.” 
Banks and institutional lenders are the debt providers in a LBO structure. While bank 
lenders – commercial banks, savings and loan institutions, and finance companies – 
traditionally provide short-term and amortizing loans, institutional lenders – hedge 
funds, pension funds, prime funds, insurance companies, and structured vehicles (e.g., 
CDO funds) – usually provide debt for longer-term and limited amortization loans.554 
High yield bonds issued as part of the LBO financing structure are purchased by bond 
investors, which generally include high yield mutual funds, hedge funds, pension funds, 
insurance companies, and distressed debt funds. 
                                                 
553
 This capital is organized into funds that are usually established as limited partnerships. As explained in 
Kaplan and Schoar (2003), “[T]he limited partners (LPs) consist largely of institutional investors and 
wealthy individuals who provide the bulk of the capital”. According to Axelson et al. (2009) “[P]rivate 
equity investments are generally made by funds that share a common organizational structure […] The 
funds are usually organized as limited partnerships, with the limited partners (LPs) providing most of the 
capital and general partners (GPs) making investment decisions and receiving a substantial share of the 
profits (most often 20%).” 
554
 Kaplan and Stein (1993) find that banks provided the majority of buyout debt during the 1980s. 
Similarly, Demiroglu and James (2010) point out that “… commercial banks have traditionally played an 
important role in leveraged buyout (LBO) financing.” They present the following three explanations why 
LBO firms rely heavily on bank debt: (i) concentrated ownership makes bank loans easier to negotiate; 
(ii) banks are thought to have a comparative advantage in monitoring; and (iii) when LBOs are financed 
with more short-term bank debt the incentive effects of debt [Jensen (1986)] are likely to be stronger. 
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Finally, target management plays a crucial role in: (1) marketing of the target to 
potential buyers; (2) preparing marketing material and financial information; and (3) 
holding a meaningful equity interest in the post-LBO company. 
Arzac (2005) answer the following question: ‘What is an ideal LBO candidate?’ The 
author presents the following desirable characteristics: (1) a firm with predictable 
revenues and cash-generating capacity; (2) competent management that understands the 
demands imposed by the financial structure of the LBO, as the focus shifts to cash 
generation and debt retirement; and (c) the nature of the company’s assets.555 Similarly, 
Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009) argue that firms with relatively stable and predictable cash 
flows and significant assets are good candidates for LBOs, because they can bear larger 
quantities of debt.
556
 
 
Advantages and Disadvantages of an LBO  
Empirical studies report that the premiums paid are 40% or more of the market price of 
the stock a month or two before the announcement of the buyout [Weston et al. (2001)]. 
Thus, understanding the sources of these gains is a key aspect. The rationale for the 
emergence of LBOs can be explained by the following sources of wealth gains: (1) tax 
savings [e.g., Weston et al. (2001), Renneboog and Simons (2005), Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009), and Guo et al. (2011)];
557
 (2) agency costs reduction [e.g., Opler and 
Titman (1993), Weston et al. (2001), Renneboog and Simons (2005), Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009), and Guo et al. (2011)];
558
 (3) wealth transfers [e.g., Weston et al. 
                                                 
555
 It is important to notice that LBOs are transitory forms of ownership. During the LBO, management 
attempts to improve operations, and the sponsor looks for a transfer of ownership to a more permanent 
owner. Exit can be made via: (1) an IPO; (2) a sale to strategic buyer; and (3) another LBO (to provide 
some liquidity to the sponsor and higher ownership to management). See Arzac (2005) for further details. 
556
 For Rosenbaum and Pearl (2009) a firm must have the following characteristics to be “… a strong 
LBO candidate: Strong Cash Flow Generation; Leading and Defensible Market Position; Growth 
Opportunities; Efficiency Enhancement Opportunities; Low Capex Requirements; Strong Asset Base; 
Proven Management Team.” 
557
 Lowenstein (1985), Kaplan (1989a), and Frankfurter and Gunay (1992) argue that the wealth gains 
from LBOs are largely the result of interest tax shields related to the high leverage that underlies the 
transaction. However, (i) the tax gains realization do not require an LBO, (ii) high leverage increases the 
cost of financial distress, and (iii) LBO’s firms assume much more debt as than was necessary to 
eliminate their tax earnings. Thus, as pointed out by Opler and Titman (1993), “[T]his suggests that there 
must also be nontax-related motives for using debt in LBOs.” 
558
 Three important hypothesis can be pointed out: (1) the incentive realignment hypothesis; i.e., the need 
to realign incentives of managers with those of shareholders is frequently mentioned as a potentially 
important factor in LBOs transactions [see, e.g., Kaplan (1989b)]; (2) the control hypothesis means that 
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(2001) and Renneboog and Simons (2005)];
559
 (4) better management incentives [e.g., 
Opler and Titman (1993), Weston et al. (2001), Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), and Guo 
et al. (2011)];
560
 (5) improvement of operating performance and efficiency [e.g., 
Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990), Weston et al. (2001), and Kaplan and Strömberg 
(2009)];
561
 (6) corporate undervaluation [e.g., Weston et al. (2001), and Renneboog and 
Simons (2005)];
562
 (7) reduction of transaction costs [e.g., Renneboog and Simons 
(2005)];
563
 and (8) takeover defenses [e.g., Renneboog and Simons (2005)].
564
 
Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) point out that proponents of LBOs argue that these 
transactions create economic value by (1) reducing agency problems, (2) increasing 
operating performance, and (3) increasing interest tax shields.
565
 Regarding agency 
problems, Jensen (1989) and Kaplan (1989a and 1989b) argue that by paying careful 
attention to management incentives LBOs reduce agency problems between managers 
and shareholders. Private equity firms typically give the management team a large 
equity upside through stocks and options and require management to make investment 
in the company. Additionally, because companies are private, management’s equity is 
                                                                                                                                               
the wealth gains become from the increase in the quality of control – LBO transaction constitute a 
reunification of ownership and control by mitigating the free-rider problem [Grossman and Hart (1980)] 
on monitoring managerial actions in public corporations with a dispersed shareholder structure [see, e.g., 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Rice (1984), Admati, Pleiderer, and Zechner (1994), and Maug (1998)]; and 
(3) the free cash flow hypothesis suggests that the wealth gains of LBOs are largely the result of the 
elimination of free cash flow problems – according to Jensen (1986) managers have incentives to retain 
resources and grow firm beyond its optimal size [see, e.g., Jensen (1986), and Cotter and Peck (2001)]. 
559
 Weston et al. (2001) argue that the payment of premiums in an LBO transaction may represent wealth 
transfers to shareholders from bondholders, preferred stockholders, employees, and even the government. 
560
 With an LBO the management’s ownership stake increase so that the incentives are stronger for 
improved performance. 
561
 Lichtenberg and Siegel (1990) argue that LBOs contribute to a better allocation of resources in the 
economy by improving the operating performance of the target firm. According to Weston el al. (2001), 
the decision process can be more efficient under private ownership, which is associated with the delisting 
of the target firm. 
562
 Asymmetric information between managers and outsiders about the firm value means that 
management has superior information and knows the true distribution of future returns. Thus, wealth 
gains can result from alternative higher-valued use of the firm’s assets by management. This is the case in 
MBOs, where managers of the target can employ specific accounting and finance techniques to depress 
pre-announcement share prices [see, e.g., Lowenstein (1985), Schadler and Karns (1990), Harlow and 
Howe (1993), and Kaestner and Liu (1996)]. 
563
 The transaction cost hypothesis suggests that wealth gains from LBOs result from the elimination of 
the transaction costs associated with the listing of the target firm on the stock exchange.  
564
 Renneboog and Simons (2005) argue that “… the takeover defense hypothesis suggests that the wealth 
gains from going private are the result of the management team willing to buy out the other shareholders 
in order to stay in control.” 
565
 Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) “… use the terms private equity and leveraged buyout interchangeably.” 
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illiquid, what reduces their incentives to manipulate short-term results.
566
 The second 
key ingredient in reducing agency problems is leverage.
567
 As pointed out by Kaplan 
and Strömberg (2009), “[L]everage creates pressure on managers not to waste money, 
because they must make interest and principal payments. This pressure reduces the 
‘free cash flow’ problems described in Jensen (1986)…” Thirdly, private equity 
investors control more actively the boards of the acquired companies and are more 
involved in governance.
568
 LBOs add industry and operating expertise, creating value to 
target companies. Private equity firms use their industry expertise and operating 
knowledge to develop value creation plans to their investments. As referred by Acharya 
and Kehoe (2008) and Gadiesh and MacArthur (2008), a plan can include: cost cuttings, 
strategic changes, marketing strategy repositioning, and management changes and 
upgrades.
569
 Finally, the high portion of debt in LBOs gives rise to valuable interest tax 
deductions. Kaplan (1989a) and Marais, Schipper, and Smith (1989) agree that tax 
savings are a considerable source of gains. 
 
However, Kaplan and Strömberg (2009) present some disadvantages of LBOs. They 
assert that critics argue that LBOs take advantage of tax benefits and superior 
information, but do not create economic value. The same idea is presented by Opler and 
                                                 
566
 As referred by Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007), “[C]oncentrated ownership provides private equity 
investors with the ability to monitor and control the strategy of buyout target firm through an active 
presence on the board of directors.” 
567
 Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986, 1989) argue that debt can induce management to act in 
the interests of investors in ways that cannot be duplicated with optimally designed compensation 
packages. Guo et al. (2011) examine (for a sample of 192 buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006) 
whether, and how, LBOs create value. They argue that consistent with the benefits of debt, “… cash flows 
gains are greater for firms with greater increases in leverage as a result of buyout.” 
568
 Tirole (2006) argues that LBOs, as governance instruments of the market for corporate control, create 
“… a new and superior form of corporate governance.” Andres et al. (2007) examine a sample of 115 
European leveraged going to private transactions from 1997 to 2005 and posit that corporate governance 
mechanisms – related to free cash flow, shareholder protection, undervaluation and the market for 
corporate control – are important factors in explaining the short term gains generated by European LBOs. 
The same line of reasoning is presented by Nikoskelainen and Wright (2007). According to Gertner and 
Kaplan (1996), and Acharya and Kehoe (2008), LBOs companies boards are smaller and meet more 
frequently than public companies. Farther, private equity investors quickly replace management with poor 
performance. Guo et al. (2011) find that cash flow performance increases when the private equity replaces 
the CEO before or at the time of the LBO. 
569
 The empirical evidence on the operations performance of companies shows largely that LBOs are 
associated with significant operating and productivity improvements. Cumming, Siegel, and Wright 
(2007) summarize much of this literature and conclude that there “… is a general consensus across 
different methodologies, measures, and time periods regarding a key stylized fact: LBOs [leveraged 
buyouts] and especially MBOs [management buyouts] enhance performance and have a salient effect on 
work practices.” 
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Titman (1993), which refer that “[C]ritics of LBOs argue that most of the gains to 
equityholders arise because of tax savings (see Lowenstein (1985)) and the 
expropriation of nonequity stakeholders (e.g., employees and bondholders) and have 
expressed concern about the effect of financial distress…”570 Cumming and Zambelli 
(2010) assert that the current criticism of LBOs is associated with: (1) the potential 
negative impact on the acquired company; (2) the insider managers may hold private 
knowledge that can be used as insider information in other transactions;
571
 and (3) 
private equity that finance LBOs may weaken the target firms and kill jobs.
572
 More 
recently, particular criticism has been directed at the so-called club deals.
573
 Officer et 
al. (2010) find that “… target shareholders in club deals receive significantly lower 
premiums than sole-sponsored LBOs and other merger and acquisition transactions.” 
While agreeing that tax savings are a significant source of gains in LBOs, Kaplan 
(1989b), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1990), and Smith (1990) show that wealth is also 
created. They find cash flow improvements after LBO transaction. Thus, as referred by 
Opler and Titman (1993), “… the magnitude of financial distress costs as well as the 
gains from incentive realignment, may be important factors in determining whether a 
firm chooses to do an LBO.” They found out that firms with simultaneously higher cash 
flows and lower Tobin’s q are more likely to undertake an LBO, which is consistent 
with the free cash flow hypothesis.
574
 Based on capital structure theory, Roden and 
Lewellen (1995) argue that the financing decision to be taken by the buyout group will 
involve a trade-off between leverage-related costs (agency costs of high levels of debt 
financing and bankruptcy costs) and leverage-related benefits (disciplining effect of 
                                                 
570
 Asquith, Gertner, and Scharfstein (1991), Kaplan and Stein (1993), and Opler (1993) developed 
academic studies of bankruptcy costs and bankruptcy cost reduction in highly levered transactions. These 
studies emerged because firms that did LBOs in the late 1980s incurred in financial problems which 
renewed concerns about potential financial distress costs created by these transactions. 
571
 Some authors point out that LBOs benefits are induced by private equity investors superior 
information on future company performance – incumbent management is a source of this inside 
information. However, empirical findings are inconsistent with operating improvements being the result 
of asymmetric information. As referred by Kaplan and Strömberg (2009), “… the evidence does not 
support an important role for superior firm-specific information on the part of private equity investors 
and incumbent management.” 
572
 On the contrary, Amess and Wright (2007) present evidence that “… LBOs, per se, do not destroy jobs 
and emphasize the need for more empirical evidence to better address the current international 
controversy surrounding LBOs.” 
573
 In a club deal two or more private equity firms jointly sponsor a LBO. 
574
 The same intuition is presented by Carow and Roden (1997). Additionally, they also show that firms 
with lower, and therefore greater debt capacity, have higher abnormal returns. 
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debt on management and the value of tax shields provides by the debt).
575
 They found 
evidence that “… the financing package is designed systematically to respond to 
differences across firms in their growth prospects, in the variability of their earnings, in 
their liquidity characteristics, in their plans to sell assets, and in opportunities to 
achieve tax savings…” Therefore, the amount and the profile of cash flow is a matter of 
concern in structuring the financing package.  
 
The Market for LBOs 
We can identify three major stages of LBOs in the United States: (1) the 1980s; (2) the 
early 1990s; (3) and the mid-2000s.
576
 LBOs first appeared as an important 
phenomenon in the 1980s, to the point that Jensen (1989) predicted that such 
organizations would ultimately become the dominant corporate organizational form.
577
 
As private equity firms have become the main equity provider in LBOs
578
 and they 
apply performance-based managerial compensation, highly leveraged capital structures 
and active governance, Jensen refers to LBOs as superior to those of public corporations 
with dispersed shareholders, low leverage, and weak corporate governance. However, a 
few years later, “[T]he junk bond market crashed; a large number of high-profile 
leveraged buyouts resulted in default and bankruptcy; and leveraged buyouts of public 
companies (so called public-to-private transactions) virtually disappeared by early 
1990s.” [Kaplan and Strömberg (2009)]. In the mid-2000s United States and the rest of 
the world experienced a second LBO boom, with a record amount of capital committed 
to private equity. However, since 2008, with the financial turmoil in the debt markets, 
LBOs have declined again. The credit crisis brought collateralized loan obligations 
(CLOs) to a halt, consequently the LBO market dried up.
579
 
                                                 
575
 According to Roden and Lewellen (1995) “… the financing choices observed should reflect a trade-off 
that seeks to match at the margin the benefits and opportunities with the costs and constrains.” 
576
 See Renneboog and Simons (2005) for a description of international trends and regulatory changes in 
the LBO market. 
577
 As pointed out by Opler and Titman (1993), between 1979 and 1989 the market capitalization of 
public-to-private transactions in the US alone was in excess of $250 billion. 
578
 For example, between 2000-2004, the Western European private equity market (including the United 
Kingdom) had 48.9% of worldwide leveraged buyout transaction value, compared with 43.7% in the 
United Sates. 
579
 CLOs are CDOs backed predominantly by loans. According to Benmelech and Dlugosz (2009) “CLOs 
played a key role in financing billions of dollars of private equity firms’ leveraged buyouts around the 
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In Europe, the LBO market only experienced one wave.
580
 As pointed out by De 
Maeseneire and Brinkhuis (2011), “[A]fter years of enormous growth, at present the 
European LBO market is in any aspect bigger than ever but since the second half of 
2007 declining.” As the capital structure of buyouts consists of high proportion of debt, 
the global financial crisis triggered by the deep plunge in the value of US sub-prime 
mortgages affected the players in the LBO market. 
 
Empirically, a substantial body of work based on LBOs from the 1980s concludes that 
leveraged transactions create value. Specifically, those studies have documented (1) 
gains in operating performance [e.g., Kaplan (1989b), Smith (1990), and Renneboog 
and Simons (2005)]; (2) gains in value from pre-buyout to a later change in ownership 
and restructuring [e.g., Kaplan (1989c), Kaplan (1994), and Andrade and Kaplan 
(1998)]; or (3) a relationship between premiums paid in buyouts and proxies for sources 
of the value gain [e.g., Kaplan (1989a), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Marais, Schipper, and 
Smith (1989), and Lee, Rosenstein, Ragan, and Davidson (1992)].
581
 The authors 
explain these gains based on the following theories: (i) benefits of tax shields; (ii) 
disciplining effects of leverage; and (iii) better governance mechanisms.  
According to Guo et al. (2011) several features “… have changed in the more recent 
wave of buyouts including potential motivations for transactions, transaction structures, 
characteristics of target firms, and characteristics of the financial sponsors.” For a 
sample of 192 buyouts completed between 1990 and 2006, they conclude that cash flow 
performance is positively related (1) to the increase of leverage as a result of the buyout 
– consistent with the theories of the benefits of debt; (2) to the replacement of the CEO 
by the private equity sponsor, before or at the time of the LBO; and (3) to the existence 
of more than one private equity sponsor involved (the so-called ‘club deal’ transaction). 
Based on a sample of 180 LBOs completed between 1997 and 2007, Demiroglu and 
                                                                                                                                               
world.” As pointed out by Kaplan and Stromberg (2009), the influx of capital from these vehicles was so 
extraordinary that the amount of capital committed to private equity in 2006 and 2007 reached record 
levels, surpassing the leverage buyout wave of the late 1980s. 
580
 According to the World Economic Forum Private Equity Report (2008), the LBO activity has 
increased greatly over the years. While the total value of firms acquired through LBOs between 1970 and 
2007 has been estimated at about $3.6 trillion, $2.7 trillion of these transactions took place between 2001 
and 2007. 
581
 All documented statistically significant positive excess returns to pre-buyout stockholders of 13% or 
more. 
A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis of Structured Finance 
______________________________________________________________________ 
 
 325 
James (2010) find that (1) the frequency of reputable private equity groups (PEGs) in 
LBO transactions is negatively related to credit risk spreads; (2) buyouts of high 
reputation PEGs are financed with less traditional debt; and (3) leverage and maturity 
are consistent with the hypothesis that the reputation of the PEG affect lenders’ 
perception of the underlying risk of the transaction. Similarly, De Maeseneire and 
Brinkhuis (2011) show that “… the reputation of private equity sponsor involved in the 
buyout is positively related to LBO leverage.” 
 
LBOs in Continental Europe, United Kingdom, and United States 
According to Renneboog and Simons (2005) both the number of deals and the value of 
LBO activity in the Continental European market are lagging that of the UK for the 
following reasons: (1) the European financial structure to undertake public-to-privates is 
different from that in the U.K.; (2) cultural aspects may also play an important role in 
the functioning and sophistication of European financial markets; and (3) the legal and 
fiscal regulation in Europe is traditionally not as favorable as in the U.K. and U.S.
582
  
Research on LBOs based on U.S. transactions cannot be entirely extrapolated to U.K. 
and Continental Europe. First, the nature of debt financing differs substantially between 
U.S. and those of U.K./European deals. Second, tax issues are different in U.S. and 
U.K. – e.g., while they represent an important source of wealth gains in U.S. 
transactions, in U.K. taxes cannot play such large role because dividends are untaxed. 
Third, U.S. market for corporate control is more effective than that of U.K. and 
Continental Europe. Fourth, the buyout market in the U.K. and Continental Europe has 
been more closed than those in the U.S. Finally, regulation and organization of market 
for corporate control in U.K. and Continental European markets is completely different 
than the U.S. ones.
583
 
 
 
                                                 
582
 See Renneboog and Simons (2005) for further discussion of legal and fiscal regulation in Continental 
Europe. 
583
 For a interesting analysis of the market developments for buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe 
see Wright et al. (2006). 
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Annex 6: Structured Finance and Special Purpose Vehicles 
 
Gorton and Souleles (2005) define a special purpose vehicle (SPV or SPE) as “… a 
legal entity created by a firm (known as sponsor or originator) by transferring assets to 
the SPV, to carry out some specific purpose or circumscribed activity, or a series of 
such transactions. SPVs have no purpose other than the transaction(s) for which they 
were created, and they can make no substantive decisions; the rules governing them are 
set down in advance and carefully circumscribe their activities. Indeed, no one works at 
SPV and it has no physical location.” 584 They can be either a trust or a company, and 
are used for a variety of purposes, including structured risk management solutions. 
SPVs can be either onshore or offshore and are powerful structured finance tools.  
It is possible to identify the following common characteristics of off-balance sheet 
SPVs: (1) they are sub-capitalized (high financial leverage); (2) they have no 
management or employees, thus their administrative functions are performed by a 
trustee; (3) their assets are serviced by means of a servicing arrangement; and (4) they 
are structured so that there cannot be an event of default which would through the SPV 
into bankruptcy. This idea is presented by Gorton and Souleles (2005), who argue that 
one of the “… key source of value to using SPVs is that they help to reduce bankruptcy 
costs.” Structured finance transactions are means of off-balance sheet financing usually 
involving transferring assets to SPVs, thus reducing the amount of assets subject to 
bankruptcy costs. Hence, off-balance sheet financing is most advantageous for sponsors 
that face higher bankruptcy costs.
585
 However, there are costs related to the off-balance 
sheet debt financing, namely; (1) fixed costs of setting up the SPV; and (2) no tax 
advantage (interest tax shields) of off-balance sheet debt to the SPV. 
As referred by Tavakoli (2008), “[B]ecause of their normally off-balance-sheet, 
bankruptcy-remote, and private nature, SPEs can be used for both legitimate and 
illegitimate uses.” The main objective of the originator is meeting the requirements for 
off-balance sheet treatment of the assets; i.e., for bankruptcy and accounting purposes 
the structure should be considered as a sale and not as a loan. Additionally, the structure 
                                                 
584
 See Gorton and Souleles (2005) for further discussion of the background of SPVs, with a particular 
focus on legal, accounting, bankruptcy, taxable and credit enhancement issues. 
585
 This idea is corroborated by Mills and Newberry (2005) and Gorton and Souleles (2005). 
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should be classified as a debt financing for tax purposes – the originator will want to 
ensure that the sale of assets to the SPV does not constitute a taxable event. The two 
main objectives from the perspective of the sponsor are: (i) SPE to pay zero tax on 
payments flowing in and flowing out; and (ii) avoid corporate tax and the venue of the 
SPE and the deal sponsor. 
It is important to notice that the structured solution in terms of bankruptcy and tax 
treatment varies by venues. For example: 
1. Venue such as Cayman Islands, with no tax treaties in place with most 
jurisdictions: there is no mechanism for reclaiming withholding tax (if any) on 
the underlying asset income from the country of origination. In this case, the 
SPE will purchase assets that are not subject to withholding at the country of the 
assets’ origination so that investors will not suffer a reduced return. 
2. Venue with tax treaties in place – assets subject to withholding tax may 
specifically be chosen so the withholding tax can be reclaimed.  
In Europe, it is also an objective to avoid value-added tax (VAT) and stamp duties. The 
last goal is to have zero tax leakage, if possible. Venues such as the Caymans, Jersey, 
and Guernsey offer this advantage, but may not enjoy ready investor acceptability. 
Other venues such as the Netherlands, Luxemburg, and Ireland also offer several tax 
advantages.
586
 There is (1) no withholding tax on note interest; (2) no stamp duty; (3) no 
withholding tax on deposits; and (4) a very small VAT in servicing and administration 
for the SPV. 
SPEs can be set up also onshore in certain venues. For example, in the German Market 
a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung (GmgH) corporate structure is sometimes 
employed. In Portugal, legislation permits the use of two alternative arrangements for a 
securitization transaction: firstly, the Credit Securitization Fund or Fundo de 
Titularização de Créditos (“FTC”), and secondly, the Credit Securitization Company or 
Sociedade de Titularização de Créditos (“STC”). While, in the first alternative, a non-
Portuguese special purpose vehicle (“SPV”) has been included in all FTC 
                                                 
586
 The choice between venues take into account other considerations such as documentation needed, 
setup costs and setup time. The Netherlands usually takes several weeks longer to provide tax rulings for 
SPEs compared to Ireland and Luxemburg. For example, United Kingdom-based deals arrangers might 
prefer to deal with Ireland, since Ireland uses English law-based system. 
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securitizations, in the second alternative the STC – a Portuguese company – acquires 
certain types of receivables and issues directly securitization bonds. 
Focusing on securitization, Lancaster et al. (2008) present Structured Investment 
Vehicle (SIV), Structured Lending Vehicle (SLV), and Credit Derivative Product 
Companies (CDPC) as types of Structured Finance Operating Companies (SFOC). 
According to Moody’s (2005) “[S]tructured Financial Operating Companies (SFOCs) 
are companies that depend upon detailed, pre-determined parameters to define and 
restrict their business activities and operations. Moody’s ratings issued on SFOCs rely 
heavily upon these parameters and generally apply to the issuer’s debt programs rather 
than to specific debt issues.” An SIV is a vehicle that purchases securities (selected by 
the SIV manager), holds them and usually issue two types of securities – senior notes 
and capital notes – to fund the acquisition of the asset pool.587 A SLV “… purchase 
securities and then enters into a repurchase agreement or repo (as the asset buyer), 
total return swap (TRS) or funding agreement.” Again, the primary purpose of SLVs is 
to provide leveraged returns for clients. Finally, CDPC sells synthetic credit protection 
on single company names or a portfolio of companies as well as structured assets. It 
issues equity and debt classes and then takes synthetic credit exposure [see, e.g., 
Lancaster et al. (2008)]. 
                                                 
587
 Lancaster et al. (2008) argue that “[I]s primary purpose is the creation of leveraged returns for the 
capital note (subordinated) investors by way of spread arbitrage between the return on assets and the 
cost of funding.” 
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Annex 7: Regression Analyses of the Determinants of Credit Spreads: Models Grouped by Variables 
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Dependent variable: [1a] [1b] [1c] [2a] [2b] [2c] [3a] [3b] [3c] [4a] [4b] [4c] [5a] [6b] [7c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans All AS Bonds All CB PF Loans with 
rating
AS Bonds with 
rating
CB with 
rating
PF Loans with 
credit 
accessibility
AS Bonds with 
credit 
accessibility
CB with rating 
and credit 
accessibility 
PF Loans with 
management 
fee
AS Bonds with 
management 
fee
CB with 
management 
fee
PF Loans with 
upfront fee
AS with rating, 
collateral, fixed 
rate and 
callable
CB with rating, 
credit 
accessibility, 
fixed rate and 
callable
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
113.44
*
81.57
**
103.66 13.27 -139.35
**
242.39
**
275.34
**
-242.27
**
123.38
**
-257.06 10.45 89.13
**
22.34 -254.90
**
(9.43) (2.37) (7.78) (1.08) (0.31) (-14.39) (7.21) (3.25) (-24.47) (3.60) (-0.91) (0.59) (3.18) (0.60) (-24.60)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
-6.75 -8.80
**
16.81 3.74 0.75 -21.62
**
-10.95 11.10
**
-13.00 49.66 -11.17
**
0.30 2.76 13.34
**
(-4.93) (-1.52) (-6.43) (1.13) (0.92) (0.58) (-4.46) (-1.09) (9.56) (-1.97) (1.18) (-4.67) (0.06) (0.71) (11.45)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
-40.91
**
10.44 0.79 7.35
**
-47.65
**
1.33 39.33 -0.08
(2.04) (-5.48) (1.32) (0.10) (2.79) (-4.28) (0.27) (1.72) (-0.02)
Maturity 0.51 -0.72 -1.12
**
-0.59 -0.36 1.00
**
0.25 -0.34 1.30
**
0.75 0.84 3.63
**
0.83 0.16 0.26
(1.67) (-1.52) (-3.87) (-0.69) (-0.67) (4.60) (0.66) (-0.49) (5.62) (0.99) (0.30) (7.42) (1.77) (0.26) (0.97)
Number of tranches -1.02 -3.08 19.62
**
7.68 2.39 23.97
**
-3.62 -18.25
**
28.39
**
12.02
**
-6.37 10.07 2.08 1.37 25.87
**
(-0.56) (-0.95) (36.87) (1.32) (0.86) (9.10) (-1.53) (-3.08) (9.46) (2.88) (-0.60) (1.87) (0.68) (0.49) (8.53)
Number of banks 1.42
**
-9.36
**
-1.63
**
0.32 -8.24
*
-1.65
**
1.94
**
-27.57
**
-1.55
**
1.15 -16.55 1.53
**
-0.98
*
-4.51 -2.05
**
(3.87) (-2.58) (-3.47) (0.26) (-2.10) (-4.35) (3.50) (-3.51) (-2.90) (1.32) (-1.95) (3.32) (-2.05) (-1.17) (-3.80)
Country risk 7.78
**
-12.80 0.46 -13.97 -4.99 -2.04 9.88
**
-16.60 1.79 -7.21 10.40
**
2.89 -8.06 2.33
(2.91) (-1.04) (0.29) (-1.48) (-0.74) (-1.51) (3.63) (-1.10) (1.31) (-1.93) (5.39) (0.91) (-1.21) (1.71)
Currency risk 38.11
**
16.95 3.01 4.24 35.36 27.46
**
48.39
**
129.28
**
8.96
*
5.02 109.20 21.81
**
-6.78 27.21 1.25
(2.88) (0.79) (0.60) (0.19) (1.96) (6.64) (2.65) (2.93) (2.04) (0.21) (1.83) (4.44) (-0.59) (1.50) (0.29)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
10.39 17.49
**
-10.10 6.43 58.30
**
-111.97
*
20.11
**
19.71 -2.37 39.27
**
-9.61 21.08
**
(5.23) (0.46) (3.41) (-0.53) (1.58) (4.25) (-2.43) (4.17) (1.02) (-0.38) (3.92) (-0.48) (4.45)
Crisis 174.01
**
121.25
*
77.41
**
78.50 33.70 86.53
**
154.60
**
37.39
**
177.94
**
127.29
**
131.57
**
31.82 33.85
**
(16.26) (2.43) (15.43) (1.30) (0.74) (20.73) (8.07) (4.88) (8.48) (8.29) (7.10) (0.88) (4.38)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
0.12 -0.33
*
-0.03 -0.12
*
(-4.46) (1.28) (-2.24) (-0.31) (-2.24)
Volatility 0.49 2.25
*
2.06
**
2.42
**
2.98
**
-0.53 6.37
**
1.63
**
1.86
**
2.73
**
1.53
**
(1.64) (2.13) (9.91) (2.81) (17.88) (-1.26) (3.59) (5.80) (5.25) (3.51) (5.50)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.45
**
-0.02 -0.45 -0.52
**
-0.16
**
-0.40
**
-0.56
**
-0.05 -0.24
*
0.11 -0.09
**
-0.33
**
-0.50
**
-0.05
(-7.41) (-3.30) (-0.60) (-1.98) (-4.35) (-6.31) (-4.31) (-3.34) (-1.39) (-2.54) (0.22) (-2.98) (-5.43) (-4.42) (-1.53)
Commercial 101.80
**
102.44
**
25.01 -17.93
**
131.04 -37.90
**
248.55
**
70.56
**
19.12 -47.60
**
(3.28) (17.20) (0.99) (-3.82) (1.95) (-6.36) (2.84) (8.81) (0.69) (-7.72)
Industrial 10.29 57.95 98.75
**
39.82 27.34 0.69 12.87 0.07 -12.07
*
12.55 -130.38 56.23
**
6.79 26.61 -24.22
**
(1.14) (1.56) (19.30) (24.51) (0.99) (0.17) (1.08) (0.00) (-2.24) (0.82) (-1.79) (10.05) (0.38) (0.89) (-4.33)
Utilities 12.92 -16.49 20.66
**
16.60 -55.51 -39.93
**
13.71 30.30 -61.72
**
6.96 -10.24 2.58 -1.91 -65.45 -64.43
**
(1.41) (-0.42) (4.17) (0.57) (-1.52) (-8.59) (1.20) (0.40) (-11.13) (0.41) (-0.17) (0.27) (-0.11) (-1.72) (-10.78)
Transportation 14.33 128.94 68.80
**
110.02
**
12.16 19.55 -0.60 -13.58 -71.68 16.65 -32.99 103.77
**
-9.19
(1.39) (1.88) (5.94) (3.64) (1.47) (1.37) (-0.06) (-0.75) (-0.60) (0.67) (-1.68) (3.03) (-0.90)
Government 7.18 14.93 28.77 25.68
*
14.38 36.64
*
-5.82 -22.53 49.16
*
(0.31) (0.38) (0.52) (2.20) (0.57) (2.33) (-0.09) (-0.90) (2.30)
Other 163.47
**
69.91
**
74.13
**
121.17
**
52.66
*
(5.83) (3.42) (3.06) (3.37) (2.28)
Rating 7.37
**
27.44
**
29.06
**
30.80
**
27.24
**
29.19
**
(2.99) (8.65) (43.11) (38.84) (10.42) (37.00)
Credit accessibility 0.54
**
-0.66 0.82
**
0.83
**
(3.39) (-1.02) (10.27) (10.27)
Management fee 0.85
**
1.84 0.51
**
(3.17) (1.35) (2.74)
Upfront fee 0.74
**
(8.57)
Collateral -47.37
**
(-2.68)
Fixed rate -26.93 29.24
**
(-1.13) (8.79)
Callable -15.89 50.68
**
(-1.08) (9.54)
Number of observations 1,029 439 10,543 39 364 8,686 763 171 6,139 125 37 1,334 196 364 6,139
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.19 0.21 0.67 0.46 0.43 0.49 0.24 0.53 0.70 0.37 0.40 0.66 0.48 0.55
F 90.00 6.55 238.24 6.60 11.45 261.21 77.32 6.03 232.48 18.56 2.75 32.82 25.76 11.57 223.82
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Annex 8: Regression Analyses of the Determinants of Credit Spreads: Models Grouped by Issue Type 
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Dependent variable: [1a] [2a] [3a] [4a] [5a] [1b] [2b] [3b] [4b] [6b] [1c] [2c] [3c] [4c] [7c]
Credit spread (bps) All PF Loans PF Loans with 
rating
PF Loans with 
credit 
accessibility
PF Loans with 
management 
fee
PF Loans with 
upfront fee
All AS Bonds AS Bonds with 
rating
AS Bonds with 
credit 
accessibility
AS Bonds with 
management 
fee
AS with rating, 
collateral, fixed 
rate and 
callable
All CB CB with 
rating
CB with rating 
and credit 
accessibility 
CB with 
management 
fee
CB with rating, 
credit 
accessibility, 
fixed rate and 
callable
Independent variables:
Intercept 257.66
**
103.66 242.39
**
123.38
**
89.13
**
113.44
*
13.27 275.34
**
-257.06 22.34 81.57
**
-139.35
**
-242.27
**
10.45 -254.90
**
(9.43) (1.08) (7.21) (3.60) (3.18) (2.37) (0.31) (3.25) (-0.91) (0.60) (7.78) (-14.39) (-24.47) (0.59) (-24.60)
Log transaction size -19.52
**
16.81 -21.62
**
-13.00 0.30 -6.75 3.74 -10.95 49.66 2.76 -8.80
**
0.75 11.10
**
-11.17
**
13.34
**
(-4.93) (1.13) (-4.46) (-1.97) (0.06) (-1.52) (0.92) (-1.09) (1.18) (0.71) (-6.43) (0.58) (9.56) (-4.67) (11.45)
Log loan to value 4.37
*
10.44 7.35
**
1.33 -0.08 -40.91
**
0.79 -47.65
**
39.33
(2.04) (1.32) (2.79) (0.27) (-0.02) (-5.48) (0.10) (-4.28) (1.72)
Maturity 0.51 -0.59 0.25 0.75 0.83 -0.72 -0.36 -0.34 0.84 0.16 -1.12
**
1.00
**
1.30
**
3.63
**
0.26
(1.67) (-0.69) (0.66) (0.99) (1.77) (-1.52) (-0.67) (-0.49) (0.30) (0.26) (-3.87) (4.60) (5.62) (7.42) (0.97)
Number of tranches -1.02 7.68 -3.62 12.02
**
2.08 -3.08 2.39 -18.25
**
-6.37 1.37 19.62
**
23.97
**
28.39
**
10.07 25.87
**
(-0.56) (1.32) (-1.53) (2.88) (0.68) (-0.95) (0.86) (-3.08) (-0.60) (0.49) (36.87) (9.10) (9.46) (1.87) (8.53)
Number of banks 1.42
**
0.32 1.94
**
1.15 -0.98
*
-9.36
**
-8.24
*
-27.57
**
-16.55 -4.51 -1.63
**
-1.65
**
-1.55
**
1.53
**
-2.05
**
(3.87) (0.26) (3.50) (1.32) (-2.05) (-2.58) (-2.10) (-3.51) (-1.95) (-1.17) (-3.47) (-4.35) (-2.90) (3.32) (-3.80)
Country risk 7.78
**
-13.97 9.88
**
-7.21 2.89 -12.80 -4.99 -16.60 -8.06 0.46 -2.04 1.79 10.40
**
2.33
(2.91) (-1.48) (3.63) (-1.93) (0.91) (-1.04) (-0.74) (-1.10) (-1.21) (0.29) (-1.51) (1.31) (5.39) (1.71)
Currency risk 38.11
**
4.24 48.39
**
5.02 -6.78 16.95 35.36 129.28
**
109.20 27.21 3.01 27.46
**
8.96
*
21.81
**
1.25
(2.88) (0.19) (2.65) (0.21) (-0.59) (0.79) (1.96) (2.93) (1.83) (1.50) (0.60) (6.64) (2.04) (4.44) (0.29)
U.K. borrowers 49.85
**
58.30
**
19.71 39.27
**
10.39 -10.10 -111.97
*
-9.61 17.49
**
6.43 20.11
**
-2.37 21.08
**
(5.23) (4.25) (1.02) (3.92) (0.46) (-0.53) (-2.43) (-0.48) (3.41) (1.58) (4.17) (-0.38) (4.45)
Crisis 174.01
**
78.50 154.60
**
177.94
**
131.57
**
121.25
*
33.70 31.82 77.41
**
86.53
**
37.39
**
127.29
**
33.85
**
(16.26) (1.30) (8.07) (8.48) (7.10) (2.43) (0.74) (0.88) (15.43) (20.73) (4.88) (8.29) (4.38)
Risk free rate -0.16
**
-0.33
*
-0.12
*
0.12 -0.03
(-4.46) (-2.24) (-2.24) (1.28) (-0.31)
Volatility 0.49 -0.53 2.25
*
2.42
**
6.37
**
2.73
**
2.06
**
2.98
**
1.63
**
1.86
**
1.53
**
(1.64) (-1.26) (2.13) (2.81) (3.59) (3.51) (9.91) (17.88) (5.80) (5.25) (5.50)
EUSA5y-Libor3M -0.46
**
-0.45 -0.40
**
-0.24
*
-0.33
**
-0.45
**
-0.52
**
-0.56
**
0.11 -0.50
**
-0.02 -0.16
**
-0.05 -0.09
**
-0.05
(-7.41) (-1.98) (-4.31) (-2.54) (-5.43) (-3.30) (-4.35) (-3.34) (0.22) (-4.42) (-0.60) (-6.31) (-1.39) (-2.98) (-1.53)
Commercial 101.80
**
25.01 131.04 248.55
**
19.12 102.44
**
-17.93
**
-37.90
**
70.56
**
-47.60
**
(3.28) (0.99) (1.95) (2.84) (0.69) (17.20) (-3.82) (-6.36) (8.81) (-7.72)
Industrial 10.29 39.82 12.87 12.55 6.79 57.95 27.34 0.07 -130.38 26.61 98.75
**
0.69 -12.07
*
56.23
**
-24.22
**
(1.14) (24.51) (1.08) (0.82) (0.38) (1.56) (0.99) (0.00) (-1.79) (0.89) (19.30) (0.17) (-2.24) (10.05) (-4.33)
Utilities 12.92 16.60 13.71 6.96 -1.91 -16.49 -55.51 30.30 -10.24 -65.45 20.66
**
-39.93
**
-61.72
**
2.58 -64.43
**
(1.41) (0.57) (1.20) (0.41) (-0.11) (-0.42) (-1.52) (0.40) (-0.17) (-1.72) (4.17) (-8.59) (-11.13) (0.27) (-10.78)
Transportation 14.33 19.55 -13.58 -32.99 128.94 110.02
**
-71.68 103.77
**
68.80
**
12.16 -0.60 16.65 -9.19
(1.39) (1.37) (-0.75) (-1.68) (1.88) (3.64) (-0.60) (3.03) (5.94) (1.47) (-0.06) (0.67) (-0.90)
Government 7.18 28.77 14.38 -5.82 -22.53 14.93 25.68
*
36.64
*
49.16
*
(0.31) (0.52) (0.57) (-0.09) (-0.90) (0.38) (2.20) (2.33) (2.30)
Other 163.47
**
69.91
**
74.13
**
121.17
**
52.66
*
(5.83) (3.42) (3.06) (3.37) (2.28)
Rating 7.37
**
27.44
**
27.24
**
29.06
**
30.80
**
29.19
**
(2.99) (8.65) (10.42) (43.11) (38.84) (37.00)
Credit accessibility 0.54
**
-0.66 0.82
**
0.83
**
(3.39) (-1.02) (10.27) (10.27)
Management fee 0.85
**
1.84 0.51
**
(3.17) (1.35) (2.74)
Upfront fee 0.74
**
(8.57)
Collateral -47.37
**
(-2.68)
Fixed rate -26.93 29.24
**
(-1.13) (8.79)
Callable -15.89 50.68
**
(-1.08) (9.54)
Number of observations 1,029 39 763 125 196 439 364 171 37 364 10,543 8,686 6,139 1,334 6,139
Adjusted R
2
0.51 0.67 0.49 0.70 0.66 0.19 0.46 0.24 0.37 0.48 0.21 0.43 0.53 0.40 0.55
F 90.00 6.60 77.32 18.56 25.76 6.55 11.45 6.03 2.75 11.57 238.24 261.21 232.48 32.82 223.82
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Annex 9: Independent Variables and their Expected Impact on the 
Credit Spread 
 
We use the following microeconomic variables in this study: (i) Log transaction size; 
(ii) Log loan to value; (iii) Maturity; (iv) Number of tranches; (v) Currency Risk; (vi) 
Number of banks; (vii) U.K. borrowers; (viii) Sector (Commercial; Industrial; Utilities; 
Financial Institutions; Transportation; Government; Other); (ix) Rating; (x) 
Management fee; (xi) Upfront fee; (xii) Collateral; (xiii) Fixed rate; and (xiv) Callable. 
The following variables in our regression model intend to reflect the macroeconomic 
effects on the credit spread, namely: (i) Country risk; (ii) Crisis; (iii) Risk free rate; (iv) 
Volatility; (v) EUSA5y-Libor3M; and (vi) Credit accessibility. Next we intend to present 
a short definition of each variable and its expected impact on the credit spread. 
 
Log transaction size 
The log transaction size is the natural log of the global euro-equivalent amount of the 
transaction. A higher issue amount is generally believed to improve, ceteris paribus, 
secondary market liquidity. Larger issues are likely to be associated with less 
uncertainty, to be more liquid, and to have more public information available about 
them than smaller offerings. Hence, we would expect larger issues to have lower 
spreads. However, it is feasible to associate risk with loan size. Larger transactions 
might imply higher risk for lender since they constitute a larger share in its loan 
portfolio.  
The reviewed empirical studies find positive as well as negative impacts on the spread 
with respect to the size of the loan. Scott and Smith (1986) find a positive coefficient 
and thus argue that size is a proxy for default risk. Contrary, Blackwell and Winters 
(1991) support a negative impact of size on the spread based in the argument that the 
cost of loan production lead to economies of scale and thus decreases in the spread. 
Similarly, Booth (1992) analyzes the impact of monitoring-related contract costs on 
bank loan spread and concludes that loan size has a negative impact on the spread. 
Recently, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) find a negative coefficient on loan and bond size. 
Overall, the sign of the coefficient cannot be predicted with confidence for SDF. 
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Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find a negative and significant relationship between 
loan spread and size for most syndicated credits, except for PF loans. Sorge and 
Gadanecz (2008) find that transaction size and credit spread are significantly, negatively 
related for PF loans, which might suggest that there are significant economies of scale 
for banks to arrange larger syndicated credit facilities. On the contrary, Blanc-Brude 
and Strande (2007) conclude that the tranche size is not a driver in PPPs. Thus, we 
expect a negative or insignificant sign for the coefficient. 
Referring to AS, Maris and Segal (2002) study the determinants of credit spread on 
CMBS and find that tranche size influence negatively the CMBS credit spread. 
Similarly, Firla-Cuchra (2005), Vink and Thibeault (2008), and Buscaino et al. (2009) 
find a negative impact of transaction size on the spread. We expect larger AS issues to 
have lower spreads. 
 
Log loan to value 
The log loan to value is the natural log of the loan to value ratio. Typically, traditional 
loan transactions with higher loan to value ratios are generally seen as higher risk and, 
therefore, the loan will generally cost the borrower more. However, in an AS 
transaction the structure is layered so that each position benefits from the credit 
protection of all the positions subordinated to it. For example, each senior class (or 
tranche) has absolute priority in the cash flow over the more junior classes and are 
typically smaller than the senior ones. Thus, we expect a negative coefficient sign as AS 
tranches with a lower loan to value ratio (junior tranches) have a lower expected 
recovery rate and therefore require a higher return. Empirically, Vink and Thibeault 
(2008) find insignificant results for ABS, MBS, and CDOs. 
 
Maturity 
Time to maturity is measured in years. Loans or bonds with longer maturities tend to be 
more risky than loans or bonds with shorter maturities or average lives, because 
predictability of future cash flows weakens with horizon. Therefore, investors usually 
demand higher premium for longer term securities. 
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Empirical results show, for loans, a significant positive coefficient [e.g., Scott and 
Smith (1986)] but also an insignificant negative one [e.g., Booth (1992)]. Regarding 
CB, several authors [e.g., Jones et al. (1984), Sarig and Warga (1989), He et al. (2000), 
Duffie and Singleton (2001), and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008)] argue that lenders get a 
higher remuneration in investment grade bonds for being exposed to risk for a longer 
period of time. However, the literature has been more controversial regarding the term 
structure of credit spreads for non-investment grade bonds [see, among others, Sarig 
and Warga (1989), Fons (1987), Helwege and Turner (1999), and Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008)]. 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that spread and maturity have significant negative 
relationship for PF loans. Gatti et al. (2007) find that despite maturities are negatively 
related to spreads, the coefficients are not statistically significant. Sorge and Gadanecz 
(2008) detect that whereas credit spreads for both investment-grade and speculative-
grade bonds other than project finance are a positive linear function of maturity, in PF 
loans the term structure of credit spreads is ‘hump-shaped’.588 Thus, the variable 
expected sign for PF and CB transactions cannot be determined clearly from either the 
theoretical or the empirical literature. 
Regarding AS, Vink and Thibeault (2008) find a significant negative relationship 
between spread and (i) CDOs with a maturity lower than 5 years (low maturity); and (ii) 
MBS with a maturity longer than 15 years (high maturity). However, the coefficients on 
ABS with low maturity and high maturity are insignificant. 
 
Number of tranches 
PF and AS issues are usually divided into one or more tranches. The same happens with 
several CB issues in our sample. For each transaction we computed manually the 
variable number of tranches. For PF and CB issues, it is feasible to associate risk with 
the number of tranches. Riskier transactions might imply a higher number of tranches 
since each investor is available to constitute a lower share in its portfolio and thus a 
positive coefficient is expected. 
                                                 
588
 According to Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), “… when all other micro and macro risk factors are 
controlled for, a linear positive relationship between spread and maturity shows up very significant for 
both bonds and loans used for purposes other than project financing.” 
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For AS bonds, the number of tranches allows us to analyze the impact of tranching on 
the credit spread. As referred by Vink and Thibeault (2008), “[T]ranching could allow 
the issuer to take advantage of market factors such as greater investor sophistication 
and heterogeneous screening skills related to asymmetric information.” Firla-Cuchra 
and Jenkinson (2006) find a significant and negative relationship between the number of 
tranches and the credit spread (launch spread). Thus, a negative coefficient of number of 
tranches is expected. 
 
Number of banks 
The bank involvement measured by the number of banks supporting the transaction can 
be used to approximate a deal’s risk, since safer loans are easier to syndicate. The main 
reason why we collected this information is the need to analyze any differences in bank 
syndicates. However, it is expected to obtain a negative impact on the spread with 
respect to the number of banks involved for AS and CB, as it would indicate that a 
larger number is able to achieve, ceteris paribus, a better result or lower the spread.  
Empirically, syndication is presented as playing a potential role in driving the credit 
spreads in PF loans. Esty and Megginson (2000, 2003) show a positive relationship 
between syndicate size (and concentration) and loan pricing, while Strahan (1999), 
Kleimeier and Megginson (2000), and Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) report that the 
presence of larger syndicates reduces credit spreads. Thus, the variable expected sign 
for PF loans cannot be determined clearly from the empirical literature. 
Regarding AS transactions, Vink and Thibeault (2008) find that whereas credit spread 
and number of lead managers are significantly, negatively related for MBS, they have a 
insignificant relationship for ABS and CDOs. 
 
Currency risk 
As referred in sub-section 4.4.2, currency risk is defined as the risk that is run if the 
currency in which the loans is repaid differs from the borrower’s home country 
currency. We should expect issues exposed to currency risk to have higher credit 
spreads than issues not exposed to currency risk. However, Kleimeier and Megginson 
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(2000) find a significantly negative relationship between currency risk dummy and 
spread for every syndicated loans category. This idea is corroborated by Gatti et al. 
(2007) who find that loans with cash flow or currency risk have lower spreads than 
those without. Contrary, Vink and Thibeault (2008) find that AS issues exposed to 
currency risk have higher spreads than other issues not exposed to currency risk. 
 
U.K. borrowers 
We included this variable to analyze the impact of given borrower/issuer belongs to 
U.K. or to Continental Europe. Whereas the U.K. financial market is more developed 
and deeper than the continental Europe market, we expect borrowers from U.K. to raise 
funds at a lower spread compared to borrowers from continental Europe. 
 
Sector 
We calculated dummies to identify seven borrower/issuer business groups that we might 
expect to have different risk characteristics and therefore to incur different pricing: 
Commercial; Industrial; Utilities; Transportation; Government; and Other. The control 
group includes banks and financial services.
589
 
Sorge and Gadanecz (2008), based on a sample of PF loans, other loans, and bonds 
issued between 1993 and 2001, find that bonds and loans other than PF in the financial 
and transportation sectors carry a discount whereas high-tech borrowers are perceived 
as being more risky. They also conclude that issuers in the utility and state sectors enjoy 
a relatively cheaper cost of borrowing. 
For PF loans, Gatti et al. (2007) find insignificant, positive or negative relationship 
between credit spread and business groups dummy depending on the sample used. 
Corielli et al. (2010) point out that industrial sectors does not influence the level of 
credit spread in PF transactions.  
 
 
                                                 
589
 Sector is a dummy variable divided into seven categories as proposed by Kleimeier and Megginson 
(2000). 
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Rating 
Virtually all empirical studies on CB credit spread have found credit ratings to be one of 
the most important determinants of spreads. Several authors find a significantly 
positively relationship between credit rating and credit spread for CB issues.
590
 
Consistently with Firla-Cuchra (2005) and Hu and Cantor (2006), Vink and Thibeault 
(2008) present credit rating as the most significant in determining credit spread at issue 
for AS bonds; i.e., the credit spread rises when rating worsen. Similar conclusions are 
presented by Buscaino et al. (2009). 
Analyzing PF issues, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) find that one unit increase in 
credit risk rating is associated with a significant increase in a PF loan’s spread. 
In short, a better rating should result in lower credit spreads. However, a word of 
caution is needed here, as it is important to notice that the rating scales are inverse 
scales, so it is expected that spread increases as the rating decreases. As we converted 
the rating into a number (see Table 4.8), the ratings are ranked and a better rating 
receives a lower number. Thus, the higher the number, the riskier the loan. This coding 
of the variable credit rating implies that it will have positive coefficient, since the higher 
the rating the higher the number coded for the credit rating variable and the higher the 
spread. 
 
Management Fee 
Credit spreads are not an entire measure of the cost of a loan or a bond, because 
borrowers also have to pay fees that are usually related to creditworthiness and 
performance. Commitment fees are typically charged by lenders in the syndications 
market and are paid annually on the balance of the undrawn portion of a PF loan. 
Management fees are periodic payments made by issuers to the underwriting banks. 
Variable management fee represents the fees that are periodically paid to the bank 
syndicate for PF loans and to the underwriting group of banks for bonds. Management 
                                                 
590
 See, e.g., Arvantis, Gregory, and Laurent (1999), Duffie and Singleton (1999), Elton et al. (2001), 
Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Martin (2001), Huang and Huang (2003), Hull, Predescu, and White 
(2004), and Gabbi and Sironi (2005). 
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fees are higher for riskier borrowers because they are more likely to borrow and more 
likely to default. 
Empirically, Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) find that commitment fees are 
significantly and positively correlated with spreads. 
 
Fixed rate 
We collected information on whether the issue had a fixed rate or a floating rate. With 
fixed interest rate, the interests do not fluctuate and are typically protected to avoid the 
risk of rising interest rates. We expect borrowers to raise funds at a higher spread 
through fixed priced issues than through floating priced issues. For this reason, a 
positive sign is expected for a fixed rate issue. 
Empirically, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) find a significant discount in the pricing of 
floating rate bonds. They assert that this can reflect the insurance which fixed rate offers 
against future interest rate fluctuations. 
 
Callable 
Callable is a dummy variable equal to one if the bond has a call option and zero 
otherwise. A callable bond is a bond that can be redeemed by the issuer at some point 
before the bond reaches its date of maturity. The call price will usually exceed the par or 
issue price; i.e., usually there are substantial call premiums. Thus, a positive sign is 
expected for a callable bond as the issuer has an option, for which it pays in the form of 
a higher credit spread. 
 
Upfront fee 
A fee paid by a borrower to a bank (mandate bank) or a bank syndicate (lead arrangers) 
for making a loan. It includes fees to be paid to participating banks, also called 
participation fees. 
Credit spreads and fees are usually complements or substitutes in syndicated loans; i.e., 
arrangers are usually ‘paid’ by spreads and fees. For example, Gatti et al. (2007) find 
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that top arrangers are paid by higher fees even if the overall cost of the loan tranche is 
reduced by certification. Blanc-Brude and Strange (2007) find that upfront fees are 
significantly and positively correlated with spreads. We expect thus a positive sign for 
upfront fee. 
 
Collateral 
The markets for the securities issued through securitization are composed of three main 
classes. Securities backed by mortgages are called mortgage-backed securities (MBS), 
securities backed by debt obligations are called collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), 
and securities backed by consumer-backed products – e.g., car loans and consumer 
loans and credit cards – are called asset-backed securities (ABS). Collateral is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if securities are backed by mortgages (i.e., if they are 
MBS) and 0 otherwise (e.g., if securities are backed by consumer-backed products). 
The type of collateral in an AS transaction should determine the credit spread. Vink and 
Thibeault (2008) find that the average spreads are statistically and significantly lower 
for MBS than they are for ABS. We should thus expect a significantly negatively 
coefficient for collateral dummy variable. 
 
Country risk 
Country risk is approximated by Standard & Poor’s country rating; i.e., the S&P's 
country credit rating at close. The rating is converted as follows: AAA=1, AA+=2, and 
so on until D=22. Thus, this variable measures from 1 for the countries with the lowest 
risk to 22 for the countries of highest risk. A positive coefficient is expected since 
countries with a lower score number (highest quality) have lower country risk. 
The reviewed empirical studies find a positive impact on the credit spread with respect 
to the country risk rank for PF loans. For example, Kleimeier and Megginson (2000) 
and Gatti et al. (2007) find that whenever employed, the country risk rank variable is 
significantly positive. Similarly, Corielli et al. (2010) find positive signs of the country 
risk rating. Regarding AS we do not find any empirical study that includes country risk 
as an regressor to test the impact of country credit risk on credit spread. 
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Crisis 
Crisis is a dummy variable equal to one if the issue date or active date belongs to the 
crisis period and zero otherwise. We consider a pre-crisis period from January 1
st
, 2000 
through to September 14
th
, 2008, and a crisis period from September 15
th
, through to 
December 31
st
, 2011. A positive coefficient is expected since the 2007/2008 financial 
crisis has resulted in a number of bank bailouts and business failures, a decline in 
consumer wealth, and a downturn in economic activity. 
 
Risk free rate 
We use as a proxy for the risk-free rate the three-month German Treasury bill at the 
time of the signing of the loan or issuing the bonds. Eichengreen and Mody (1998) and 
Kamin and Von Kleist (1999) find that the general level of interest rates is an important 
determinant of the pricing of loans and bonds. Scott and Smith (1986) find a positive 
impact for the risk free rate on the contract rate. In contrast, Blanc-Brude and Strange 
(2007), for a sample of EU and UK PPPs, find that risk-free rate variable proves to have 
no statistically significance on the pricing of PF tranches.  
 
Volatility 
None of the previous studies investigating pricing for loans and bonds include any 
volatility conditions controls, as we do. Volatility refers to the amount of uncertainty or 
risk associated with changes in a asset’s value. A higher volatility means that a asset’s 
value can potentially be spread out over a larger range of values; i.e., the price of the 
financial assets can change dramatically over a short time period in either direction. On 
the contrary, a lower volatility means that a asset’s value does not fluctuate 
dramatically, but changes in value at a steady pace over a period of time. We use the 
Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) Volatility Index (VIX) as a proxy for market 
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volatility.
591
 VIX reflects a market estimate of future volatility, based on the weighted 
average of the implied volatilities for a wide range of strikes. 
We expect a positive relationship between volatility and credit spread as borrowers will 
require a higher return in the presence of higher volatility. 
 
EUSA5y-Libor3M 
The slope of the Euro swap curve (obtained as the difference between the five-year Euro 
swap rate and the 3-month Libor rate) is motivated by the following reasons: (i) it 
corrects for the fact that loans and bonds credit spread might be measured over base 
rates of different maturities; and (ii) it controls for varying inflation expectations, which 
might have different impact on pricing fixed versus floating rate debt. 
For CB and other loans than PF, Sorge and Gadanecz (2008) find that a steeper US 
Treasury yield curve is associated with lower spreads. Hu and Cantor (2006) find that 
structured finance spreads are highly correlated with the slope of the swap curve. 
 
Credit accessibility 
Credit conditions might have a significant impact on the cost of funding. The variable 
credit accessibility tries to capture this effect. We use iTraxx Europe index as a proxy 
for credit conditions and therefore for the credit accessibility of borrowers/issuers to 
funding in the closing date of loans and bonds tranches.
592
 iTraxx Europe is constructed 
on a set of rules with the overriding criterion being that of liquidity of the underlying 
Credit Default Swaps (CDS). Despite none of the previous studies include any credit 
conditions control, we expect borrowers to raise funds at a higher credit spread when 
the iTraxx Europe index rise and thus the credit accessibility is lower. 
 
                                                 
591
 The VIX Index is a key measure of market expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P 500 
stock index option prices. Since its introduction in 1993, VIX has been used as one of the most important 
barometers of investor sentiment and market volatility. 
592
 The Markit iTraxx Europe index comprises 125 equally weighted credit default swaps on investment 
grade European corporate entities, distributed among 4 sub-indices: Financials (Senior & Subordinated), 
Non-Financials and HiVol. The composition of each Markit iTraxx index is determined by the Index 
Rules. Markit iTraxx indices roll every 6 months in March and September. 
